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Hypotheses are nets: only he who casts will catch. 
Georg Philipp Friedrich Freiherr von Hardenberg, Novalis Schriften (Friedrich Schlegel and 
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than its history, 
and the logic of discovery . . . : the way error is 
detected, the use of 
hypothesis, of imagination, the mode of testing. 
Lord Acton cited in Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (Routledge Classics, 
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Nothing can be more material to the obligation than the means of 
enforcement. Without the remedy the contract may, indeed, in the 
sense of the law, be said not to exist, and its obligation to fall within 
the class of those moral and social duties which depend for their 
fulfilment wholly upon the will of the individual. The ideas of validity 
and remedy are inseparable, and both are parts of the obligation, 
which is guaranteed by the Constitution against invasion. The 





‘the convention is necessarily based on the trust which the 
Contracting States accord to one another’s legal systems and judicial 
institutions’ and ‘a prohibition imposed by a court, backed by a 
penalty, restraining a party from commencing or continuing 
proceedings before a foreign court undermines the latter court’s 





                                                          
1 Justice Swayne in Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. 535, 552 (1867). 
2 Case C 159/02 Turner v Grovit [2004] ECR I-3565 [24] and [27]. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
Point of Departure 
English commercial private international law in general and jurisdiction and choice of law 
agreements in particular have been characterized as private law matters, where the growing 
influence of general common law contract and commercial law principles is increasingly 
evident.3 This is supported by the relative effect of an exclusive choice of court agreement in 
English law as giving rise to an independently enforceable inter partes contractual obligation 
to sue only in the elected forum, over and above their more traditional international 
procedural and allocative role of prorogating and derogating the jurisdiction of courts. 
Similarly, Briggs argues by analogy with arbitration and jurisdiction agreements, that the 
choice of law agreement also gives rise to an independently enforceable inter partes 
contractual obligation to abide by the applicable law specified by the clause and not to act in 
a way that will undermine or subvert that chosen law or otherwise make it impossible for 
that chosen law to operate. This contractual aspect of the choice of law agreement is in 
addition to its orthodox international allocative role of specifying the law applicable to the 
contract. For Briggs, the obligations contained within a comprehensive dispute resolution 
agreement are capable of being breached and where breached will like any ordinary 
contractual breach lead to both primary and secondary remedies. Briggs is never shy of 
advancing the pacta sunt servanda4 (Latin for ‘agreements must be kept’5) principle as the 
                                                          
3 See Adrian Briggs, Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law (Oxford Private International Law Series, OUP 
2008) 5; Edwin Peel, ‘Introduction’ in Pascal de Vareilles-Sommieres (ed.), Forum Shopping in the European 
Judicial Area (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2007) 1, 2-4. 
4 Briggs, Agreements (n 3) Preface ix, 22, 195; Trevor C Hartley, ‘The European Union and the Systematic 
Dismantling of the Common Law of Conflict of Laws’ (2005) 54 ICLQ 813, 821; Alex Mills, The Confluence of 
Public and Private International Law: Justice, Pluralism and Subsidiarity in the International Constitutional 
Ordering of Private Law (CUP 2009) Chapter 3, 78; cf Briggs, Agreements (n 3) 13, notes that the principle of 
pacta sunt servanda cannot coexist with a view that rules of conflict of laws are rules of a public law character; 
Jürgen Basedow, The Law of Open Societies: Private Ordering and Public Regulation in the Conflict of Laws (Brill 
Nijhoff, Leiden 2015) 135-136, 145-146, notes that the binding effect of choice of law agreements flows from 
the universal legal principle of pacta sunt servanda. However, this does not mean that the agreement regulates 
or proscribes the conduct of the parties because a choice of law agreement is properly conceived of as a ‘self-
fulfilling (dispositional) contract’; HLA Hart when discussing the nature of international law and the possible 
formulation of a ‘basic norm’ of international law has discussed the principle of pacta sunt servanda as a 
potential candidate. However, he reasoned that the view has been abandoned by many theorists and it is 
incompatible with the fact that not all obligations under international law arise from ‘pacta’, however widely 
that term is construed. It should be noted that Hart is recognizing that regulatory constraints played at least 
some role within an emerging international legal order. Therefore, the principle of pacta sunt servanda does 
not even offer a satisfactory and comprehensive justification of the customary behaviour of states in public 
international law: See HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (OUP 1961) 228; For the relevance of the general principle 
of pacta sunt servanda in relation to the law of treaties in public international law, see, the Preamble and 
Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, signed at Vienna on May 23, 1969, entered into 
force on January 27, 1980, (1980) UNTS 332, 339; See also, Hans Wehberg, ‘Pacta Sunt Servanda’ (1959) 53 
American Journal of International Law 775.   
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basis for the enforcement of such agreements by stays6 and anti-suit injunctions.7 In 
Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law  (hereinafter referred to as “Agreements”), 
Briggs carefully develops a series of powerful interconnected arguments to support probably 
the most significant and novel contribution of the monograph to English legal practice; the 
central argument that a claim for damages for breach of a jurisdiction or choice of law 
agreement is sustainable in principle because it is derived from the orthodox understanding 
of such clauses as contractual obligations.8 The damages remedy for breach of jurisdiction 
and choice of law agreements has also been enticing enough to garner the attention of this 
author and is the subject of this PhD thesis. Seeking to derive secondary obligations from the 
breach of the primary obligations of a comprehensive dispute resolution agreement, Briggs 
argues that:9 
There is no reason to suppose…..that the bargain for the resolution of disputes was 
itself incapable of giving rise to secondary as well as to primary obligations. Unless 
there is something distinctive about the nature of an agreement for the resolution of 
disputes, it shares with other contracts a framework of promises limiting the 
freedom the parties would otherwise have…….If it shares this much, it is reasonable 
to suppose that it shares the capacity to generate secondary obligations, which arise 
on the breach of primary obligations, which are designed to encourage observance of 
the duties undertaken, and where this fails, to provide compensation for breach. 
 
Thesis Statement 
During the course of this doctoral thesis, it will be argued that it is misconceived to think of 
jurisdiction and choice of law agreements as unilaterally enforced domestic private law 
obligations within an English ‘dispute resolution’ paradigm because multilateral private 
international law rules are essentially secondary rules for the allocation or public ordering of 
regulatory authority which may not permit a separation of functions or the relative effect of 
such agreements. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
5 Bryan A Garner (ed), Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. West Group 2004); cf. ‘Agreements are to be kept’: 
Jonathan Law and Elizabeth A Martin (ed.), Oxford Dictionary of Law (7th Edition, OUP 2009). 
6 See The Eleftheria [1970] P 94; The El Amria [1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 119; The Sennar (No 2) [1985] 1 WLR 490 
7 See Continental Bank NA v Aeakos SA [1994] 1 WLR 588, 598 (CA); The Jay Bola [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 79; OT 
Africa Line Ltd v Magic Sportswear Corp [2005] EWCA Civ 710 [33]. 
8 Briggs, Agreements (n 3)  Chapter 8 (Damages for breach of jurisdiction agreements), Chapter 11 (Damages 
for breach of choice of law agreements); For the development of the idea of the damages remedy in the 
writings of the pre-eminent English common law proponent, see, Adrian Briggs, ‘Decisions of British Courts 
during 2001 involving Questions of Private International Law’ (2001) 72 British Yearbook of International Law 
437, 446-452; Adrian Briggs, ‘Anti-suit Injunctions and Utopian Ideals’ (2004) 120 LQR 529, 532; Adrian Briggs, 
‘The Principle of Comity in Private International Law’ (2012) 354 Recueil des Cours 65, 132-133; Adrian Briggs, 
Private International Law in English Courts (OUP 2014) 345-347. 




It may be observed that if jurisdiction and choice of law agreements are deemed to be 
private law issues then they are more in the nature of primary conduct regulating rules as 
opposed to secondary power conferring rules. A paradigm focused primarily on unilaterally 
regulating the domestic private law rights of the parties to the litigation and with little 
regard for the international allocative or distributive function of private international law 
rules is susceptible to venture too far in that direction and devise private law remedies to 
enforce private law agreements. These remedies are intended to achieve substantive justice 
for the litigants in the individual case but they may also end up compromising a broader 
notion of justice in private international law, encompassing both the requirements of 
international structural order and substantive fairness. Structural order is compromised in 
the unilateral private law enforcement of jurisdiction and choice of law agreements as such 
enforcement gives rise to a clash of sovereign legal orders and also the possibility of ‘regime 
collision’10 by interfering with the jurisdiction and judgments apparatus of foreign courts 
which a multilateral conception of private international law is supposed to prevent in the 
first place. 
It is envisaged that an enquiry into the damages remedy for breach of jurisdiction and choice 
of law agreements will constitute a major flank of this research project’s central argument 
and will serve two primary purposes. First, the damages remedy is a necessary consequence 
of an enquiry concerning the fundamental juridical nature and classification of jurisdiction 
and choice of law agreements.11 An in depth examination of the fundamental juridical 
nature of these agreements may offer insights into whether the contractual private law 
characterization attributed to them under orthodox English common law thinking is the best 
method of conceptualizing their classification and ramifications. Significantly, the question of 
the appropriate characterization of choice of court agreements lies at the very root of the 
legal basis of the damages remedy. If a procedural or public law classification of choice of 
                                                          
10 See Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Gunther Teubner, ‘Regime Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the 
Fragmentation of Global Law’ (2004) 25 Michigan Journal of International Law 999, 1000, referring to the 
emergence of ‘inter-systemic conflicts law’ which may for our purposes be understood not as collisions 
between the conflicts rules of nation states, but as collisions between the conflicts rules of distinct multilateral 
private international law regimes; Nikitas Hatzimihail, ‘General Report: Transnational Civil Litigation Between 
European Integration and Global Aspirations’ in Arnaud Nuyts and Nadine Watté (eds.), International Civil 
Litigation in Europe and Relations with Third States (Bruylant 2005) 595, 654 employs the term ‘conflict of 
conventions’ to describe the interaction of different international instruments, especially those dealing with 
private law matters. 
11 See Chapter 4 below. 
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court agreements is preferred the argument of the contractual damages remedy for breach 
of such agreements becomes significantly weaker.12 Under the ‘procedural contract’ 
classification, choice of court agreements are merely “statements of consent” to the 
jurisdiction of the selected court which may or may not be conclusive in determining the 
question of jurisdiction. Unlike a substantive characterization, there is no independently 
enforceable promissory private law element embodied in the jurisdiction agreement under 
the procedural classification. The function of the choice of court agreement is solely to 
prorogate or derogate the jurisdiction of a court. In Chapter 7 of Agreements, Briggs 
classifies Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation as a sort of a unilateral contract between 
each of the parties individually and the court with no room for a contractual analysis in the 
language of substantive rights and obligations.13 Under such a conception, party autonomy 
under the Brussels I Regulation is part of a hierarchical framework of jurisdictional rules 
which operate by the ‘formal waiver of jurisdictional privilege’ by both the parties in a 
formally valid choice of court agreement.14 
The second purpose of our enquiry is that an examination of the viability of the damages 
remedy will raise the broader issue of the proper and legitimate role of private law remedies 
for enforcing jurisdiction and choice of law agreements in private international law.15 The 
identification, articulation and development of the complex issues surrounding the damages 
remedy will require a measured approach that is cognizant to the demands of the principle 
of mutual trust and the effet utile of EU law, the variable nature of the constraints imposed 
by the notion of comity, the res judicata effect of a foreign judgment and the principle of 
finality in international dispute resolution. The range of issues invoked by the damages 
remedy include inter alia those related to procedure, substance, public law, private law, 
                                                          
12 For a discussion of the procedural or ‘public law’ classification of jurisdiction agreements, see LC Ho, ‘Anti-
suit Injunctions in Cross Border Insolvency: A Restatement’ [2003] ICLQ 697, 707-709; CJS Knight, ‘The Damage 
of Damages: Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law ’ [2008] Journal of Private International Law 501; 
Andreas F Lowenfeld, Conflict of Laws: Federal, State and International Perspectives (2nd Edition New York: 
Matthew Bender 1998) 308; F Sparka, ‘Classification of Choice of Forum Clauses and their Separability from the 
Main Contract’ in Jurisdiction and Arbitration Clauses in Maritime Transport Documents: A Comparative 
Analysis (Hamburg Studies on Maritime Affairs 19, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010) 81; Jonas Steinle 
and Evan Vasiliades, ‘The Enforcement of Jurisdiction Agreements under the Brussels I Regulation: 
Reconsidering the Principle of Party Autonomy’ [2010] Journal of Private International Law 565. 
13 Briggs, Agreements (n 3) Chapter 7. 
14 ibid 524. 
15 Alexander Layton, ‘The Prohibition on Anti-Suit Injunctions and the Relationship Between European Rules on 
Jurisdiction and Domestic Rules on Procedure’ in Pascal de Vareilles-Sommieres (ed.), Forum Shopping in the 
European Judicial Area (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2007) 91, 96, notes that remedies are concerned with the 
substantive private law regime of a Member State and as a result they should be beyond the scope of the 
Brussels Convention as interpreted by the European Court. 
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national law, international law, European Union law and comparative law. In view of both 
the European ‘procedural contract’ conception of a jurisdiction agreement and the primacy 
accorded to the principles of mutual trust and the effet utile of EU law, it will be argued that 
the prospects of the damages remedy taking root and making much headway before the 
CJEU interpreting the Brussels I Regulation are substantially reduced. The dynamics of the 
damages remedy in the context of the European Judicial Area are examined in Chapter 9 
below. 
It has been argued that the ‘great divide’16 between the English common law and 
continental civil law on matters of jurisdiction and the enforcement of jurisdiction 
agreements in particular has led to ‘mutual incomprehension’17 on both sides.18 Indeed, the 
prevalence of a ‘fundamentally’19 or ‘paradigmatically’20 different jurisdictional regime has 
been a source of an uneasy friction which has at times surfaced with the principles of the 
common law conflict of laws being on “trial” at the Court of Justice of the European Union.21 
On the one hand, a ‘theory driven’22 legislative and territorial ‘conception’23 of civil 
                                                          
16 Aude Fiorini, ‘The Codification of Private International Law in Europe - Could the Community Learn from the 
Experience of Mixed Jurisdictions’ (2008) 23 Tulane European and Civil Law Forum 89, 100. 
17 Briggs, Agreements (n 3) 201. 
18 ibid 8: When referring to the common law conception of jurisdiction agreements as contracts, Briggs refers 
to a ‘clash of legal cultures’ precipitated by the fact that: ‘the intellectual tradition of private international law 
has been to be more wary of appeals to plain contractual reasoning, on the footing that the international 
element in conflicts cases calls for special attention and different sensitivity’; Jan-Jaap Kuipers, ‘Party 
Autonomy in the Brussels I Regulation and Rome I Regulation and the European Court of Justice’ (2009) 10 
German Law Journal 1505, 1517 <http://www.germanlawjournal.com/index.php?pageID=11&artID=1224> 
accessed 1 January 2013, notes that ‘prorogation of jurisdiction was considered to be a public law matter on 
the continent, but was classified as a contract by common law’ (Emphasis added). 
19 Jonathan Harris, ‘Understanding the English Response to the Europeanisation of Private International Law’ 
(2008) 4 Journal of Private International Law 347, 352-353; See Anna Gardella & Luca G Radicati Di Brozolo, 
“Civil Law, Common Law and Market Integration: The EC Approach to Conflicts of Jurisdiction” (2003) 51 
American Journal of Comparative Law 611; See also, Peter F Schlosser, ‘Lectures on Civil-Law Litigation Systems 
and American Cooperation With Those Systems’ (1996-1997) 45 University of Kansas Law Review 9, 37-38; 
Friedrich Juenger, ‘Judicial Jurisdiction in the United States and in the European Communities: A Comparison’ 
(1984) 82 Michigan Law Review 1195, 1210-1212. 
20 See Ralf Michaels, ‘Two Paradigms of Jurisdiction’ [2006] Michigan Journal of International Law 1003; cf 
Giesela Ruhl, ‘Party Autonomy in the Private International Law of Contracts: Transatlantic Convergence and 
Economic Efficiency’ in Eckart Gottschalk and others (eds.), Conflict of Laws in a Globalized World (CUP 2007) 
153, conducts a comparative analysis of party autonomy in the private international law of contracts and 
argues that American and European law demonstrate a high degree of convergence in relation to the grant and 
design of party autonomy and its limitations as opposed to choice of law in general. 
21 The triumvirate of decisions in Gasser, Turner and Owusu have been referred to as ‘fifteen months of infamy’ 
in: Adrian Briggs, ‘The Impact of Recent Judgments of the European Court on English Procedural Law and 
Practice’ (2005) Vol. II, No. 124 Zeitschrift fur Schweizerisches Recht 231, 232; Oxford Legal Studies Research 
Paper No. 11/2006 <Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=899689> accessed 5 February 2014 
22 Hartley, The EU and the Common Law of Conflict of Laws (n 4) 814. 
23 A distinction between the terms ‘concepts’ and ‘conceptions’ is drawn by the author in the sense frequently 
employed by Dworkin in Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Harvard University Press 1986) 71-72; See Stephen 
Guest, Ronald Dworkin (Edinburgh University Press 1992) 34-37; The distinction was openly adopted by Rawls 
in John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press 1971) Chapter 5. 
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jurisdiction does not empower a judge in one state to rule on the jurisdiction of another 
state. On the other, a practice driven conception of civil jurisdiction which accords primacy 
to the principle of pacta sunt servanda will not refrain from enforcing the private law rights 
and obligations of the parties in relation to a jurisdiction agreement.24 The lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction will not deter the English court with jurisdiction in personam from 
enforcing a jurisdiction agreement through anti-suit injunctions and the damages remedy. 
Briggs has compared the communication between these disparate approaches to private 
international law across the common law and civil law divide with the Chinese metaphor of 
‘a chicken talking to a duck’.25  
This doctoral research project includes amongst its foremost aims, the removal of any 
subsisting doubts amongst English common lawyers that there are no viable alternatives to a 
contractual private law paradigm for jurisdiction and choice of law agreements and their 
enforcement. Indeed, a greater appreciation of the international procedural or public law 
dimension of jurisdiction and choice of law agreements and their enforcement in the English 
common law will pave the way for a possible reconciliation between the seemingly disparate 
and opposed positions of the English common law and civil law Member States of the EU 
with respect to these clauses and private international law in general. At the same time, the 
impact of the English common law’s pragmatic, ‘practice driven’26, pro-enforcement 
approach on the continental civil law conception of jurisdiction and choice of law 
agreements and private international law as a whole warrants a careful and nuanced 
assessment. It would be grossly unfair to cast aside the English common law’s very 
significant original contribution on the developing path towards an eventual reconciliation of 
the fundamental nature and consequences of jurisdiction and choice of law agreements - the 
fruits of the common law’s labour will be examined and accorded perspective.  
                                                          
24 Peter Nygh, ‘The Preliminary Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters’ in P Borchers & J Zekoll (eds.), International Conflict of Laws for the Third Millennium: 
Essays in Honor of Friedrich K Juenger (Transnational Publishers, Ardley 2001) 264, notes that traditionally 
common law judges have been guided by pragmatism and a strong commercial sense and these concerns have 
been ‘placed on a pedestal’; Hartley, The EU and the Common Law of Conflict of Laws (n 4) 814-815, observes 
that the civilian systems focus on the structure (and logic) of the law while common law systems are based on 
the operation (and experience) of the law. He also highlights the existence of a conflict between common law 
systems and civilian systems in relation to the interests of the parties assuming priority in the former and the 
interests of the States involved taking priority in the latter; TC Hartley’s understanding of the common law in 
general reflects the famous aphorism: ‘The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience.’ in OW 
Holmes, The Common Law (1st Edition, Macmillan, London 1882) 1; cf Edward Coke, The First Part of the 
Institutes of the Laws of England, or, A Commentary on Littleton (first published 1628, F Hargrave and C Butler 
eds, 19th Edition, London 1832) 97b: ‘Reason is the life of the law’. 
25 Briggs, Agreements (n 3) 201. 
26 Hartley, The EU and the Common Law of Conflict of Laws (n 4) 814. 
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This is an area of the law where the chances of cross fertilization of legal concepts from one 
legal tradition to another in the form of methodological pluralism (eclecticism) or as a 
catalyst for the synthetization or integration of legal concepts is multiplied manifold due to 
the interface created between the European Union’s harmonized private international law 
rules and an ever resilient English common law tradition with its own sophisticated and 
indigenous conflict of laws regime.27 Indeed, it would be trite to comment that the 
successive waves of EU private international law regulations emanating from Brussels and 
the efforts of the Hague Conference on Private International Law in securing the design, 
ratification and implementation of multilateral conventions interact with the procedural, 
substantive and choice of law rules of the legal systems of Member States and Contracting 
States and thus provide a unique example of private international law as comparative law in 
action.28 
A number of the issues relating to the legal basis, jurisdiction, choice of law and recognition 
and enforcement of the damages remedy overlap with anti-suit injunctions issued by English 
courts to enforce jurisdiction agreements. Therefore, the more developed jurisprudence on 
anti-suit injunctions will serve as a guide to the exploration of issues relating to the damages 
remedy. 
The primacy of jurisdictional disputes in international commercial litigation is a consequence 
of the fact that the selection of an appropriate forum is usually outcome determinative.29 
The emphasis on jurisdictional disputes vis-à-vis questions of choice of law in private 
international law justifies the difference in the depth of analysis devoted to choice of court 
agreements as compared to choice of law agreements in this doctoral thesis. The analysis of 
the fundamental juridical nature, classification and private law enforcement of choice of 
court agreements constitutes the primary focus and a discussion of the classification and 
enforcement of choice of law agreements is mostly confined to Chapter 11. At the outset, it 
should be noted that the attribution of a contractual obligation not to sue in a forum that 
will not give full effect to the choice of law agreement does not reflect the conventional 
understanding of such clauses as merely declaratory of the parties’ intentions as to the 
                                                          
27 See Ralf Michaels, ‘The Functional Method of Comparative Law’ in Mathias Reimann and Reinhard 
Zimmermann (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (OUP 2006) 339. 
28 See Mathias Reimann, ‘Comparative Law and Private International Law’ in Mathias Reimann and Reinhard 
Zimmermann (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (OUP 2006) 1363. 
29 See AS Bell, Forum Shopping and Venue in Transnational Litigation (OUP 2003) 14-19, 23-48; R Fentiman, 
International Commercial Litigation (2nd Edition, OUP 2015) 9-12; Briggs, Agreements (n 3) Preface, vii. 
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applicable law.30 Therefore, it will be argued that a ‘promissory’ conception of a choice of 
law agreement is not obvious as in the paradigm case of an English exclusive jurisdiction 
agreement which gives rise to a mutual contractual obligation not to sue in a non-elected 
forum.           
The discipline of private international law, the concept of party autonomy, the classification 
and enforcement of jurisdiction and choice of law agreements both traverse and are 
informed by the fundamental categories of ‘public law’/’private law’, ‘international 
law’/’national law’ and ‘procedural law’/’substantive law’. In this thesis, these categories will 
be employed to help us further our understanding of private international law and the place 
occupied by jurisdiction and choice of law agreements within this multifaceted and 
increasingly relevant field of law. It will be argued that jurisdiction and choice of law 
agreements are complex ‘hybrids’ possessing both procedural and substantive 
components.31 A simple ‘binary’ classification is reductive and may not be conducive for 
analytical purposes as the various conceptions of such agreements tend to lie in the broad 
continuum between a purely ‘procedural’ or purely ‘substantive’ classification. 
The methodologies employed to analyse the classification and private law enforcement of 
jurisdiction and choice of law agreements will be a melange of comparative legal analysis, 
doctrinal analysis and jurisprudential argumentation drawn from legal theory. Recent 
developments in legal theory in relation to private international law and the concept of party 
autonomy will enrich the discussion of the fundamental juridical nature, classification and 
private law enforcement of jurisdiction and choice of law agreements in Chapter 2 and at 
various points throughout the thesis. The traditional English common law of conflict of laws 
will serve as the reference point for the comparative legal analysis. A comparative legal 
analysis is utilised here in three senses. First, the differences in the common law and civil law 
approaches to private international law in the EU and at the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law provide a fertile environment in which comparative legal analysis may be 
effectively employed. Secondly, the English conflict of laws is compared to the European 
Union private international law regime and the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements in relation to the classification and private law enforcement of jurisdiction and 
choice of law agreements. Thirdly, the Brussels I Regulation is compared to the Hague 
                                                          
30 See Ace Insurance v Moose Enterprise Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 724 (Brereton J); Navig8 Pte Ltd v Al-Riyadh Co 
for Vegetable Oil Industry (The Lucky Lady) [2013] EWHC 328 (Comm), [2013] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 104, [2013] 2 CLC 
461 (Andrew Smith J). 
31 See Chapter 4 below. 
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Convention on Choice of Court Agreements in relation to the classification and private law 
enforcement of jurisdiction agreements. A doctrinal legal analysis is consistently employed 
throughout the thesis to analyse travaux préparatoires, legislative text, judicial 
pronouncements and academic deliberations within a national legal system or within a 
European or international legal instrument.   
The primary emphasis is on English language legal sources supplemented by some French 
language legal sources from the EU. The German language legal sources cited were used 
after either the procurement of an English translation by the author or they were cited on 
the basis of an official English language abstract. Relevant commonwealth legal sources are 
referred to where there is lack of authority on the issue in English law or where these 
sources provide a unique perspective that would materially enrich the quality of the debate. 
Some references from Scots private law and private international law are also cited but they 
are not meant to be exhaustive. 
The next chapter (Chapter 2) will examine the conventional English private international law 
classification of the nature of jurisdiction and choice of law agreements and whether this 
understanding of their fundamental character is defensible from the perspective of 
multilateral private international law rules, the recent jurisprudential discourse on the 
inherent global governance function of private international law rules32 and the quest for a 
deeper rationalization of the concept of party autonomy and private international law in 
general as part of the emerging ‘third paradigm of jurisdiction’.33  
The analogy with arbitration agreements is often invoked to justify a unified ‘dispute 
resolution agreement’ approach to arbitration agreements and jurisdiction agreements in 
the English common law of conflict of laws. Chapter 3 attempts to deconstruct this pervasive 
yet largely unquestioned analogy on an issue by issue basis, whilst highlighting that the 
significant public procedural imperatives at play in the context of jurisdiction agreements 
may merit a differentiated treatment from arbitration agreements which are premised solely 
on the contractual agreement between the parties.  
                                                          
32 See H Muir Watt and Diego P Fernandez Arroyo (eds.), Private International Law and Global Governance (Law 
and Global Governance Series, OUP 2014); J Bomhoff and A Meuwese, ‘The Meta-regulation of Transnational 
Private Regulation’ (2011) 38 Journal of Law and Society 138. 
33 See A Mills, ‘Rethinking Jurisdiction in International Law’ (2014) 84 British Yearbook of International Law 187, 
237; Michaels, Two Paradigms of Jurisdiction (n 20) 1069; C McLachlan, Lis Pendens in International Litigation 
(Pocketbooks of the Hague Academy of International Law, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2009) 438-439. 
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Chapter 4 compares the classification of jurisdiction and choice of law agreements in English 
private international law with the ‘procedural contract’ conception of such agreements 
under the Brussels I Regulation and the continental European legal systems. It is significant 
to note that there exists at least some support within the English common law tradition for a 
conception of jurisdiction agreements which bears a very close resemblance to the 
‘procedural contract’ conception in terms of both nature and effects. This will be followed by 
an evaluation of the juridical nature of choice of court agreements and whether non-
exclusive jurisdiction agreements are capable of being breached. 
The rest of the thesis critically examines the English common law’s creative damages remedy 
for breach of jurisdiction and choice of law agreements from the perspective of the 
traditional English common law of conflict of laws, the increasingly important and ever 
burgeoning EU private international law regime34 and global efforts at regulation in the form 
of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements.35 Before embarking on the 
examination the private law enforcement of jurisdiction agreements, Chapter 5 will take a 
short detour by highlighting the significance of drafting and inserting undertakings not to 
breach the choice of court agreement and inserting an indemnity clause to compensate for 
the breach of the choice of court agreement as best practice in international commercial 
contracts. The issue of jurisdiction to enforce the choice of court agreement is considered 
next. An examination of the most appropriate legal basis of the claim of damages in the law 
of contract, tort, restitution and equity respectively will be carried out. The crucial issue of 
the applicable law of the claim for damages under the contractual, tortious, restitutionary 
and equitable legal bases will also be analysed. The inherent power of the English courts to 
award damages in lieu or in addition to injunctions or specific performance is also 
assessed.36 Towards the end of the chapter the recognition and enforcement of the 
judgment awarding the damages remedy is considered. 
                                                          
34 Council Regulation (EU) 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast) [2012] 
OJ L351/1 [‘Recast Regulation’ or ‘Brussels I Regulation (Recast)’]; See also, Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001 on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Brussels I) 
[2001] OJ L12/1 (‘Brussels I Regulation’). 
35 Adopted at the 20th Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, The Hague, 30th June 
2005; On 1 October 2015, the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements entered into force in 28 States 
(Mexico and all Member States of the EU, except Denmark). The Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments (Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 2005) Regulations 2015, SI 2015/1644, have brought the Hague 
Convention into force in the UK. 
36 Section 50 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 (England and Wales); The Supreme Court Act 1981 (c. 54) was 
renamed as the Senior Courts Act 1981 (1.10.2009) by virtue of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (c. 4), ss. 
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Chapter 6 surveys the state of the judicial authorities on the damages remedy and these will 
hopefully point towards the unanswered questions that stand in need of determination. In 
particular, two very significant recent decisions of the English Court of Appeal in Starlight 
Shipping Co v Allianz Marine & Aviation Versicherungs AG (The Alexandros T)37 and 
Marzillier, Dr Meier & Dr Guntner Rechtsanwaltsgesellschaft MbH v AMT Futures Ltd38 will be 
examined in depth.   
Chapter 7 will examine the arguments of principle for and against the damages remedy. The 
concept of comity is dealt with in depth to reveal the tension created by a strong and weak 
conception of comity. The English common law conception of comity relies on its ambiguity 
and the notion plays a negligible role in the context of the private law enforcement of 
jurisdiction agreements. This discussion is followed by a comparison of the damages remedy 
with the anti-suit injunction in terms of impact on the notion of comity and the relative 
effectiveness of each remedy.  
Chapter 8 considers the potential dynamics of the damages remedy under several 
hypothetical scenarios under the increasingly less relevant English common law jurisdictional 
regime. It will be proposed that a wider conception of res judicata in the form of 
constructive res judicata or the extended doctrine of res judicata based on the abuse of 
process may be employed to limit the claim of damages to the court first seised unless the 
remedy is unavailable in the first forum. This should help limit claims for damages in the 
English courts and serve as an example of methodological pluralism (eclecticism) in the 
conflicts of jurisdictions. It will be argued that the proposed development in English law will 
be a step in the right direction towards the emerging third paradigm of jurisdiction. 
Chapter 9 assesses the damages remedy in the context of the European Union’s Brussels I 
Regulation. The Brussels I Regulation (Recast) and its amendments in relation to choice of 
court agreements and the role played by the damages remedy in the reform process are 
then considered. The scope for pre-emptive proceedings and the potential role of the 
damages remedy (post Starlight Shipping Co v Allianz Marine & Aviation Versicherungs AG 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
59, 148, Sch. 11 para. 1(1); SI 2009/1604, art. 2(d); There is no statutory equivalent to this provision in Scots 
law. 
37 [2014] EWCA Civ 1010 (Longmore LJ). 
38 [2015] EWCA Civ 143 (Christopher Clarke LJ). 
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(The Alexandros T)39) as a complementary enforcement mechanism addressing the lacunas 
in the legal regulation of choice of court agreements in the Recast Regulation are examined.  
Chapter 10 analyses the compatibility of contractual remedies for breach of exclusive 
jurisdiction agreements with the system of qualified or partial mutual trust enshrined in the 
Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. It will be argued that although the text of 
the Convention and the Hartley-Dogauchi Report do not explicitly sanction the use of anti-
suit injunctions, the damages remedy and anti-enforcement injunctions, the design of the 
Convention may allow the use of these measures to achieve the objective of the Convention 
by enforcing of exclusive choice of court agreements.   
Chapter 11 will be followed by an analysis of the fundamental juridical nature of choice of 
law agreements, whether they can be breached and the remedial consequences. The issue 
of breach and the availability of primary and secondary remedies for breach of choice of law 
agreements is largely uncharted territory.  
Chapter 12 will summarize the key findings, contributions to knowledge and conclusions 
arrived at from a comparative study of the juridical nature and private law enforcement of 
jurisdiction and choice of law agreements. Arguably, the inherent tension between the in 
personam contractual nature of jurisdiction and choice of law agreements and the in rem 
effect of such agreements40 will render the separation of functions incompatible with a 
multilateral jurisdiction and judgments order. Moreover, a deeper understanding of private 
international law and party autonomy in the form of the emerging third paradigm may also 
call into question the utility of a unilateral private law remedy for enforcing such 
agreements.   
 
                                                          
39 [2014] EWCA Civ 1010 (Longmore LJ). 
40 In this PhD thesis, the in rem effect of jurisdiction and choice of law agreements refers to the international 
allocative or international procedural function of such agreements which may override any subsisting in 
personam contractual obligation attributed to these agreements within a multilateral private international law 
regime. As such, any attempt by the English courts to enforce the in personam contractual obligation attributed 
to a jurisdiction or choice of law agreement by second guessing the findings of the courts of another Member 
State will necessarily run counter to the international allocative ethos of the Brussels I Regulation. The usage 
here is consistent with Muir Watt’s employment of the terms in personam and in rem effects of choice of court 
agreements in H Muir Watt, ‘”Party Autonomy” in International Contracts: From the Makings of a Myth to the 
Requirements of Global Governance’ (2010) 6 European Review of Contract Law 1, 30; cf The employment of 
the terminology in personam and in rem effects of a jurisdiction and choice of law agreement should not be 
conflated with the concepts of jurisdiction in personam and jurisdiction in rem which are two categories of 
adjudicatory authority exercised by the English courts. See TC Hartley, International Commercial Litigation (2nd 
Edition, CUP 2015) 12-13.        
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Contribution to Knowledge 
This doctoral thesis will advance the idea that it is misconceived to think of jurisdiction and 
choice of law agreements as unilaterally enforced domestic private law obligations within an 
English ‘dispute resolution’ paradigm because multilateral private international law rules are 
essentially secondary rules for the allocation or public ordering of regulatory authority which 
may not permit a separation of functions or the relative effect of such agreements. The 
author has endeavoured to subject the private law classification and enforcement of 
jurisdiction and choice of law agreements in the English common law of conflict of laws, the 
EU private international law regime and the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements to a rigorous analysis and in the process made an original and significant 
contribution to knowledge in the field. As a matter of fact, this is the first full length analysis 
of the impact of a multilateral and regulatory conception of private international law on the 
private law enforcement of jurisdiction and choice of law agreements before the English 
courts. In this regard, the thesis seeks to both pre-empt and offer innovative solutions to 
issues that may arise under the jurisprudence of the emergent Brussels I Regulation (Recast) 
and the Hague Convention. Briggs’ common law idea of the separation of functions or the 
relative effect of jurisdiction and choice of law agreements in Agreements may be 
considered to be the pre-eminent scholarly invocation and possibly the academic high water 
mark advancing the unilateral private law enforcement of such agreements before the 
English courts.  
The increasingly less relevant English common law jurisdictional regime in relation to choice 
of court agreements is a result of an ever burgeoning EU private international law regime 
and global efforts at regulation by the Hague Conference on Private International Law. 
Therefore, the need to understand the fundamental juridical nature, classification and 
private law enforcement of jurisdiction and choice of law agreements before the English 
courts from the perspective of the EU private international law regime and the Hague 
Convention is greater than ever. This doctoral thesis aims to fill an existing gap in the 
literature in relation to an account of jurisdiction and choice of law agreements which 
explores and reconnects arguments drawn from international legal theory with legal 
practice. However, the scope of the work remains most relevant for cross border 
commercial litigators and transactional lawyers interested in crafting pragmatic solutions to 
the conflicts of jurisdictions and conflict of laws. It is hoped that an awareness of the 
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concept of a more reconciled international legal order in the form of multilateral private 
international law rules will not blind us to the complex reality of international litigation 
where the distribution of regulatory authority by national private international law rules is 
often overlapping and may encourage competing jurisdictional claims. 
The author will draw upon the significant recent jurisprudential deliberations on the global 
governance function of private international law as a multilateral structural coordinating 
framework for the allocation of regulatory authority to enhance the contours of the contrast 
with the English ‘dispute resolution’ paradigm. In particular, the conception of private 
international law norms as higher level secondary rules for the allocation of regulatory 
authority focused primarily on conflicts justice or an allocative distributive justice may limit 
the significance of the separation of functions within jurisdiction agreements. This thesis will 
argue that the separation of functions within a jurisdiction agreement is in itself 
incompatible with an internationalist or multilateral conception of private international law. 
In other words, a system for the public ordering of private law assumes priority over or 
trumps the existence of the private law rights and obligations of the parties to the 
jurisdiction and choice of law agreements and their unilateral enforcement by the English 
courts. Otherwise, the private law enforcement of the mutual contractual obligation not to 
sue in a non-contractual forum attributed to an exclusive jurisdiction agreement may 
operate as a ‘unilateral private international law rule’ with a controversial and 
confrontational allocative function of its own. It may lead to the ‘privatization of court 
access’ by dubiously perpetuating and prioritizing the unilateral private ordering of private 
law over the multilateral public ordering of private law. Moreover, the enforcement of 
jurisdiction agreements by private law remedies within a multilateral system will necessarily 
distort the allocative or distributive function of private international law rules by giving 
precedence to the redistributive will of the parties premised on principles of corrective 
justice inter partes of questionable applicability. International structural order is 
compromised in the unilateral private law enforcement of jurisdiction and choice of law 
agreements as such enforcement gives rise to a clash of sovereign legal orders and also the 
possibility of ‘regime collision’ by interfering with the jurisdiction, judgments and choice of 
law apparatus of foreign courts which a multilateral conception of private international law 
is supposed to prevent in the first place. However, this thesis will argue that outside the 
confines of the European Union private international law regime, the variable geometry that 
is characteristic of the international civil and commercial litigation sphere may not impede 
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the separation of functions within such agreements. Whether an English court ought to 
grant a private law remedy enforcing such agreements is of course another matter. 
The collective implications of the global governance function of the conflict of laws,41 the 
design of multilateral private international law norms as universal higher level secondary 
rules for the allocation of regulatory authority and the wider notion of justice in private 
international law for the separation of functions within and the relative effect of jurisdiction 
and choice of law agreements is considered in Chapter 2. Moreover, the recent 
jurisprudential discourse on the emerging third paradigm and the quest for a more 
comprehensive understanding of party autonomy may also offer significant insights into the 
place occupied by the damages remedy for breach of a choice of court agreement within the 
spectrum of techniques for enforcing jurisdictional party autonomy and managing the 
incidence of parallel proceedings. The existing state of tension between the substantive law 
paradigm and the internationalist paradigm of party autonomy highlighted in Chapter 2 may 
also help identify the contours of the dialectically opposed categories and provide the 
necessary framework for examining the continued viability of private law remedies for 












                                                          
41 See FN 32 above. 
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Chapter 2 - Private International Law, Party Autonomy and the English 
‘Dispute Resolution’ Paradigm 
The ‘Public’ Role and Function of Private International Law 
It has been argued that the usual sharp distinction drawn between public and private 
international law obfuscates the significant ‘public’, ‘international’ and ‘systemic’ function of 
private international law in ordering the regulation of transnational disputes.42 The 
‘domestication’43 of private international law coupled with the prevalence of an 
                                                          
42 Alex Mills, The Confluence of Public and Private International Law: Justice, Pluralism and Subsidiarity in the 
International Constitutional Ordering of Private Law (CUP 2009) Chapter 1, 88-99; Horatia Muir Watt, ‘Private 
International Law Beyond the Schism’ (2011) 2 Transnational Legal Theory 347 (HAL Archive, 3 April 2014). 
<https://hal-sciencespo.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00973084> accessed 1 May 2015, 15-17, argues that the 
domestication of private international law and the loss of its regulatory function occurred when modern public 
international law emerged separately during the course of the nineteenth century; Campbell McLachlan, Lis 
Pendens in International Litigation (Pocketbooks of the Hague Academy of International Law, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2009) 453-454, 460, notes that private international law facilitates choices between parallel 
exercises of adjudicatory authority in two different states where the same parties and the same cause of action 
are involved; FA Mann, Studies in International Law (OUP 1972) 15, highlighted that the doctrine of 
international jurisdiction was one of those subjects which touched upon both public international law and the 
conflict of laws, stood somewhere on the borderline between international and municipal law, and could not 
be treated in isolation from either; Lord Mance, ‘The Future of Private International Law’ [2005] Journal of 
Private International Law 185, 185: ‘Since the purpose of private international law is to ensure the smooth 
interaction of different legal systems, the appropriateness of its principles in any national system requires 
review for consistency with the corresponding principles of other legal systems.’; Andreas F Lowenfeld, 
International Litigation and the Quest for Reasonableness: Essays in Private International Law (Clarendon Press, 
OUP 1996) 1-2, rejects what he terms the ‘unconvincing separation’ between public international law and 
private international law; The great nineteenth century American jurist and Justice of the Supreme Court, 
Joseph Story termed private international law ‘a most interesting and important branch of public law’ and 
considered it to be a constituent part of the ‘law of nations’: Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of 
Laws (1st Edition, Hilliard, Gray and Company, Boston 1834) 9; cf. Symeon C Symeonides, Codifying Choice of 
Law Around the World: An International Comparative Analysis (OUP 2014) 348, addresses the question 
‘whether PIL [private international law] is really “private law” in the sense of involving only the private interests 
of the disputing parties, or whether it also implicates the interests of the states connected to the dispute’ and 
concludes that ‘PIL  may still be viewed as “private law”, but as one that often implicates important public 
interests.’; Michael Akehurst, ‘Jurisdiction in International Law’ (1972-1973) 46 British Yearbook of 
International Law 145, 170-177, considers that public international law is irrelevant to private international 
law; Arthur T von Mehren and Eckart Gottschalk, Adjudicatory Authority in Private International Law: A 
Comparative Study (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007) 265-266, conclude that public international law only 
yields abstract principles which need to be concretised into specific norms for application in transnational 
dispute resolution; Ralf Michaels, ‘Public and Private International Law: German Views on Global Issues’ (2008) 
4 Journal of Private International Law 121, 138, argues that the thesis that public and private international law 
are necessarily merging is not substantiated. However, he does recognise that private international law will 
have to learn from public international law in order to adapt to the changing realities of the international legal 
order; Neil Walker, Intimations of Global Law (CUP 2015) 109, suggests that the ‘schism’ between private 
international law and public international law has begun to be challenged by a more integrated understanding 
of private and public domains in a less state-centred age.  
43 Muir Watt, Private International Law Beyond the Schism (n 42) 15; For a discussion of the public-private 
distinction in law from its heyday as a facilitator of an unfettered laissez faire economic liberalism in the 
nineteenth century to its demise at the hands of legal realists and critical legal scholars, see, Morton J Horwitz, 
‘The History of the Public/Private Distinction’ (1982) 130 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1423; Duncan 




‘epistemological tunnel vision’44 and a lack of awareness or interest in the discipline’s 
inherent global governance potential have lent support to a conception of private 
international law as purely national law,45 which is and should be focused on resolving 
transnational disputes based on domestic conceptions of substantive justice or fairness in 
the individual case.46 Indeed, the emphasis on substantive justice or party expectations in 
private international law has aided in the characterisation of the discipline as a matter of 
substantive private law and vice versa. However, it will be argued that it is very difficult to 
evaluate the true nature and function of private international law rules based on the 
concepts of substantive justice or party expectations in the individual instance. 
The move towards the classification of private international law as purely national law and 
the consequent emphasis on its private law rather than inherent public law nature has been 
described as a product of two late nineteenth century developments.47 First, it was a result 
of the increased diversity in national legal systems and national private international law 
rules expressed in the codification movements.48 Second, it is a product of the emphasis on 
the concept of ‘sovereignty’49 in positivist international legal theory which classified the 
decision of states with respect to private international law disputes as a matter of 
discretionary comity.50  
The effects of this limited conception of private international law as purely national law 
include the diversity and complexity of modern rules of private international law, the 
understanding of private international law as a mechanism for the enforcement of national 
private rights, and hence the problematic focus in modern private international law theory 
on ‘justice’ and ‘fairness’.51 Under this restricted paradigm, private international law does 
not contribute much to the ordering or structuring of international private relations. In fact, 
                                                          
44 Muir Watt, Private International Law Beyond the Schism (n 42) 31. 
45 See Peter North, ‘Private International Law in Twentieth Century England’ in Jack Beatson and Reinhard 
Zimmermann, Jurists Uprooted: German-Speaking Émigré Lawyers in Twentieth Century Britain (OUP 2004) 
483, 508; Sir Peter North notes that in the early decades of the twentieth century public and private 
international law were considered to be fundamentally different in England: See AV Dicey, Conflict of Laws (3rd 
Edition, 1922) 14, when referring to public and private international law stated that the ‘two classes of rules 
which are generically different from each other’; GC Cheshire, Private International Law (1935) 20, stated that 
‘there is, of course, no affinity between Private and Public International Law’. 
46 Mills, The Confluence (n 42) 1. 
47 ibid 71. 
48 Walker (n 42) 108. 
49 Mills, The Confluence (n 42) 40-52.  
50 ibid 224; Adrian Briggs, Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law (Oxford Private International Law 
Series, OUP 2008) 538; See AV Dicey, Digest of the Law of England with Reference to the Conflict of Laws 
(Stevens & Sons, London 1896) 10. 
51 Mills, The Confluence (n 42) 72. 
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it frequently adds to the complexity of international disputes. In subjecting transnational 
disputes to a wide range of rules (often operating with broad and flexible exceptions) it 
creates uncertainty and expense, and in so doing it may even reduce the effectiveness of 
both national and international systems of regulation. It bears neither the nature nor the 
function which was envisaged for private international law by the 13th Century Italian 
statutists or by Friedrich Carl von Savigny.52 
As a consequence of the positivist emphasis on traditional notion of state sovereignty and 
the divergent codified conflicts rules in the late nineteenth century, the foundations of 
private international law were instead located in the problematic concept of private ‘vested 
rights’. The vested rights theory explains private international law as a discipline concerned 
with ensuring the protection of private rights acquired under foreign law. However, this 
theory misses the point that it is the rules of private international law which determine 
when such rights are or are not acquired. A commentator has noted that: ‘Although the 
theory of vested rights has since been rejected, it has had a strong continuing influence, 
cementing the common law focus on private international law as concerned with private 
rights.’53 
The proliferation of diverging national private international law approaches in the late 
nineteenth century continued in Europe until the establishment of the EU and its private 
international law regime.54 EU private international law rejects the conceptualization of the 
subject as part of the substantive national private law of each Member State. Instead, 
European private international law rules perform an essentially public function of allocating 
or mapping the regulatory authority of Member States with diverse national private law 
systems.55 In effect, the original conception of private international law as a truly 
international system of global ordering and coordinating legal diversity is revived within a 
                                                          
52 See Alex Mills, ‘The Private History of International Law’ (2006) 55 ICLQ 1; Mills, The Confluence (n 42) 26-73; 
See also, Walker (n 42) 108. 
53 Mills, The Confluence (n 42) 53; See Dicey, Digest of the Law of England with Reference to the Conflict of Laws 
(n 50). 
54 Mills, The Confluence (n 42) 175-205; The international perspective of private international law is also echoed 
in the foundation of the Hague Conference of Private International Law in 1893, ‘to work for the progressive 
unification of the rules of private international law’: Article 1 of the Statute of Hague Conference of Private 
International Law; See also, Walker (n 42) 109-110. 
55 With reference to the Brussels Convention [now Brussels I Regulation (Recast)], Gardella and Radicati Di 
Brozolo note that the Convention creates a system for ‘the distribution of adjudicatory power among the 
member states’: Anna Gardella & Luca G Radicati Di Brozolo, “Civil Law, Common Law and Market Integration: 
The EC Approach to Conflicts of Jurisdiction” (2003) 51 American Journal of Comparative Law 611, 614. 
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supranational EU.56 This is achieved through an ever burgeoning regime of harmonized 
private international law rules which function as higher level universal secondary legal 
norms.57 In contrast, explicit references to a systemic perspective in the English common law 
are rare and the courts typically display the same reliance on the ambiguity of comity 
exhibited in other common law systems.58 
The overall success of the EU private international law regime has also lent itself as an 
alternative to substantive harmonization of the national private laws of the Member 
States.59 The existence and possible conflict or overlap of a very large number of diverse 
national primary norms should not be perceived as an obstruction to the fulfillment of 
European ideals and goals. The community principle of subsidiarity60 and its practical 
manifestation in the ability of private international law to structure the regulatory authority 
of Member States can effectively manage and coordinate this diversity of national primary 
norms. From this perspective, private international law rules provide a structural 
coordinating framework where the term “European integration” is given effect in a new 
sense. By limiting the harmonization efforts to the public rules of private international law, 
the legal and cultural heritage of the Member States is thereby preserved.  
Returning to the search for an appropriate theory of justice in private international law we 
may find that: ‘references to ‘justice’ only make sense as indicating an underlying concern 
with the appropriateness of an allocation of regulatory authority.’61 From this perspective, 
the determination of the applicable law in a private international law dispute should not 
focus on parochial and insular considerations of a private law inspired substantive justice. 
Rather, the choice of law process should involve a multilateral consideration of the 
appropriateness of the applicable law to the resolution of the type of dispute based on 
connecting factors or localising elements. This suggests that it may be better to understand 
the rules of private international law as higher level ‘secondary norms’ or ‘second order 
choices of law’ which act as signposts pointing towards the applicable substantive law. The 
                                                          
56 See Mills, The Confluence (n 42) 157-174, for a discussion of private international law rules serving a 
constitutional function in the federal systems of Canada and Australia.  
57 See FN 62 below. 
58 Mills, The Confluence (n 42) 224; Briggs, Agreements (n 50) 538; Adrian Briggs, ‘The Principle of Comity in 
Private International Law’ (2012) 354 Recueil des Cours 65, 181-182; See also, Walker (n 42) 109, who 
attributes the ‘thin’ inter systemic accomodations of private international law to the ‘schism’ between private 
international law and public international law.  
59 Mills, The Confluence (n 42) 185-187; Horatia Muir Watt, ‘European integration, legal diversity and the 
conflict of laws’ (2005) 9 Edinburgh Law Review 6, 16-21. 
60 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union [2012] OJ C 326/18, art 5(3). 
61 Mills, The Confluence (n 42) 11. 
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conception of private international rules as higher level secondary norms lends further 
credence to private international law’s inherent yet latent untapped potential as a ‘public’, 
‘international’ and ‘systemic’ structural coordinating framework for the allocation of 
regulatory authority.  
The ‘public’ perspective of private international law may be further developed by drawing on 
the distinction between primary and secondary legal norms in a municipal legal system, 
popularized by H.L.A. Hart in The Concept of Law.62 In Hart’s terminology, primary rules are 
duty imposing, whereas secondary rules are power conferring in nature. Primary rules are 
conduct regulating and require individuals to do or abstain from certain actions. Under 
secondary rules, ‘human beings may by doing or saying certain things introduce new rules of 
the primary type, extinguish or modify old ones, or in various ways determine their 
incidence or control their operations’.63 While primary rules are about the actions that 
individuals must do or abstain from doing, secondary rules are about primary rules 
themselves. 
For illustrative purposes, Hart’s distinction between primary and secondary rules in a 
municipal legal system may be applied to the determination of jurisdiction and choice of law 
in an international civil and commercial dispute. In a dispute over title to property, the law 
of country X would accord title to one party and the law of country Y would grant title to the 
other. The decision of the law of country X to give title to the first party is a primary legal 
norm. The decision whether it is the law of country X or the law of country Y which should 
determine title is a secondary legal norm or a second order choice of law. In the words of 
                                                          
62 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd Ed, Clarendon Press, OUP 1994) 79-81; For the application of HLA Hart’s 
distinction between primary and secondary rules to the distinction between rules of substantive private law 
and private international law rules respectively, see, Mills, The Confluence (n 42) 19; Michael J Whincop and 
Mary Keyes, Policy and Pragmatism in the Conflict of Laws (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001) 11-13, have employed 
the term ‘secondary rule’ as referring to ‘second order choices of law’ as opposed to ‘first order choices of law’; 
A similar distinction between first order and second order views is discussed in the context of private 
international law by Perry Dane, ‘Whereof One Cannot Speak: Legal Diversity and the Limits of a Restatement 
of Conflict of Laws’ (2000) 75 Indiana Law Journal 511; Mathias Reimann, ‘Comparative Law and Private 
International Law’ in Mathias Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Law (OUP 2006) 1363, 1364, submits that private international law ‘principles and rules are not 
‘private law’, at least in the traditional sense of directly regulating private relationships and entitlements; 
instead, they are secondary law telling decision-makers how to proceed, eg, what law to apply in 
transboundary cases.’ (Emphasis added); Mance, The Future of Private International Law (n 42) 186 describes 
the higher level secondary norms of private international law as ‘the infrastructure signposting parties towards 
the destination to determine substantive issues.’; John G Collier, Conflict of Laws (CUP 2001) Chapter 1, 6, 
notes that ‘Private international law is not substantive law’ in the sense of the law of contract or tort; Kurt 
Lipstein, ‘General Principles of Private International Law’ [1972] I Hague Recueil des Cours 97, 104ff asserts that 
private international law is ‘a technique and not a system of substantive rules…….. [and therefore] it has been 
particularly susceptible to influence from abroad’. 
63 Hart, The Concept of Law (n 62) 81. 
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Mills, ‘It is concerned with the scope of authority of the law, not the outcome in the specific 
case.’64 The same distinction between primary and secondary rules may be applied in the 
context of civil jurisdiction. Whether a court in country X will hear the dispute does not have 
an impact on the substantive outcome of the case in terms of conduct regulating primary 
rules as it is concerned only with whether the state will exercise adjudicatory authority over 
the dispute.  
When private international law rules are evaluated based on considerations of substantive 
justice in the individual case; they are akin to primary conduct regulating rules. However, 
such a characterisation is misconceived and that private international law rules should be 
conceptualised, from a ‘systemic perspective’, as secondary legal norms concerned with the 
allocation of regulatory authority between states. Mills notes that, ‘Private international law 
rules, from this perspective, are not concerned with private rights, but with public powers.’65 
Significant lessons may also be learnt from contrasting two different concepts of justice in 
the context of private international law rules. ‘Corrective justice’ is the pattern of 
justificatory coherence latent in the bilateral private law relationship of claimant and 
defendant whereas ‘distributive justice’ is mathematically conceived as a proportion in 
which each participant’s share is relative to whatever criterion governs the distribution.66 
Arguably, national private law is structured by principles of corrective justice that may be 
complemented by considerations of distributive justice.67 However, in contrast to private 
                                                          
64 Mills, The Confluence (n 42) 19. 
65 ibid 20. 
66 See Ernest J Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (Revised Edition, OUP 2012) 210-214; Ernest J Weinrib, 
Corrective Justice (Oxford Legal Philosophy, OUP 2012) 269; For the origins of the concept of ‘corrective 
justice’, see, Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, V, 4 (Martin Ostwald, trans., 1962); A conception of distributive 
justice is applied by a legitimate government when it treats every person under the eyes of the law with equal 
concern and respects fully the responsibility and right of each person to decide for himself how to make 
something valuable of his life by introducing law and policy to reflect these ‘two reigning principles’: See 
Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Harvard University Press 2011) 2-4; John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 
(Harvard University Press 1971) 53, introduces ‘two principles of justice’ including the ‘equality principle’ which 
regulates ‘the distribution of social and economic advantages’ that would be agreed by participants in the 
original position behind a veil of ignorance; HLA Hart, ‘Are there any Natural Rights?’ (1955) 64 The 
Philosophical Review 175, 186, submits that traditional social contractarians are mistaken in identifying the 
social contract as a right creating situation of mutual restrictions with the paradigm case of promising. The 
logical consequences of a ‘general right’ (such as the right to freedom of expression) are not limited to those of 
‘special rights’ arising out of a promise, as they relate to the character of the action to be done or its effects in 
general; John Rawls, ‘Two Concepts of Rules’ (1955) 64 The Philosophical Review 3, 29-32, argues that a 
utilitarian (or distributive) attitude may justify a ‘practice conception’ of rules but not the particular rules within 
the system, such as, the rules within the practice of ‘promising’.     
67 Ralf Michaels and Nils Jansen, ‘Private Law Beyond the State? Europeanization, Globalization, Privatization’ 
(2006) 54 American Journal of Comparative Law 843, 848; See PS Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of 
Contract (OUP 1985) 716ff, for the impact of the rise of the regulatory state and public law on laissez faire 
English contract law which incorporated a significant risk allocation function of its own. 
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law, the rules of private international law are primarily and essentially driven by principles of 
distributive justice that may be complemented by considerations of corrective justice inter 
partes as an exception. As a consequence, private international law rules are generically 
closer to rules of public law dispensing systemic justice in the abstract (ex ante) than conduct 
regulating private law rules of tort/delict apportioning liability between the doer (defendant) 
and sufferer (claimant) of harm on the basis of fault in the individual case (ex post). The 
discipline of private international law is best envisaged as comprising of secondary rules 
functioning as part of a structural coordinating framework for the distribution or allocation 
of regulatory authority in transnational disputes. 
The jurisprudential orientation and goals of private international law rules may also be 
illustrated by probing into whether choice of law norms aim at ‘conflicts justice’ or try to 
dispense ‘material justice’?68 Is the objective of the choice of law process to decide which set 
of domestic rules has the better claim to application (in the abstract and regardless of their 
content)? Or should choice of law norms directly aim at doing justice between the parties? 
The more traditional Savigny inspired multilateral approach to the choice of law process 
which continues to prevail in Europe and most other parts of the world leans towards the 
goal of multilateral ‘conflicts justice’, but has made concessions to ‘material justice’ with the 
inclusion of unilateral choice of law rules.69 Symeonides does not perceive the ‘dichotomy’ 
between ‘conflicts justice’ and ‘material justice’ as a dilemma and instead focusses on the 
question of when, how, and how much considerations of material justice should temper the 
search for conflicts justice.70 Indeed, the dominant feature of contemporary choice of law 
codifications worldwide has been defined as ‘eclecticism’71 or a ‘pluralisme des méthodes’,72 
                                                          
68 Gerhard Kegel and Klaus Schurig, Internationales Privatrecht (8th Edition, Verlag CH Beck, Munich 2000) 114 
(‘materiellprivatrechtliche Gerechtigkeit’ versus ‘internationalprivatrechtliche Gerechtigkeit’); Symeon C 
Symeonides, The American Choice-of-Law Revolution: Past, Present and Future (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2006) 404-411; Reimann, Comparative Law and Private International Law (n 62) 1375; Mills, The Confluence (n 
42) 16-17; Von Mehren and Gottschalk, Adjudicatory Authority (n 42) 29. 
69 Patrick J Borchers, ‘Categorical Exceptions to Party Autonomy in Private International Law’ (2008) 82 Tulane 
Law Review 1645, 1655, notes that ‘The European notion of mandatory rules is an intellectual cousin of Currie’s 
interest analysis.’; Ralf Michaels, ‘Post-critical Private International Law: From Politics to Technique’ in Horatia 
Muir Watt and Diego P Fernandez Arroyo (eds.), Private International Law and Global Governance (Law and 
Global Governance Series, OUP 2014) 54, favours the traditional continental private international rules and 
concludes that the next step for the existing European rules would be to show the extent to which they are 
already capable of integrating and formulating the political concerns that underlie the US conflict of laws 
revolution.  
70 Symeonides, The American Choice-of-Law Revolution (n 68) 410; Symeonides, Codifying Choice of Law 
Around the World (n 42) 347-348. 
71 Symeonides, Codifying Choice of Law Around the World (n 42) 348-349.  
72 Henri Batiffol, Le pluralisme des méthodes en droit international privé 139 Recueil des Cours 75, 106 (1973); 
Bernard Audit, Rapport Français in S Symeonides (ed.), Private International Law at the End of the 20th Century: 
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where the drafters have had no qualms about combining ideas such as multilateralism with 
unilateralism and conflicts justice with material justice. 
The significance of multilateral conflicts justice and an allocative distributive justice theory 
for the conflict of laws further confirm that the suppressed regulatory and international 
foundations of private international law are being held captive within a ‘closeted’73 or 
procrustean national private law conception of the discipline. The inherent regulatory 
function, design of multilateral secondary rules and the broader concept of justice in private 
international law encompassing the requirements of international structural order 
supplemented by considerations of substantive justice attest to the fact that the 
epistemological framework of the subject simultaneously traverses across and is enriched by 
the procedure/substance, public law/private law and international law/national law 
divides.74  
The next section questions whether the conventional English law classification of jurisdiction 
and choice of law agreements as giving rise to a subsisting and independent private law 
obligation is defensible in light of the regulatory function of multilateral private international 
law rules. 
Private International Law Norms as Secondary Rules for the Allocation of Regulatory 
Authority and the Separation of Functions within Jurisdiction and Choice of Law 
Agreements 
This section will examine whether the classification of jurisdiction and choice of law 
agreements as giving rise to a private law obligation is tenable in principle and whether a 
better justificatory and normative alternative to the common law formulation exists. Prima 
facie, it may be argued that it is misconceived to think of jurisdiction and choice of law 
agreements as private law issues within a ‘dispute resolution’ paradigm because private 
international law rules are essentially and primarily secondary rules for the allocation of 
regulatory authority. If jurisdiction and choice of law agreements are deemed to be private 
law issues then they are more in the nature of primary conduct regulating rules as opposed 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Progress or Regress? (Kluwer Law International 1999) 191, 210; Andreas Bucher, La dimension sociale du droit 
international privé (Cours general), Recueil des Cours 341 (2009); Christa Roodt, ‘Reflections on Theory, 
Doctrine and Method in Choice of Law’ (2007) 40 Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 
76. 
73 Muir Watt, Private International Law Beyond the Schism (n 42) 30. 
74 Ralf Michaels, ‘Globalization and Law: Law Beyond the State’ in Reza Banakar and Max Travers (eds.), Law 
and Social Theory (2nd Revised Edition, Hart Publishing 2013) 289, 299-303. 
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to secondary power conferring rules. It is submitted that, the obligation not to sue in a non-
contractual forum and the correlative right to be sued in the contractual forum in an 
exclusive jurisdiction agreement is a primary rule intended to regulate the conduct of the 
litigating parties. Similarly, the obligation not to sue in a forum that will disregard or not 
apply the applicable law as per the choice of law agreement and the correlative right to be 
sued in a forum that will apply the applicable law specified in the choice of law agreement is 
also a primary rule intended to proscribe the conduct of the litigating parties. 
It has been observed that primary rules and secondary rules are fundamentally different in 
terms of their character, design and effects. Therefore, a simultaneous conception of 
jurisdiction and choice of law agreements as private law contracts and as procedural bases 
for asserting jurisdiction or determining the applicable law may also to an extent be 
divergent, mutually exclusive in effect and even a contradiction in terms. The bifurcated 
conception of jurisdiction and choice of law agreements in the English common law of 
conflict of laws as both private law contracts between the parties and as bases for the 
invocation of jurisdiction or determination of the applicable law is a paradigm example of 
this duality where the contractual agreement on jurisdiction and choice of law may survive 
as an independent source of legal obligation even though it was unsuccessful in prorogating 
jurisdiction or determining the applicable law as a matter of public procedural law.75 From 
the perspective of the English common law of conflict of laws, the dual nature and function 
of jurisdiction and choice of law agreements may be symbolised as a sophisticated and 
pragmatic attempt to separate the in personam private law contract between the parties 
from the in rem procedural effects of such agreements as a basis for the invocation of 
jurisdiction or determining the applicable law.76 However, from another standpoint the 
separation of functions may be criticised for having no legal basis as where the jurisdiction or 
choice of law agreement is declared procedurally invalid or ineffective by a foreign court its 
validity as a private law agreement may also be directly impeached. An invalid contract can 
hardly be the source of any legal obligation, let alone an enforceable obligation which is 
                                                          
75 Briggs, Agreements (n 50) 526, refers to the separation of functions as ‘the principle of relative effect’; See 
Penn v Lord Baltimore (1750) 1 Ves Sen 444, on the separation of an enforceable in personam obligation from 
the erga omnes right to property abroad over which the English courts have no jurisdiction. 
76 The in rem effect of jurisdiction and choice of law agreements in this context refers to the international 
allocative or international procedural function of such agreements which may override any subsiting in 
personam contractual obligation attributed to these agreements within a multilateral private international law 
regime. As such, any attempt by the English courts to enforce the in personam contractual obligation attributed 
to a jurisdiction or choice of law agreement by second guessing the findings of the courts of another Member 
State will necessarily run counter to the international procedural ethos of the Brussels I Regulation. 
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capable of being breached and gives rise to primary and secondary remedies in its own right. 
Moreover, as a direct result of its procedural invalidity, the validity of the subsisting 
obligation is unprincipled and clearly lacks symmetry and congruence with the primary 
procedural function in terms of the requirements of internal coherence and internal 
consistency. Under the Brussels I Regulation (Recast), the protective cover of Article 31(2) 
will substantially reduce the chances of a non-chosen court ruling on the validity and 
applicability of an exclusive jurisdiction agreement if the chosen court has been seised. As a 
consequence of the new regime, the utility of an analysis separating the functions within an 
exclusive jurisdiction agreement in the context of the Recast Regulation may be questioned 
as the augmentation of jurisdictional party autonomy affected by the reverse lis pendens 
rule will ensure to a large extent that both the procedural and the substantive law aspects of 
an exclusive jurisdiction agreement will be adjudicated upon by the same chosen court. The 
anticipated decline in the incidence of pre-emptive torpedo proceedings adjudicating on the 
procedural invalidity of jurisdiction agreements will lead to a lower number of claims in the 
English courts enforcing the in personam contractual obligation not to sue in the courts of 
another Member State.   
In relation to ramifications, the private law enforcement of the procedurally ineffective yet 
independent and subsisting agreement on jurisdiction and choice of law will have little or no 
regard for the allocative or distributive function of multilateral private international law 
rules. In fact, the private law enforcement of jurisdiction and choice of law agreements will 
distort the systemic effects of the predominantly public ordering of private law. Walker 
describes both private international law and the new legal pluralism as ‘laterally co-ordinate 
approaches’ which provide a means of reconciling difference and resolving disputes between 
diverse but overlapping and interdependent legal regimes.77 He refers to the concept of 
‘radical pluralism’78 where the relationship between different legal orders neither stems 
from nor contributes to a general set of pluralist norms but is merely a product of relations 
of power and strategic considerations.79 The unilateral private law enforcement of an 
exclusive jurisdiction agreement via an anti-suit injunction or the damages remedy by the 
English courts may be considered to be a concrete example of such ‘radical pluralism’. At the 
opposite end of the legal pluralism spectrum is the norm based notion of ‘constitutional 
                                                          
77 Walker (n 42) 106. 
78 N MacCormick, ‘Beyond the Sovereign State’ (1993) 56 Modern Law Review 1; See also, N MacCormick, 
‘Risking Constitutional Collision in Europe?’ (1998) 18 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 517, 528-532, in which he 
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pluralism’.80 As EU private international law rules are secondary norms which distribute 
regulatory authority between different Member States they may be subsumed under the 
category of ‘constitutional pluralism’. The problem posed by the incompatibility of a 
unilateral private law remedy with the EU multilateral private international regime can be 
effectively compared to and illustrated by the intractable difficulty encountered when 
seeking to accommodate the notion of ‘radical pluralism’ within the idea of ‘constitutional 
pluralism’.           
A preferable and simpler approach to jurisdiction and choice of law agreements would be 
the realisation that the obligational content of a contract (its effects in personam) cannot be 
dissociated from the effects it can produce under a public law rule (effects in rem). This 
reflects the stance of the CJEU in the context of the Brussels I Regulation and more largely 
the courts of the continental civil law tradition. Under the ‘procedural contract’ conception, 
the contractual and procedural effects of the jurisdiction and choice of law agreement are 
fully convergent, mutually inclusive in effect and reconcilable. The parties may not enforce 
the subsisting private law contract (if there is any) if the clause cannot serve its primary 
procedural function of prorogating or derogating the jurisdiction of courts or determining 
the applicable law. In other words, the parties may not exercise their contractual autonomy 
(if there is any) and redistributive will derived from principles of private law corrective 
justice to alter the distributive and allocative function of private international law rules.  
In similar vein, the utilisation of private law remedies in private international law disputes 
are intended to achieve substantive justice for the litigants in the individual case but they 
may also end up compromising a broader notion of justice in private international law, 
encompassing both the requirements of international structural order and complemented 
by considerations of substantive fairness. Structural order is compromised in the unilateral 
private law enforcement of jurisdiction and choice of law agreements as such enforcement 
gives rise to a clash of sovereign legal orders and also the possibility of ‘regime collision’81 by 
interfering with the jurisdiction and judgments apparatus of foreign courts which a 
multilateral conception of private international law is supposed to prevent in the first place. 
                                                          
80 Ibid 118. 
81 See Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Gunther Teubner, ‘Regime Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the 
Fragmentation of Global Law’ (2004) 25 Michigan Journal of International Law 999, 1000, referring to the 
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It is only natural in a ‘dispute resolution’ paradigm focussed primarily on unilaterally 
regulating the domestic private law rights of the parties to the litigation to have little regard 
for the international allocative function of private international law rules and to stray too far 
in that direction and devise private law remedies to enforce private law agreements. 
Moreover, it is also relatively easy to succumb to the pragmatic attractions of the arbitration 
agreement analogy and apply concepts which flow exclusively from the agreement of the 
parties verbatim to the international litigation sphere where, arguably, other significant 
public procedural imperatives prevail.82   
The fundamentally or paradigmatically different jurisdictional regimes of the English 
common law of conflict of laws and European Union’s Brussels I Regulation may be 
attributed to the conception of jurisdiction as enforcing the private law rights of the 
litigating parties in the former and a conception which inverts the lens and views jurisdiction 
as rules of public law inviting the court to exercise jurisdiction in the latter. 
The English common law’s dispute resolution framework may work well where its unilateral 
private law remedies for breaches of jurisdiction agreements are not inhibited by the 
principle of mutual trust and the effet utile of EU law within a paradigmatic ‘double 
convention’83 multilateral jurisdiction and judgments order such as the Brussels-Lugano 
regime. Mutual trust in this particular context refers to the reposition of trust and non-
interference (directly or indirectly) with the allocation of jurisdiction between Member 
States and the recognition and enforcement of judgments of other Member State as per the 
Brussels I Regulation and the allocation of the applicable law in accordance with the Rome I 
Regulation.84 ‘A jungle of separate, broadly based, jurisdictions’85 represents the existing 
state of variable geometry in the world of international civil and commercial litigation 
outside the strictures of the EU private international law regime. So for the foreseeable 
future, the ‘jungle’ will provide fertile ground for English courts to unilaterally enforce the 
                                                          
82 The differences between arbitration agreements and jurisdiction agreements are analysed in Chapter 3 of 
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83 ‘[c]onventions that regulate jurisdiction both at the decision stage and at the recognition stage’: R Michaels, 
‘Some Fundamental Jurisdictional Conceptions as Applied in Judgment Conventions’ in E Gottschalk, R 
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separate in personam obligation in the jurisdiction and choice of law agreement without 
hindrance.86   
 
The Emerging Third Paradigm of Jurisdiction and the Quest for a More Comprehensive 
Understanding of Party Autonomy 
Having examined the inherent global governance function of private international law and 
its impact on the viability of the dual nature and function of jurisdiction and choice of law 
agreements, it is now time to evaluate the concept of party autonomy and its significance 
for the classification of such agreements and their private law enforcement. At the outset, it 
may be observed that the principle of party autonomy presents itself as a ‘theoretically 
unresolved’87 ‘Gordian knot’88 of the conflict of laws at the very crux of the 
procedure/substance, public law/private law and international law/national law divides. As a 
result, a deeper understanding and rationalization of the concept will further our 
understanding of private international law as a discipline and will also act as a very 
significant driving force behind the emerging third paradigm of jurisdiction. 
Indeed, a lot may be learned from the quest for a sounder and more comprehensive 
theoretical foundation for the principle of party autonomy in private international law. First, 
it may be asked that if private international law ought to be regarded as essentially and 
primarily public, systemic and international in character, whether the concept of party 
autonomy can be satisfactorily reconciled let alone accommodated within this regulatory 
conception of the discipline.89 In other words, if the ‘public’ rules of private international law 
are about the allocation of state power, how can individuals grant (prorogate) or take away 
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(derogate) the power that properly belongs to states?90 Apart from the incompatibility with 
the multilateral method of closest relationship in private international law, party autonomy 
also does not fit well other traditional methods.91 This incompatibility may be attributed to 
traditional conflicts methods being built around the state and its relations.92 The concept 
cannot be justified in a statutist theory because party autonomy is not concerned with a 
law’s own intended scope of application. A theory of acquired or vested rights cannot 
accommodate party autonomy because when and whether rights are acquired is determined 
by states and not by parties. It is also incompatible with a focus on governmental interests 
because governmental interests cannot be determined by private parties. As a consequence, 
Ralf Michaels describes party autonomy as a new paradigm of private international law.93 
Some private international lawyers have traditionally viewed party autonomy as indicating 
that the only limits on the national regulation of private international law are those 
concerned with private justice and fairness94 – concerns which are met if the defendant has 
freely agreed in advance to the jurisdiction or law, even if there are no other objective 
connections.95 If a state exercises jurisdiction or applies law in civil proceedings based purely 
on consent by the parties, this is difficult to reconcile with the traditional public international 
law requirement that jurisdiction must be justified by a substantial objective connection, 
typically territoriality or nationality.96 Faced with this argument, it might seem that there are 
two alternatives: first, rejecting the idea that private international law is about the allocation 
of regulatory authority between states (denying any connection between public and private 
international law, thus rejecting the application of public international law jurisdictional 
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3, refers to the national private law conception of private international law as the ‘substantive law’ paradigm. 




rules to civil disputes, leaving them unrestrained except under national law), or second, 
making unrealistic arguments against party autonomy based on state interests.97 
The synthesis of the clash between a ‘substantive law’ conception of party autonomy with 
no regard for the international allocative function of private international law and an 
‘internationalist’ conception of party autonomy which is subordinate to state interests has 
been described as a ‘paradigm shift’98 leading to the emergence of a ‘third paradigm of 
jurisdiction’ which will replace the basic assumptions of existing paradigms with a new set of 
foundational principles.99 Ralf Michaels has with the following prescient interpretive 
statement set the agenda for the development of a more reconciled international legal order 
including the place of party autonomy within it:100 ‘If this traditional image of sovereignty is 
inadequate under conditions of globalization, as is frequently claimed, then both paradigms 
are inadequate as well, and both sides must come together to create a new, third paradigm 
of jurisdiction.’101 
                                                          
97 Mills, Rethinking Jurisdiction In International Law (n 89) 233; Under Beale’s First Restatement of Conflict of 
Laws (1934), party autonomy was rejected because individuals were acting as ‘legislators’. This was an early 
direct rejection of ‘individual sovereignty’ which encouraged skepticism about rigid private international law 
rules more generally, contributing to the American ‘realist’ challenge to private international law. 
98 See Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (University of Chicago Press 1962); Mark Van 
Hoecke and Mark Warrington, ‘Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal Doctrine: Towards a New Model for 
Comparative Law’ (1998) 47 ICLQ 495, 513; For the application of the idea of ‘legal paradigms’ to adjudicatory 
authority in private international law and how paradigms differ from ‘principles’, ‘concepts’ and ‘theories’, see, 
Ralf Michaels, ‘Two Paradigms of Jurisdiction’ (2006) 27 Michigan Journal of International Law 1003, 1022-
1027; For a more preliminary distinction between the categories of ‘rules’, ‘principles’ and ‘policies’, see, 
Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press 1977) 22-28. 
99 Mills, Rethinking Jurisdiction In International Law (n 89) 237; Michaels, Two Paradigms of Jurisdiction (n 98) 
1069; McLachlan, Lis Pendens in International Litigation (n 42) 438-439, suggests that the contours of a new 
solution to lis pendens developed as a result of cooperative law reform and driven by the imperatives of 
globalization which synthesizes the civilian and common law solutions is already upon us. He cites the 
Leuven/London Principles on Declining and Referring Jurisdiction in Civil and Commercial Litigation (2000), 
Articles 21 and 22 of the Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters (30 October 1999), Article 15 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation and judicial cooperation and 
communication in matters of insolvency and international child abduction as examples of this development; 
See also, Ronald A Brand, ‘Balancing Sovereignty and Party Autonomy in Private International Law: Regression 
at the European Court of Justice’ in Johan Erauw, Vesna Tomljenovic and Paul Volken (eds.), Universalism, 
Tradition and the Individual, Liber Memorialis Petar Šarèiviè (Sellier European Law Publishers, Munich 2006) 35, 
discusses traditional concepts of state sovereignty and how those notions fail to account for ‘the new world of 
sovereign authority’ in private international law where the allocations of authority in multilateral private 
international law rules have to integrate the expanded recognition of party autonomy; cf Lehmann, Liberating 
the Individual from Battles between States (n 88) 415, refers to the need for a ‘major paradigm shift’ where 
party autonomy is justified by the individual at the centre of the conflicts problem and state relations that have 
so far been the focus of the classical theory are ignored.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
100 Michaels, Two Paradigms of Jurisdiction (n 98) 1069 (Emphasis added); See also, McLachlan, Lis Pendens in 
International Litigation (n 42) 432, 438, discussing the move ‘from a Westphalian to a cosmopolitan paradigm’ 
of jurisdiction and lis pendens; For a discussion of the ‘traditional image of sovereignty’, see FN 103 below. 
101 The reference to paradigms in this statement refers to the ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ paradigms which 
are equivalent to the ‘substantive law’ and ‘internationalist’ paradigms employed here. 
40 
 
It has been argued that the acceptance of the ‘sovereignty of the individual’ in international 
law may best explain the principle of party autonomy in private international law.102 On that 
view, the freedom to choose the applicable law is not merely a connecting factor; it is the 
parties who insert their agreement in to the legal system they have freely chosen. Thus the 
‘sovereignty of the individual’ is recognised in an increasingly pluralistic and cosmopolitan 
international legal order which balances the interests of states against those of individuals. It 
is submitted that such a stance is compatible with the view that the foundations of private 
international law lie in broader international norms. Moreover, this conception of party 
autonomy provides a more systemic and balanced explanation of the principle than 
justifications based exclusively on substantive justice or party expectations. However, the 
existing concept of state sovereignty and the methodological nationalism that defines, in 
general, the dualism of the internationalist paradigm and the substantive law paradigm fails 
to adequately account for the ‘sovereignty of the individual’ within a transnationalist 
paradigm.103 
                                                          
102 Mills, The Confluence (n 42) 292; Deference to party autonomy in private international law was described as 
reflecting ‘the sovereign will of the parties’ by Judge Bustamante in his Separate Opinion in the Serbian and 
Brazilian Loans cases, France v. Yugoslavia; France v. Brazil (1929) PCIJ Ser A, Nos 20-21, Judgments 14-15, 
p.53; Mills, Normative Individualism (n 94) 20; Basedow, The Law of Open Societies (n 87) 146-149, describes 
party autonomy in choice of law as pre-governmental right derived from human rights; Professor Nygh also 
recognised that the right of the parties to choose the applicable law represented a rule of international 
customary law: See PE Nygh, Autonomy in International Contracts (Clarendon Press, OUP 1999) 45; Professor 
Lowenfeld has also stated that ‘it is fair to say….that party autonomy- both for choice of law and for choice of 
forum, including an arbitral forum- is now part of an international customary law of dispute settlement’: See 
Lowenfeld, International Litigation and the Quest for Reasonableness (n 42) 208-209; Michaels, Public and 
Private International Law (n 42) 132, cites a 1991 resolution of the Institute of International Law as supporting 
the contention that party autonomy should be based on the notion of human rights; A resolution of the 
Institute of International Law also recognises the affinity between international norms and private 
international law rules on party autonomy: International Law Institute, ‘Autonomy of the Parties in 
International Contracts Between Private Persons or Entities’ (1991) (Rapporteur: Eric Jayme) <http://www.idi-
iil.org/idiE/resolutionsE/1991_bal_02_en.PDF> accessed 15 August 2014; See also, V van den Eckhout, 
‘Promoting Human Rights within the Union: The Role of European Private International Law’ (2008) 14 
European Law Journal 105. 
103 See Michaels, Party Autonomy in Private International Law--A New Paradigm Without a Solid Foundation? (n 
91) 7-8; The Westphalian model of sovereignty characterized by positivist international law theory conceives 
‘state sovereignty’ as states possessing some unrestricted freedoms as an a priori consequence of their 
statehood. This freedom is said to exist prior to law, thus positivists argue that international law can only exist 
as an expression of state sovereign will. States are viewed as the key actors in the formation of international 
law and both private and private international law are excluded from the domain of international law; John 
Austin excluded international law from the province of jurisprudence and positive law by referring to it as 
‘positive morality’: See WL Morison, John Austin (Edward Arnold, London 1982) 64; Similarly, Holland famously 
remarked that international law ‘is the vanishing point of jurisprudence’: TE Holland, The Elements of 
Jurisprudence (12th Edition, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1916) 392; Bentham invented the term ‘international law’ 
and defended it by saying that it was ‘sufficiently analogous’ to municipal law but found that a sovereign’s 
involvement in it through treaties is different from that in relation to ordinary mandates addressed to his own 
subjects: Morison, John Austin (n 103) 67; Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles and Morals of 
Legislation (1781, Reprinted by Batoche Books, Kitchener 2000) Preface 10, Chapter XVII, 236; Hart, The 
Concept of Law (n 62) 231; Hart rejected the ‘positivist’ account of international law because of the 
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The individual as a sovereign implies that the relationship with the state is one of equality 
and not of subordination. As a result, a contract entered into by a sovereign individual will 
be truly transnationalized and will exist detached from the state. Both the substantive 
contract and the dispute resolution agreement will be detached from national legal orders. 
However, in order to achieve meaning and enforceability, the contract will require linking to 
one state order. The linking should not be understood as a relation of subordination, 
however: neither is the state subordinate to the parties, nor vice versa are the parties 
subordinate to the state.104 The party and the state are both simultaneously, dominant and 
subordinate. It is submitted that a more cosmopolitan concept of sovereignty where the 
relationship between individuals and the state is one of co-equality and is premised on the 
existence of a more dynamic and balanced interplay between the demands of individual 
freedom and collective state interests should represent the future of private international 
law and party autonomy.105 
The Emerging Paradigm of Party Autonomy and the Continued Viability of Private Law 
Remedies for Breach of Jurisdiction and Choice of Law Agreements   
The argument from legal paradigms of jurisdiction and the emergence of the third paradigm 
of jurisdiction provide a sounder justification for party autonomy and may have significant 
implications for the continued viability of private law remedies for the enforcement of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
dependence on the problematic concept of sovereignty. He argued that international law is simply a set of 
primary rules which creates obligations, rejecting the idea that a priori norms such as sovereignty operate as a 
rule of recognition or as a justification of those rules: See ibid Chapter 10 cf Kelsen’s monist theory of law 
regarded as logically defensible both the hypothesis that international law derives its status as law through 
recognition by the individual municipal system and the distinct universal hypothesis of recognition as a basic 
norm of the entire international system: See Francois Rigaux, ‘Hans Kelsen on International Law’ (1998) 9 
European Journal of International Law 325; In the domestic sphere, AV Dicey’s Victorian notion of 
parliamentary sovereignty as ‘unlimited legislative authority of parliament’ is similarly problematic, 
inconsistent with the modern concept of the separation of powers, the rule of law and the legal and political 
constraints of European Union law and the European Convention of Human Rights: See AV Dicey, Introduction 
to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (8th Edition, Macmillan, London 1915) Chapter 1; Interestingly, the 
prevalence of the problematic concept of sovereignty existing prior to law in both positivist international law 
theory and in the domestic constitutional sphere may have helped shape Dicey’s avowed rejection of comity as 
the foundation of private international law: AV Dicey, Digest of the Law of England with Reference to the 
Conflict of Laws (n 50) 10; For a sustained critique of positivist international law theory’s traditional image of 
sovereignty and a reconsideration of the concept as ‘a contested space’ existing as a consequence of law in 
which ‘sovereignty of the individual must also be given meaning’, see, Mills, The Confluence (n 42) 75-88; 
Michaels, Two Paradigms of Jurisdiction (n 98) 1069; See also, Declaration of Judge Simma in the Kosovo 
Unilateral Declaration of Independance Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010 criticising The Case of the S.S. "Lotus", 
France v. Turkey (1927) PCIJ (Ser A) No. 10, on the basis that the PCIJ decision reflects an outdated view of 
international law which is now strongly influenced by ideas of public law and an emerging international legal 
order.     
104 Michaels, Party Autonomy in Private International Law--A New Paradigm Without a Solid Foundation? (n 91) 
9. 
105 Ibid 15. 
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jurisdiction and choice of law agreements in the ‘dispute resolution’ focussed English private 
international law. The ramifications of party autonomy as ‘sovereignty of the individual’ and 
a more cosmopolitan emerging third paradigm of jurisdiction in relation to the need to limit 
party autonomy in cases of ‘regulatory escape’106 or ‘transnational lift off’107 has already 
been highlighted by leading scholars in the field. It is submitted that the recognition of 
individual autonomy and its dynamic state of tension with state interests may also act as a 
balanced corrective to the ‘privatization of court access’ encouraged by the ‘dispute 
resolution’ paradigm which may have gone too far by devising purely private law remedies 
for the enforcement of jurisdiction and choice of law agreements. Occam’s razor may thus 
challenge the necessity of a purely private law remedy in a multifaceted international 
litigation arena where, arguably as a matter of principle, the international public ordering of 
private law should be balanced against the demands of the national private ordering of 
private law. At the same time, such developments should also help abate the negative 
repercussions of a conception of party autonomy which prioritizes the public ordering of 
private law without effectively integrating the concerns of the substantive law paradigm. 
In order to demonstrate the practical application of these broad brush theoretical 
arguments in international commercial disputes before the English courts, it is necessary to 
                                                          
106 Mills, Rethinking Jurisdiction in International Law (n 89) 237-238: The empowerment of some private actors, 
particularly corporations may put at risk the right of others, or the collective goods traditionally protected by 
the normative authority of states; The benefits of economic efficiency (including both Pareto efficiency and 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency) and healthy jurisdictional competition are encouraged by party autonomy: See Giesela 
Ruhl, ‘Party Autonomy in the Private International Law of Contracts: Transatlantic Convergence and Economic 
Efficiency’ in Eckart Gottschalk and others (eds.), Conflict of Laws in a Globalized World (CUP 2007) 153, 176-
182; However, these benefits should be balanced against the prospects of individuals or markets evading the 
regulatory influence of states and the protection of national public interests. These concerns are particularly 
prevalent in the rights granted to foreign investors in the context of investor state dispute settlement (whose 
complaints are heard by international arbitral tribunals, largely applying international not national law) and in 
the scope of recognition of party autonomy. 
107 Many scholars have expressed concern that party autonomy may enable private parties to evade the 
regulatory power of states interested in the dispute and its consequences: See Horatia Muir Watt, ‘Party 
Autonomy in International Contracts: From the Makings of a Myth to the Requirements of Global Governance’ 
(2010) 3 European Review of Contract Law 1; Muir Watt, Private International Law Beyond the Schism (n 42) 40; 
Robert Wai, ‘Private v Private: Transnational Private Law and Contestation in Global Economic Governance’ in 
Horatia Muir Watt and Diego P Fernandez Arroyo (eds.), Private International Law and Global Governance (OUP 
2014) 34, 50-52, highlights the existence of a broader range of regulatory concerns behind the ‘smooth’ market 
for international dispute resolution – the distributional consequences of international dispute resolution 
agreements for third parties and weaker contracting parties may be neglected by national courts pro-actively 
seeking to enforce choice of forum and choice of law agreements; Robert Wai, ‘Transnational Liftoff and 
Juridical Touchdown: The Regulatory Function of Private International Law in an Era of Globalization’ (2001-02) 
40 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 209, 218; cf Lehmann, Liberating the Individual from Battles between 
States (n 88) 419-421; Briggs, Agreements (n 50) 7; See also, Gilles Cuniberti, ‘The Merchant Who Would Not be 
King: Unreasoned Fears About Private Lawmaking’ in Horatia Muir Watt and Diego P Fernandez Arroyo (eds.), 
Private International Law and Global Governance (OUP 2014) 142; Erin A. O'Hara and Larry E. Ribstein, The Law 




examine the range of approaches to lis pendens108 and the enforcement of jurisdiction 
agreements from both the perspectives of the ‘substantive law’ paradigm and the 
‘internationalist’ paradigm. The techniques which predominantly support one paradigm 
largely to the exclusion of the other paradigm are most at risk of being rendered superfluous 
in the complex process of integration as they represent an approach whose legal basis may 
not be tenable under the third paradigm of jurisdiction. 
The award of damages for breach of a jurisdiction agreement is a national private law 
remedy developed by the English courts for the enforcement of such agreements.109 Most 
recently, the damages remedy has been successfully deployed by the English courts as an 
alternative to the now defunct anti-suit injunctions within the European judicial area.110 As a 
national private law remedy it falls squarely within the substantive law paradigm and is 
premised on the notions of freedom of contract and pacta sunt servanda. The attribution 
and private enforcement of an obligation not to be sued in a non-contractual forum and the 
correlative right to be sued in the contractual forum in an exclusive jurisdiction agreement 
by the English courts constitutes the enforcement of a primary norm, arguably, serving as a 
unilateral private international law rule with a confrontational and controversial 
international allocative function. Therefore, from an internationalist paradigm, the English 
conception of private international law as the unilateral enforcement of the private law 
rights of the litigating parties may seem unprincipled within a multilateral legal order. The 
argument that the damages award is not directed against the other court but against the 
party and as a consequence the remedy does not interfere with another court’s autonomy is 
only defensible from the substantive law paradigm. Arguably, the interference with the 
international allocation of jurisdiction between Member States and the recognition and 
enforcement of the resulting Member State judgment is objectionable both as an 
infringement of the principles of mutual trust and the effectiveness of European Union law 
(effet utile) and as an infringement of national sovereignty. It may also be argued that the 
damages award has a redistributive allocative function of its own which protects 
jurisdictional autonomy under Article 25 of the Recast Regulation. Again, a similar counter 
                                                          
108 Lis pendens in this context refers to the factual situation of parallel pending legal proceedings and not to the 
normative approaches which seek to resolve the factual problem: See McLachlan, Lis Pendens in International 
Litigation (n 42) 59. 
109 See Michaels, Two Paradigms of Jurisdiction (n 98) 1063-1064, examining anti-suit injunctions from both 
sides of the paradigmatic divide.  
110 Starlight Shipping Co v Allianz Marine and Aviation [2014] EWCA Civ 1010 (Longmore LJ); Cited with 
approval by Christopher Clarke LJ in AMT Futures Ltd v Marzillier, Dr Meier & Dr Gunter 
Rechtanswaltsgesellschaft mbH [2015] EWCA Civ 143. 
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argument may be employed to discredit the private law redistribution of the effects of the 
public ordering of private law.      
The emphasis on private ordering and the focus on the dispute resolution needs of the 
contracting parties has led to an overall lack of awareness and interest in the systemic 
perspective of private international law and reliance on a weaker notion of comity.111 
Section 32 of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 has been referred to as ‘the 
ultimate source of the principle’ as judgments obtained in breach of a dispute resolution 
agreement may not be recognised and enforced in England and Wales.112 This clears the way 
for the private law enforcement of the dispute resolution agreement by neutralising the 
potential danger of the enforcement of a contradictory foreign judgment which may itself 
challenge the judgment of the English court awarding damages for breach of such 
agreements. The unilateral non-recognition and enforcement under Section 32 may thus 
serve to both perpetuate and insulate the substantive law paradigm from the influence of 
the internationalist paradigm. On the other hand, it should be noted that the trials and 
tribulations of the English conflict of laws before what was perceived to be the CJEU’s 
regressive and commercially inept approach to private international law by orthodox English 
scholars was justifiable from a purely internationalist or at least European perspective.113 
In contrast to the private law enforcement of private law agreements in English private 
international law, the unreformed lis pendens rule and its relationship to Article 23 of the 
Brussels I Regulation as symbolised by the infamous CJEU decision in Gasser represents the 
other end of the continuum of techniques. The approach in Gasser falls firmly within the 
rubric of the internationalist paradigm. International allocative concerns within the 
multilateral jurisdiction and judgments order warranted that the court first seised alone 
must assess the issue of jurisdiction regardless of the jurisdiction agreement. This could 
result in endemic delay and costs for the defendant and effectively block proceedings in the 
chosen forum until the court first seised has eventually declined proceedings. The 
substantive law paradigm with its emphasis on enforcing private law obligations and the 
prevalence of the concept of pacta sunt servanda play no role within the multilateral and 
international public ordering of private law. 
                                                          
111 Mills, The Confluence (n 42) 224; Briggs, Agreements (n 50) 537. 
112 Briggs, Agreements (n 50) 321. 
113 The triumvirate of decisions in Gasser, Turner and Owusu have been referred to as ‘fifteen months of 
infamy’ in: Adrian Briggs, ‘The Impact of Recent Judgments of the European Court on English Procedural Law 
and Practice’ (2005) Vol. II, No. 124 Zeitschrift fur Schweizerisches Recht 231, 232; Oxford Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 11/2006 <Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=899689> accessed 5 February 2014. 
45 
 
Four intermediate techniques represent approaches which occupy positions in the 
continuum between the purely private law enforcement of jurisdiction agreements in the 
English common law of conflict of laws and the system of the public ordering of private law 
in the EU coordinated by the lis pendens mechanism. Advocate General Leger’s opinion that 
Article 21 of the Brussels Convention must be interpreted as meaning that a court second 
seised which has exclusive jurisdiction under an agreement conferring jurisdiction may, by 
way of derogation from that article, give judgment in the case without waiting for a 
declaration from the court first seised that it has no jurisdiction where there is no room for 
any doubt as to the jurisdiction of the court second seised is one such technique.114 Another 
technique is the Court of Appeal’s finding in Masri v Consolidated Contractors International 
Company SAL & Another that seeking an anti-suit injunction does not require a legal or 
equitable right, and may be based upon the desire to protect the jurisdiction of the English 
court,115 provides a possible solution to marrying the public law analysis with the retention 
of anti-suit injunctions in international commercial litigation.116 The idea that recovering 
damages for breach of a foreign jurisdiction clause in the English courts itself represents a 
suitable compromise which balances the overriding public interest that the conduct of the 
litigation should take place in England with the private law rights of the parties has also been 
advanced.117 During the course of this thesis it will be suggested that the extended doctrine 
of res judicata based on abuse of process or the notion of constructive res judicata may be 
employed to limit claims for damages for breach of jurisdiction agreements in the English 
courts by requiring the claimant to have exhausted all remedies in the foreign court and only 
permitting claims that could not have been raised in the foreign court under any 
circumstances.118 These intermediate techniques also serve as examples of the pervasive 
influence of comparative law and the adaptation or synthetization of legal concepts in the 
conflicts of jurisdiction. The techniques are both shaped by and respond to the needs of the 
changing realities of the international commercial litigation sphere in the wake of the onset 
                                                          
114 Case C-116/02 Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl ECLI:EU:C:2003:436. 
115 [2008] EWCA Civ 625. 
116 See CJS Knight, ‘The Damage of Damages: Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law’ (2008) 4 Journal of 
Private International Law 501. 
117 See Edwin Peel, ‘Exclusive Jurisdiction Agreements: Purity and Pragmatism in the Conflict of Laws’ [1998] 
Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 182, 225; cf Nicholas S Shantar, ‘Forum Selection Clauses: 
Damages in Lieu of Dismissal?’ (2002) 82 Boston University Law Review 1063, 1078-1088, argues that in relation 
to forum selection clauses in consumer adhesion contracts, a court should allow a consumer to pay damages in 
lieu of dismissal. In doing so he seeks to reconcile the interests of consumers by avoiding the unnecessary 
harshness of specific enforcement and sophisticated parties who are allowed to recover the costs of litigating 
in the consumer’s home forum as damages for breach of the jurisdiction agreement.     
118 See Chapter 8 below. 
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of globalization and the communitarization of private international law in the EU. As a 
consequence, the solutions proffered by the techniques are eclectic and borrow ideas from 
across the legal traditions.      
In light of the foregoing, the emergence of a more benign lis pendens mechanism in the 
Recast Regulation may be judged to be a step in the right direction from the standpoint of 
paradigms of jurisdiction because Article 31(2) creates an exception to the operation of a 
strict lis pendens rule in Article 29 of the Recast Regulation.119 The substantive law paradigm 
is clearly not validated but more crucially a semblance of its ethos is retained as the initiation 
of proceedings in the chosen court will trigger the application of the protective cover of 
Article 31(2). As a reverse lis pendens mechanism which necessitates the commencement of 
proceedings in the chosen court in order to have effect, the architecture of the lis pendens 
technique is not fundamentally altered, indicating that we are still operating within an 
internationalist paradigm, albeit one that may not be blind to the concerns of the 
substantive law paradigm. 
The damages remedy was not a viable option in the Recast Regulation and rightly so because 
in terms of the internationalist paradigm its unilateral national private law remedy status 
means that institutionalizing the remedy on a multilateral level will not reduce but 
frequently add to the complexity of jurisdiction and judgments issues between Member 
States in international commercial disputes within the EU. Moreover, an EC law remedy for 
‘breach’ of choice of court agreements strays into the realm of substantive contract law and 
would appear outside the Community’s competence under Title IV of the Treaty.120 A 
unilateral private law remedy for the enforcement of jurisdiction agreements may epitomise 
the substantive law paradigm but the incipient clash of competing priorities in the public 
regulation of international litigation in the EU may inhibit its future use.   
The solution in the Recast Regulation may not be perfect in all respects but it represents a 
brave attempt at reconciling significant competing considerations from both the 
internationalist paradigm and the substantive law paradigm. Such a reconciliation is echoed 
in one of the perennial themes of private international law: ‘Rules of private international 
law strike a balance between facilitating internationally recognised individual autonomy and 
respect for state regulatory authority – between individual freedom and collective cultural 
                                                          
119 Cf Articles 5 and 6 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (30 June, 2005). 
120 Andrew Dickinson, ‘Brussels I Review – Choice of Court Agreements’ (Conflictoflaws.net, 11 June 2009) 
<http://conflictoflaws.net/2009/brussels-i-review-choice-of-court-agreements/> accessed 15 December 2014. 
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identity.’121 The rich experience of choice of law theory, where the once mutually 
antagonistic unilateral and multilateral choice of law rules have learned to co-exist with the 
rise of methodological pluralism, may also be invoked in support of a similar eclecticism of 
techniques in the conflicts of jurisdictions.122 The Recast Regulation has ventured forth in the 
direction of eclecticism of techniques by seeking to integrate the concerns of the substantive 
law paradigm into an internationalist regime for the public ordering of private law.       
The Emerging Paradigm of Party Autonomy and the Proposed Reorganization of Private 
International Law Rules on the Basis of a Systematic Distinction between Agreements and 
Non Agreements 
It has been argued that the rules of private international law should be reorganized in a 
manner that draws a more systematic distinction between agreements and no 
agreements.123 It may be a worthwhile exercise to explore whether this proposal is 
justifiable in principle and crucially which paradigm of party autonomy would most 
satisfactorily accommodate such a position. This exercise should help us determine whether 
such a systematic distinction is defensible from the perspective of the quest for a sounder 
justification for the concept of party autonomy.    
The call for a systematic distinction between agreements and non-agreements could lead to 
a number of normative consequences. It could mean that authors of texts on private 
international law and international commercial litigation should marshal their chapter 
outline in a manner that accords priority to the examination of the law on jurisdiction and 
choice of law agreements and then consider private international law rules in default of 
party choice.124 Arguably, such an assertion is uncontroversial and is representative of the 
growing acceptance of the principle of party autonomy in the spheres of jurisdiction and 
choice of law. Acceding priority to jurisdiction and choice of law agreements may also help 
highlight the contribution of contract and commercial law reasoning to private international 
law.125 A systematic distinction between agreements and non-agreements may also be 
contrasted with the unique contribution of the emerging third paradigm of jurisdiction and 
the conception of party autonomy as ‘sovereignty of the individual’. This too is a very logical 
                                                          
121 Mills, The Confluence (n 42) 294. 
122 See FN 72 above. 
123 Lehmann, Liberating the Individual from Battles between States (n 88) 419-421; Briggs, Agreements (n 50) 6-
7. 
124 See for instance, Richard Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (OUP 2010) Chapters 2 and 3 and 
Richard Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (2nd Edition, OUP 2015) Chapters 2 and 3. 
125 Briggs, Agreements (n 50) 7. 
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representation of the emerging paradigmatic shift. As discussed above, the radical nature of 
party autonomy and the quest for its rationalization has been variably described as a 
theoretically unresolved Gordian knot, as a ‘makeshift solution’126 to an insoluble problem 
and as the ‘foundational myth of private economic law’.127 Therefore, it would be only 
natural to highlight its significance.  
However, if the reorganization suggests the application of a different set of principles and 
rules to agreements on jurisdiction and choice of law as compared to the determination of 
jurisdiction and choice of law based on traditional territorial connecting factors by the court 
in default of choice then this may be a cause for concern.128 Arguably, both private 
international law rules by agreement and without agreement do not operate in a regulatory 
vacuum and are subject to limitations of both scope and substance within the multilateral 
jurisdictional and choice of law framework of the Brussels I Regulation and the Rome I and II 
Regulations respectively.129 It is submitted that the strictures imposed by the European 
Union private international law rules will not permit the English courts to unilaterally treat 
private international law agreements differently from cases of non-agreements. 
It is submitted that the linguistic distinction between the expressions ‘private international 
law agreements’ and ‘private international law rules by agreement’ may help clarify whether 
the proposed approach is sustainable in principle. Invoking the aid of the argument from the 
paradigms of party autonomy, the former expression may be said to properly belong to the 
substantive law paradigm premised on the domestic notion of ‘freedom of contract’ and a 
national private law conception of private international law. On the other hand, the latter 
expression may be said to properly belong to the internationalist paradigm seeking to limit 
private ordering within a multilateral conception of private international law. Arguably, from 
this perspective the issue is not one of ‘agreements or non-agreements’ within the 
substantive law paradigm but should rather be concerned with the more fundamental and 
abstract distinction between ‘private international law agreements/non-agreements’ within 
                                                          
126 See Gerhard Kegel, Internationales Privatrecht (3rd Edition, Munich 1971) 255: ‘Verlegenheitslösung’. 
127 See Muir Watt, Party Autonomy in International Contracts (n 107) 7. 
128 Lehmann, Liberating the Individual from Battles between States (n 88) 419-421, operates within the 
‘substantive law’ paradigm and proposes the new category of ‘relatively mandatory rules’ which cannot be 
deviated from in a national context but may be opted out of with regard to parties’ choice from an 
international perspective; Briggs, Agreements (n 50) 7: ‘[t]he instances in which the intention of the parties 
may be overridden should be few and………should be taken less seriously when parties agree to bring their 
disputes before a court’. 
129 Jonathan Harris, ‘Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: Where Next?’ [2009] LMCLQ 537, 537; 
Borchers, Categorical Exceptions to Party Autonomy (n 69) 1651ff. 
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the substantive law paradigm and ‘private international law rules by agreement/non 
agreement’ within the internationalist paradigm.  
If preferential treatment is accorded to private international law agreements as compared to 
private international law rules by agreement then a biased stance towards the regulatory 
constraints of the internationalist paradigm is quite obvious. It is submitted that the tide of 
‘privatization’ or ‘contractualization’ should be checked in relation to arguments which 
overtly favour the private ordering of private law without considering the global governance 
implications inherent in the public ordering of private law. The privatization of court access 
that results from the separation of functions within a jurisdiction agreement is another 
manifestation of the contractualization drive with potentially negative repercussions for the 
systemic perspective of private international law. This issue has already been dealt with in 
detail during the course of this chapter. 
Conclusion 
From the foregoing it is apparent that the inherent regulatory function of the conflict of 
laws, the design of multilateral private international law norms as universal higher level 
secondary rules for the allocation of regulatory authority and the broader notion of justice in 
private international law may not lend support to the idea of the separation of functions 
within and the relative effect of jurisdiction and choice of law agreements. The recent 
jurisprudential discourse on the emerging third paradigm and the quest for a more 
comprehensive understanding of party autonomy may also offer significant insights into 
both the existing substantive law paradigm and the internationalist paradigm of party 
autonomy. It has been argued that techniques which predominantly support one paradigm 
largely to the exclusion of the other paradigm are most at risk of being rendered superfluous 
in the complex process of integration as they represent an approach whose legal basis may 
not be tenable under the third paradigm of jurisdiction. The damages remedy for breach of a 
choice of court agreement may be considered to be a core example of the substantive law 
paradigm of party autonomy which by itself renders the private law remedy particularly 
unsuitable for use within a multilateral and internationalist jurisdiction and judgments order 
such as the Brussels I Regulation. 
The next chapter attempts to deconstruct the pervasive analogy between arbitration and 
jurisdiction agreements with particular emphasis on the unified approach adopted by the 
English courts in the private law enforcement of arbitration and jurisdiction agreements. It 
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will be argued that the stronger public procedural imperatives at play in the context of 
international civil and commercial litigation may merit a differentiated treatment of such 

























Chapter 3 - The Analogy between Arbitration Agreements and Jurisdiction 
Agreements: The Technique of Severability and Whether the 
Contractualization Phenomena Distorts the Fundamental Nature and Effects 
of Jurisdiction Agreements? 
Introduction 
A significant component of my research project focusses on the fundamental nature and 
classification of a jurisdiction agreement. It has been argued that the procedural and 
substantive aspects of a jurisdiction agreement warrant the classification of a ‘hybrid’ 
contract.130 Globalization and recent developments in private international law in the EU and 
the Hague Conference have meant that our fundamental understanding of the nature of 
jurisdiction agreements is simultaneously informed by and seeks to synthesize or eclectically 
choose the best characteristics in jurisdiction agreements from across the legal traditions.131  
In the course of this particular section, it will be argued that the analogy drawn between 
arbitration agreements and jurisdiction agreements is premised on a ‘functional 
equivalence’ and they are not fully convergent or mutually inclusive in identity and effects. 
Indeed, it may be observed that the two are different but related forms of dispute resolution 
agreements. Our particular focus will be on whether the contractualization of arbitration 
agreements in relation to their enforcement can be transposed verbatim on to the 
enforcement of jurisdiction agreements in international commercial disputes before the 
English courts. The identification and rationalization of fundamental areas of divergence will 
mean that the functional equivalence attributed to such agreements should not be allowed 
to extend to the point where the relative autonomy of the two forms of dispute resolution 
agreements is at risk of being eclipsed.   
The arbitration agreement analogy seeks to demonstrate that both arbitration agreements 
and jurisdiction agreements are premised on essentially contractual foundations or the 
                                                          
130 Trevor C Hartley, Choice of Court Agreements under the European and International Instruments: The 
Revised Brussels I Regulation, the Lugano Convention and the Hague Convention (Oxford Private International 
Law Series, OUP 2013) 4-6, 129-130; Burkhard Hess, ‘The Draft Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements, External Competencies of the European Union and Recent Case Law of the European Court of 
Justice’ in Arnaud Nuyts and Nadine Watté (eds.), International Civil Litigation in Europe and Relations with 
Third States (Bruylant 2005) 263, 271. 
131 See generally, Richard Garnett, Substance and Procedure in Private International Law (Oxford Private 
International Law Series, OUP 2012) 104-108. 
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notion of ‘freedom of contract’.132 However, the specific public procedural characteristics of 
jurisdiction agreements and international litigation within multilateral private international 
law regimes may necessitate a differentiated stance towards the private law enforcement of 
both forms of dispute resolution agreements. The aim of this section is to deconstruct the 
analogy between the two types of forum selection agreements on an issue by issue basis in 
order to clarify and reach a better understanding of the true nature of choice of court 
agreements and how they differ from arbitration agreements. The principle of severability in 
choice of forum agreements is examined first before moving on towards analysing the 
fundamental points of divergence between such agreements. 
Severability in Dispute Resolution Agreements 
An arbitration agreement is a separate and distinct agreement from the substantive contract 
and is not ordinarily impeached or rendered void if the substantive contract is discharged, 
frustrated, repudiated, rescinded, avoided or found to be void.133 This is so even where the 
substantive contract is void on the grounds of initial illegality.134 The principle of severability 
is distinct from the concept of the arbitrator’s jurisdiction to rule on its own jurisdiction 
which is referred to as kompetenz-kompetenz.135 
Section 7 of the English Arbitration Act 1996 sets down the position previously established in 
English common law and provides:136 
Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, an arbitration agreement which forms or was 
intended to form part of another agreement (whether or not in writing) shall not be 
regarded as invalid, non-existent or ineffective because that other agreement is 
invalid, or did not come into existence or has become ineffective, and it shall for that 
purpose be treated as a distinct agreement.   
Prior to the Arbitration Act 1996, the principle of severability of arbitration agreements in 
England had been expressed clearly by the Court of Appeal in Harbour Assurance Co (UK) Ltd 
v Kansa General International Insurance Co Ltd.137 Severability was said to be an essential 
corollary to giving effect to the parties autonomy to provide for the resolution of disputes 
                                                          
132 PE Nygh, Autonomy in International Contracts (Oxford Private International Law Series, OUP 1999) Chapter 
1, 2. 
133 Margaret L Moses, The Principles and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (2nd Edition, 
Cambridge University Press 2012) 19; David Joseph QC, Jurisdiction and Arbitration Agreements and their 
Enforcement (2nd Edition, Sweet and Maxwell 2010) 123-128.  
134 Joseph (n 133) 123-128. 
135 See Section 30 of the Arbitration Act 1996 (England and Wales). 
136 See also Section 5(1) of the Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010; PR Beaumont and PE McEleavy, Anton’s Private 
International Law (SULI, 3rd Edition, W Green 2011) Chapter 11. 
137 [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 455. 
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and now has become part of the very alphabet of arbitration law. Lord Justice Hoffman 
observed in the course of his judgment in Harbour v Kansa that there will be cases where the 
allegations relevant to the impeachment of the substantive contract will directly impeach 
the separate arbitration agreement. The House of Lords in Fiona Trust and Holding Corp v 
Privalov has fully endorsed the principle of severability.138  
The same principle of severability applies at common law to choice of court agreements. The 
principle will in practice be given effect in the context of application of the jurisdiction rules 
under CPR r 6.20 and CPR r 11. In view of the refinement and development of the analysis in 
relation to arbitration agreements as expressed by the Court of Appeal in Harbour v Kansa, 
the material questions in each case remain the same as for an arbitration agreement, 
namely (a) whether the disputes fall within the four corners of the choice of court 
agreement and (b) whether the plea advanced directly impeaches the choice of court 
agreement. Both of these questions should be determined in accordance with the applicable 
law of the choice of court agreement. Under English law in cases of the plea of non est 
factum, fraud or duress it may be that both the substantive contract and the jurisdiction 
agreement are simultaneously impeached. As with arbitration agreements, where illegality is 
alleged, the nature of the illegality needs to be considered and whether it directly impeaches 
the jurisdiction agreement. 
There has been consistent judicial support at first instance in favour of applying the principle 
of severability to jurisdiction agreements in the same manner as it is applied to arbitration 
agreements.139 In Credit Suisse First Boston (Europe) Ltd v Seagate Trading Co Ltd140 the issue 
of severability arose in the context of an application for an anti-suit injunction made by the 
claimant relying upon a jurisdiction agreement contained in a trading confirmation. The 
defendant averred that the trading confirmation had been procured by fraud. Rix, J referred 
to the principle of severability but concluded that the allegation of fraud impeached all the 
terms of the trading confirmation, including the choice of court agreement, and hence gave 
good reason for not granting an anti-suit injunction. More recently, the English Court of 
Appeal has endorsed the principle of severability as being equally applicable to jurisdiction 
                                                          
138 Premium Nafta Products Limited and others v. Fili Shipping Company Limited and others [2007] UKHL 40; 
[2007] All ER (D) 233 (Oct). 
139 Credit Suisse First Boston (Europe) Ltd v Seagate Trading Co Ltd [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 784, 797 (Rix J. without 
deciding the point); IFR Ltd v Federal Trade SpA [2001] All ER (D) 48 (Colman J.); and Sonatrach petroleum Corp 
v Ferrell International Ltd [2002] 1 All ER (Comm) 627 at [30] (Colman J.); Connex South Eastern Ltd v MJ 
Building Services Group Plc [2004] EWHC 1518. 
140 [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 784. 
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agreements and arbitration agreements. In Deutsche Bank AG v Asia Pacific Wireless 
Broadband Wireless Communications141 Longmore, LJ reiterated that a challenge to the 
validity of the main contract itself was not sufficient to impeach the choice of court 
agreement. In each case it was necessary to find a direct attack on the choice of court 
agreement itself. Longmore, LJ then repeated the possible example of forged signatures that 
had been referred to in the House of Lords in Fiona Trust and Holding Corp v Privalov. 
Quite apart from binding precedent, there are a number of reasons why it is suggested that 
this approach is sound in principle. First, the policy of giving effect to party autonomy applies 
with as much force to a jurisdiction agreement as it does to an arbitration agreement. 
Secondly, the principle of severability has achieved wide acceptance in the international 
community in relation to jurisdiction and arbitration agreements alike. This is especially 
important in the context of dispute resolution agreements where the validity of such an 
agreement must be determined by reference to its proper law. This is unlikely to be English 
law in the case of a foreign jurisdiction agreement. Thirdly, a similar result to that obtained 
by applying the principle of severability as explained in Harbour v Kansa is arrived at under 
the Brussels I Regulation and it would make no sense for English common law to approach 
the matter differently. Fourthly, as has been seen already, dispute resolution agreements 
take many forms including giving parties an option either to litigate or arbitrate. The 
application and extent of the principle of severability should not depend upon which option 
is taken, particularly once a dispute has arisen. 
An agreement conferring jurisdiction under Article 25 of the Regulation is given effect even 
when the dispute concerns whether or not the contract which contains the jurisdiction 
agreement is void.142 Although not expressly referred to by the Court of Justice of the EU in 
these terms, a jurisdiction agreement should be seen as an independent and collateral 
bargain that is established in accordance with the autonomous requirements of Article 25. 
Thus it is open to establish consensus between the parties as to the terms of the substantive 
contract but not as regards the agreement to confer jurisdiction. The existence or otherwise 
of a contract between the parties and its terms is established by reference to the 
requirements of Article 25. The Court of Justice in Benincasa v Dentalkit Srl was faced with 
                                                          
141 [2008] EWCA Civ 1091; [2008] 2 Lloyd’s Rep at [24]. 
142 Benincasa v Dentalkit Srl Case C-269/95 [1997] ECR 1-3767 at [28]-[30]; Trasporti Castelletti Spedizioni 
Internazionali SpA v Hugo Trumpy SpA Case C=159/97 [1999] ECR I-1597 at [51]; See PF Schlosser, ‘The 
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questions that arose under a franchising agreement said to confer jurisdiction on the courts 
of Florence. The claimant commenced proceedings in Germany, seeking a declaration that 
the franchising agreement including the jurisdiction agreement was void under German law. 
The Court of Justice concluded that, if the disputes fell within the scope of the jurisdiction 
agreement, then an Article 25 agreement also conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the chosen 
court, notwithstanding that the dispute concerned the question of whether or not the 
contract containing the jurisdiction agreement was void. The Court of Justice’s reasoning 
was not explicitly based on an application of the principle of severability, but was couched in 
terms of the attainment of the objectives of the Brussels Convention; namely giving effect to 
the principle of party autonomy and legal certainty. In particular, the Court of Justice stated 
that the objectives of the Brussels Convention would be undermined if a party could escape 
its bargain on jurisdiction by asserting the invalidity of the substantive contract. It is 
submitted; however, that the result arrived at by the CJEU is entirely consistent with the 
principle of severability and was certainly viewed in this way by Justice Moore Bick in AIG 
Europe SA v QBE International143 and by the Court of Appeal in Deutsche Bank AG v Asia 
Pacific Wireless Broadband Wireless Communications.144  
Interim Conclusion 
The specific provision for the principle of severability along with a choice of law rule for the 
substantive validity of a jurisdiction agreement in the Hague Convention and the Recast 
Regulation support the arguments in favour of an essentially contractual justification for 
choice of court agreements. The referral of issues relating to material validity, a substantive 
element of a jurisdiction agreement, to the law of the chosen forum including its private 
international law rules recognises the complex hybrid or ‘mixed’ nature of a choice of court 
agreement incorporating a mix of substantive and procedural components.145 Article 3(d) of 
the Hague Convention and Article 25(5) of the Recast Regulation offer an additional layer of 
protection for choice of court agreements by emphasizing that an attack on the existence 
and validity of the main contract does not by itself impeach the existence and validity of the 
                                                          
143 [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 268 at [26]. 
144 [2008] EWCA Civ 1091; [2008] 2 Lloyd’s Rep at [24]; See Aeroflot v Berezovsky [2013] EWCA Civ 784, [64]: 
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independent choice of court agreement.146 This ensures that the forum chosen by the 
parties exercises adjudicatory authority even where the very existence of the contract is in 
dispute. The principles of party autonomy and legal certainty justify the exercise of 
jurisdiction by the chosen court where the validity of the substantive contract is impugned. 
To reiterate, the establishment of a choice of law rule for material validity and the 
enshrinement of the principle of severability for choice of court agreements will reinforce a 
contractual interpretation of such agreements. However, to view these developments as 
impetus or justification for the contractual enforcement of jurisdiction agreements via anti-
suit injunctions and the damages remedy may border on the naïve. The principal method of 
enforcing choice of court agreements in both the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements and the Brussels I Regulation (Recast) is jurisdictional or procedural and not 
contractual. The designated court in a choice of court agreement shall exercise jurisdiction 
whilst all other courts are required to stay and eventually decline jurisdiction.147 In the case 
of the Brussels I Regulation (Recast) a reverse lis pendens rule accords primacy to 
proceedings commenced in the chosen court over any other court seised.148 The prospects 
of contractual remedies enforcing choice of court agreements making headway is necessarily 
curtailed in a ‘double convention’ multilateral jurisdiction and judgments system which 
prioritizes the overarching principle of mutual trust and the effet utile of EU law over and 
above the enforcement of private law rights and obligations embodied in an exclusive 
jurisdiction agreement. 
Having considered that the principle of severability developed in the context of arbitration 
agreements applies equally to jurisdiction agreements, the time is ripe for a comparison of 
the two types of forum selection clauses in order to reveal their fundamental points of 
divergence.       
Deconstructing the Arbitration Agreement Analogy 
There is a pervasive tendency, especially in the English common law tradition, to paint both 
arbitration agreements and jurisdiction agreements with the same broad brushstroke.149 
                                                          
146 Article 3(d) of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements; Article 25(5) of the Brussels I 
Regulation (Recast). 
147 Articles 5 and 6 of the Hague Convention. 
148 Article 31(2) of the Brussels I Regulation (Recast). 
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Certain significant elements of functional identity along with the general emphasis on 
serving the ‘dispute resolution’ needs of the litigating parties in the English courts may be 
responsible for conjuring up the similar practical treatment of both types of choice of forum 
agreements.150 For instance, both types of agreement are based on the parties genuine 
consent and mutual agreement along with the basic contract formation requirements to be 
considered valid,151 both promote procedural certainty, predictability and economic 
efficiency in the legal relations between the contracting parties, both serve the procedural 
function of invoking the jurisdiction of the chosen court or arbitral tribunal and both (except 
non-exclusive or asymmetric jurisdiction agreements) exclude the possibility of any 
otherwise competent non-chosen forum from taking jurisdiction. As a result, they are 
frequently equalized by the courts, which apply the same principles to both jurisdiction and 
arbitration agreements.152 In English law, exclusive jurisdiction agreements and arbitration 
agreements are accorded equivalent effect when courts exercise their discretion in granting 
anti-suit injunctions or awarding damages for breach of such agreements.153 The principles 
of deciding whether to grant anti-suit injunctions in cases where there is an exclusive 
jurisdiction agreement are summarized in Donohue v Armco.154 The landmark House of Lords 
decision has been followed in cases granting anti-suit injunctions in support of arbitration 
agreements.155 
Apart from a contractual analysis of the classification and enforcement of arbitration 
agreements, the enforcement of arbitration agreements and the resulting arbitral awards 
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151 See Article II(3) of the New York Convention; Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation; Article 25 of the Brussels 
I Regulation (Recast); Articles 3(c), 5(1), 6(a) and 9(a) of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. 
152 See JJ Fawcett and JM Carruthers, Cheshire, North & Fawcett: Private International Law (14th Ed, Oxford 
University Press 2008) 469-475; Thomas Raphael, The Anti-Suit Injunction (Oxford Private International Law 
Series, OUP 2008) Chapter 7; cf Tham (n 149) argues that the analogy between jurisdiction and arbitration 
clauses is misplaced as jurisdiction agreements are no more than ancillary contracts which do not give rise to 
primary and secondary obligations of their own. However, it is submitted that the English authorities actually 
demonstrate a clear acceptance that exclusive forum clauses give rise to independent obligations, breach of 
which sounds in the award of damages or the grant of an anti-suit injunction. The orthodox English authorities 
and scholarship draw no distinction between the treatment of arbitration clauses and jurisdiction clauses. 
153 See Fawcett and Carruthers (n 152) 470-475; Donohue v Armco Inc. [2001] UKHL 64, [2002] 1 All ER 749; 
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154 [2001] UKHL 64, [2002] 1 All ER 749. 
155 Atlanska Plovidba v Consignaciones Asturianas SA (The Lapad) [2004] 2 CLC 886, para 28; Noble Assurance 
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are governed globally by the New York Convention.156 Article II(3) of the Convention 
provides: 
The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in respect of 
which the parties have made an agreement within the meaning of this article, shall, 
at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds 
that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being 
performed. 
Article III of the Convention states that each Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards 
as binding and enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory 
where the award is relied upon, under the conditions laid down in the Convention. The New 
York Convention has proved to be a very successful global framework for the allocation of 
arbitral jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of arbitration awards.  
Although from a pragmatic perspective, an arbitration agreement appears to possess a 
similar function as compared to an English exclusive jurisdiction agreement, it is submitted 
that the two types of choice of forum agreements operate at different levels in relation to 
both their classification and enforcement. The observation of Fletcher Moulton LJ in 
Doleman and Sons v. Ossett Corporation157, that by agreeing to send their disputes to 
arbitration: 
The parties have agreed that the rights of the parties in respect of that dispute shall 
be as stated in the award [as determined by the arbitrator], so that in essence it 
partakes the character of ‘accord and satisfaction by substituted agreement’. The 
original rights of the parties have disappeared, and their place has been taken by 
their rights under the award. 
The question is whether a jurisdiction agreement is treated in the same way by the courts. 
However, a jurisdiction agreement does not manifest itself as an agreement by the parties 
that their original primary and secondary obligations are to be discharged by accord and 
satisfaction arising from the judgment by the judge. The substitution of the original rights of 
the parties under the contract does not occur as a result of any private agreement but by 
operation of law pursuant to the ‘doctrine of merger’.158 When an English court pronounces 
judgment, the cause of action disclosed by the pleadings is ‘merged’ with the judgment:159 
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‘the very right or cause of action claimed or put in suit has in the first proceedings passed 
into judgment, so that it merged and has no longer an independent existence’. 
Given its status as a distinct collateral contractual agreement of its own, the effect of which 
is to discharge the primary and secondary obligations under the main agreement and bind 
the parties to a new procedure, Fletcher Moulton LJ’s observation in Doleman & Sons160 that 
contractual damages should be available to compensate a contracting party when the other 
initiates legal proceedings in breach of an arbitration clause should come as no surprise.161 
An arbitration agreement constitutes a collateral contract with distinct primary and 
secondary obligations of its own. Furthermore, the arbitration agreement is subject to the 
technique of severability which serves to insulate or protect the arbitration agreement from 
a challenge to the validity of the substantive contract.162 Similarly, it may be observed that 
under the English common law an exclusive choice of court agreement is also susceptible to 
being breached and where breached may lead to both primary and secondary obligations of 
its own.163 However, the contractual analysis borrowed from the parallel world of arbitration 
agreements may not always effortlessly translate into viable solutions for the enforcement 
of choice of court agreements as the latter may operate within a multilateral jurisdiction and 
judgments framework which may prioritize international allocative concerns over and above 
the private law enforcement of court access:164 
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It may be more palatable to certain courts for a party to request that the court 
enforce an arbitration agreement – when a court enforces an arbitration clause, it 
does not prefer one national court over another. The court is merely ordering that 
the dispute be resolved in accordance with the parties’ agreement. This is nothing 
more than enforcing a privately agreed upon means of dispute resolution, without 
attempting to allocate jurisdiction between national courts. Choice of court 
agreements, on the other hand, are different. Where a court enforces a choice of 
court agreement, it could conceivably be seen, by ordering the parties to litigate their 
case in a particular national forum, as preferring one national court over another – an 
impression that some court may be reluctant to give. Moreover, some courts regard 
the jurisdiction of a court as a matter of public law. These courts will not enforce a 
choice of court agreement if seen as an attempt to do just that.   
Daniel Tan’s insightful observation in the context of the American federal courts may be 
further developed by an instructive reference to the public or regulatory function of 
multilateral private international law rules by the Supreme Court of Canada:165 ‘the twin 
objectives sought by private international law in general [are] order and fairness’. The 
emphasis on ‘order’ here refers to the systemic structural demands of the public or 
constitutional ordering of private law in contrast to the goal of substantive justice and 
fairness between the parties in the individual case. Such a focus is natural within a 
conception of private international law as a multilateral framework for the allocation of 
regulatory authority in federal systems.166  
On the other hand, the English common law’s jurisprudence on the unilateral use of anti-suit 
injunctions and the damages remedy for enforcing choice of forum agreements has emerged 
without a proper and careful consideration of the wider regulatory implications of the 
development of such remedies for the allocative and distributive function of private 
international law.167 Anti-suit injunctions can effectively derail foreign proceedings and 
infringe upon the sovereignty of the foreign state in the process of enforcing an exclusive 
jurisdiction agreement. Moreover, applying an unrestrained contractual analysis to the 
damages remedy for breach of exclusive jurisdiction agreements may mean that 
considerations of a unilateral substantive law nature will always prevail over international 
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Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden & Boston 2009) 76-81; Campbell McLachlan, ‘International Litigation and 
the Reworking of the Conflict of Laws’ (2004) 120 LQR 580, 581-582; Campbell McLachlan, ‘The Jurisdictional 
Limits of Disclosure Orders in Transnational Fraud Litigation’ (1998) 47 ICLQ 3, 3.  




procedural concerns, thereby wreaking havoc for a multilateral conception of private 
international law. For instance, the prospect of second guessing the findings of a foreign 
court on the merits and recovering substantive claw back damages may effectively reverse 
or nullify the foreign judgment and in the process damage the reputation of private 
international law as part of the larger international legal order. 
However, the specific public procedural constraints on the private law enforcement of 
jurisdiction agreements in a multilateral conception of private international law should not 
inhibit the enforcement of arbitration agreements.168 In exceptional circumstances, an anti-
arbitration injunction (or the damages remedy) has been awarded by an English court to 
restrain a foreign arbitral tribunal.169 Arguably, an anti-suit injunction or the damages 
remedy may also be granted by an arbitral tribunal as tribunals are not subject to the EU 
rules on international civil procedure.170 In the context of the European judicial area, the 
Grand Chamber of the CJEU’s pragmatic decision in Gazprom has confirmed the accuracy of 
the latter hypothesis.171 The decision seeks to limit the operation of the principles of mutual 
trust and the effectiveness of EU law (effet utile) to court to court proceedings in Member 
States as in the paradigm case of West Tankers.172 Therefore, it may be observed that the 
scope for the enforcement of arbitral autonomy is greater than the avenues available for the 
private law enforcement of jurisdiction agreements in the EU.173 A pervasive contractual 
analysis vouched in the language of substantive law rights and obligations arising from such 
agreements is thus more readily attributable to arbitration agreements as compared to 
                                                          
168 See Article 1(2)(d) of the Brussels I Regulation (Recast) and Article 1(2)(d) of the Brussels I Regulation. 
169 Claxton Engineering Services Limited v Tam Olaj-Es Gazkutato [2011] EWHC 345 (Comm) (Hamblen J); Albon 
v Naza Motor Trading Sdn Bhd [2007] EWCA Civ 1124, [2008] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 1; See Rory Butler and Baptiste 
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170 See West Tankers Inc. v Alliance SpA [2012] EWHC 854 (Comm) [78] (Flaux J), determined that the arbitral 
tribunal ‘was not deprived, by reason of European law, of the jurisdiction to award equitable damages for 
breach of the obligation to arbitrate.’; For the view that the arbitral tribunal may award damages, because the 
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State, see CMA CGM SA v Hyundai Mipo Dockyard Co Ltd [2008] EWHC 2792 (Comm), [2009] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 213 
(Burton J). 
171 Case C-536/13 Gazprom ECLI:EU:C:2015:316. 
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exclusive jurisdiction agreements.174 It may also be argued that the strong notion of mutual 
trust which animates the EU private international law regime does not similarly constrain the 
enforcement of arbitration agreements within the EU under the New York Convention.175 
Parties are only subject to arbitration if they have contracted to be so - ex contractu.176 The 
submission of a dispute to arbitration is therefore exclusively premised on freedom of 
contract and the presence of an appropriately worded arbitration agreement is both a 
necessary and generally sufficient basis for the arbitrator to be seised with the dispute. The 
current Article 25(1) of the Brussels I Regulation (Recast) does not require a connection 
between the parties to the choice of court agreement and the chosen court or the EU and 
the chosen court must accept jurisdiction if the clause meets the comprehensive criteria for 
validity set out in that provision. Article 23(1) of the Brussels I Regulation required at least 
one of the parties to the choice of court agreement to be domiciled in the EU but where 
both parties were not domiciled in the EU and the chosen court was in the EU, the English 
common law jurisdictional regime governed the prorogation of jurisdiction.177 According to 
the increasingly less relevant common law regime, the English courts will usually enforce an 
English jurisdiction agreement in the absence of strong reasons to the contrary but it is 
neither necessary nor sufficient to establish an English court’s jurisdiction.178 
Arbitration agreements submit disputes to arbitral tribunals, which are private bodies, 
acquiring their dispute resolution power solely and exclusively from the autonomy of the 
parties.179 In addition to designating the seat of the tribunal, the parties have the autonomy 
                                                          
174 Jonathan Harris, ‘Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: Where Next?’ [2009] LMCLQ 537, 555 
175 See Recital 12 of the Brussels I Regulation (Recast); AG Wathelet has even radically argued that the second 
paragraph of Recital 12 attempts to ‘exclude from the scope of the regulation any proceedings in which the 
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176 Jonathan Hill and Adeline Chong, International Commercial Disputes: Commercial Conflict of Laws in English 
Courts (Fourth Edition, Hart Publishing, Oxford 2010) 755-756.  
177 Article 23(3) of the Brussels I Regulation. 
178 This is presumably because the adjudicatory authority of the English courts is a function of the sovereign 
power of the state and cannot be regulated by a private agreement between the parties. Although the state 
has sanctioned some recognition of party autonomy as a jurisdictional connecting factor insofar as the parties 
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there is no good arguable case for it to stay the proceedings on forum non conveniens grounds and thereby not 
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179 For the contractual and jurisdictional character of arbitration agreements, see, Julian DM Lew, Loukas A 




to select the composition of the tribunal, the law applicable to the arbitration agreement, 
the arbitration procedure and the merits of the dispute.180 It may be argued that the parties 
can also exclude the application of the domestic law of any states and subject the merits of 
the dispute to flexible international commercial norms, such as the lex mercatoria.181 
However, it has been argued that the Rome I Regulation applies in the determination of the 
law applicable to the merits of the dispute in international commercial arbitration 
proceedings with a seat in the EU.182 According to the Rome I Regulation, the parties are not 
entitled to make a choice of a non-state body of law, such as the lex mercatoria as the 
Regulation refers to ‘the law of a state’ in the relevant provisions.183 Therefore, the Rome I 
Regulation will restrict the choice of the applicable law on the merits in arbitration 
proceedings to the law of a state. However, in the absence of any choice of law by the 
parties, Section 46(3) of the English Arbitration Act 1996 provides that the tribunal shall 
apply the law determined by the conflict of laws rules which it considers applicable. It has 
been argued that this statutory discretion in favour of the arbitrator enabling the selection 
of the conflict of laws rules of a jurisdiction to which the Rome I Regulation is irrelevant will 
not render the award capable of being challenged by the English courts.184 However, this 
latter approach assumes that it is a provision in the English law of arbitration that leads to 
the application of either the Rome I Regulation or another system of conflict of laws which 
then determines the applicable law. On the contrary, if the Rome I Regulation is in fact 
applicable, the principles of supremacy and direct effect of EU law would operate to disable 
Section 46 of the Arbitration Act 1996 itself and render superfluous any need to refer to the 
                                                          
180 Burcu Yüksel, ‘The Relevance of the Rome I Regulation to International Commercial Arbitration in the 
European Union’ (2011) 7 Journal of Private International Law 149, 167-168, notes that from the perspective of 
the autonomous conception of international commercial arbitration and the Arbitration Act 1996 (England and 
Wales and Northern Ireland), an arbitral tribunal may encounter fewer constraints in determining the law 
applicable to the merits of the dispute. However, she argues that the Rome I Regulation should be relevant in 
the context of international commercial arbitration in the EU because the ‘arbitration agreement’ exclusion 
does not extend to the law applicable to the substance of the dispute and that an arbitrator sitting in a 
Member State is similar in function to a judge and therefore should be bound to apply the rules of the Rome I 
Regulation.     
181 Ibid 169-170. 
182 ibid 154. 
183 Cf A choice of non-state body of law, such as the lex mercatoria is allowed under Section 46(1)(b) of the 
Arbitration Act 1996; cf Recital 13 of the Rome I Regulation allows the parties to incorporate a non-state body 
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184 See R Merkin, ‘The Rome I Regulation and Reinsurance’ (2009) 5 Journal of Private International Law 69, 77; 
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Rome I Regulation or another system of conflict of laws indirectly through a provision of 
national law. 
Party autonomy is the very foundation of international commercial arbitration.185 The 
degree of flexibility that exists in international commercial arbitration is not matched by 
international litigation. Although most states allow the parties to choose the forum to hear 
their disputes, the parties cannot tailor the civil procedure and private international law 
rules of the chosen forum to suit their needs. Party autonomy is a complementary rule in 
international litigation which promotes certainty, predictability and economic efficiency in 
the legal relations between the contracting parties. It is not, however, the foundation of 
cross border adjudication. 
In Bremer Vulkan Schiffbau und Maschinenfabrik v South India Shipping Corp. Ltd186, it was 
clearly accepted that the primary obligations contained within an arbitration agreement can 
be discharged by frustration or breach.187 If so, the arbitration agreement comes to an end 
the arbitrator will no longer be seised of any power over the resolution of the dispute. Can 
this also be said of jurisdiction agreements? Although it may be possible for an English 
jurisdiction agreement to cease to have effect due to frustration, can a party to an English 
jurisdiction agreement ever perform his part of the bargain in so defective a manner as to 
entitle the other party to elect to discharge the jurisdiction agreement so as to relieve the 
English courts of their jurisdiction over the dispute in relation to the main contract? Surely 
such a breach is a theoretical impossibility? This helps to point out the fundamental 
difference between the jurisdiction of arbitrators and that of the courts: the former derive 
their jurisdiction solely from the arbitration agreement between the parties, whereas the 
latter derive their jurisdiction from a multiplicity of factors centred on the concept of 
connection with the forum (one of which is the presence of an English choice of court 
agreement). Apart from consent and agreement between the parties to settle disputes in 
the chosen forum, a jurisdictional framework would provide that the connection between 
the defendant and the forum and the connection between the cause of action (claim) and 
                                                          
185 Blackaby and Partasides (n 161) 85; Moses (n 133) 18. 
186 [1981] AC 909; [1981] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 253. 
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the forum are the fundamental localizing elements that animate the corpus of rules of 
jurisdiction in personam.188  
Another fundamental difference between the jurisdiction of arbitrators and that of the 
courts is that an arbitration agreement by its very nature cannot bind third parties whilst a 
national court can compel a third party to be joined in the proceedings so that the court can 
resolve all the matters in dispute in the course of a single action.189 Seen from this 
perspective, the exercise of arbitral autonomy creates a fragmented and atomised form of 
dispute resolution in which the jurisdiction of each arbitral tribunal is limited by the extent 
of the parties’ arbitration agreement.190 The arbitration agreement and process presupposes 
that there will be other closely related disputes which will have to be decided by other 
courts or tribunals.191 The very exercise of party autonomy may require a preliminary 
determination, whether by a national court or tribunal, as to the validity and scope of the 
arbitration agreement.192 As Dickinson aptly puts it, ‘…….arbitration processes cannot be said 
to be small islands in the sea of dispute resolution that enjoy total independence from 
national legal systems – at best they are semi-autonomous.’193  
The conflation in the treatment of both arbitration and jurisdiction agreements by English 
courts has been questioned in relation to whether the interests of third parties and wider 
societal concerns are adequately factored into a ‘dispute resolution’194 focussed model of 
adjudication in which the English Commercial Court acts ‘as an umpire’195 when passively 
deciding on the private interests as between the parties.196 It has been argued that a 
stronger emphasis on the unique public procedural imperatives at play in international 
litigation as opposed to international arbitration may help reconcile the systemic perspective 
                                                          
188 Actor sequitur forum rei (the claimant goes to the court of the defendant) enshrined in Article 2 of the 
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192 See George A Bermann, ‘Forum Shopping at the ‘Gateway’ to International Commercial Arbitration’ in 
Franco Ferrari (ed.), Forum Shopping in the International Commercial Arbitration Context (Sellier European Law 
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of private international law with the unilateralism of the English conflict of laws and in the 
process also address wider public concerns that lie beyond the narrow remit of the parties’ 
interests.       
The concern with connection to the forum as opposed to simple reliance on party choice 
reflects the foundation of judicial power as an emanation of state sovereignty.197 It follows 
that the basis for enforceability of damages pursuant to a judgment of an English court 
differs from that of an arbitral award or for that matter damages pursuant to a foreign 
judgment. A judgment for damages by an English court is an exercise of sovereign power. An 
English judgment even if made in error has binding effect unless and until set aside on 
appeal. Execution may be taken out immediately on the judgment without any regard as to 
its underlying merits, unless leave has been granted to stay execution. In contrast although 
an arbitral award is supposed to be treated as if it were a judgment, a number of defences 
may be raised to prevent its having such an effect. A judgment therefore peremptorily 
directs the distribution of economic resources from one litigant to another and immediately 
entitles the judgment creditor to the full array of judicial enforcement machinery to ensure 
performance of the judgment by the judgment creditor. 
At risk of some over simplification, an arbitral award is toothless in England without the 
backbone of recognition by the English courts, which can treat such awards as an obligation 
in their own right, and upon which court proceedings may be brought (an action on the 
award).198 Like foreign judgments, arbitral awards are only enforceable at common law in 
England at one remove. Without the interposition of recognition as a species of obligation, 
the beneficiary of such awards (like a foreign judgment creditor) cannot levy execution 
against the assets of the losing party, nor can application be made for committal for 
contempt (as there can be none). The same is also true when reliance is placed on the 
English Arbitration Act 1996, Section 66(1), which provides that an arbitral award may be 
enforced as if it were an English judgment, albeit only with leave of court. Like foreign 
judgments, therefore, whether at common law or under statute, enforcement only comes at 
one remove following some degree of approbation by the English courts. 
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The underlying differences between choice of court agreements and arbitration agreements 
determine the fact that some states provide the same contractual requirements in deciding 
their formation and validity, while providing more stringent restrictions to the enforcement 
of choice of court agreements.199 In other states even the validity requirements differ 
between jurisdiction and arbitration agreements.200 
The contractual requirements for formation and the principle of severability provide the 
basis for an analogy to be drawn between arbitration agreements and jurisdiction 
agreements. However, extending the contractual analysis of arbitration agreements to the 
issue of the private law enforcement of jurisdiction agreements is not free from difficulty. 
Therefore, caution needs to be exercised when transplanting a concept from the context of 
private ordering by private arbitral institutions onto the interstate jurisdictional framework 
of transnational adjudication which prioritizes both ‘public law and private law’201 
considerations – the twin private international law functions of ‘order and fairness’ are both 
significant but the former generally prevails over the latter. This is particularly so in a 
multilateral conception of private international law found within federal systems where the 
public ordering of private law may prevent unilateral private law remedies from privatizing 
court access as between the parties and from distorting the allocative or distributive 
function of the conflict of laws. 
The dual role of an exclusive jurisdiction agreement as both invoking the jurisdiction of a 
court (prorogation and derogation function) and as an independent subsisting promissory 
obligation between the parties to sue only in the nominated court also does not intrinsically 
support a pure contractual analysis either. It is highly unlikely that an exclusive choice of 
court agreement will be able to act as an independent source of legal obligation between 
                                                          
199 Following the CJEU decision in Gazprom, the scope for the enforcement of arbitration agreements is 
arguably greater than the private law enforcement of jurisdiction agreements by the English courts in the EU. 
Cf Starlight Shipping Co v Allianz [2014] EWCA Civ 1010 (Longmore LJ); In the United States, the enforcement of 
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the parties where it has been declared inapplicable, invalid or ineffective by the courts of 
another EU Member State.202 The invocation of the relative effect of the jurisdiction 
agreement as an independent subsisting private law obligation (in personam effect) despite 
the obvious invalidity of the clause (in rem effect) is in a sense reminiscent of Turner v Grovit 
where the anti-suit injunction was hailed as not aimed towards the civil jurisdictional 
apparatus of the Member State but as a restraining measure directed at the party in breach. 
The separation of the functions within a jurisdiction agreement is obviously incompatible (in 
terms of both classification and effects) with a strict multilateral and internationalist 
paradigm of party autonomy and private international law.203 
Outside the confines of the European judicial area, the variable geometry which is 
characteristic of the international civil and commercial litigation will not oppose the idea of 
the application of equivalent principles to the unilateral private law enforcement of 
jurisdiction and arbitration agreements by the English courts.204 Whether the English courts 
ought to adopt a unified approach to the enforcement of jurisdiction and arbitration 
agreements is of course another matter. 
Chapter 4 examines the fundamental juridical nature and classification of jurisdiction 
agreements. The continental civil law understanding of choice of court agreements as 
‘procedural contracts’ will be discussed and compared to the English common law’s 
attribution of a relative effect to such agreements. Non-exclusive jurisdiction agreements 
are also considered and particularly from the perspective of the damages remedy, whether 
such agreements can be breached. Asymmetric or unilateral choice of court agreements play 
a significant role in practice but their validity has been impugned by the rulings of the French 
Cour de Cassation in Banque Rothschild and ICH v Credit Suisse. The validity of asymmetric 
clauses is also a preliminary issue prior to the question of the application of Article 31(2) of 
the Recast Regulation to such clauses. It will be argued that asymmetric clauses are valid 
under Article 25 of the Recast Regulation as the substantive validity of the clause is referred 
to the lex fori prorogatum including its private international law rules which would validate 
                                                          
202 Pursuant to Articles 23 and 24 of the Brussels I Regulation; Articles 25 and 26 of the Recast Regulation 
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clauses selecting the English courts as such clauses are valid according to English law. 
Alternatively, it may be argued that the compatibility of an asymmetric jurisdiction 
agreement with Article 25 of the Recast Regulation is not an issue of substantive validity but 
a question of the scope of an ‘agreement’ governed by an autonomous interpretation of 
























Chapter 4 – Private Law or Public Law? An Assessment of the Fundamental 
Juridical Nature and Classification of Jurisdiction Agreements 
Fundamental Juridical Nature and Classification of Choice of Court Agreements 
The ‘procedural contract’ conception of choice of court agreements,205 conceives such 
clauses as merely a ‘joint statement of consent’ by the parties to the jurisdiction of the 
selected court which may or may not be conclusive in determining the question of 
jurisdiction.206 Unlike a substantive characterization, an independently enforceable inter 
partes contractual obligation to sue only in the elected forum is not embodied in the 
jurisdiction agreement under the procedural contract classification. As a consequence, the 
function of the jurisdiction agreement is reduced or limited to the prorogation or derogation 
of the jurisdiction of courts. LC Ho is one of the few English common law commentators to 
adopt a position similar to the continental civil law conception of a ‘procedural contract’.207 
He argues that the only way that the nominated court can honour the statement of consent 
is to hear the action and if necessary restrain proceedings in a foreign court whose 
jurisdiction falls outside that consent. Ho comments that:208  
It is only to this extent that a forum selection clause is ‘enforceable’. It is only to this 
extent that there is an ‘obligation’ on the claimant to proceed in the chosen forum. It 
                                                          
205 The jurisprudence of the German Federal Court (Bundesgerichtshof BGH) classifies a jurisdiction clause as a 
contract about the procedural relationship between the parties – a ‘procedural contract’. The scope of a 
jurisdiction agreement is confined to its effects on prorogation or derogation of certain courts (prozessuale 
Verfugungswirkung), meaning that a jurisdiction agreement may add or remove certain courts from the list of 
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I, Juris Publishing 2011) 363-366, for a discussion of choice of court agreements as ‘procedural contracts’ in 
Austrian, German, Swiss, Czech and European Union law; See also, Felix Sparka, ‘Classification of Choice of 
Forum Clauses and their Separability from the Main Contract’ in Jurisdiction and Arbitration Clauses in 
Maritime Transport Documents: A Comparative Analysis (Hamburg Studies on Maritime Affairs 19, Springer-
Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010) 81. 
206 See LC Ho, ‘Anti-suit Injunctions in Cross Border Insolvency: A Restatement’ [2003] ICLQ 697, 707-709; 
Andreas F Lowenfeld, Conflict of Laws: Federal, State and International Perspectives (2nd Edition New York: 
Matthew Bender 1998) 308; CJS Knight, ‘The Damage of Damages: Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of 
Law ’ [2008] Journal of Private International Law 501, 506-507 suggests that the correct way to view a 
jurisdiction agreement is to see it as an invitation to the court to exercise its public law powers and take 
jurisdiction over the dispute. He concludes that ‘Evaluating the jurisdictional competencies of a judicial body is 
a quintessentially public law topic.’ 
207 Ho (n 1206). 
208 ibid 708-709. 
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is also only to this extent that there is a ‘right’ of the defendant not to be sued in the 
non-selected forum. There is no independent right to contractual remedy for breach 
of contract. 
CH Tham has challenged the contractual enforcement of jurisdiction agreements by 
choosing to classify such terms as ancillary obligations.209 Tham relies on the classification of 
contractual obligations adopted by Treitel to support the argument:210 
[t]he primary obligation is one to render the actual performance promised; the 
secondary obligation is one to pay damages for failure to perform the primary 
obligation…….. Primary obligations must also be distinguished from ancillary ones, 
that is, those imposed by provisions which deal not with the performance to be 
rendered, but with such matters as the resolution of disputes arising out of the 
contract, or the inspection by one party of records to be kept by the other for the 
purpose of ascertaining what rights and duties have come into existence under the 
contract. Normally, such ancillary obligations are intended to survive rescission and 
are accordingly not released by it. 
The classification of contractual obligations into primary, secondary and ancillary obligations 
is derived from Lord Diplock’s analysis in Photo Production Ltd v Securior Ltd.211 Analyzing 
primary and secondary obligations, Lord Diplock specifically left out arbitration or 
jurisdiction clauses due to their irrelevance in that context.212 In similar vein, a civil law 
commentator has argued that choice of court agreements are functionally dependent on the 
primary contract and thus should be classified as collateral (dependent) agreements which 
does not give rise to an enforceable obligation.213 
It should be noted that if a procedural or public law classification of jurisdiction agreements 
is adopted the argument of the contractual damages remedy for breach of such agreements 
becomes significantly weaker.214  
However, orthodox English common law judicial authority and scholarship conceptualizes an 
agreement to submit disputes to an identifiable forum as giving rise to the mutually 
enforceable right and obligation to bring any claims arising under the agreement exclusively 
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in that court.215 Such an agreement is referred to as an exclusive choice of court agreement. 
The initiation of proceedings by a party to the exclusive jurisdiction agreement in a court 
other than the nominated court will ordinarily be a breach of contract. Under the common 
law jurisdictional regime, in the absence of strong reasons, the English courts will ordinarily 
enforce an exclusive choice of court agreement, and will restrain the party acting in breach 
of its contractual obligation by either the grant of an anti-suit injunction or a stay of 
proceedings.216 The presence of a foreign exclusive choice of court agreement does not at 
common law oust the jurisdiction of the English court, but it does give rise to an obligation 
that will be enforced in the absence of strong reasons.217 In similar vein, a party to the 
exclusive jurisdiction agreement acting in breach of its obligation to bring proceedings 
exclusively in the nominated court might be held liable in damages.218 To reiterate, the core 
and kernel of the exclusive jurisdiction agreement is the positive contractual right and 
obligation to bring disputes that fall within the ambit of the clause in a prescribed manner. A 
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close parallel can be drawn between an arbitration agreement and an exclusive jurisdiction 
agreement in this respect.219 
Can a Non-Exclusive Jurisdiction Agreement be breached? 
Although the contracting parties are free to tailor dispute resolution agreements to suit their 
specific needs, in practice the most significant distinction to be drawn when considering the 
nature of a jurisdiction agreement is whether the agreement is properly to be classified as 
exclusive or non-exclusive. Briggs has suggested in his monograph, Agreements that it might 
be useful to cast aside what he calls “the unhelpful terminology of non-exclusive jurisdiction 
agreements” and recalibrate the focus instead on construing what obligations the parties 
wished to create and impose on one another.220  
However, as a matter of logic, it is important that the courts treat disputes subject to non-
exclusive jurisdiction clauses as being different from disputes subject to exclusive jurisdiction 
clauses. Otherwise, the non-exclusivity expressly provided for by the parties in their non-
exclusive jurisdiction agreement may be undermined. Similarly, Briggs’ advancement of a 
unified category for both types of choice of court agreements is not without doubt as it all 
too easily blurs into insignificance the existing boundary in theory and practice between 
exclusive and non-exclusive jurisdiction agreements.221 In practice, the categories exclusive 
and non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement and the distinction between them are of central 
importance to the application of Article 25 of the Recast Regulation.222 The distinction 
retains its importance in relation to Article 3(a) of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements which excludes non-exclusive choice of court agreements from the scope of the 
Convention. Recital 22 and Article 31(2) of the Recast Regulation also rely on the distinction 
and a literal reading of the provision and the recital limits the reverse lis pendens rule to 
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exclusive choice of court agreements.223 Similarly, the distinction between the two types of 
agreement is of significance in relation to the enforcement of the jurisdiction agreements by 
the courts, including enforcement by way of a claim for damages for breach of contract.  
At this juncture, it is important to highlight that the issue of breach and the consequent 
action for damages for breach of choice of court agreements is predominantly, if not solely, 
relevant in relation to exclusive jurisdiction agreements, because non-exclusive jurisdiction 
agreements by their very nature do not lend themselves towards the finding of an inter 
partes contractual obligation to sue only in the nominated forum.224 Non-exclusive 
jurisdiction agreements may attribute jurisdiction to a court which would otherwise not be 
competent. Thus, they have the effect of widening the range of courts that can potentially 
be seised by the parties.225 
As examined, an exclusive choice of court agreement gives rise to the mutual right and 
obligation to refer disputes that fall within the scope of the clause to the identified court. In 
contrast, a non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement is an agreement by one or more contracting 
parties to submit to the jurisdiction of one or more identified courts. By its very nature, a 
non-exclusive choice of court agreement also does not create a contractual obligation to 
bring proceedings in the identified court or courts.226 The contracting party or parties agree 
to submit to the identified jurisdiction. Possibly more accurately, it is an agreement whereby 
the parties preclude themselves from denying that the identified court or courts has 
substantive jurisdiction.227 Under a non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement, if a party brings 
proceedings in another court which has jurisdiction – for example by reference to domicile 
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of the defendant – this will not, without more, amount to a breach of contract.228 It ought, 
however, to be a breach of contract to act in a manner so as to prevent a party from bringing 
proceedings in the non-exclusive forum.229 It is instructive to contrast two decisions of the 
English Court of Appeal which in part turned on the different wording of the respective 
clauses. In Sabah Shipyard (Pakistan) Ltd. V. Islamic Republic of Pakistan230 the defendant 
had in a contract of guarantee agreed to submit to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the 
English courts, but had commenced proceedings in Pakistan seeking, inter alia, an injunction 
restraining the claimant from presenting any demand under or enforcing the guarantee. This 
conduct was cited by Lord Justice Waller as an example of a breach of the non-exclusive 
jurisdiction clause, since one party could not act in such a manner so as to prevent the other 
from exercising his rights under it.231 In Royal Bank of Canada v. Centrale Raiffeisen-
Boerenleenbank232 the parties swap agreement expressly contemplated the ability of either 
party to bring proceedings other that in England, to whose jurisdiction each party agreed to 
submit. Proceedings in due course were brought by the defendant in New York and the 
claimant in England. The claimant successfully sought to restrain the defendant from 
proceeding with the New York action. The Court of Appeal concluded that, by reason of the 
terms of the swap agreement, there was no breach involved in the bringing of the New York 
proceedings and there was nothing to suggest that the conduct of those proceedings had 
been or become oppressive or vexatious. 
At its core, a non-exclusive choice of court agreement permits a party to be sued in one or 
more identified courts without creating any positive obligation to bring proceedings in that 
forum. A non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement is nevertheless given effect at common law 
either by refusing to stay proceedings brought in England pursuant to such a clause or by the 
grant of a stay on grounds of forum non conveniens if proceedings are brought in England, 
and England is a forum other than the identified non-exclusive forum. The enforcement of a 
non-exclusive jurisdiction by the grant of an anti-suit injunction is more problematic because 
of the need in such cases to show either a breach of contract, or vexatious or oppressive 
conduct. The Court of Appeal in Highland Crusader Offshore Partners LLP v Deutsche Bank 
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AG233 has decisively moved in the right direction by making it clear that there is no 
presumption that the pursuit of parallel proceedings in the context of a non-exclusive 
jurisdiction agreement is by itself vexatious or oppressive. A party complaining of such 
parallel proceedings in order to obtain the grant of an anti-suit injunction will need to point 
to factors over and above the mere existence or pursuit of parallel proceedings. 
Interim Conclusion 
In view of the foregoing excursus, it is quite clear that at common law, an exclusive choice of 
court agreement creates and gives rise to the mutual right and obligation to bring 
proceedings exclusively in the nominated forum and none other. The initiation of 
proceedings by either contracting party in a non-chosen forum will amount to a breach of 
the exclusive choice of court agreement. The same analysis cannot be applied verbatim to 
the case of the non-exclusive choice of court agreements as a result of the differing nature 
of obligations created and imposed between the parties in such agreements. A non-exclusive 
jurisdiction agreement is essentially enabling in effect as it allows the contracting parties to 
initiate proceedings in a range of potential forums. The wider range of prospective courts 
available and tolerance of parallel proceedings make non-exclusive jurisdiction agreements 
less susceptible to being breached by either contracting party.     
Hybrid Jurisdiction-Arbitration Agreements 
Apart from the conventional binary categories of exclusive and non-exclusive choice of court 
agreements, the venue provisions in a dispute resolution agreement may adopt a more 
sophisticated hybrid form. The hybrid agreement may provide that litigation in a given court 
is primary, with arbitration as an alternative,234 or that arbitration is primary and litigation 
secondary.235 Such hybrid agreements are often asymmetric or unilateral, giving one party 
the option to choose how the dispute should be resolved. An international finance 
agreement might, for instance, provide that the English courts have jurisdiction, but provide 
that ‘any dispute arising out of or in connection with this agreement, may at the option of 
the bank be referred to and finally resolved by arbitration’.236 
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Hybrid agreements may also possess a more complex and multi-tiered structure. Such 
agreements may make provision for an escalating series of optional dispute resolution 
mechanisms, ascending in formality from various types of alternative dispute resolution 
(pre-action negotiation, conciliation, mediation, expert determination), until arbitration or 
litigation is necessitated. However, such a hybrid clause has to be clearly and unambiguously 
worded, as the optional nature of the agreement and the satisfaction of the pre-requisites 
for engaging a higher tier of dispute resolution may lead the court to strike down the clause 
for lack of certainty.237 For these reasons, optional clauses in major commercial transactions 
are generally limited to a choice between litigation and arbitration along with the added 
certainty that any choice is at the option of one party alone. 
Hybrid jurisdiction-arbitration agreements offer significant advantages to the contracting 
parties by providing the flexibility of a wider range of available forums and extending the 
reach of party autonomy in forum selection by covering both litigation and arbitration. The 
inherent flexibility of the hybrid agreement may be harnessed to tailor dispute resolution to 
respond to the needs of a particular dispute. For instance, a multi-party and multi-
jurisdictional dispute may be better suited to coordinated international commercial litigation 
in view of international commercial arbitration’s often fragmented and atomized treatment 
of international commercial disputes. Alternatively, the parties may want to maintain an 
ongoing business relationship which may be jeopardized by the formal and adversarial 
nature of international litigation. Moreover, considerations based on the enforcement of the 
eventual judgment or arbitral award may also be very relevant when the parties opt for the 
method of international dispute resolution.238 
The agreement to litigate in the courts of a Member State is the only element of a hybrid 
clause which is subject to the Brussels I Regulation. An agreement to submit disputes to an 
arbitral tribunal or arbitration is not subject to the Brussels I Regulation.239 The agreement to 
litigate in a hybrid clause must satisfy the usual requirements of form and agreement in 
Article 25 of the Recast Regulation.    
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Asymmetric or Unilateral Choice of Court Agreements 
A choice of court agreement may be bilateral, allowing each party to sue the other in the 
same court or courts of a Member State, or asymmetric,240 whereby one party alone submits 
to the agreed Member State court’s jurisdiction and the other party has a wider choice of 
forum. Asymmetric or unilateral choice of court agreements are very common in cross 
border finance transactions, where the rights of one party to a jurisdiction agreement are at 
least partly unilateral. For instance, a borrower and lender in an international loan 
agreement will submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of a designated court, but the lender will 
reserve the right to sue the borrower in any other court of competent jurisdiction.241 The 
jurisdiction of any alternative court depends on whether that court has personal or subject 
matter jurisdiction242 and not on consent. Where the counterparty’s obligation is the 
repayment of a debt, such clauses are less a mechanism for resolving disputes, and more an 
avenue for facilitating the enforcement of the debt. 
The lender may rely on a summary enforcement procedure available under national law to 
recover the debt in any alternative court.243 A unilateral jurisdiction agreement allows a 
creditor the flexibility to seek enforcement wherever a borrower’s assets are for the time 
being located. By minimizing enforcement risk they reduce the cost of the transaction to 
borrowers and enhance the readiness of lenders to provide finance. Asymmetric clauses are 
valid and enforceable in English law and have been upheld without challenge or reservation 
in a number of English decisions.244 However, the validity and enforcement of such 
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asymmetric provisions within the EU regime, and in many national legal systems,245 is 
uncertain. 
Doubt has arisen in particular because of the controversial decision of the French Cour de 
Cassation in Ms X v Banque Privee Edmond de Rothschild Europe (Societe) (hereinafter 
referred to as ‘Banque Rothschild’).246 In Banque Rothschild, Ms X, a French national, 
commenced proceedings in Paris against Banque Rothschild, a Luxembourg bank with which 
she had an account. The contract between them provided that the Luxembourg courts 
should have exclusive jurisdiction over any claims brought by Ms X, but permitted the bank 
to sue either in Luxembourg or in the courts of the client’s domicile or any other court of 
competent jurisdiction. Relying on the first limb of the clause, the bank argued that the 
French courts had no jurisdiction. Agreeing with the courts below, however, the Cour de 
Cassation held that Ms X was free to sue in France. The French Supreme Court held that, the 
jurisdiction agreement, purporting to confine her to suing in Luxembourg, was ineffective. 
Deploying a principle familiar in French contract law, the court held that the clause was 
potestative,247 as it merely granted an option to the bank to sue in Luxembourg.248 As such it 
was contrary to the objectives of Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation. The effect of the 
decision is to destabilize a term frequently encountered in cross border commercial 
transactions. In future proceedings in EU Member States (including England) concerning 
asymmetric jurisdiction agreements, arguments based on the decision in Banque Rothschild 
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will inevitably be employed in an attempt to disable them. The effect is to generate 
uncertainty and expense, and to render a future reference to the CJEU more likely. 
On 25 March 2015, the French Supreme Court for Civil and Criminal matters (Cour de 
cassation) upheld its decision in Banque Rothschild and ruled that an asymmetrical 
jurisdiction clause is not be enforceable in France.249 The case concerned a French business 
and a Swiss bank. The clause provided that the bank could sue in “any other court of 
competent jurisdiction”. The lower court had validated the clause. The Cour de 
cassation allowed the appeal and ruled that the clause could have been validated if it had 
made clear on which “objective elements” it granted jurisdiction, which the lower court did 
not discuss. The decision lacked a reference to the French contract law concept of 
potestative clauses. Contrary to Banque Rothschild, the case concerned Article 23 of the 
Lugano Convention (2007) and a consumer was not involved. 
On 7 October 2015, the French Supreme Court (Cour de cassation) handed down a decision 
that has clarified its interpretation of the rules for jurisdiction clauses within the European 
Union.250 In this case, a company incorporated in France (eBizcuss) and a company 
incorporated in Ireland (Apple Sales International) had signed a contract with a jurisdiction 
clause whereby the parties agreed that disputes would be settled in the courts of the 
Republic of Ireland. However, the same clause also reserved the right of the Irish company 
alone to apply to the courts with jurisdiction over the counterparty's registered office, or 
those in any country where it suffered a loss caused by the counterparty. The French 
company complained that the Irish company was infringing competition law, and started 
proceedings before the Paris Commercial Court seeking compensation for the harm it had 
suffered. The Irish company successfully argued that the Commercial Court lacked 
jurisdiction, which belonged to the courts of Ireland. When the French company's appeal to 
the Paris Court of Appeal was also unsuccessful, it filed a Supreme Court appeal. The Cour de 
cassation took the opportunity in this decision to refine its jurisprudence in Banque 
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Rothschild and ICH v Crédit Suisse by upholding asymmetric jurisdiction clauses provided that 
they objectively identify the courts that may have jurisdiction. In the view of the French 
Supreme Court even though the French and Irish companies did not enjoy the same freedom 
in choosing which court would hear their dispute, the jurisdiction clause did abide by the 
predictability requirement by making it possible to objectively identify which courts could 
conceivably have jurisdiction. It is submitted that the French Supreme Court is distancing 
itself from the requirement of strict mutuality of terms (potestative) by focusing on objective 
criteria that help identify the courts possessing jurisdiction. In this particular case, the option 
to sue in ‘any other court of competent jurisdiction’ frequently attributed to asymmetric 
jurisdiction agreements was replaced by a more predictable clause which provided a 
narrower range of readily ascertainable courts.      
The issue exposed in the French Supreme Court rulings is whether, and if so in what 
circumstances, it is possible to advance an argument that asymmetric jurisdiction 
agreements are incompatible with what is now Article 25. Insofar as this is possible, the 
implications are serious and far-reaching. If such agreements are wholly ineffective and void 
neither party could rely on the agreement to found jurisdiction even in the primary court 
identified in the clause. Suppose that the parties to an international loan agreement confer 
jurisdiction on the English courts, but permit the lender to sue alternatively in any other 
court of competent jurisdiction. The borrower could now object even to proceedings 
brought by the lender in England. Again to challenge the validity of asymmetric jurisdiction 
agreements is to threaten a barrage of torpedo actions, in which counterparties, seeking to 
avoid a unilaterally exclusive jurisdiction agreement in favour of one court, commence pre-
emptive proceedings elsewhere. Borrowers, contractually bound to litigate in England under 
English law, often seek to escape the pro creditor approach of the English courts when 
applying English law by seeking a declaration of non-liability in legal systems offering them 
greater protection. Such pre-emptive strikes are destined to fail if both contracting parties 
have bilaterally agreed to the exclusive jurisdiction of the English courts. But pre-emptive 
proceedings may become a feasible or even a viable option if the debtor has grounds to 
challenge the validity of asymmetric jurisdiction agreements. The French Supreme Court 
decisions have meant that the likelihood of pre-emptive proceedings being initiated in an 
attempt to impugn the validity of an asymmetric jurisdiction agreement conferring 
jurisdiction on the English courts has increased. However, the ruling in Apple Sales 
International v eBizcuss indicates a possible change in the French Supreme Court’s attitude 
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towards such clauses and arguably reduces the litigation risk arising from pre-emptive 
proceedings challenging the validity of an English asymmetric jurisdiction agreement. Under 
the circumstances and in the context of the Brussels jurisdiction and judgments regime, an 
action for damages for breach of the jurisdiction agreement may play a significant role in 
both effectively deterring the onset of these torpedo actions and in responding to the actual 
breach of contract by compensation.   
Effectiveness of Asymmetric Jurisdiction Agreements and Article 25 of the Recast 
Regulation 
It is submitted that, asymmetric non-exclusive jurisdiction agreements are in principle 
compatible with Article 25 of the Brussels I Regulation (Recast).251 First, Article 25 expressly 
provides that agreements within its scope are exclusive unless otherwise agreed, thereby 
recognizing that non-exclusive jurisdiction agreements are compatible with the 
Regulation.252 Second, the decision in Banque Rothschild is inconsistent with the 
assumptions underlying Article 25. The choice of court agreement provision in the Brussels 
Convention expressly provided that: ‘If an agreement conferring jurisdiction was concluded 
for the benefit of only one of the parties, that party shall retain the right to bring 
proceedings in any other court which has jurisdiction by virtue of this Convention’.253 Those 
words were omitted from Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation not because such 
agreements are objectionable, but because (it was generally assumed) the endorsement of 
non-exclusive jurisdiction in Article 23 made explicit reference to unilateral agreements 
unnecessary. 
Apart from evidence of the recognition of non-exclusive jurisdiction agreements, it is 
proposed that the effectiveness of asymmetric jurisdiction agreements under Article 25 of 
the Recast Regulation may be examined from the perspectives of validity, certainty, form 
and fairness. The validity of unilateral jurisdiction agreements is perhaps uncontroversial as 
these agreements will be valid if the parties select an appropriate forum. It is to be observed 
whether such agreements comply with Article 25’s requirements of form, certainty and 
fairness. 
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The determination of the substantive validity of a jurisdiction agreement under Article 23 of 
the Brussels I Regulation is problematic. First, the question arises whether the requirements 
imposed by Article 23 are a sufficient guarantee of substantive validity. If the answer is in the 
negative then the issue arises whether and to what extent may the law of a national legal 
system be applied to determine the issue. The exact identity of the national law used to 
determine substantive validity raises its own challenges. 
At the outset, it may be argued that the compatibility of an asymmetric jurisdiction 
agreement with Article 25 of the Recast Regulation is not an issue of substantive validity but 
a question of the scope of an ‘agreement’ governed by an autonomous interpretation of 
Article 25 of the Recast Regulation. It is arguable that the potestative nature of a jurisdiction 
clause and the existence of objective criteria that helps identify the courts possessing 
jurisdiction may be characterized as issues of formal consent. The advantage of such a 
characterization would be that it automatically facilitates a pan-European solution to the 
issue of the compatibility of asymmetric jurisdiction agreements with Article 25 of the Recast 
Regulation. The choice of law hurdle including the burden of pleading and proving foreign 
law on the validity of such agreements in the lex fori prorogatum would be eliminated.   
However, it will be argued here that the compatibility of asymmetric jurisdiction agreements 
with Article 25 of the Recast Regulation should be characterized as an issue of substantive 
validity. Article 25 of the Recast Regulation provides that an agreement is ineffective if null 
and void as to its substantive validity under the law of the Member State whose courts are 
designated under the agreement. Therefore, the validity of an asymmetric jurisdiction 
agreement will depend on the law of the prorogated forum, including its rules of private 
international law.254 In practice, depending on the legal system in question, validity will 
therefore depend on the local law of the forum or on the law applicable to the main 
contract. 
Where an agreement is valid as per the law of the agreed court, it will also be valid in the 
courts of another Member State. Article 25 stipulates that the law of the chosen court 
including its choice of law rules will govern substantive validity. If a bank and a borrower 
                                                          
254 Jan Strnad, ‘Determining the Existence of Consent for Choice-of-Court Agreements under the Brussels I-bis 
Regulation’ (2014) 14 The European Legal Forum 113, 117-118; Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation 
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agree to the jurisdiction of the English courts, in which such agreements are valid, but the 
bank is permitted to sue in addition in any other court of competent jurisdiction. Let’s 
suppose, that the borrower brings proceedings in Austria, contrary to the agreement. If the 
bank then sues in the English courts, the English courts have sole responsibility under Article 
31(2) for determining the validity of the agreement.255 Even if the bank does not sue in 
England so as to engage Article 31(2), the Austrian courts would be required to refer the 
agreement’s validity to English law under Article 25. Conversely, suppose that the bank 
exercises its option to sue in any court of competent jurisdiction by initiating proceedings 
against the borrower in France. Suppose that the borrower challenges the bank’s right to do 
so by relying on the argument that such agreements are invalid in French law. The borrower 
may also argue that such agreements are by necessary implication also contrary to European 
Union law. The challenge will fail because under Article 25 English law alone governs the 
validity of a jurisdiction agreement. The underlying logic is that the parties have agreed 
(although for the bank’s sole benefit) to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the English courts, 
making English law the law of the chosen court. Even if the bank opts to sue in France 
pursuant to the agreement, the jurisdiction of the French courts is not the agreed 
jurisdiction under Article 25. It will derive from whatever ground of personal or subject 
matter jurisdiction the bank relies on. There is no sense in which French law, as the law of 
the actual forum, is engaged. 
Asymmetric jurisdiction agreements will be invalid if the parties select as the primary court 
designated in the agreement a court in a Member State which imposes strict requirements 
of mutuality on contractual terms. English law will refer the issue of the substantive validity 
of a jurisdiction agreement to the law governing the host contract. As observed above, 
asymmetric jurisdiction agreements have been upheld without challenge or reservation in 
numerous English decisions. 
English law’s positive treatment of asymmetric jurisdiction agreements is premised on three 
underlying principles.256 First, such agreements are considered as imposing an obligation on 
beneficiaries and do not lack mutuality. The beneficiary is obliged to accept that the English 
courts have jurisdiction over any claim brought by the counterparty. Second, the principles 
                                                          
255 This, of course, is subject to whether an asymmetric jurisdiction agreement qualifies as an exclusive 
jurisdiction agreement for the purposes of Article 31(2) of the Brussels I Regulation (Recast). An asymmetric 
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of the freedom and sanctity of the contract are paramount in assessing the effect of such 
clauses.257 Even a clause requiring the borrower to accept the jurisdiction of any court in 
which the bank elects to sue would be valid. Third, Article 6 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights may not affect any restriction on a party’s choice of forum. It has been 
judicially pronounced that it ‘is directed to access to justice within the forum chosen by the 
parties, not to choice of forum’.258   
Certainty 
It may be argued that asymmetric jurisdiction agreements confer discretion on where one 
party might bring proceedings and hence undermine the legal certainty inherent in the 
Recast Regulation’s jurisdictional regime. However, Article 25 itself recognises non-exclusive 
jurisdiction agreements and uncertainty as to venue are part and parcel of such agreements. 
Apart from the specific case of Article 25, the Recast Regulation clearly makes provision for 
allowing claimants a fettered or limited choice of venue or forum shopping. The special 
jurisdiction rules under Article 7 of the Recast Regulation are based on a connection 
between the subject matter of the dispute and the forum and are an alternative to personal 
jurisdiction under Article 4 of the Regulation. 
Let’s consider an asymmetric jurisdiction agreement providing that proceedings may be 
commenced in ‘any other court of competent jurisdiction’ from the perspective of certainty. 
It is submitted that, determining the court of competent jurisdiction under the clear and 
precisely demarcated jurisdictional rules of the Recast Regulation is not an onerous task and 
does not lead to wanton uncertainty. Under the Recast Regulation, the parties to the 
asymmetric jurisdiction agreement will be in a position to predict with reasonable clarity and 
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It might be suggested that asymmetric jurisdiction agreements are incompatible with the 
requirements as to form of Article 25. First, the objection to asymmetric jurisdiction 
agreements may be said to lie in their unilateral form, whereby one party assumes 
obligations regarding jurisdiction, while the other does not. This line of reasoning fails on 
two distinct grounds. On the one hand it mistakes the nature of such agreements. While 
they are clearly asymmetric, by giving one party alone the right to sue other than in the 
designated court, they are not truly unilateral in nature. Far from imposing no obligation on 
the beneficiary under the agreement, such agreements oblige that party to accept the 
jurisdiction of the designated court if sued there by the counterparty. Even if, as is common, 
such agreements are expressed to be for the benefit of one party, this does not entitle that 
party to renounce its agreement to proceedings in the designated court. 
More significantly, whatever the nature of such agreements, there is nothing in the Recast 
Regulation or its objectives to suggest that any asymmetry or lack of mutuality is an 
objection to their effectiveness. Indeed, Article 25’s language clearly suggests that such 
concerns about form are irrelevant. Article 25 expressly demands that jurisdiction 
agreement be in writing, or otherwise in a form evident to the parties, but says nothing 
more about their permitted structure. 
Second, it might be suggested that hybrid jurisdiction agreements are incompatible with 
Article 25, because the Recast Regulation governs only agreements to the jurisdiction of one 
Member State, being limited to agreements to submit to the court or courts of that Member 
State. This is misconceived for two reasons. There is no reason why the parties cannot agree 
to the jurisdiction of the courts of more than one Member State. More importantly, such an 
agreement misunderstands the nature of a typical asymmetric clause. Such clauses do not 
purport to confer jurisdiction on the courts of more than one Member State. The only 
jurisdiction agreement contained in such a clause is the agreement to the jurisdiction of the 
designated court. Whether any court has jurisdiction depends not on agreement, but on 
whether any other court is otherwise competent, by reason of the defendant’s domicile, or 
because it has subject matter jurisdiction under Article 7. The wording of the former Article 
17 of the Brussels Convention is here instructive. It provided that where an agreement 
conferring jurisdiction was concluded for the benefit of only one of the parties, that party 
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shall retain the right to bring proceedings in any other court which has jurisdiction by virtue 
of this Convention. 
Third, it may be said that only an agreement which excludes the possibility of proceedings in 
more than one Member State is exclusive. An asymmetric agreement is therefore inevitably 
non-exclusive. Although no such definition is provided by the Regulation, exclusive 
jurisdiction agreements are thus defined by Article 3(a) of the Hague Convention on Choice 
of Court Agreements (‘Hague Convention’): The parties agree to ‘the courts of one 
Contracting State or one or more specific courts of one Contracting State to the exclusion of 
the jurisdiction of any other courts’. In the context of the Hague Convention this narrow 
definition serves its purpose as only exclusive jurisdiction agreements are regulated by the 
Convention. In the context of the Regulation, however, the effect of regarding asymmetric 
agreements as non-exclusive is potentially problematic. There is nothing incoherent about 
concluding that such agreements are non-exclusive for the purposes of Article 31(2), but 
intractable problems arise in the context of Article 25. Such a conclusion is inconsistent with 
a counterparty’s clear agreement that it will sue exclusively in the designated court, and it 
cannot have been intended to deny such an agreement exclusive effect should a 
counterparty sue in another court in breach of the agreement. 
Arguably, the solution is to draw a distinction between a jurisdiction clause and the distinct 
agreements it may compromise. It is coherent to say that asymmetric clauses are to be 
classified as non-exclusive, insofar as they do not confine proceedings to a single court. 
However, such clauses contain separate exclusive and non-exclusive jurisdiction agreements, 
whereby the counterparty’s agreement to sue in the designated court is exclusive, and the 
beneficiary’s agreement to sue in that court is non-exclusive. 
Fourth, it may be argued that Article 25 allows for the possibility that a jurisdiction 
agreement may be either exclusive or non-exclusive, but not both. Certainly, Article 25 
describes these as alternatives, but again, it is important to distinguish jurisdiction clauses, in 
the sense of terms or paragraphs in a contract, from jurisdiction agreements, being the legal 
binding promises contained in such clauses. A jurisdiction agreement cannot logically be 
both exclusive and non-exclusive simultaneously, but a single clause may incorporate 





It may be suggested that asymmetric jurisdiction agreements are incompatible with the 
principle of equal access to justice premised on Article 6 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (‘ECHR’).259 This argument supplies a means for challenging such provisions 
for lack of mutuality otherwise lacking in the letter and spirit of the Brussels I Regulation, but 
it fails to convince. First, the requirement of equal access to justice cannot realistically be 
applied in a manner in which each party is actually placed on an equal footing in litigation. 
Such an altruistic supposition is necessarily divorced from the complex realities of high value 
international commercial litigation where equality of arms is at best an illusion. Second, it is 
difficult to countenance why a freely entered into contractual agreement, in the absence of 
malice or bad faith by the other party, could be regarded as infringing a party’s rights. In a 
different but related context it appears that a party which has agreed to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the English courts cannot complain that its Article 6 ECHR rights are infringed 
if an English court grants an injunction to prevent it from suing elsewhere.260 Even if Article 6 
ECHR engages in the present context, it is doubtful that it can be concerned with the extent 
of a party’s choice of jurisdiction. As has been said: 
Article 6 of the ECHR does not deal at all with where the right to a fair and public 
hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal established by law is to be 
exercised by a litigant. The crucial point is that civil rights must be determined 
somewhere by a hearing and before a tribunal in accordance with the provisions of 
Article 6.261 
As this implies, the principle of equality of arms enshrined in Article 6 ECHR is concerned 
with the position of the parties before a particular court, not whether the parties have an 
equal choice of court prior to selecting a forum to litigate in.262 It is possible that some 
involuntary restriction on a party’s right to litigate, such as an anti-suit injunction which 
denies a claimant the opportunity to sue anywhere, might infringe the requirement of access 
to justice.263 The principle would also be infringed if the effect of limiting a party’s choice of 
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incorporates into UK law the rights contained in the European Convention on Human Rights. 
260 OT Africa Line Ltd v Hijazy (The Kribi) (No 1) [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 76, [42]. 
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forum is to force them into a court where they would not receive substantial justice,264 but 
in such cases it is not any lack of equality in the choice of forum which is the source of the 
injustice. The source of injustice is rather the determination of the party’s civil rights and 
obligations in a court which denies them a fair, just and impartial hearing resulting in a 
miscarriage of justice. 
Interim Conclusion 
Building on the arguments above, principle suggests that unilateral or asymmetric non-
exclusive jurisdiction agreements are compatible with Article 25 of the Recast Regulation. 
These are agreements whereby the parties agree to the jurisdiction of a given court, but one 
party alone has the right to sue in any other court of competent jurisdiction. Thus, one party 
submits to the exclusive jurisdiction of a given court, whereas the other party submits to 
that court’s non-exclusive jurisdiction. Such provisions are a type of non-exclusive 
jurisdiction agreement, which are expressly permitted by Article 25.  
Notwithstanding any arguments regarding the compatibility of an asymmetric non-exclusive 
jurisdiction agreement with Article 25, the potential for torpedo actions impugning the 
validity of such agreements in the wake of Banque Rothschild cannot be ruled out. However, 
the ruling in Apple Sales International v eBizcuss indicates a possible change in the French 
Supreme Court’s attitude towards such clauses and arguably reduces the litigation risk 
arising from pre-emptive proceedings challenging the validity of an English asymmetric 
jurisdiction agreement. Whether any subsequent proceedings in the English courts will 
trigger Article 31(2) of the Recast Regulation is uncertain at the moment. However, it has 
been argued that the borrower in an international finance agreement is obliged to litigate in 
the primary forum and thus the jurisdiction agreement is exclusive in a sense. Hence, 
proceedings in the primary forum in response to the commencement of a torpedo action by 
the borrower should in principle be able to rely on Article 31(2).265 In the event that Article 
31(2) cannot be invoked or even otherwise, seeking damages for breach of the asymmetric 
jurisdiction agreement in the English courts may compensate the disgruntled party. Thus, 
the common law’s pragmatic damages remedy will be revitalized by augmenting the 
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procedural mechanisms for the enforcement of jurisdiction agreements in the Recast 
Regulation.    
From a systemic perspective, a future reference to the CJEU concerning the validity of such 
agreements may help clarify the waters muddied by the decision of the Cour de Cassation in 
Banque Rothschild. A positive development which may ameliorate the litigation risk created 
by Banque Rothschild is the incorporation of a new provision in the Recast Regulation which 
refers the substantive validity of a jurisdiction agreement to the law of the selected forum 
including its rules of private international law. This will mean that the courts of any Member 
State seised with a dispute will refer the substantive validity of an asymmetric jurisdiction 
agreement to the law of the selected forum and that such agreements shall be valid, if valid 
under the lex fori prorogatum. The alternative argument that the compatibility of 
asymmetric jurisdiction agreements with Article 25 is solely an issue of the scope of an 
‘agreement’ governed by an autonomous interpretation of Article 25 of the Recast 
Regulation has also been explored. A clarification of the position on the compatibility of 
asymmetric jurisdiction agreements with Article 25 of the Recast Regulation from a CJEU 
decision would be most welcome.   
Effectiveness of Asymmetric Jurisdiction Agreements and Article 23 of the Brussels I 
Regulation 
Jurisdiction agreements in disputes commenced before 10 January 2015 are subject to 
Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation, if one party is domiciled in an EU Member State. The 
effect of asymmetric jurisdiction agreements is in principle the same as under Article 25 of 
the Recast Regulation, with the important exception that Article 23 makes no explicit 
reference to the law governing the substantive validity of jurisdiction agreements. The law 
governing the substantive validity of a jurisdiction agreement is therefore a controversial 
issue under the Brussels I Regulation.266 
It is possible that the conditions of validity stipulated by Article 23 are complete and that a 
jurisdiction agreement is enforceable merely if the requirements of consensus, form and 
certainty are satisfied. The alternative is that substantive validity of such an agreement is 
within the remit of national law, with the effect that the law governing the agreement 
regulates such matters as the vitiation of consent by reason of fraud, duress or mistake. The 
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English courts have accepted that no reference to national law is possible.267 However, this 
view is not the norm elsewhere268 and the opposite view has been adopted in some EU 
Member States.269 Some Member States apply the law of the forum and others the law 
governing the contract.270 
If Article 23 is an autonomous regime, not subject to national law, the issue of substantive 
validity becomes irrelevant and leaves asymmetric agreements to be decided by reference 
to considerations of form, certainty and fairness. Insofar as substantive validity is subject to 
national law, their validity is a matter for that law, exposing such agreements to the risk of 
invalidity depending on the content of that law. Such agreements would be valid, therefore, 
in an English court, in a contract governed by English law.  
Asymmetric Agreements Subject to National Law 
Under Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation, national law governs the prorogative effect of 
agreements to the jurisdiction of EU national courts, neither party to which is EU 
domiciled.271 However, Article 23 precludes any court but the designated court from 
exercising jurisdiction unless the designated court has declined jurisdiction.272 The effect is 
that an English court will apply English law to determine the validity and effect of an 
asymmetric agreement in which the English court is the primary forum. As a consequence, 
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courts of a Member State concluded by non EU domiciliaries is regulated by the Brussels I Regulation.   
92 
 
Fundamental Juridical Nature and Classification of Choice of Court Agreements under the 
Brussels I Regulation (Recast) 
As mentioned above, the distinction between an exclusive and non-exclusive choice of court 
agreement remains relevant in the context of the European Union private international law 
regime exemplified by the Brussels I Regulation and the Recast Regulation. Exclusive 
jurisdiction agreements for the courts of a Member State, which meet the requirements of 
Article 25 of the Recast Regulation will take precedence and oust the jurisdiction of the 
courts of the defendant’s domicile (Article 4 – incorporating the actor sequitur forum rei 
principle), and the special jurisdiction provisions in Articles 7 and 8 of the Recast 
Regulation.273 Any court other than the chosen court must stay proceedings once the chosen 
court is seised and eventually decline jurisdiction unless a party has submitted to the 
jurisdiction of that court under Article 26.274 Exclusive jurisdiction under Article 24 of the 
Recast Regulation will also assume priority over an exclusive jurisdiction agreement pursuant 
to Article 25. If the parties have conferred non-exclusive jurisdiction on the courts of one or 
more identified Member States, then this will not take precedence over the jurisdiction of 
the courts of the defendant’s domicile (Article 4) or any special jurisdiction available under 
Articles 7 and 8 of the Recast Regulation. The allocation of substantive jurisdiction in such a 
case will be determined by the order in which proceedings are brought. Under Article 27 of 
the Brussels I Regulation, any other court than the court first seised must stay its 
proceedings.275 However, Article 31(2) of the Recast Regulation has reversed the CJEU’s 
commercially inept ruling in Gasser by making provision for a reverse lis pendens rule which 
accords priority to the court chosen in an exclusive jurisdiction agreement. 
Shedding light on the different treatment of exclusive and non-exclusive choice of court 
agreements under Article 25, may serve to conceal a rather more fundamental contrast 
between the approach to jurisdiction agreements at the English common law and under the 
European Union’s Brussels I Regulation (Recast). It has been observed that at common law 
an exclusive choice of court agreement contains a positive contractual obligation to refer 
disputes that fall within the ambit of the clause to an identified court and an obligation not 
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to bring proceedings elsewhere.276 On the other hand, Article 25 of the Regulation ‘serves a 
procedural purpose’,277 in that it determines whether a jurisdiction agreement successfully 
prorogates the jurisdiction of a court or derogates the jurisdiction of a court or neither.278 
Briggs has argued that a contractual understanding of a jurisdiction agreement is neither 
necessary nor desirable and it is unhelpful to think of such agreements as capable of being 
breached.279 He advances the view that:280 ‘Article 23 does not require, and is not 
necessarily satisfied by, a contractually binding agreement on jurisdiction’. The English 
courts have held that what is required is that the party who is to be held to a proposed 
agreement has agreed with the person who wishes to sue him, in a sufficient form, to accept 
the jurisdiction of the court in which he is to be sued.281 The CJEU has declined to analyse 
jurisdiction agreements in the language of private law rights and as though they were 
contracts, or to invalidate them when the contract in which they are made is legally 
invalid.282 As a consequence, if the parties make their agreement in the form of a contract to 
sue in one court and to not sue in any other, a term of the contract will be able to serve or 
fulfill the procedural or jurisdictional purpose of determining, or contributing to the 
determination of, the jurisdiction of courts of Member States. In the concluding chapter of 
Agreements, Briggs whilst summarizing the common law private international law rules 
states that ‘agreements on jurisdiction within the Brussels scheme operate by formal waiver 
of jurisdictional privilege, and do not depend upon the existence of a private contract.’283 
The essentially procedural character of jurisdiction agreements under the Regulation is given 
credence by the fact that the original Rome Convention and its successor instrument the 
Rome I Regulation expressly exclude arbitration agreements and agreements on choice of 
court from their material scope of application.284 When the European Economic and Social 
Committee was consulted on a draft text of the Rome I Regulation, it observed that the 
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exclusion of choice of court agreements was due to their procedural status.285 The Giuliano–
Lagarde Report on the Rome Convention notes that choice of court agreements were 
excluded from the design of the Convention because ‘the matter lies within the sphere of 
procedure and forms part of the administration of justice (exercise of State authority)’.286 
The official report also stated that ‘rules on jurisdiction are a matter of public policy and 
there is only marginal scope for freedom of contract’.287 As a matter of fact, the UK 
delegation had sought to include arbitration agreements into the choice of law regime of the 
Rome Convention, arguing that they were of a different nature to jurisdiction agreements.288 
The UK delegation ‘emphasized that an arbitration agreement does not differ from other 
agreements as regards the contractual aspects’289 thus hinting at the special procedural role 
of jurisdiction agreements in the allocation of jurisdiction.290 
Where a substantive challenge to the jurisdiction agreement was admissible, the common 
law had tended to refer to the law which governs the agreement as if it were a contract. The 
reasoning was that the question whether there is an agreement, by which the person is 
bound, is functionally similar to the question whether there is a contract by which parties 
are bound; and that each is referable to a form of proper law. There exists little or no 
support for this methodology in the jurisprudence of the European Court. It simply stated 
that the presence and effect of an agreement on jurisdiction is to be determined by 
reference to the formality requirements, and is not to be subjected to rules for 
determination of the applicable law, which may be complicated and which may vary, to an 
unacceptable degree, from court to court.291 It would follow that within the context of the 
Regulation, a jurisdiction agreement is not essentially contractual in character. Rather, it is a 
formal statement, by a party or parties not otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of a court, 
that a jurisdiction will be accepted, and a public statement by a party or parties that a court 
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which would otherwise have had jurisdiction will not be seised with a claim to which this 
agreement refers.292 
When the agreement is seen in those terms, it is much less obvious that one should assess 
its validity as though it were contractual in nature. In particular, a party to such an 
agreement who departs from it may not be breaching the agreement, for there is nothing to 
breach. The proper question is instead whether the party proposed to be bound had agreed 
or assented, in writing, to the jurisdiction of the court. This would explain why Articles 25 
and 26 are grouped together as ‘prorogation’: the one is an acceptance of the jurisdiction of 
a court prior to the institution of proceedings; the other is an acceptance of the jurisdiction 
of a court after the institution of proceedings.293 Each amounts to an acceptance which is 
immediately binding according to its terms, and valid as soon as it is made in due form.  
The Recast Regulation has introduced a new choice of law provision which refers issues of 
substantive validity to the lex fori prorogatum including its private international law rules 
and the technique of severability has also been codified.294 The question that arises is 
whether and to what extent the amendments in Article 25 of the Recast Regulation coupled 
with the traditional requirement for ‘agreement’ in the text of the current and preceding 
instruments render jurisdiction agreements as ‘contracts’ under the Regulation.  
It is submitted that the determination whether a jurisdiction agreement is a ‘contract’ is a 
matter of perspective and is ‘culturally conditioned’.295 The Anglo-American approach to 
contract views contract as a mutual exchange of promises, and is sometimes referred to as 
the promissory approach.296 The substantive law conception of jurisdiction agreements as 
giving rise to mutually enforceable executory promises not to sue in a non-contractual forum 
can be easily justified by the promissory approach to contracts. In contrast, the approach in 
Scotland and Civilian jurisdictions focuses on the agreement of the parties, using a 
consensual analysis.297 Arguably, the procedural contract conception of a jurisdiction 
agreement as not giving rise to mutually enforceable executory promises not to sue in a non-
                                                          
292 JSC Aeroflot-Russian Airlines v Berezovsky [2013] EWCA Civ 784. 
293 Briggs, Private International Law in English Courts (n 216) 251. 
294 See Chapter 9 below. 
295 See Horatia Muir Watt, ‘Party Autonomy in International Contracts: From the Makings of a Myth to the 
Requirements of Global Governance’ (2010) 3 European Review of Contract Law 1, 30. 
296 See Charles Fried, Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation (Harvard University Press 1981). 
297 See Black, Woolman on Contract (n 257) 2; Robin-Evans Jones and Geoffrey MacCormack, ‘Obligations’ in 
Ernest Metzger (ed.), A Companion to Justinian’s Institutions (Duckworth, London 1998) 127, 150. 
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contractual forum can be satisfactorily reconciled with an approach based solely on the 
agreement of the parties. 
Therefore, it may be unfair or at least simplistic to classify jurisdiction agreements under the 
Brussels regime as merely ‘procedural’.298 For instance, German law employs the term 
‘procedural agreement’ for jurisdiction agreements, but according to the prevailing juristic 
opinion, in particular, the choice of court agreement is perceived as a substantive law 
agreement.299 Jurisdiction agreements are governed primarily by procedural rules, but 
substantive law rules may also be applied. It is commonly understood that the validity of the 
main contract and the jurisdiction agreement need to be assessed independently and that 
the material validity of jurisdiction agreements should be governed by the lex causae and 
not the lex fori.300 The lex fori is applied to the procedural effects and in relation to the 
formal requirements of Section 38 of the ZPO.301 Thus the effects of forum selection are 
manifested in civil procedure rules which limit the scope of application of the substantive 
law rules.302 Therefore, it would be more accurate to state that German doctrine defines 
choice of court agreements as ‘bilateral procedural acts’303 or ‘hybrid contracts’304 or 
                                                          
298 Ulrich Magnus, ‘Choice of Court Agreements in the Review Proposal for the Brussels I Regulation’ in Eva Lein 
(ed.), The Brussels I Review Proposal Uncovered (BIICL, London 2012) 83, 86-87, is critical of Briggs’ 
interpretation of Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation and his denial that a bilateral agreement is required. He 
notes that it is contrary to the prevailing view among leading German and English academics. See references to 
German language sources in the text and Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (2015) (n 240) 68-69; 
Magnus and Mankowski (n 268) 474-475; A Layton and H Mercer, European Civil Practice (2nd Edition, Sweet & 
Maxwell, London 2004) 720; See Jonathan Hill and Adeline Chong, International Commercial Disputes: 
Commercial Conflict of Laws in English Courts (Hart Publishing 2010) 123-125, for a good overview of the 
differing views.    
299 Belohlávek, Rome Convention - Rome I Regulation (n 205) 364; Sparka (n 205) 87; Both Belohlávek and 
Sparka refer extensively to German case law and literature on the issue. The ‘procedural contract’ approach 
may be regarded as a general principle common to the law of a number of continental civil law Member States 
including Germany, Austria, Switzerland and the Czech Republic. See Ralf Michaels, ‘Two Paradigms of 
Jurisdiction’ [2006] Michigan Journal of International Law 1003, 1041-1045, for a discussion of the German law 
of civil jurisdiction (internationale Zuständigkeit) as the blueprint for the European paradigm of jurisdiction. 
300 Sparka (n 205) 86-87. 
301 Sparka (n 205) 87; Section 38 of the German Code of Civil Procedure (‘ZPO’); See Arthur T von Mehren and 
Eckart Gottschalk, Adjudicatory Authority in Private International Law: A Comparative Study (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2007) 220-224. 
302 Magnus and Mankowski (n 268) 511: ‘In Civil Law the view appears to prevail that [breach of a jurisdiction 
agreement] can only result in procedural sanctions.’; See P Gottwald, ‘art 23 EuGVVO’ in T Rauscher, J Wenzel 
and P Wax (eds.), Münchener Kommentar zur Zivilprozessordnung (3rd Edition, Beck 2008) [79] (only procedural 
sanctions); Briza (n 214) 551; Alexander J Belohlávek, ‘Arbitration Agreement, MDR Clauses and Relation 
thereof to Nature of Jurisdictional Decisions on the Break of Legal Cultures’ in Józef Okolski, Andrzej Całus, 
Maksymilian Pazdan, Stanisław Sołtysiński, Tomasz Wardyński, Stanisław Włodyka (eds.), Essays in Honour of 
60 years of the Court of Arbitration at the Polish Chamber of Commerce in Warsaw [Księga pamiątkowa 60-
lecia Sądu Arbitrażowego przy Krajowej Izbie Gospodarczej w Warszawie] (Warszawa 2010) 401, 408-409. 
303 Ingo Saenger, Zivilprozessordnung: Handkommentar (2nd Edition, Nomos, Baden-Baden 2007) 65; Alexander 
J Belohlavek, ‘The Definition of Procedural Agreements and Importancy to Define the Contractual Nature of the 
Arbitration Clause in International Arbitration’ in M Roth and M Giestlinger (eds.), Yearbook of International 
Arbitration (Intersentia / DIKE / NWV, Vienna-Graz, 2012) 21, 35-36. 
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‘substantive law agreements regulating procedural relationships’305 or as both ‘substantive 
and procedural’.306 Procedural contracts can only operate where there are no mandatory 
provisions in the procedural law (ZPO) prohibiting them.307 Swiss law also adheres to a 
‘procedural agreement’ conception and refers to the procedural implementation of these 
agreements as ‘instruments of a procedural modification of the claim’ (prozessuale 
Modifikation der Forderung).308 
The Regulation is concerned with the allocation of adjudicatory authority between the 
courts of the Member States of the EU. The Regulation establishes a framework for the 
allocation or distribution of jurisdiction and these provisions have a hierarchical structure, 
including, but not limited to, the obligation upon each Member State court to give effect to 
the parties agreement to confer exclusive jurisdiction on identified courts of a Member State 
unless a party submits to another jurisdiction (Article 26). Under the Recast Regulation, each 
Member State is required to give effect to an agreement that satisfies the requirements of 
Article 25. It is not permissible for the courts of one Member State to review the jurisdiction 
of another Member State court.309 This does not apply at common law. At common law the 
English courts are concerned not so much with the allocation of jurisdiction, but rather the 
ascertainment and enforcement of an obligation to bring proceedings only in one forum. 
Conclusion 
Apart from the cursory difference in treatment accorded to exclusive and non-exclusive 
choice of court agreements, Article 25 sheds light on the consequences of a 
‘paradigmatically’310 or ‘fundamentally’311 different jurisdictional regime for the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
304 Burkhard Hess, ‘The Draft Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, External Competencies of the 
European Union and Recent Case Law of the European Court of Justice’ in Arnaud Nuyts and Nadine Watté 
(eds.), International Civil Litigation in Europe and Relations with Third States (Bruylant 2005) 263, 271. 
305 Belohlávek, Rome Convention - Rome I Regulation (n 205) 364. 
306 Sparka (n 205) 87. 
307 Rauscher, Wenzel and Wax, Münchener Kommentar zur Zivilprozessordnung (n 275) [73]. 
308 Belohlávek, Rome Convention - Rome I Regulation (n 205) 365-366. 
309 Overseas Union Insurance Case C-351/89 [1991] ECR 1-3317 at [26]; Erich Gasser Gmbh v MISAT Srl Case C-
116/02 [2004] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 222 at [54]. 
310 See Michaels, Two Paradigms of Jurisdiction (n 299); Aude Fiorini, ‘The Codification of Private International 
Law in Europe - Could the Community Learn from the Experience of Mixed Jurisdictions’ (2008) 23 Tulane 
European and Civil Law Forum 89, 100-101; cf Giesela Ruhl, ‘Party Autonomy in the Private International Law of 
Contracts: Transatlantic Convergence and Economic Efficiency’ in Eckart Gottschalk, Ralf Michaels, Giesela Ruhl 
and Jan von Hein (eds.), Conflict of Laws in a Globalized World (CUP 2007) 153, conducts a comparative analysis 
of party autonomy in the private international law of contracts and argues that American and European law 
demonstrate a high degree of convergence in relation to the grant and design of party autonomy and its 
limitations as opposed to choice of law in general. 
311 Jonathan Harris, ‘Understanding the English Response to the Europeanisation of Private International Law’ 
(2008) 4 Journal of Private International Law 347, 352-353; Anna Gardella & Luca G Radicati Di Brozolo, “Civil 
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enforcement of such clauses by the English common law as compared to the European 
Union’s Recast Regulation. The English common law’s pragmatic, ‘practice driven’312 focus 
on the enforcement of an inter partes contractual obligation contained within a jurisdiction 
agreement is met with a ‘theory driven’313 hierarchical jurisdictional framework where giving 
effect to party autonomy has to be balanced against other arguably procedural concerns.314 
The Regulation’s emphasis is on the multilateral allocation of adjudicatory authority 
between the courts of the Member States of the EU, where the contractual enforcement of 
private law rights embodied in a jurisdiction agreement by way of a claim for damages may 
call into question the primacy accorded to the principle of mutual trust and the principle of 
effectiveness of EU law (effet utile).      
It has been observed that a multilateral jurisdiction and judgments order such as the Recast 
Regulation may only permit jurisdiction agreements to manifest procedural consequences. 
In other words, the contractual obligation not to be sued in a non-elected forum and the 
correlative right to sue only in the contractual forum are intrinsically incompatible with the 
system of the international public ordering of private law affected by the Regulation. 
Notwithstanding the procedural consequences, the contractual components of a choice of 
court agreement are evident in the agreement between the parties and the explicit 
sanctioning of the technique of severability and the explicit referral of issues of material 
validity to the lex fori prorogatum including its private international law rules under Article 
25 of the Recast Regulation. 
Chapter 5 examines the legal basis of the damages remedy for breach of a choice of court 
agreement from the perspective of jurisdiction to enforce a choice of court agreement, 
applicable law and recognition and enforcement of the judgment awarding the damages 
remedy. Prior to the assessment of the legal basis, the practical preliminary issue of drafting 
undertakings, indemnity clauses and liquidated damages clauses to enforce the breach of 
the choice of court agreement are discussed. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Law, Common Law and Market Integration: The EC Approach to Conflicts of Jurisdiction” (2003) 51 American 
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Chapter 5 - ‘Dispute Resolution’ Epitomized: An Assessment of the Damages 
Remedy for Breach of Jurisdiction Agreements 
Introduction 
Before proceeding to explore the legal basis, jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition 
and enforcement of the judgment awarding damages for breach of an exclusive jurisdiction 
agreement, it is necessary to digress briefly to examine the practical value of drafting and 
inserting clauses in international commercial contracts which guarantee the secondary 
enforcement of exclusive choice of court agreements and choice of law agreements. An 
examination of these clauses as a preliminary issue is warranted because these clauses 
possess a universal appeal and are not specific to the English common law tradition. Indeed, 
prominent civil law commentators have advanced the use of penalty clauses in international 
commercial contracts as a deterrent and to guarantee secondary enforcement as the 
continental ‘procedural contract’ conception of an exclusive jurisdiction agreement does not 
give rise to a substantive obligation not to sue in a non-elected forum which can be 
employed to ground a cause of action for damages. Moreover, the operation of these 
clauses may not strictly depend on the concept of a ‘breach’ of a choice of court agreement 
as understood by the common law notion that suing in a non-chosen Member State 
constitutes a ‘wrong’. Non-compliance with the exclusive jurisdiction agreement is sufficient 
to trigger these clauses into operation. A liquidated damages clause also has the additional 
advantage of predictability in terms of the heads and quantum of damages when compared 
to an action for damages for breach of an exclusive jurisdiction agreement.  
Preliminary Issue: Practical Solutions for Enforcing English Exclusive Choice of Court 
Agreements by Drafting Clauses to Guarantee the Secondary Enforcement of Jurisdiction 
Agreements 
This section provides some practical solutions aimed at preventing and effectively 
responding to the initiation of preemptive proceedings in a foreign court in breach of an 
English exclusive choice of court agreement. The suggested practical solutions are based on 
English law and focus on the effective management of legal risk in multistate transactions by 
utilizing drafting best practice to augment jurisdictional party autonomy and enforce the 
ensuing obligation not to sue in a non-elected forum.  
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The suggested drafting solutions are designed to operate at two levels. First, they should 
provide additional deterrent value, which should help avoid a breach of the choice of court 
agreement in the first place. Secondly, in the event of a breach of the choice of court 
agreement, they should work to assist the aggrieved party in responding to the breach. It is 
submitted that, the very apt general observation that ‘prevention is better than the cure’ 
does not lose any of its significance when applied in the context of the preventative and 
responsive aspects of enforcing choice of court agreements via undertakings and indemnity 
clauses. The following paragraphs assess the utility of drafting and inserting undertakings, 
indemnity clauses and liquidated damages clauses to ensure the performance of the 
obligation not to sue in a non-nominated forum encapsulated in an exclusive choice of court 
agreement.         
Undertakings Not to Breach the Choice of Court Agreement 
Well advised parties seeking to minimize litigation risk315 arising from multistate transactions 
should endeavour to devote as much drafting time and attention to the choice of court 
provision of an international commercial contract as they do to the substantive performance 
provisions when negotiating the terms. One way of protecting the innocent party is to insert 
appropriate undertakings in the contract pursuant to which the parties undertake not to 
bring court proceedings in breach of the choice of court agreement.316 The advantage of 
drafting such specific undertakings is that the innocent party will be able to rely on the 
obligations owed by the party in breach without the need to invoke a separate cause of 
action for damages for breach of the choice of court agreement. This should make it easier 
and quicker to enforce the terms in the event of a breach.  
In addition to the undertakings in the agreement, parties may wish to bolster their relative 
positions by obtaining personal undertakings from the directors and the senior management 
of the respective companies, thereby making those individuals party to the contract.317 
However, it should be noted that, apart from the specific case of contractual undertakings by 
the directors and senior management of the company, the scope for lifting the corporate veil 
                                                          
315 See Richard Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (2nd Edition, OUP 2015) Chapter 2: Litigation risk 
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316 Neville Byford and Afzalah Sarwar, ‘Arbitration Clauses after West Tankers: The Unanswerable Conundrum? 




and thereby making the controllers of the company constructive parties to the contract has 
been severely restricted by the Supreme Court of the UK in VTB Capital Plc v Nutritek 
International Corp & Ors.318  
As a result of the personal undertakings, companies may be less likely to take steps in breach 
of the choice of court agreement if those in control of the company and those making the 
relevant decisions are personally bound by the relevant obligations. These personal 
undertakings would be identical to those given by the company and would include for 
instance an undertaking not to induce or cause the relevant company to bring proceedings in 
breach of the choice of court agreement.319 The parties’ position may also be strengthened 
by obtaining financial guarantees from the directors and senior management of the 
company. In the event of a breach, in addition to having a direct claim against the company, 
the innocent party has the option of suing the individuals concerned who would otherwise 
not be parties to the contract.  
Indemnity Clauses and Liquidated Damages Clauses Enforcing the Breach of a Choice of 
Court Agreement 
Before proceeding to examine the fundamental nature and enforcement of choice of court 
agreements, it is useful to highlight the importance of drafting and inserting an indemnity 
clause as best practice in international commercial contracts. It is increasingly common to 
reinforce an exclusive choice of court agreement by drafting a clause whereby each party 
undertakes to indemnify the other against any loss arising from a failure to comply with the 
                                                          
318 In VTB Capital Plc v Nutritek International Corp & Ors [2013] UKSC 5, the claimants sought to bring two 
potential defendants before the court by arguing that they were co parties to a contract concluded by a 
company subject to their control, and so subject to a jurisdiction agreement in the contract in favour of the 
English courts. The UK Supreme Court declined to accept that the potential defendants were constructive 
parties to the contract. The corporate veil should not be pierced so as to deem a third party to be a party to a 
contract which it has not in fact concluded. The UK Supreme Court expressly overruled controversial previous 
authority in favour of binding alleged ‘puppeteers’ to jurisdiction agreements in contracts concluded by 
companies subject to their control: Antonio Gramsci Shipping Corporation v Stepanovs [2011] EWHC 333 
(Comm); Alliance Bank JSC v Aquanta Corp [2011] EWHC 3281 (Comm); Kensington International Ltd v Republic 
of Congo [2005] EWHC 2684 (Comm); See, further, Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (2015) (n 
315) 90-91; Adrian Briggs, Private International Law in English Courts (OUP 2014) 253; Adrian Briggs, ‘The 
Subtle Variety of Jurisdiction Agreements’ [2012] LMCLQ 364, 370-371. 
319 Apart from a specific contractual undertaking couched in these terms, it has been argued that a claim in 
damages may lie against a claimant’s lawyers for the tort of inducing breach of contract where it can be 
established that the claimant was advised by them to bring pre-emptive proceedings in breach of a choice of 
court agreement in AMT Futures Ltd v Marzillier, Dr Meier & Dr Guntner Rechtsanwaltsgesellschaft MbH [2014] 
EWHC 1085 (Comm) (Popplewell J); Marzillier, Dr Meier & Dr Guntner Rechtsanwaltsgesellschaft MbH v AMT 
Futures Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 143 (Christopher Clarke LJ) 
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agreement.320 It may be inserted in addition to an agreement not to sue other than in 
accordance with the choice of court agreement and not to challenge the effect of the clause 
in another court. A comprehensive and well drafted clause must itemize all potential 
litigation costs and expenses, to avoid any argument that litigation costs are a normal 
business expense which should be met.  
Conceptually, an indemnity clause works around the difficulties associated with penalty 
clauses in the English common law.321 It should be noted that, an indemnity clause does not 
imply that suing contrary to a choice of court agreement is a breach of contract. Determining 
whether a choice of court agreement may be breached by suing in a non-elected forum is a 
separate issue subject to the applicable law of the jurisdiction agreement.322 The indemnity 
clause also avoids any risks that the counterparty may argue that its conduct may be 
excused. The insertion of an indemnity clause in an international commercial contract will 
also be appropriate in cases where under the applicable law of the choice of court 
agreement the breach of such an agreement does not lead to the award of substantial 
compensatory damages. The act of suing contrary to the choice of court agreement will 
trigger an independent obligation to indemnify, thus sidestepping any argument about the 
lack of a legal basis for the recoverability of damages under the applicable law of the choice 
of court agreement. It is irrelevant that the court where the counterparty brings proceedings 
adjudicates that the agreement is ineffective and asserts jurisdiction accordingly. The 
promise to reimburse is independent of whether another court has jurisdiction.  
From the standpoint of international legal practice, indemnity clauses operate at three 
levels. First, is the case where the court in which the counterparty commences proceedings 
declines jurisdiction, or asserts jurisdiction but finds against the counterparty on the merits. 
The indemnity clause ensures that the costs and expenses of defending proceedings are 
recoverable, as they may not be recoverable or sufficiently recoverable in the court 
concerned. Second, is the scenario where the alternative court asserts jurisdiction and 
awards damages on the merits to the counterparty. The indemnity clause confers on the 
judgment debtor a separate right of action which effectively neutralizes the judgment debt. 
                                                          
320 Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (2015) (n 315) 121-122; Adrian Briggs, Agreements on 
Jurisdiction and Choice of Law (Oxford Private International Law Series, OUP 2008) 175-176; Byford and Sarwar, 
Arbitration Clauses After West Tankers (n 316) 30; Koji Takahashi, ‘Damages for Breach of a Choice of Court 
Agreement’ (2008) 10 Yearbook of Private International Law 57, 87-88. 
321 Hugh Beale, Chitty on Contracts (30th Edition, 2008) para 26-125ff. 
322 In English Law, suing in a non-elected forum is considered to be a breach of the contractual obligation not to 
sue in the non-nominated forum attributed to an exclusive jurisdiction agreement. 
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Third, the indemnity clause may act as an effective deterrent by discouraging and dissuading 
the counterparty from launching the preemptive proceedings in the first place. 
This latter aspect of the operation of an indemnity clause is the optimal solution and 
probably it’s most significant effect in practice. The remedial response of an indemnity 
clause to actual non-compliant proceedings may not be a commercially viable option. It may 
require separate enforcement in further proceedings, which for a party already embroiled in 
a costly dispute, may not be the best way forward.323 In fact, the effective and efficient 
resolution of disputes may be protracted and undermined by separate proceedings to 
enforce the indemnity clause. Moreover, disputes about the actual amount of the indemnity 
may also not be foreclosed. On balance, where available, the specific enforcement of a 
choice of court agreement by way of an anti-suit injunction is likely to be perceived by 
litigants as preferable to secondary enforcement by way of an indemnity.324 
An issue which has attracted the attention of some continental civil law jurists is the 
possibility of guaranteeing the performance of the choice of court agreement through a 
penalty clause.325 Borrowing from this idea, it is submitted that, problems of assessment 
might in principle be solved by prior agreement as to the quantum of each identified head of 
loss.326 Such a provision may be unenforceable in English and Scots contract law if 
                                                          
323 Briggs when referring to the separate enforcement proceedings in the context of the damages remedy for 
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/prof_magnus_and_prof_mankowski_university_of_hamburg_en.pdf> accessed 15 February 2014; Ulrich 
Magnus, ‘Choice of Court Agreements in the Review Proposal for the Brussels I Regulation’ in Eva Lein (ed.), 
The Brussels I Review Proposal Uncovered (BIICL, London 2012) 89-90. 
326 Martin Illmer, ‘Chapter 2 – Article 1’ in Andrew Dickinson and Eva Lein (eds.), The Brussels I Regulation 
Recast (OUP 2015) 80. 
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characterized as a penalty clause,327 but not if the assessment is proportionate to the 
legitimate interest of the innocent party in the enforcement of the primary obligation.328 The 
advantage of inserting a liquidated damages clause is that it brings certainty for the innocent 
party who will know in advance of the dispute, which losses it will be able to recover under 
the agreement. Furthermore, unless the clauses are deemed to be unenforceable, these 
clauses will allow the innocent party to recover for types of losses which may otherwise be 
struck out for being unforeseeable or too remote.329 A further advantage of liquidated 
damages clauses is that it will make it quicker and easier for the innocent party to bring a 
claim for the losses it has already identified and quantified. It is submitted that, 
quantification presents a substantial practical impediment to the development of a 
predictable and cost effective damages remedy for breach of jurisdiction agreements.330 The 
identification and quantification of specific heads of damages by prior agreement in a 
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330 Jonathan Harris, ‘Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: Where Next?’ [2009] LMCLQ 537, 546; 
Thomas Raphael, The Anti-Suit Injunction (OUP 2008) 330; Briggs, Private International Law in English Courts (n 
318) 399: ‘assessment of damages for breach of a jurisdiction clause is liable to be problematic, and any 
attempt at quantification not much more than speculative’; Francisco Garcimartin, ‘Chapter 11 – Article 31(2)-
(4)’ in Andrew Dickinson and Eva Lein (eds.), The Brussels I Regulation Recast (OUP 2015) 338; Illmer (n 326) 80: 
‘The calculation of the actual damage will potentially be very difficult and time consuming, carrying a 
considerable degree of uncertainty.’; Gary B Born, International Commercial Arbitration (2nd Edition, Kluwer 
Law International 2014) Chapter 8, 1304: ‘calculating the quantum of damages is difficult and speculative’; 
Nigel Blackaby and Constantine Partasides with Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter, Redfern and Hunter on 
International Arbitration (5th Edition, OUP 2009) 20: ‘an agreement to arbitrate is a contract of imperfect 
obligation. If it is broken, an award of damages is unlikely to be a practical remedy, given the difficulty of 
quantifying the loss sustained’. 
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liquidated damages clause may be a preferable approach and in appropriate cases may 
reduce the need to rely on a separate cause of action of damages for breach of a jurisdiction 
agreement.  
Indemnity clauses may escape the charge of interfering with the kompetenz-kompetenz of 
the sovereign jurisdictional apparatus of the foreign court and undermining the res judicata 
effect of a judgment obtained by the counterparty in non-compliant proceedings because 
these clauses are fundamentally contractual in nature and their purpose is to regulate the 
conduct of the parties. Nevertheless, the theoretical possibility of the contractual 
enforcement of an indemnity clause indirectly interfering with the principle of mutual trust 
and the principle of the effectiveness of the Brussels I Regulation cannot be foreclosed. 
Contractual drafting devices in the form of undertakings, indemnity clauses and liquidated 
damages clauses serve as a deterrent and provide additional layers of protection to reinforce 
the enforcement of choice of court agreements by reining in and compensating for the loss 
suffered as a result of preemptive proceedings in a non-chosen forum. The obligation to 
indemnify encapsulated in an indemnity clause is triggered by proceedings launched by a 
counterparty in a non-elected court. Therefore, the separate and independent obligation to 
indemnify is at one remove from the choice of court agreement and related issues including, 
whether such agreements may be breached and the existence of a separate cause of action 
of damages for breach of such agreements. 
Undertakings and Indemnity Clauses Enforcing the Breach of the Choice of Law Agreement 
Multistate transaction risk may be minimized by inserting an appropriate undertaking in the 
contract pursuant to which the parties undertake to comply with the choice of law 
agreement. The advantage of drafting such specific undertakings is that the disgruntled 
party will be able to rely on the obligations owed by the party in breach without the need to 
invoke a separate cause of action for damages for breach of the choice of law agreement. 
This should make easier and quicker to enforce the agreement in the event of a breach. 
In addition to the undertakings in the agreement, parties may wish to bolster their relative 
positions by obtaining personal undertakings from the directors and the senior management 
of the respective companies, thereby making those individuals party to the contract. In the 
event of a breach, in addition to having a direct claim against the company, the innocent 
party has the option of suing the individuals concerned who would otherwise not be parties 
to the contract. 
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An indemnity clause is another effective drafting device which seeks to indemnify the 
aggrieved party as a consequence of the other party’s non-compliance with the governing 
law clause.331 There should be no legal constraint on a clause which indemnifies or makes 
provision for liquidated damages in the event of non-compliance with the choice of law 
agreement. A liquidated damages clause provides a proportionate pre estimate of the 
damages recoverable for the loss incurred due to breach of contract. This is, however, 
without prejudice to a penalty clause which seeks to punish the non-compliant party with 
punitive or exemplary damages. 
In relation to indemnity clauses the question arises whether a party may be required to pay 
where it has merely pleaded that a given issue is not regulated by the chosen law. If the 
answer is in the affirmative, reliance on mandatory rules or public policy of the forum may 
constitute an act of non-compliance with the governing law clause. In similar vein, a party 
pleading that a particular matter properly belongs within the domain of procedure and 
hence is regulated by the lex fori regit processum332 rule should be seen as a derogation 
from the applicable law specified by the choice of law agreement. However, in reality, choice 
of law agreements are subject to rules which define the scope of the applicable law specified 
by such agreements. Therefore, the applicable law in a choice of law agreement applies only 
to substantive issues determined by the choice of law rules of the forum. The choice of law 
rules of the forum are mandatory and cannot be waived by private agreement between the 
parties. However, a choice of law agreement may perhaps be seen as not conflicting with the 
choice of law regime for allocating regulatory authority, but as a contractual agreement 
between the parties where each party promises to comply with the choice of law 
agreement. Under this conception, the choice of law agreement constitutes an independent 
and subsisting source of contractual obligation regardless of the treatment of the clause by a 






                                                          
331 Briggs, Agreements (n 320) 175-176. 
332 ‘[t]he law of the forum governs procedure’: See Richard Garnett, Substance and Procedure in Private 
International Law (Oxford Private International Law Series, OUP 2012) Introduction, 1-4. 
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The Legal Basis of the Claim for Damages for Breach of a Choice of Court 
Agreement 
Introduction 
A defendant in proceedings in which the claim was commenced in breach of a validly 
concluded jurisdiction agreement may wish to claim damages in the English courts to 
recover the loss sustained in defending the action. However, the claim for damages has no 
prospects of success unless it is supported by an appropriate cause of action or legal basis. 
This section will examine and seek to identify the most suitable legal basis for the claim of 
damages within the law of contract, tort, restitution and equity respectively. The survey will 
not limit itself to an assessment of the legal basis of the damages claim within the English 
substantive law of obligations or equity and will therefore endeavour to adopt a 
comparative law approach as far as possible where the respective influences of the common 
law and the civil law legal systems are accorded perspective.  
The English common law conflict of laws regime conceptualizes a choice of court agreement 
as performing a dual role and function; a procedural role as a basis for the invocation of the 
jurisdiction of the court and a substantive role in giving rise to an inter partes independently 
enforceable contractual obligation to sue only in the elected forum and none other.333 This 
substantive contractual obligation and the corresponding substantive right not to be sued in 
a non-contractual court forms the basis of the contractual enforcement of a choice of court 
agreement. Therefore, by relying on the substantive nature of the right not to be sued in the 
non-contractual forum contained within the choice of court agreement, there is scope for 
characterizing as substantive the issues of whether, in what circumstances, and to what 
extent damages are recoverable for breach of a choice of court agreement. The substantive 
characterization of this right contained within a jurisdiction agreement gives rise to a choice 
of law issue and much will depend on the applicable law attributed to the damages claim, 
which will in turn depend on the legal basis such as contract, tort, restitution or equity in 
which the claim is framed. It is crucial to emphasize, that the legal basis of the claim for 
damages in the law of contract is dependent on a substantive characterization of the choice 
of court agreement. A purely procedural characterization of the choice of court agreement 
will lead to the sole application of the law of the forum (lex fori), without regard to any 
                                                          
333 Trevor C Hartley, Choice of Court Agreements under the European and International Instruments: The 
Revised Brussels I Regulation, the Lugano Convention and the Hague Convention (Oxford Private International 
Law Series, OUP 2013) 4, para 1.03; ibid 129, para 7.01. 
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substantive element within the agreement requiring the application of the choice of law 
rules.   
Before analyzing the contractual legal basis of the claim for damages for breach of an 
exclusive choice of court agreement and related choice of law issues, the question of 
jurisdiction to enforce the jurisdiction agreement will be addressed. The contractual basis is 
explored prior to the other possible legal bases since the debates in the common law 
jurisdictions generally presuppose that the breach of a choice of court agreement is a 
contractual question.334 Issues arising from the recognition and enforcement of the English 















                                                          
334 Briggs, Agreements (n 320) 327. 
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Jurisdiction to Enforce Breach of a Choice of Court Agreement: Can an Anti-Suit Injunction 
or Damages Remedy be Awarded for Breach of a Foreign (Non-English) Choice of Court 
Agreement? 
The orthodox English common law principles governing exclusive choice of court agreements 
attribute a substantive right not to be sued in a non-chosen forum to each contracting 
party.335 This substantive right is capable of being breached and where breached by the 
instigation of proceedings in a non-elected forum by one of the parties gives rise to both 
primary and secondary remedies.336 The applicable law of the exclusive choice of court 
agreement governs the substantive right not to be sued in a non-contractual forum including 
its existence, validity, breach and enforcement. 
Where an exclusive jurisdiction agreement has been breached by reference to its governing 
law, the issue of which court or courts possess the jurisdiction to enforce the clause arises.337 
Briggs mentions three possibilities: the chosen court, the court in which proceedings have 
been brought which are arguably in breach, or any court which has in personam jurisdiction 
over the party in breach.338 The jurisdiction of the English courts in relation to a claim in tort 
for damages for inducing breach of an English exclusive choice of court agreement is 
examined in Chapter 6.   
The nominated court clearly has a strong interest in enforcing a contract which provides for 
its jurisdiction but it may not be the only court with a claim to enforce such a contract.339 
The choice of court agreement can also be enforced in the court where the wrongful 
proceedings have been initiated. However, the proposition that the clause can only be 
enforced in the place where it was breached is counter intuitive, not only because of the 
opportunity given to the party in breach to select his court. Briggs argues that the contract 
may be enforced by any court which has, according to its civil procedural law, personal 
jurisdiction over the party in breach.340 This last option is the most controversial and 
theoretically enticing and gives rise to a debate about the proper role of comity in the 
                                                          
335 Donohue v Armco Inc [2001] UKHL 64, [2002] 1 All ER 749 (Lord Bingham); The Angelic Grace [1995] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep 87 (CA). 
336 See Briggs, Agreements (n 320) Chapter 6 and Chapter 8. 
337 ibid 207-212. 
338 Ibid 207. 
339 See Mantovani v. Carapelli [1978] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 63, 73 (Donaldson J), affirmed by the Court of Appeal in 
Mantovani v. Caparelli [1980] 1 Lloyd's Rep 375, 382: An arbitration agreement was interpreted as covering a 
damages claim for its breach. 
340 Briggs, Agreements (n 320) 207. 
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enforcement of foreign exclusive choice of court agreements through anti-suit injunctions 
and the damages remedy. This section will explore the issues surrounding the enforcement 
of an exclusive choice of court agreement by any court having personal jurisdiction over the 
party in breach.  
It is submitted that where a foreign court is the chosen forum under an exclusive choice of 
court agreement, English courts should not, at least in general, grant an anti-suit injunction 
to enforce the clause, for reasons of comity. This conclusion follows from the general 
principle, established in Airbus Industrie GIE v Patel341 that the English court should have a 
sufficient interest in or connection with the matter in question to justify the indirect 
interference with the foreign court which an anti-suit injunction entails. In Airbus Industrie 
GIE v Patel, the House of Lords held that the third party court will usually have no sufficient 
interest in deciding before which of two foreign courts a matter should be heard, even if the 
injunction defendant is resident within its territorial jurisdiction, and even if the foreign 
court which would be most appropriate to hear the substantive case will not be able to grant 
effective anti-suit relief. Although Lord Goff of Chieveley ruled that England must normally 
be the ‘natural forum’342 in which to seek an anti-suit injunction, he made it clear that he 
was not addressing the situation where there was an alleged breach of a jurisdiction 
agreement:343 
I wish to stress however that, in attempting to formulate the principle, I shall not 
concern myself with those cases in which the choice of forum has been, directly or 
indirectly, the subject of a contract between the parties. Such cases do not fall to be 
considered in the present case. 
Rule 39(4) of Dicey, Morris and Collins on The Conflict of Laws is ambivalent on the issue:344 
An English court may restrain a party over whom it has personal jurisdiction from the 
institution or continuance of proceedings in a foreign court in breach of a contract to 
refer disputes to an English (or, semble, another foreign) court, or to arbitration, 
unless the foreign proceedings in question are in a civil or commercial matter 
brought, or to be brought, before the courts of a Member State or a Convention 
State.  
                                                          
341 Airbus Industrie GIE v Patel [1999] 1 AC 119. 
342 See Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd [1986] 3 WLR 972, [1986] 3 All ER 843, [1987] AC 460 (Lord Goff). 
343 [1999] 1 AC 119, 138F. 
344 Lawrence Collins and others (eds.), Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Laws (15th Edition, Sweet and 
Maxwell, London 2012) Chapter 12, 600 [Rule 39(4)]. 
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The use of the word semble345 in relation to the English enforcement of a breach of foreign 
choice of court agreement via an anti-suit injunction indicates that the point is undecided or 
doubtful. 
There is little English case law relating to the problem, although the approach taken in The 
MSC Dymphna, which is apparently the only English decision directly on the point, suggests 
that where the English court is a third state court, it would be inclined not to enforce the 
foreign exclusive forum clause by an anti-suit injunction.346 In OT Africa Line Ltd v Magic 
Sportswear Corp, Longmore LJ made obiter comments which may be interpreted to suggest 
that the English courts will not hesitate in granting anti-suit injunctions in aid of exclusive 
choice of court agreements selecting third state courts.347 However, it is doubtful that 
Longmore LJ was considering the third state court situation as the case before him involved 
an exclusive choice of court agreement selecting the English courts. Moreover, the issues of 
international comity necessarily implicated in interfering on behalf of another court were 
not considered. In A/S D/S Svendborg v Wansa, an anti-suit injunction was granted to 
restrain proceedings in Sierra Leone which were in breach of an Estonian exclusive choice of 
court agreement.348 However, the anti-suit injunction was not granted to force the parties to 
litigate in Estonia, but rather to ensure that the substantive claims were heard in England 
together with other linked substantive claims which were governed by English exclusive 
choice of court agreements. It could thus be said that the English court did have ‘sufficient 
interest’, because of the intended proceedings before it. Notwithstanding, Svendborg v 
Wansa must be viewed as a marginal decision, arising out of very unusual facts; the 
injunction defendant had boasted of his ability to subvert the process of the courts of Sierra 
Leone. If the parties had agreed to a jurisdiction other than England, that should be a strong 
factor against the grant of an anti-suit injunction restraining proceedings in a third country in 
favour of English proceedings. At the very least, it cannot be right to apply the Angelic 
Grace349 principles without qualification in such a situation. 
                                                          
345 ‘semble’ [Latin: it seems] Used to suggest that a particular point may be doubtful; See Jonathan Law and 
Elizabeth A Martin (ed.), Oxford Dictionary of Law (7th Edition, OUP 2009). 
346 The Owners of the ‘MSC Dymphna’ v Agfa-Gevaert NV (David Steel J, 19 December 2001), where Steel J held 
(in an unreserved judgment) that the court had no jurisdiction to grant an anti-suit injunction restraining 
proceedings in Belgium once he had held, contrary to the injunction claimant’s submissions, that the relevant 
exclusive jurisdiction clause was actually a clause for exclusive US jurisdiction. The Judge observed that the 
claimant could apply to the US courts for an anti-suit injunction. 
347 OT Africa Line Ltd v Magic Sportswear Corp [2005] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 170 (CA) (Longmore LJ).  
348 A/S D/S Svendborg v Wansa [1996] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 559, 563, 575; [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 183 (CA), 186-188 
349 The Angelic Grace [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 87 (CA), 96. 
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In People’s Insurance Co v Akai Pty Ltd, Mr. Judicial Commissioner Choo Han Teck of the High 
Court of Singapore dismissed an application for an anti-suit injunction to restrain 
proceedings in Australia in order to enforce an English exclusive jurisdiction clause, stating 
that the application should be made to the English court, as ‘the Singapore Court should not 
assume the role of an international busybody’, and ‘where there are two courts having 
jurisdiction a third court with tenuous connection should not influence the course unless 
there are strong reasons to do so.’350 
However, an English academic commentator,351 and other commonwealth decisions suggest 
that anti-suit injunctions may be granted in the third country situation, at least where the 
injunction is sought to enforce a foreign arbitration agreement. In IPOC International Growth 
Fund Ltd v OAO CT Mobile,352 the Court of Appeal of Bermuda held that an anti-suit 
injunction could be granted to enforce foreign arbitration agreements, where the Bermudan 
courts had personal jurisdiction over the defendant, and a similar decision has been reached 
by the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court.353 In IPOC International Growth Fund Ltd v OAO CT 
Mobile, a dispute arose between parties who had made contracts which contained 
arbitration agreements for Sweden and Switzerland. In breach of these agreements, one of 
the parties, a Bermudan entity, brought proceedings before the Russian courts, apparently 
designed to undermine the outcome of the arbitration. The other parties to the agreement 
applied to the Bermuda courts for an injunction to restrain the breaches of the arbitration 
agreements; and the Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the judge below to make the 
orders.  
The Court of Appeal of Bermuda in IPOC International Growth Fund Ltd v OAO CT Mobile did 
not consider that international comity required it to refrain from issuing an anti-suit 
injunction where the dispute was insufficiently connected to Bermuda. On the contrary, 
international comity was viewed as requiring courts to cooperate with one another in 
holding parties to their contractual bargains. But the comity issue is about where those 
rights should be enforced and is not an emanation of the principle of pacta sunt servanda. 
                                                          
350 People’s Insurance Co v Akai Pty Ltd [1998] 1 SLR 206 (Singapore High Court), quoted with apparent approval 
in Akai Pty Ltd v People’s Insurance Co Ltd [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 90, 108; See Richard Fentiman, ‘Comity and 
Antisuit Injunctions’ (1998) 57 Cambridge Law Journal 467, 467. 
351 Briggs, Agreements (n 320) 208-212; Adrian Briggs, The Conflict of Laws (3rd Edition, Clarendon Law Series, 
OUP 2013) 134. 
352 [2007] Bermuda LR 43. 
353 Finecroft Ltd v Lamane Trading Corp (Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court, 6 January 2006) It should be noted, 
that Airbus v Patel was not referred to and may not have been cited to the court. 
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The sufficient interest or connection requirement as a restraint on the award of anti-suit 
injunctions for reasons of comity supports the adoption of an ‘international systemic’354 
approach to private international law and in this respect can be compared loosely to the 
locus standi requirement for judicial review of bodies exercising public functions in domestic 
administrative law.355 The unrestrained contractual enforcement of exclusive choice of court 
agreements by any court with personal jurisdiction over the defendant will promote the 
availability of anti-suit relief in common law jurisdictions and allow states with tenuous links 
with the dispute to pronounce on the validity and enforcement of a foreign jurisdiction 
agreement. A remedy will be available in a third state court for those parties who have been 
sued in a non-chosen forum despite the presence of a valid choice of forum agreement. The 
inability of the elected court itself to restrain the proceedings in the non-chosen forum will 
be compensated by litigation for an anti-suit injunction in the third state court with in 
personam jurisdiction over the defendant, provided that the applicable law of the choice of 
court agreement recognises the existence of a substantive right not to be sued in a non-
chosen forum and can grant anti-suit injunctions.356 Thus, based on this conception, the 
contractual anti-suit injunction can be seen to evolve purely as a manifestation of the 
principle of pacta sunt servanda. Forum and remedy shopping in the major common law 
centres of litigation offering anti-suit relief may flourish as a result. Moreover, the law on 
contractual anti-suit injunctions unhinged from the sufficient interest or connection 
requirement may be seen to move further away from the general law on cross border 
injunctive relief on the basis of vexatious and oppressive litigation abroad.    
Nevertheless, it is suggested that Mr. Judicial Commissioner Choo Han Teck’s prudent 
approach has much to commend it, at least in relation to exclusive choice of court 
agreements in favour of a foreign court and governed by foreign law.357 Despite Lord Goff’s 
                                                          
354 Alex Mills, The Confluence of Public and Private International Law: Justice, Pluralism and Subsidiarity in the 
International Constitutional Ordering of Private Law (Cambridge University Press 2009) Chapter 1, 10-11. 
355 In order to bring an application for judicial review, a party must have: "sufficient interest in the matter to 
which the application relates" (Section 31(3) of the Senior Courts Act 1981). 
356 See Cameron Sim, ‘Choice of Law and Anti-Suit Injunctions: Relocating Comity’ [2013] ICLQ 703; Briggs, The 
Conflict of Laws (n 351) 133; Adrian Briggs, ‘The Unrestrained Reach of an Anti-Suit Injunction: A Pause for 
Thought’ [1997] LMCLQ 90. The lex fori governs matters of procedure including the enforcement of the 
remedy. However, it can be argued that, if the lex causae does not recognise and cannot grant anti-suit 
injunctions, the English court should not do so either. By granting an anti-suit injunction through a simplistic 
and reductive application of the lex fori, the English court would be transforming the nature of the underlying 
right which would be inappropriate: Phrantzes v Argenti [1960] 2 QB 19, 35-36 Cf IPOC International Growth 
Fund Ltd v OAO CT Mobile [2007] Bermuda LR 43. 
357 In The Angelic Grace [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 87 (CA), 96 (CA), Millett LJ suggested that there should be no 
hesitation in granting an anti-suit injunction to restrain a party from proceeding in breach of an arbitration 
agreement governed by English law. However, the third state court issue was not before Millett LJ, who should 
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suggestion in Airbus Industrie GIE v Patel that the sufficient interest or connection 
requirement does not apply to contractual anti-suit injunctions, there is no obvious reason 
why this is so. It is submitted that, the principles articulated in Airbus Industrie GIE v Patel 
logically apply in the contractual situation as a matter of comity. Ordinary contractual anti-
suit injunctions will not be affected by the principles circumscribing the remedy articulated 
by Lord Goff as the selection of English jurisdiction ipso facto gives the English courts a 
sufficient interest or connection. Although, the existence of an exclusive jurisdiction clause 
in favour of the English courts or an English arbitration clause may diminish comity concerns 
about interfering with litigation in an unchosen forum, it does not follow that comity 
becomes irrelevant where the English forum is enforcing a foreign choice of court 
agreement.  
To reconcile intervention by anti-suit injunction by a third state court with comity, there 
would need to be some factor which gave the third state court an interest in intervention. 
The primary rationale that has been so far articulated in the case law and the academic 
discourse is the overriding importance of the principle of pacta sunt servanda.358 But this 
creates no specific jurisdictional connection between the third state court and the dispute 
and is premised on a purely private law and perhaps misconceived conception of the rules of 
international civil procedure. Such an approach neglects the international ordering of 
regulatory authority in private law affected by private international law concepts such as 
international comity. Further, even if the injunction defendant were resident within the third 
state court’s jurisdiction, it is suggested that this is not sufficient to justify, as a matter of 
comity, the indirect interference with the targeted courts own assessment of whether or not 
the proceedings before it are in breach of contract or should be stayed. Finally, it should not 
suffice that the chosen court cannot itself grant anti-suit injunctions as a matter of its own 
law, as this lacuna is part of the package to which the parties have agreed. If under the 
applicable law of the choice of court agreement, anti-suit injunctions cannot be granted or 
the substantive right not to be sued in a non-chosen forum does not exist, the lex fori will 
not be able to grant an anti-suit injunction to enforce the clause.359   
                                                                                                                                                                                     
not be read as holding that, if an agreement to arbitrate in a foreign in a foreign country is governed by English 
law, the English courts should have no hesitation in intervening. 
358 Briggs, Agreements (n 320). 
359 Ubi jus, ibi remedium (Latin maxim: where there is a right there is a remedy), Ashby v White (1703) 14 St Tr 
695, 92 ER 126 (Lord Chief Justice Holt); See Jonathan Law and Elizabeth A Martin (ed.), Oxford Dictionary of 
Law (7th Edition, OUP 2009). 
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The commonwealth cases where injunctions in support of a foreign forum have been 
granted all involve arbitration agreements and it could be argued that concerns about being 
an ‘international busybody’ are mitigated where the English court is not intervening to 
protect another court, but instead in support of an arbitration tribunal that cannot protect 
itself. The arbitration tribunal derives its jurisdiction solely from the arbitration agreement 
between the parties whereas the jurisdiction of a court as an emanation of state sovereignty 
is premised on the concept of connection with the forum with jurisdictional party autonomy 
being a supplementary basis for jurisdiction and not the foundation of international 
adjudication.360 Therefore, it is easier to enforce a foreign arbitration agreement as 
compared to a foreign jurisdiction agreement because the requirement of a sufficient 
interest or connection with the forum loses part of its significance in the context of the 
former and the pacta sunt servanda principle dominates in the enforcement of the 
arbitration clause.  Yet, notwithstanding these arguments, it is submitted that the English 
court, in general, does not have a sufficient interest to intervene by injunction in favour of a 
foreign arbitration.361 Indeed, the general principle of international arbitration law, that the 
courts of the seat of the arbitration are the natural forum to provide any ancillary relief to 
support the arbitration, should also discourage the English court from granting anti-suit 
injunctions to protect overseas arbitrations.362 Additionally, it can be argued that an anti-
arbitration injunction is a violation of Article II(3) of the New York Convention in 
circumstances where, by blocking a foreign arbitration agreed to in a contract, the English 
courts fail to ‘refer the parties to arbitration.’363 However, it should be noted that the latter 
argument assumes that the French notion of negative kompetenz-kompetenz applies.364 
Outside of France, the international commercial arbitration law of the vast majority of states 
allows broad judicial intervention on issues at the threshold of arbitration.365     
                                                          
360 ZS Tang, Jurisdiction and Arbitration Agreements in International Commercial Law (Routledge Research in 
International Commercial Law, Routledge, London & New York 2014) 3-5; Chee Ho Tham, ‘Damages for Breach 
of English Jurisdiction Clauses: More than Meets the Eye’ [2004] LMCLQ 46, 50-56. 
361 See Claxton Engineering Services Ltd v TXM Olaj-es Gazkutato KTF [2011] EWHC (Comm) 345, [2011] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep 510 (QB); Rory Butler and Baptiste Weijburg, ‘Do Anti-Suit Injunctions Still Have a Role to Play? – An 
English Law Perspective’ (2011-2012) 24 University of San Francisco Maritime Law Journal 257, 279-283 
362 Butler and Weijburg (n 361) 280; Black Clawson International v Papierwereke Waldhof-Ashaffenburg AG 
[1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 446 (QB). 
363 Article II(3) of the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, 10 June, 1958, 330 UNTS 4739. 
364 George A Bermann, ‘Forum Shopping at the ‘Gateway’ to International Commercial Arbitration’ in Franco 
Ferrari (ed.), Forum Shopping in the International Commercial Arbitration Context (Sellier European Law 
Publishers, Munich 2013) 86-91. 
365 Ibid 91-94. 
116 
 
If an exclusive choice of court agreement stipulates that all proceedings must be 
commenced in a given foreign court, it might be argued that the jurisdiction agreement is 
itself infringed by an application to the English courts for an anti-suit injunction.366 Under the 
circumstances, it is far from clear whether the English courts right to interfere in the course 
of proceedings of a foreign court is justified where its own assumption of jurisdiction is open 
to question.  
The position that any court with personal jurisdiction over the defendant can grant an anti-
suit injunction is even more difficult to reconcile with the view that the English courts should 
only grant anti-suit injunctions where the foreign court’s jurisdiction is exorbitant and 
‘serious injustice will be occasioned as a result of the failure of a foreign court to decline 
jurisdiction.’367 It is not easy to see that there will be many cases where England is a proper 
forum in which to seek injunctive relief for a breach of a foreign jurisdiction clause. Apart 
from concerns about England having tenuous links or not being the natural forum of the 
dispute, the applicable law of the foreign choice of court agreement may not grant anti-suit 
injunctions or recognise the existence of a substantive right not to be sued in a non-elected 
forum. Furthermore, any attempt to interfere as a global guardian of contractual rights is 
likely to provoke irritation elsewhere.368   
The legal bases of the claim for damages in the substantive law of contract, tort, restitution 





                                                          
366 Briggs, Agreements (n 320) 211; Harris, Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: Where Next? (n 330) 
542; Raphael (n 330) 191. 
367 For an approach that considers that the ‘sufficient interest’ or connection principle enunciated in Airbus 
Industrie GIE v Patel [1999] 1 AC 119 imposes a necessary but not sufficient condition for compliance with 
international comity: See Amchem Products Inc v British Columbia (Workers Compensation Board) (1993) 102 
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Lis Pendens in International Litigation (Pocketbooks of the Hague Academy of International Law, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden & Boston 2009) 161-163; Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (2015) (n 
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broad theory of comity’ as opposed to ‘The narrow theory of comity’ articulated by Lord Goff in Airbus 
Industrie GIE v Patel; Briggs, The Conflict of Laws (n 351) 134. 




The contractual claim for damages for breach of a choice of court agreement is only 
sustainable where the jurisdiction clause is conceived of as equivalent to an ordinary 
commercial contract. On the other hand, the conception of a jurisdiction agreement as a 
contract with a special character or as a contract which regulates procedure (‘procedural 
contract’) does not lend support to the contractual claim of damages. Therefore, at the very 
foundation of the damages remedy issue, lies the perplexing question of the appropriate 
characterization of a jurisdiction agreement as an ordinary contract susceptible to breach 
and damages or as a special contract with only procedural consequences.369 In opposition to 
this reductive and binary understanding of the fundamental nature of a choice of court 
agreement, it is suggested that the true nature of such a clause is most closely modelled or 
represented by a ‘hybrid’ contract incorporating a combination of substantive and 
procedural elements.370 For instance, issues relating to the formation of a  choice of court 
agreement, such as the effect of fraud or duress and other vitiating factors on validity should 
be characterized as substantive and accordingly be subject to the ordinary choice of law 
process. On the other hand, issues relating to the administration of justice which have a 
direct impact on the resources of the state should be characterized as procedural and 
accordingly be determined by the law of the forum (lex fori). For example, the conferral or 
exclusion of jurisdiction by a valid choice of court agreement is an issue which should be 
characterized as procedural.    
                                                          
369 See Tang (n 360) 1-2, 13: ZS Tang conceives dispute resolution agreements as ‘special contract terms’ as 
they aim to grant jurisdictional competence to an authority, while derogating other competent authorities 
from their jurisdiction. As state sovereignty is involved, the choice of court agreement, though aiming to 
resolve private law matters between private parties, cannot be classified as purely private. The interaction 
between private rights and public powers in a jurisdiction agreement may give rise to a clash between the 
contractual and procedural imperatives such as the infringement of another Member States paramount 
jurisdiction (Article 24 of the Recast Regulation), the exercise as opposed to the existence of jurisdiction may be 
impractical (forum non conveniens analysis) and the sceptical view of the ouster of a courts’ adjudicatory 
authority by private agreement. Moreover, considerations of the orderly resolution of international 
commercial disputes where third parties are involved may trump the choice of court agreement and the public 
policy or fundamental national interest of the forum may also override the jurisdiction agreement. 
370 See F Sparka, ‘Classification of Choice of Forum Clauses and their Separability from the Main Contract’ in 
Jurisdiction and Arbitration Clauses in Maritime Transport Documents: A Comparative Analysis (Hamburg 
Studies on Maritime Affairs 19, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010) 97-98; TM Yeo, ‘The Contractual Basis 
of the Enforcement of Exclusive and Non-Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements’ (2005) 17 Singapore Academy 
of Law Journal 306, 320: Professor Yeo argues that, although choice of court agreements can be viewed from a 
procedural and contractual perspective, the predominant approach in Singapore and English law in respect of 
the exclusive jurisdiction agreement has been to give primacy to the rationale of the enforcement of a 
contractual bargain, tempered by a judicial discretion in its enforcement within the procedural jurisdictional 
context; See also, TM Yeo, ‘Natural Forum and the Elusive Significance of Jurisdiction Agreements’ [2005] 
Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 448, 454. 
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The ‘procedural contract’ conception of a choice of court agreement does not rely on the 
analogy with an ordinary commercial contract and its enforcement through contractual 
remedies. The role of an exclusive jurisdiction agreement under the procedural contract 
characterization is solely to prorogate the jurisdiction of a court and does not lead to the 
creation of an independently enforceable obligation between the parties to sue only in the 
nominated forum. Takahashi notes that, in Japan, agreements on procedural steps, such as a 
choice of court agreement, are referred to as ‘procedural contracts’ (sosho keiyaku).371 
Takahashi mentions other varieties of procedural contracts including arbitration 
agreements, choice of law agreements, anti-suit agreements, agreements to discontinue an 
action, agreements to desist from executing a judgment, agreements to abstain from 
disputing particular facts, and agreements to refrain from adducing particular evidence. In 
case there is a breach of a procedural contract, it is generally assumed that the court may 
either bring the action to an end or specifically enforce the agreement.372 In Japanese 
jurisprudence, there is no discussion of the possibility of awarding damages for breach of 
any of these procedural contracts. However, Takahashi suggests that the possibility of an 
award of damages may not be foreclosed.373   
A minority view which acknowledges the distinctive character of a choice of court 
agreements is also to be found in the scholarship of the common law tradition. Thus it has 
been suggested that a choice of court agreement is not an ordinary contract creating an 
independently enforceable obligation and that the only way to enforce the agreement is to 
uphold or decline jurisdiction or to restrain proceedings in other countries.374 However, 
orthodox common law authority and scholarship makes no dogmatic distinction in character 
between choice of court agreements and substantive contracts. In the words of Briggs: 
“There is no distinction between a contract to sell and a contract to sue.”375  In fact, the 
commentaries and analyses emphasize an attribute shared by both - that they are a 
                                                          
371 Takahashi, Damages for breach of a Choice of Court Agreement (n 320) 68-71, 69. 
372 Ibid. 
373 Ibid. 
374 LC Ho, ‘Anti-suit Injunctions in Cross Border Insolvency: A Restatement’ [2003] ICLQ 697, 707-709; CJS 
Knight, ‘The Damage of Damages: Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law ’ [2008] Journal of Private 
International Law 501, 507-508; Andreas F Lowenfeld, Conflict of Laws: Federal, State and International 
Perspectives (2nd Edition New York: Matthew Bender 1998) 308; See also the debate in the German legal 
system regarding the appropriate characterization of a choice of court agreement as a substantive or a 
procedural contract: Magnus, Choice of Court Agreements in the Review Proposal for the Brussels I Regulation 
(n 325) 89-90; U Magnus and P Mankowski, Brussels I Regulation (2nd Edition, Sellier 2012) 511; Sparka (n 370) 
81; Jonas Steinle and Evan Vasiliades, ‘The Enforcement of Jurisdiction Agreements under the Brussels I 
Regulation: Reconsidering the Principle of Party Autonomy’ [2010] Journal of Private International Law 565, 
575-580.     
375 Briggs, Agreements (n 320) 195. 
119 
 
consequence of some quid pro quo in the negotiation process culminating in the conclusion 
of a contract. Declining to enforce a choice of court agreement thus upsets the parties 
bargain as much as would refusal to enforce a price term or limitation clause. 
Traditionally, however, the English common law has been treating a breach of a choice of 
court agreement differently from the breach of an ordinary contract. Thus the primary 
remedy available as of right for breach of an ordinary contract is damages whereas specific 
performance is only granted at the court’s discretion where damages do not provide 
adequate relief. On the other hand, the usual remedy for breach of a choice of court 
agreement has not been the award of damages but a stay of proceedings or, where the 
action was brought abroad, the issuing of anti-suit injunction.376 An English Court of Appeal 
decision has attributed this difference in treatment not to any dogmatic characterization of a 
choice of court agreement but to more practical reasons, namely, the difficulty of 
quantifying damages for its breach and the negative impact that damages award may have 
on international comity.377 It should, however be highlighted that the difficulty of 
quantification by itself is not a good enough reason to deny the recoverability of damages. 
The potential negative impact on the concept of international comity is dealt with in the 
appropriate section below and for present purposes it is a consideration extraneous to the 
assessment of the contractual legal basis for breach of a choice of court agreement. 
In cases where quantification and comity do not pose insurmountable obstacles, the 
common law jurists are not deterred from submitting the breach of a choice of court 
agreement to the normal contractual analysis. This would result in the award of damages, if 
the applicable law is English law or another common law legal system, because damages are 
recoverable as of right as the primary remedy and because liability for breach of contract is 
strict,378 requiring neither negligence nor intent on part of the party in breach.  
In civil law legal systems, on the other hand, liability for breach of contract is traditionally 
fault based.379 Takahashi notes that under Japanese law both judicial authority and academic 
commentary require negligence or intent as an essential element for liability for breach of 
                                                          
376 Stays of proceedings: The Eleftheria [1970] P 94; The El Amria [1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 119; The Sennar (No 2) 
[1985] 1 WLR 490; Anti-suit injunctions: Continental Bank NA v Aeakos SA [1994] 1 WLR 588, 598 (CA); The Jay 
Bola [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 79; OT Africa Line Ltd v Magic Sportswear Corp [2005] EWCA Civ 710 [33]. 
377 OT Africa Line Ltd v Magic Sportswear Corp [2005] EWCA Civ 710, [2005] 1 CLC 923, [33] (Longmore LJ); For 
the difficulties encountered in quantifying damages for breach of a choice of forum agreement see FN 330 
above. 
378 See Stephen A Smith, Contract Theory (Clarendon Law Series, OUP 2004) 376. 
379 Takahashi, Damages for Breach of a Choice of Court Agreement (n 320) 68-71, 71. 
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contract.380 Accordingly, if a choice of court agreement were to be treated under the normal 
contractual principles, liability for its breach would not be established unless negligence or 
intent was proved on the part of the claimant bringing the action complained of. It follows if 
the claimant was in genuine belief that the agreement was null and void and if he is found to 
be faultless in so believing he may be exonerated. It would be possible to find negligence or 
intent in cases where the court first seised finds that the proceedings before it have been 
commenced in breach of a choice of court agreement and accordingly refuses to hear the 
case by either dismissing or staying its proceedings. Making such a finding, however, would 
be more difficult in cases where the court first seised does not acknowledge that there is a 
breach, though it might still be legitimate to hold that there was an intentional breach in 
such cases as where the claimant has flouted a plainly valid choice of court agreement by 
bringing an action before a remote court which would, to his knowledge, exercise an 


















Applicable Law of the Contractual Claim for Damages 
The private international law rules of most countries recognise the autonomy of the parties 
to select the law applicable to their contract in the form of a valid choice of law 
agreement.381 
As a matter of principle, an express choice of law agreement specifically directed at disputes 
arising from the breach of a choice of court agreement should also be given effect.382 The 
role of party autonomy in choice of law of contractual obligations is significantly enhanced 
as a result of the enforcement of such specific clauses. Rare as they may be in international 
civil and commercial litigation, express choice of law agreements of this nature can be 
conceptualized without stretching the existing contours of such agreements beyond their 
proper limits. Since some of the model clauses for choice of court agreements have already 
begun to provide for an express provision on damages in case of its breach, it is not a bridge 
too far to consider including an express choice of law agreement for the damages claim. 
However, in the vast majority of cases, even the parties who are legally prudent to conclude 
a choice of court agreement do not take the trouble of negotiating a choice of law 
agreement to govern disputes arising from a potential breach of their choice of court 
agreement. Then, by default, a contractual damages claim for breach of a choice of court 
agreement will be governed by the law applicable to the choice of court agreement in the 
absence of choice. As to what that law is, the positions under the national choice of law rules 
of the Member States of the EU vary.383 The likely options are the applicable law of the 
substantive contract to which the choice of court agreement is attached,384 the substantive 
                                                          
381 See Recital 11 and Article 3(1) of the ‘Rome I Regulation’: Regulation No 593/2008 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations OJ 
L/2008/177/6; See also Article 3(1) of the Rome Convention; CGJ Morse, ‘Conflict of Laws’ in HG Beale and 
others (eds), Chitty on Contracts (Volume I, 31st Edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London 2012) Chapter 30, 2195 . 
382 See ‘Dépeçage’ (Splitting the Applicable Law) provided for in the last sentence of Article 3(1) of the Rome I 
Regulation: ‘By their choice the parties can select the law applicable to the whole or to part only of the 
contract.’ See P Beaumont and P McEleavy, Anton’s Private International Law (SULI/W Green 2011) 454-455; 
Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (2010) (n 367) 192; Morse (n 381) Chapter 30, 2200-2201; See 
Morse, (n 381) Chapter 30, 2178-2179 as authority for the splitting of the applicable law under the common 
law’s ‘proper law’ doctrine. Giuliano-Lagarde Report page 17. 
383 There is no uniform practice among the EU Member States since Article 1(2)(e) of the Rome I Regulation 
excludes choice of court agreements from its scope of application. National choice of law rules are applicable; 
See Article 1(2)(d) of the Rome Convention; Mario Giuliano and Paul Lagarde, ‘Report on the Convention on the 
Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations’ [1980] OJ C282/1, 11-12; Collins, Dicey, Morris and Collins on the 
Conflict of Laws (n 344) Chapter 32, 1788; Beaumont and McEleavy (n 382) Chapter 10, 434-439; Morse (n 381) 
Chapter 30, 2258. 
384 This option finds support in the English case law as observed by: Collins, Dicey, Morris and Collins on the 
Conflict of Laws (n 344) Chapter 12, 603-604; David Joseph QC, Jurisdiction and Arbitration Agreements and 
their Enforcement (2nd Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, London 2010) 182; Briggs, The Conflict of Laws (n 351) 231; 
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law of the forum prorogatum,385 and the law specified by the private international law rules 
of the forum chosen by the choice of court agreement.386  
The last option has been adopted by Articles 5(1) and 6(a) of the Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements387 (30 June, 2005) read in conjunction with its official 
explanatory report.388 The alignment of the Brussels I Regulation (Recast) with the Hague 
Convention has ensured that the substantive validity of a choice of court agreement under 
the Recast Regulation is also governed by the law specified by the choice of law rules of the 
forum prorogatum.389 Under the new Article 25(1) the elected court shall have jurisdiction 
‘unless the agreement is null and void as to its substantive validity under the law of that 
Member State‘.390 This position has been defended on the basis that it serves to avoid the 
undesirable result of parallel proceedings and the denial of justice which might arise if the 
court seised and court chosen apply different laws.391 The motivation of the Hague 
Convention for allowing the application of the doctrine of renvoi is driven by the need to 
further enhance party autonomy in international commercial transactions.392 However, 
some academic commentators wonder whether the same objective could not be achieved 
equally well, with the added advantages of simplicity and certainty, by the second option i.e. 
the substantive law of the forum chosen by the choice of court agreement.393 
Takahashi states that the first and second options tend to coincide with each other in 
practice.394 This is because where parties to a contract conclude a choice of court 
agreement; they often favour the application of the law of the chosen forum and conclude a 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
See Sulamerica CIA Nacional de Seguros SA and others v Enesa Engenharia SA and others [2012] EWCA Civ 638, 
[2012] 1 All ER (Comm) 795; Morse (n 381) Chapter 30, 2190. 
385 Forum prorogatum: [Latin] Prorogated jurisdiction. See Jonathan Law and Elizabeth A Martin (ed.), Oxford 
Dictionary of Law (7th Edition, OUP 2009); Daniel Tan and Nik Yeo, ‘Breaking Promises to Litigate in a Particular 
Forum: Are Damages an Appropriate Remedy?’ [2003] LMCLQ 435. 
386 B. Hess, T. Pfeiffer and P. Schlosser, Report on the Application of Regulation Brussels I in the Member States, 
Study JLS/C4/2005/03, (‘Heidelberg Report’) para 377. 
387 The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements has entered into force in Mexico and 27 Member 
States of the EU (except Denmark) on 1 October 2015. 
388 Trevor C Hartley and Masato Dogauchi, ‘Explanatory Report on the 2005 Hague Choice of Court Agreements 
Convention’ (2007) para 125 in Ronald A. Brand and Paul Herrup, The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of 
Court Agreements, Commentary and Documents (Cambridge University Press 2009). 
389 Article 25(1) and Recital 20 of the Brussels I Regulation (Recast). 
390 Ibid. 
391 A Schulz, ‘The Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements’, Journal of Private 
International Law [2006] 243, 256; Beaumont and McEleavy (n 382) 253-255; Hartley, Choice of Court 
Agreements (n 333) 165-171. 
392 Beaumont and McEleavy (n 382) 253-255. 
393 Koji Takahashi, ‘Damages for Breach of a Choice of Court Agreement: Remaining Issues’ [2009] Yearbook of 
Private International Law 73, 84 – 86; Burkhard Hess, ‘The Brussels I Regulation: Recent Case Law of the Court 
of Justice and the Commission’s Proposed Recast’ (2012) 49 Common Market Law Review 1075, 1107. 
394 Takahashi, Damages for Breach of a Choice of Court Agreement: Remaining Issues (n 393) 84-86. 
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choice of law agreement accordingly. Even in the absence of an express choice of law 
agreement, the presence of an exclusive choice of court agreement may serve as evidence of 
an implied choice in favour of the law of the chosen court.395 In this regard, recital 12 of the 
Rome I Regulation prescribes an exclusive choice of court agreement as one of the factors to 



















                                                          
395 The choice of a particular forum may indicate that the parties intend the contract to be governed by the law 
of that forum: For a discussion of the English common law presumption Qui elegit judicem elegit jus see, BA 
Marshall, ‘Reconsidering the Proper Law of the Contract’ (2012) 13 Melbourne Journal of International Law 1, 
15-17; See Report on the Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations by Professors Mario 




Where a claim has been commenced in breach of a choice of court agreement, the 
defendant in those proceedings may seek to recover damages premised on a cause of action 
in the substantive law of tort instead of relying on the more conventional contractual legal 
basis.396 The prospective claim for tortious damages is supported by the fact that at least 
under some legal systems, an institution of an action may constitute a tortious act in certain 
circumstances. Thus, the American Law Institute’s Restatement (Second) of Law of Torts 
defines ‘wrongful civil proceedings’ concisely in Section 674:397 
One who takes an active part in the initiation, continuation or procurement of civil 
proceedings against another is subject to liability to the other for wrongful civil proceedings 
if: 
(a) He acts without probable cause, and primarily for a purpose other than that of 
securing the proper adjudication of the claim in which the proceedings are based, 
and 
(b) Except when they are ex parte, the proceedings have terminated in favor of the 
person against whom they are brought. 
The challenging task facing any legal system willing to treat the initiation of civil proceedings 
in certain circumstances as constituting a tortious act is to endeavor to clearly and precisely 
                                                          
396 Adrian Briggs accepts that the claim for compensation may be characterized as ‘tortious or non-contractual’ 
and that such a cause of action may fit more easily into the ‘public law’ rubric of the Brussels I Regulation, but 
does not explore the issue any further: Briggs, Agreements (n 320) 326-327, 337; Thomas Raphael describes the 
possibility of an award of damages outside the contractual case as ‘unexplored territory’, but in contrast to 
Briggs argues that, where there is no clear and concrete personal contractual obligation to enforce, it is harder 
to avoid the conclusion that the award of damages inherently involves an assessment of the jurisdiction of 
another Member State court, and is thus prohibited: Raphael (n 330) 296, 331, 341; Fentiman also alludes to 
the possibility of recovering damages from a pre-emptive claimant, in tort, arising from the defendant’s ‘abuse 
of process’, but does not develop the argument: Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (2015) (n 315) 
113; Tham argues that a claim for damages in tort is more appropriate than contractual damages because an 
exclusive jurisdiction clause would have to constitute more than a mere ancillary obligation to the overarching 
substantive contract (e.g. on the sale of goods) and give rise to a primary or secondary contractual obligation in 
its own right in Tham (n 360). However, it is submitted that the English authorities actually demonstrate a clear 
acceptance that exclusive forum clauses give rise to independent obligations, breach of which sounds in 
damages and draw no distinction between arbitration clauses and jurisdiction clauses. 
397 Emphasis added. 
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define those instances, so that the fundamental right to seek judicial remedies is not 
attenuated without cause.398  
The tort of malicious prosecution is dominated by the problem of balancing two 
countervailing interests of high social importance: safeguarding the individual from being 
harassed by unjustifiable litigation and encouraging citizens to aid in law enforcement.399 
A Japanese Supreme Court decision has emphasized that a cautious approach should be 
taken to avoid imposing undue limitations on the right to seek judicial remedies and 
declared that the institution of an action was under most circumstances not a tortious act.400 
However, the Japanese Supreme Court acknowledged that where the institution of an action 
was plainly unreasonable in the light of the purpose of the judicial system, it could constitute 
a tortious act. Similarly, the French Cour de Cassation, too, exercised caution when it held 
that the institution of an action was in principle a right and did not give rise to liability to pay 
damages unless it was done with malice, bad faith or gross negligence.401 
In English law, the viability of a claim for damages in tort in respect of allegedly wrongful civil 
proceedings abroad needs to be assessed.402 The recent decision of the Judicial Committee 
of the Privy Council in Crawford Adjusters (Cayman) Ltd v Sagicor General Insurance 
(Cayman) Ltd403 (‘Sagicor’) might be instructive in this respect as the ruling has clarified the 
scope of the torts of malicious prosecution and the abuse of legal process.404 Indeed, it may 
now be possible to employ the generally applicable tort of malicious prosecution to the case 
of wrongful civil proceedings abroad. However, Chapter 6 will demonstrate that allocation of 
                                                          
398 Jenny Steele, ‘Malicious Prosecution’ in Michael A Jones and Anthony M Dugdale, Clerk and Lindsell on Torts 
(20th Edition, Sweet and Maxwell 2010) Chapter 16, 1066; Tom KC Ng, ‘The Torts of Malicious Prosecution and 
Abuse of Legal Process’ (2014) 130 LQR 43, 43. 
399 John G Fleming, The Law of Torts (8th Edition, Sweet and Maxwell 1992) 609. 
400 Takahashi, Damages for Breach of a Choice of Court Agreement: Remaining Issues (n 393) 79-82, 79. 
401 Ibid; The French Cour de Cassation Civ 2, 11 January 1973, No. 71-12.446 (reported in Bulletin des arrets 
Cour de Cassation Chambre civile 2 N. 17 P.12). 
402 Raphael (n 330) 332. 
403 Crawford Adjusters (Cayman) Ltd v Sagicor General Insurance (Cayman) Ltd [2013] UKPC 17; [2013] 3 W.L.R. 
927 (‘Sagicor’); It should be noted that the decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) are 
not strictly binding upon the English courts. However, the decisions are considered to possess persuasive 
authority.  In practice many of the judges which make up the JCPC are also judges of the UK Supreme Court. 
Therefore, the decisions of the JCPC are considered to be significant, worthy of consideration and it is not 
unusual for them to be followed by the English courts. ; See MDJ Conaglen and RC Nolan, ‘Precedent from the 
Privy Council’ (2006) 122 LQR 349: The note highlights the differing approaches adopted by the English courts 
to the issue of the authority of rulings by the JCPC on appeals to the Committee from jurisdictions outside 
England. 
404 KC Ng (n 398) 43-47; See, generally: John Murphy and Christian Witting, Street on Torts (13th Edition, OUP 
2012) Chapter 23, 615-624; Simon Deakin, Angus Johnston and Basil Markesinis, Markesinis and Deakin’s Tort 
Law (7th Edition, OUP 2013) Chapter 10, 382-386. 
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jurisdiction over tortious claims for damages under Article 7(2) of the Brussels I Regulation 
(Recast) will prevent rather than support the exercise of jurisdiction by the English courts. 
Similarly, as will be discussed in the next section, there are serious difficulties in showing 
that English law is the applicable law of the tortious claim for damages. Significantly, the 
classification of the cause of action as a tort will not alter the fact that the damages remedy 
interferes with the principle of mutual trust and the principle of effectiveness of EU law 
(effet utile).  
According to the traditional understanding of the tort of malicious prosecution a claimant 
must establish the following:405 
1. The prior proceedings brought by a respondent were determined in the claimant’s 
favour. 
2. The proceedings were instituted without reasonable and proper cause. 
3. The respondent acted maliciously. 
4. The claimant had suffered (and can only recover in respect of) one or more of only 
three permissible heads of damage: namely, actual damage to reputation, person or 
property (that is, out of pocket expenses but not consequential economic loss).  
5. The prior proceedings were criminal in nature (the tort was inapplicable to most civil 
proceedings, the major exception being winding-up petitions). 
Moreover, it was thought that the tort of abuse of process required proof of some overt act 
or threat apart from the instigation of legal proceedings. The tort of abuse of process also 
did not allow recovery of pure economic loss. 
The majority of the Privy Council in Crawford Adjusters (Cayman) Ltd v Sagicor General 
Insurance (Cayman) Ltd rejected propositions 4 and 5 above. The Privy Council by a majority 
of three (Lady Hale, Lord Kerr and Lord Wilson) to two (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption), 
held that malicious prosecution extended to civil proceedings.406 Lord Wilson and Lord 
Sumption observed that abuse of process did not require proof of an overt act. Lord Wilson 
further suggested that both torts could lead to recovery for pure economic loss. 
                                                          
405 James Edelman and John Davies, ‘Torts and Equitable Wrongs’ in Andrew Burrows (ed.), English Private Law 
(Oxford Principles of English Law, 2nd Edition, OUP 2007) 1313-1314; KC Ng (n 398) 44. 
406  Crawford Adjusters (Cayman) Ltd v Sagicor General Insurance (Cayman) Ltd [2013] UKPC 17; [2013] 3 W.L.R. 
927, [40]-[56] (Lord Wilson).  
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In relation to the search for an appropriate tortious cause of action to support the claim for 
damages for wrongful civil litigation it is necessary to analyse the nature of the loss 
sustained and its treatment under English tort law. The loss suffered as a result of the breach 
of the jurisdiction agreement may consist of wasted costs and expenses of litigating in the 
non-contractual forum and if the foreign court assumes jurisdiction, a judgment on the 
merits of the dispute. It is submitted that the loss incurred is in the nature of pure economic 
loss. Pure economic loss is treated differently from other forms of loss by some legal systems 
within their regime for tort liability, whereas others make no such distinction.407 Under 
English tort law, while the largest category of tort is negligence, its core is to protect persons 
and property.408 The protection of purely economic interests is largely left to the defined 
categories of intentional torts,409 which the English courts would not be easily persuaded to 
expand.  
Following the Privy Council’s interpretation of the scope of the tort of malicious prosecution 
in Sagicor, the chances of a tortious cause of action of malicious prosecution premised on 
remedying wrongful civil litigation abroad succeeding have been augmented.410 Previously, 
the House of Lords in Gregory v. Portsmouth City Council411 had held that the tort of 
malicious prosecution is limited to the malicious institution of criminal prosecutions and 
certain civil proceedings which constituted special cases of abuse of legal process. Under the 
tort of malicious prosecution, it is wrongful maliciously to procure the commencement or 
continuance of criminal proceedings, and also certain limited categories of civil proceedings, 
including the malicious presentation of a winding up order or bankruptcy petition, 
maliciously procuring a bench warrant412 or search warrant413 and the malicious arrest of a 
ship.414 But to complete this cause of action, the criticized proceedings must have been 
                                                          
407 English tort law draws a distinction between pure economic loss and loss arising from damage to reputation, 
persons and property: See Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis (n 404) 471; Murphy and Witting (n 404) 356. 
408 See Murphy v Brentwood District Council [1991] 1 AC 398. 
409 For example: the torts of inducing breach of contract, causing loss by unlawful means (tortious 
interference), conspiracy, passing off, malicious falsehood. 
410 For commentary on adapting the tort of malicious prosecution to serve the needs of remedying cross border 
wrongful civil litigation prior to the decision in [2013] UKPC 17; [2013] 3 W.L.R. 927: See Tham (n 360) 60-62; 
Raphael (n 330) 332-335; Takahashi, Damages for Breach of a Choice of Court Agreement: Remaining Issues (n 
393) 79-82. 
411 Gregory v. Portsmouth City Council [2000] 1 AC 419; See Joseph (n 384) 487. 
412 Roy v Prior [1971] AC 470 HL. 
413 Gibbs v Rea [1998] AC 786 PC. 
414 Congentra AG v Sixteen Thirteen Marine SA (The Nicholas M) [2008] EWHC 1615 (Comm); [2009] 1 All ER 
(Comm) 479; [2008] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 602: Flaux J. concluded that the facts could arguably fall within the category 
of ‘wrongful arrest’ of a ship. The ship had been detained for repairs while chartered by the defendant, and the 
claimant argued that the delay (which had caused them to lose their next charter) was the product of a 
conspiracy; See generally, Raphael (n 330) 333-334. 
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brought maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause, and must have failed. It 
might be argued that, the Privy Council’s decision in Sagicor has given rise to a tort of 
maliciously instituting civil proceedings of general applicability in English law. Under the 
existing authorities the same conditions apply in relation to foreign proceedings, so that if 
the claimant abroad has succeeded in his foreign proceedings, no cause of action will lie 
under English law.415 These limitations mean that the tort of malicious prosecution, in its 
current state of development in English law, affords no platform for the award of damages 
against vexatious or oppressive foreign litigation.416 Other available tortious causes of action 
do not directly target vexatious or oppressive foreign litigation. It is presumably the limited 
utility and applicability of tortious claims that explain why, in practice, general non-
contractual anti-suit injunctions have not been based upon tortious causes of action.417 
Where an exclusive choice of court agreement is binding between A and B and a third party, 
C, who is in practical control of B, has directed B to breach the agreement, the English courts 
have accepted that anti-suit injunctions or claims for damages, could be founded on the tort 
of inducing breach of contract.418 In Kallang Shipping SA v Axa Assurances Senegal (The 
Kallang), Gloster J held that a claim for an anti-suit injunction against a third party insurer, 
based on the torts of inducing a breach of contract, interference with business, and 
conspiracy for inducing its insured to breach an exclusive jurisdiction clause, was arguable.419 
In Kallang Shipping SA v Axa Assurances Senegal ("The Kallang") (No.2), where Axa Senegal 
had induced their insureds to breach an arbitration clause by orchestrating proceedings 
before the courts of Senegal, Jonathan Hirst QC, sitting as a deputy High Court judge, 
awarded damages against Axa Senegal for procuring a breach of contract.420 He observed 
that an alternative claim for interference in business relations by unlawful means added 
                                                          
415 Ibid. 
416 Ibid. 
417 Ibid 335. 
418 See, generally, OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1, for the leading authority on the tort of 
inducing breach of a contract in English substantive private law. 
419 Kallang Shipping SA v Axa Assurances Senegal (The Kallang) [2007] 1 Lloyd's Rep 160 (Gloster J); See also, 
Horn Linie GmbH v Panamericana Formas e Impresos SA (The Hornbay) [2006] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 44, [26], where 
Morison J even suggested that claims for damages for inducing breach of contract would in principle be a more 
attractive solution to the problem than granting an anti-suit injunction. The choice of law issue was not raised 
in this case; Raphael (n 330) 335-336. 
420 Kallang Shipping SA v Axa Assurances Senegal ("The Kallang") (No.2) [2008] EWHC 2761 (Comm), [2009] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep 124, [90]-[94] (Jonathan Hirst QC J); See also The Duden [2008] EWHC 2762 (Comm), [2009] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep 145 (Jonathan Hirst QC J); See Joseph (n 384) 493-494; Thomas Raphael, The Anti-Suit Injunction: 
Updating Supplement (Oxford Private International Law Series, OUP 2010) 69. 
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nothing.421 A conspiracy claim was rejected on the grounds that Axa Senegal controlled the 
running of the case exclusively and so did not conspire with its insured in any meaningful 
sense.422 However, as Jonathan Hirst QC stressed, both parties agreed that this issue was to 
be determined in accordance with English law and no case on Senegalese law was 
pleaded.423 This line of decisions is welcome from a purely pragmatic standpoint and 
provides the aggrieved party with a wider potential range of parties to sue for an effective 
remedy. However, it will be argued that the jurisdictional and choice of law issues that arise 
from a claim for damages for inducing breach of a choice of court agreement under the 
Brussels I Regulation and Rome II Regulation present a substantial impediment to both the 
legal basis and the viability of such a claim. These issues are examined in depth in Chapter 6.  
The pure economic loss will be more readily recoverable under legal systems which adopt 
the French tradition of a single compensation rule.424 Article 1382 of the French Code Civil 
embraces all kinds of losses, stipulating that ‘Any act whatever of man, which causes 
damage to another, obliges the one by whose fault it occurred, to compensate it.’425 
Negligent conducts are subject to the same rule as intentional acts.426 Takahashi notes that 
Japanese tort law also belongs to the French tradition and its Civil Code provides in Article 
709 that anyone who intentionally or negligently violates other’s rights or interests worthy 
of legal protection must compensate for the losses thereby caused.427 Despite the German 
Civil Code’s (‘Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch’ or ‘BGB’) categorical exclusion of liability for tortious 
damages for pure economic loss, the German courts have zealously endeavored to fill in the 
gaps by finding ways to compensate for pure economic loss.428 This is in sharp contrast to 
the great weight reputedly given by German law to theoretical orthodoxy over pragmatism. 
                                                          
421 Kallang Shipping SA v Axa Assurances Senegal ("The Kallang") (No.2) [2008] EWHC 2761 (Comm), [2009] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep 124, [94]. 
422 Ibid [96]. 
423 Ibid [90]. 
424 Cees van Dam, European Tort Law (2nd Edition, OUP 2013) 210-211; Takahashi, Damages for Breach of a 
Choice of Court Agreement: Remaining Issues (n 393) 79-82, 81; G Wagner, ‘Comparative Tort Law’ in M 
Reimann and R Zimmermann (Eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (OUP 2006) 1012, 1020 argues 
that the difference between English and Continental legal systems is more apparent than real but does not 
deny that a difference exists between English law and French law on the recoverability of pure economic loss.  
425 Article 1382 of the French Civil Code provides:  ‘Tout fait quelconque de l’homme, qui cause à autrui un 
dommage, oblige celui par la faute duquel il est arrive, à le réparer’ (English Translation from Legifrance) 
<http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr>. 
426 Article 1383 of the French Civil Code provides: ‘Chacun est responsable du dommage qu'il a causé non 
seulement par son fait, mais encore par sa négligence ou par son imprudence’ (Everyone is liable for the 
damage he causes not only by his intentional act, but also by his negligent conduct or by his imprudence.) 
(English translation from Legifrance) <http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr>. 
427 Takahashi, Damages for Breach of a Choice of Court Agreement: Remaining Issues (n 393) 79-82, 81 
428 van Dam (n 424) 211-213. 
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It should be noted that the tort claim is not founded upon the breach of a choice of court 
agreement per se but upon a broader context in which the action has been commenced.429 
Though a breach of a choice of court agreement is a major element of that context, the test 
is whether the whole circumstances are such that the institution of the action is, under the 
Restatement, ‘primarily for a purpose other than that of securing the proper adjudication of 
the claim’ or, under the test of the Japanese Supreme Court, ‘plainly unreasonable in the 
light of the purpose of the judicial system.’ Since the procedural character of a choice of 
court agreement does not have a direct impact, the tort claim is more conducive to 
substantive characterisation than the contractual claim. It means that the court which would 
not allow a contractual claim to recover damages for breach of a choice of court agreement 
by treating it as a procedural matter may allow a tort claim, provided that the requirements 
in all other respects are fulfilled. Briggs does suggest that, a claim for damages based on the 
law of tort may fit more easily into the rubric of the ‘public law’ oriented Brussels I 













                                                          
429 Ibid. 
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Applicable Law of the Tortious Claim for Damages 
The following general observations may be made in order to facilitate the creation of a 
framework for inquiry into the applicable law of a tortious claim of damages for breach of a 
jurisdiction agreement. Specific reference will be made to the European Union’s Rome II 
Regulation431 and the choice of law rules contained therein to assist us in the determination 
of the applicable law. 
According to Article 1(1) of the Rome II Regulation, ‘This Regulation shall apply, in situations 
involving a conflict of laws, to non-contractual obligations in civil and commercial 
matters.’432 The CJEU has held that the term ‘civil and commercial matters’ must be 
interpreted autonomously without regard to national Member State jurisprudence.433 
Decisions of the CJEU that define what constitutes a civil and commercial matter under 
Article 1(1) of the Brussels I Regulation offer general guidance in determining what 
constitutes a ‘civil and commercial matter’ for the Rome II Regulation.434 The CJEU has 
defined the term negatively: a matter is not civil or commercial if (a) a public authority is 
involved in creating the disputed obligations and (b) this public authority acts ‘in the exercise 
of its powers’.435 It is submitted that a tortious action for wrongful civil proceedings based on 
the tortious right not to wrongfully sued abroad falls under ‘civil and commercial matters’ 
because it is premised on a private law relationship.     
The Rome II Regulation governs non-contractual obligations.436 The CJEU’s interpretations of 
comparable provisions in the Brussels I Regulation may serve as guidance. Under Article 5 of 
the Brussels I Regulation, the courts must distinguish between contractual and non-
                                                          
431 Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Law Applicable to Non-
Contractual Obligations [2007] OJ L199/40 ‘Rome II Regulation’; See generally, John Murphy, ‘Foreign Torts’ in 
Michael A Jones and Anthony M Dugdale, Clerk and Lindsell on Torts (20th Edition, Sweet and Maxwell 2010) 
Chapter 7. 
432 Article 1(1) of the Rome II Regulation (Emphasis added); See Ivo Bach, ‘Article 1’ in Peter Huber (ed.), Rome 
II Regulation: Pocket Commentary (Sellier European Law Publishers, Munich 2011) 28-44; Richard Plender and 
Michael Wilderspin, The European Private International Law of Obligations (3rd Edition, Sweet and Maxwell 
2009) 472-478. 
433 LTU v Eurocontrol (Case C-29/76) [1976] ECR 1541, para 3. 
434 The Brussels I Regulation, Rome I Regulation and Rome II Regulation form an integrated and coherent 
system of harmonized private international law rules in civil and commercial matters in the European Judicial 
Area. See Eva Lein, ‘The New Rome I / Rome II / Brussels I Synergy’ (2008) 10 Yearbook of Private International 
Law 177, 189-190; Bach (n 432) 31-35. 
435 LTU v Eurocontrol (Case C-29/76) [1976] ECR 1541, para 4; Sonntag v Waidmann (Case C-172/91) [1993] ECR 
I-1963, para 20; Netherlands v Reinhard Ruffer (Case 814/79) [1980] ECR I-3807 para 9. 
436 See Andrew Scott, ‘The Scope of ‘Non-Contractual Obligations’’ in John Ahern and William Binchy (eds), The 
Rome II Regulation on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations: A New International Litigation 
Regime (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden and Boston 2009) 57-83; Bach (n 432) 36-43. 
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contractual obligations to determine which State’s courts have jurisdiction over a case: those 
of the place of performance (for contractual obligations) or those of the places where the 
harmful event occurred or may occur (for non-contractual obligations).437 In making this 
distinction, the CJEU defined the term non-contractual negatively: it encompasses every 
damages claim that cannot be classified as contractual. Therefore any obligation that the 
obligor has not freely assumed must be considered non-contractual and thus within the 
scope of the Rome II Regulation.438 The tortious right not to be wrongfully sued abroad and 
the corresponding tortious obligation are not freely assumed and thus must be considered 
non-contractual and within the scope of the Rome II Regulation. 
The Rome II Regulation applies only in ‘situations involving a conflict of laws’.439 This 
qualification to the applicability of Rome II Regulation is unnecessary and superfluous as the 
need to refer to the Regulation does not arise in a dispute with connections to only one 
State. Secondly, the term ‘conflict of laws’ is potentially misleading as the term covers the 
entire discipline of private international law in common law jurisdictions. A reference to 
‘choice of law rules’ instead of ‘conflict of laws’ would have been more appropriate. The 
connection with more than one State or a situation ‘involving a conflict of laws’ is apparent 
in the case of wrongful civil proceedings abroad.   
Under the general choice of law rule for torts in the Rome II Regulation, the applicable law of 
a tort/delict claim shall be the law of the country in which the damage occurs (lex loci damni) 
irrespective of the country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred and 
irrespective of the country or countries in which the indirect consequences of that event 
occur.440 Which place would this rule point to if it is applied to the case where a tort claim 
for wrongful civil proceedings is made to recover damages for breach of a choice of court 
agreement? It is easy to imagine that the place of the direct damage will be localised in the 
court where the allegedly wrongful litigation was pursued.441 However, Articles 4(1) and 
                                                          
437 Articles 5(1) and 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation. 
438 Bach (n 432) 36-37. 
439 ibid 44. 
440 Article 4(1) of the Rome II Regulation; See Bach (n 432) 70-91; Plender and Wilderspin (n 432) 499-534. 
441 Bach (n 432) 87, para 49: ‘If the tort consists in an abusive court proceeding against the victim, the damage 
will regularly not be physical but exclusively economic in nature. In these cases, the proceeding itself must be 
regarded as the direct damage.’ (emphasis in original); See Alexander Layton, ‘Anti-Arbitration Injunctions and 
Anti-Suit Injunctions: An Anglo-European Perspective’ in Franco Ferrari (ed.), Forum Shopping in the 
International Commercial Arbitration Context (Sellier European Law Publishers, Munich 2013) 135 for the 
consequences of applying a choice of law analysis under the Rome II Regulation to anti-suit injunctions. Such an 
approach may lead to the application of a law which does not recognise the remedy; Briggs, Private 
International Law in English Courts (n 318) 401-402, notes that the jurisprudence of the English courts has 
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4(2)442 can be displaced443 by the operation of an ‘escape clause’ where it is clear from all 
the circumstances of the case that the tort/delict is ‘manifestly more closely connected with 
another country.’444 To prevent EU Member State courts from abusing the escape clause by 
using it as a pretext for the application of the lex fori, the European legislature refused to 
establish Article 4(3) as a general rule and instead structured it as an exception.445 As a 
consequence, the escape clause must be applied restrictively.446 Raphael suggests that the 
Court of Justice of the European Union may well not accept that the place where the 
litigation ‘should’ have happened is manifestly more closely connected to the tort than the 
place where it did happen.447 Additionally, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that, at least 
in most cases where non-contractual anti-suit injunctions might be sought on the basis that 
vexatious or oppressive proceedings have been brought before the courts of country A, the 
events constituting any tort have occurred in country A, and the most significant legal factor 
relating to any tortious conduct is its engagement of the legal system of country A.448 
On the contrary, Adrian Briggs suggests that the applicable law should be ‘that of the 
country with which the dispute between the parties has its closest and most real 
connection’.449 Similarly, Chee Ho Tham avers that ‘it would be substantially more 
appropriate to apply the law of the forum’ to a tort claim brought where the claimant 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
adopted the view that there is no role for a choice of law analysis and that applying a foreign applicable law as 
the lex loci damni would ultimately be a futile endeavour. The choice of England as the natural forum for the 
dispute acts as a surrogate choice of law rule and leads to the application of English principles of equity to 
assess the conduct complained of.     
442 See Plender and Wilderspin (n 432) 534-536. 
443 Article 4(3) of the Rome II Regulation. 
444 Recital 18 of the Rome II Regulation. 
445 Explanatory Memorandum of the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on 
the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations (“Rome II”) COM (2003) 427 final, 12. 
446 See Winrow v Hemphill [2014] EWHC 3164 (QB) [63] (Slade J) (‘Article 4(3) places a high hurdle in the path of 
a party seeking to displace the law indicated by Article 4(1) or 4(2).’); Stylianou v Toyoshima and Suncorp 
Metway Insurance Limited [2013] EWHC 2188 (QB) (Sir Robert Nelson J); Collins, Dicey, Morris and Collins on 
the Conflict of Laws (n 344) Chapter 35, 2214-2215 (‘the court must be satisfied that the threshold of closer 
connection has been clearly demonstrated’); Andrew Dickinson, The Rome II Regulation: The Law Applicable to 
Non-Contractual Obligations (Oxford Private International Law Series, OUP 2008) Chapter 4, 340-341 (‘Article 
4(3) must, therefore, be considered exceptional, requiring strong and clear reasons for displacing the law 
otherwise applicable under Arts 4(1) and (2)’); Plender and Wilderspin (n 432) Chapter 18, 536 and R Plender 
and M Wilderspin, The European Private International Law of Obligations (2015) (Sweet & Maxwell 2015) 555 
(‘art. 4(3) should be resorted to only in exceptional circumstances.’); JJ Fawcett and JM Carruthers, Cheshire, 
North & Fawcett: Private International Law (14th Ed, Oxford University Press 2008) 799; Richard Fentiman, ‘The 
Significance of Close Connection’ in John Ahern and William Binchy (eds), The Rome II Regulation on the Law 
Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations: A New International Litigation Regime (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
Leiden and Boston 2009) 85-112; Beaumont and McEleavy (n 382) Chapter 14, 649; Bach (n 432) 99. 
447 Raphael (n 330) 333. 
448 Ibid 332. 
449 Briggs, The Unrestrained Reach of an Anti-Suit Injunction (n 356) 95; cf Jonathan Harris, ‘Anti-Suit Injunctions 
– A Home Comfort’ [1997] LMCLQ 413. 
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abroad was acting in breach of an exclusive jurisdiction agreement.450 Relying on Article 4(3) 
of the Rome II Regulation, Takahashi also opines that a tort claim seeking damages for 
breach of a choice of court agreement will in the final analysis be governed by the law which 
governs the agreement since the claim is undeniably closely connected with the 
agreement.451 The law applicable to a choice of court agreement is discussed in the 
appropriate section above. 
It can be difficult to reconcile the arguments of Briggs and Tham with the statutory terms of 
Part III of the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995, in force at that 
time.452 The Act does not mandate a generalized assessment of substantial appropriateness 
but rather a narrower assessment of connecting factors related to the tort. The country 
where litigation should take place is not the country where a tort of wrongfully litigating 
abroad has taken place, nor is it the country to which that tort is most closely connected. To 
aver that the most legally significant feature of a tortious action for damages is someone 
else’s judgment as to where it should have been brought but certainly was not, seems to be 
reasoning tainted by the desired result. 
In the preceding section, we assessed that damages may be awarded by the English courts 
applying English law for the tort of inducing breach of the choice of forum agreement. 
However, the rational development of this tortious cause of action will be encumbered by 
and would have to surmount the choice of law hurdle.453 In OT Africa Line Ltd v Magic 
Sportswear Corp,454 Langley J was faced with an application to serve an application for an 
anti-suit injunction out of the jurisdiction, not only on the contractual party to the exclusive 
forum clause, who had breached the clause by commencing proceedings in Canada, but also 
on their third party insurers. One of the bases advanced for the injunction against the third 
party insurers was the tort of inducing a breach of contract. The judge applied Part III of the 
Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 and concluded that under 
                                                          
450 Tham (n 360) 66. 
451 Takahashi, Damages for Breach of a Choice of Court Agreement: Remaining Issues (n 393) 87. 
452 Raphael (n 330) 333; For Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995, See Dickinson, The 
Rome II Regulation (n 446) Chapter 1, 9-12; It should be noted, that the arguments in favour of displacing the 
applicable law under Articles 4(1) and (2) by virtue of Article 4(3) of the Rome II Regulation will have to cross a 
higher threshold as compared to Section 12 of the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 
1995. ‘A comparison of the respective wording “substantially more appropriate” as opposed to “manifestly 
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that imposed by Section 12 of the 1995 Act.’: (Emphasis added) Plender and Wilderspin (n 432) Chapter 18, 537 
and Plender and Wilderspin, The European Private International Law of Obligations (2015) (n 446) 557. 
453 Raphael (n 330) 335. 
454 [2005] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 252, 256. 
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Section 11,455 the most significant elements of the tort occurred in Canada, which is where 
the insurers caused their insured to issue proceedings. The claimants did not even argue that 
it was substantially more appropriate for English law to apply under Section 12 but the judge 
observed that in his view they were right not to do so.456 As a result Canadian law applied 
and Langley J refused to accept that Canadian law would treat the Canadian proceedings as 
tortious, in a case where Canadian law treated the exclusive jurisdiction clause as non-
binding. It is submitted, that even if Langley J had been considering the Rome II Regulation it 
seems likely that he would have concluded that the place where the direct damage occurred 
was Canada, and thus that Canadian law was applicable under Article 4(1).457 
The application of the law of the place of the wrongful proceedings will mean that any claim 
in tort will usually be pointless, because in the rare cases where a court will accept that the 
commencement of litigation before it in the normal way is actionably wrongful, it will usually 
provide adequate remedies to resolve the problem.458 However, the law of the place of the 
wrongful proceedings will not apply in all cases. For instance, a pre-existing relationship 
between the parties in the form of a contract which has a close connection with the tort in 
question can result in the applicable law of the contract extending its cover to the tort as 
well.459 In the specific case of the breach of a choice of court agreement, the tort for 
wrongful civil litigation does have a close connection with the choice of court agreement and 
it can be argued that the law applicable to the jurisdiction agreement also applies to the 
tort. Another example of the displacement of the applicable law under Article 4(1), is where 
the person claimed to be liable and the person sustaining damage both have their habitual 
residence in the same country at the time when the damage occurs, therefore, resulting in 
the application of the law of that country.460 
                                                          
455 Section 11(1) of the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 provides: ‘The general 
rule is that the applicable law is the law of the country in which the events constituting the tort or delict in 
question occur.’ 
456 Section 12(1) of the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 provides: ‘If it appears, in 
all the circumstances, from a comparison of—  
(a)the significance of the factors which connect a tort or delict with the country whose law would be the 
applicable law under the general rule; and  
(b)the significance of any factors connecting the tort or delict with another country, 
that it is substantially more appropriate for the applicable law for determining the issues arising in the case, or 
any of those issues, to be the law of the other country, the general rule is displaced and the applicable law for 
determining those issues or that issue (as the case may be) is the law of that other country.’ 
457 Raphael (n 330) 336. 
458 ibid 333.  
459 Article 4(3) of the Rome II Regulation. 
460 Article 4(2) of the Rome II Regulation; See Bach (n 432) 92-99. 
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The choice of law rules of some countries may allow the parties to choose the applicable law 
before a tortious act takes place and may give party autonomy precedence over the 
objective connecting factors.461 Article 14(1) of the Rome II Regulation makes provision for a 
choice of law made by an agreement entered into after the event giving rise to the damage 
occurred or where all the parties are pursuing a commercial activity, by an agreement freely 
negotiated before the event giving rise to the damage occurred. Under such rules, effect will 
be given to an express choice of law agreement specifically made for disputes arising from 
the breach of a choice of court agreement, if it is framed in terms wide enough to cover a 
claim in tort. As noted above, such an express choice of law agreement is, albeit not wholly 
inconceivable, unlikely to be concluded in practice. 
Before concluding our foray into the law applicable to a tortious claim for damages for 
breach of contract, it is necessary to consider an anomalous choice of law rule premised on 
parochial policy oriented grounds. The choice of law rules for tort of some countries may 
retain what is known as the double actionability rule,462 under which the cumulative 
application of the law of the forum is reserved. If the claim is brought in a forum adopting 
such a rule, the hurdle that the claim must overcome is so much the higher since it has to 
meet the requirements of the law of the forum over and above the requirements of the law 






                                                          
461 See Thomas Kadner Graziano, ‘Freedom to Choose the Applicable Law in Tort – Articles 14 and 4(3) of the 
Rome II Regulation’ in John Ahern and William Binchy (eds), The Rome II Regulation on the Law Applicable to 
Non-Contractual Obligations: A New International Litigation Regime (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden and 
Boston 2009) 113-132; Ivo Bach, ‘Article 14’ in Peter Huber (ed.), Rome II Regulation: Pocket Commentary 
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from Phillips v Eyre (1870) LR 6 QB 1 (Willes J), some have since rejected the double actionability rule (e.g. the 
Supreme Court of Canada in Jensen v Tolofson [1994] 3 SCR 1022; the Australian High Court in Régie Nationale 
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authority of Boys v Chaplin [1971] AC 356 (Lord Wilberforce). However, the Scottish courts now apply the Rome 
II Regulation and the common law rule is restricted to defamation cases; See Beaumont and McEleavy (n 382) 




A restitutionary claim is not a claim seeking to recover compensatory damages for loss 
suffered but is a claim seeking to strip away gain. It is outside the scope of the present 
discussion on the legal basis of the damages remedy if the expression ‘damages for breach 
of a choice of court agreement’ is strictly understood. However, the restitutionary claim 
does merit an examination since, by bringing an action in breach of a choice of court 
agreement, the claimant may obtain gain and the defendant may wish to deprive him of it. A 
claimant who suffers a smaller loss than the defendant’s gain or who suffers injury of a non-
pecuniary kind from the breach of contract will find a gain based award more attractive than 
compensatory damages for loss suffered.  
In cases where the court first seised declines jurisdiction, both parties may suffer losses in 
the form of costs and expenses but neither will obtain gain. As a consequence, a 
restitutionary claim will not be available. However, in cases where the court first seised 
accepts jurisdiction and decides to hear the case on the merits, the claimant may obtain gain 
if the judgment is more favourable to him than that which would have been rendered in the 
forum chosen by the choice of court agreement. Since the gain obtained by the claimant in 
this situation is also manifested as the loss incurred by the defendant, the defendant may 
make a claim in contract, tort or equity to recover damages. However, as observed above, a 
tort claim may not be granted unless the wrong has been committed intentionally or 
negligently. Also as examined above, a contractual claim, too, may be subject to a fault-
based liability regime depending on the applicable legal system. Since fault will not be a 
prerequisite for a restitutionary claim, the absence of intention or negligence will not 
constitute an obstacle if the defendant frames the claim in the law of restitution. 
Even if a claim framed in contract or tort is considered to be available, a concurrent 
restitutionary claim should not be precluded463 since the cause of action is different: a claim 
for damages, whether framed in contract or tort, is founded on the wrong causing losses 
whereas a restitutionary claim is founded on the wrong resulting in gain. That is not, 
however, the position accepted by all legal systems. 
                                                          
463 This is the position widely accepted under Japanese law; See Takahashi, Damages for Breach of a Choice of 
Court Agreement: Remaining Issues (n 393) 82. 
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In English law, the availability of restitution for wrongs, as distinguished from restitution for 
subtractive unjustified enrichment, is severely restricted.464 Thus, restitution for a tort is 
normally only granted for proprietary torts in which the title to, or possession of, the 
property of the injured party has been infringed. With respect to restitution for a breach of 
contract, the traditional view is that it does not succeed save in exceptional circumstances 
such as where the breach of contract also constitutes a proprietary wrong (whether breach 
of a restrictive covenant or a tort) or an equitable wrong (such as breach of confidence or 
breach of fiduciary duty).465 The restriction was apparently somewhat relaxed by the House 
of Lords in Attorney General v. Blake,466 in which it was held that restitution of profits could 
be ordered for a breach of contract in an exceptional case where damages measured by a 
claimant's loss or specific relief were inadequate or unavailable, especially if the claimant 
had a legitimate interest in preventing the defendant’s profit making activity.467 In the 
absence of more specific guidance, it is not certain how that test would be applied to the 
case of a breach of a choice of court agreement even if we assume for the sake of argument 
that damages do not provide adequate relief. However, in a very significant judgment of the 
English High Court in Vercoe v Rutland Fund Management Ltd468 Sales J identified a number 
of key principles to determine when the remedy of restitution of profits should be available 
for breach of contract. The general principle concerns the identification of the just response 
to the particular wrong, which is determined by assessing whether the claimant’s objective 
interest in performance of the relevant obligation makes it just and equitable that the 
defendant should retain no benefit from the breach of the obligation, so that the remedy 
awarded is not disproportionate to the wrong done to the claimant. Where the claimant has 
a particularly strong interest in full performance, he should be entitled to a choice between 
damages and account of profits. The claimant might have a particularly strong interest in full 
                                                          
464 See McKendrick, Contract Law (n 327) 343: ‘But, where the ground on which restitution is sought is that the 
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467 Graham Virgo, ‘Restitution’ in HG Beale and others (eds), Chitty on Contracts (Volume I, 31st Edition, Sweet 
and Maxwell, London 2012) Chapter 29, 2130-2134; McKendrick, Contract Law (n 327) Chapter 20, 345-346. 




performance of the contract where, for example, the breach of contract involves 
infringement of property rights, including intellectual property rights, or where it would not 
be reasonable to expect the contractual right to be released for a reasonable fee, such as the 
right to have state secrets maintained as in Attorney General v Blake itself or rights arising 
under fiduciary relationships. If the claimant does not have a strong interest in performance, 
as will be the case in a more commercial context, account of profits should not be available 
and the claimant should be confined to what the parties would have reasonably agreed that 
the defendant would have paid to the claimant to release the contractual right. If, as Sales J 
in the English High Court has determined, the circumstances must be exceptional, a breach 
of a choice of court agreement would not normally qualify for restitution of profit. 
In many civil law systems, both restitution for wrongs and restitution for subtractive 
unjustified enrichment will be covered by a broad rule allowing the claimant to deprive the 
defendant of gain obtained without legal basis.469 Under Japanese law, for example, 
restitution is granted if the defendant has gained at the expense of the claimant in the 
circumstances where the gain has no legal basis.470 If, by bringing an action in breach of a 
choice of court agreement, the claimant has obtained gain in the shape of a more favourable 
judgment than that which would be rendered in the forum chosen by the choice of court 
agreement, that gain may be deemed to have no ‘legal basis,’ depending on the 
interpretation of that expression under the applicable law. 
It should be noted that the restitutionary claim is not founded upon the breach of a choice 
of court agreement per se but upon a broader context in which the breach has resulted in 
the claimant’s gain. Since the procedural character of a choice of court agreement does not 
have a direct impact, the restitutionary claim is more conducive to substantive 
characterisation than the contractual claim. It means that the court which would not allow a 
contractual claim to recover damages for breach of a choice of court agreement by treating 
it as a procedural question may allow a restitutionary claim to strip away the claimant’s gain, 
provided that the requirements in all other respects are fulfilled. 
 
                                                          
469 cf. In English law, the absence of legal basis is not enough but it is necessary to identify a specific ‘unjust 
factor’ such as mistake or duress. Although the late Professor Peter Birks advocated abandoning that approach 
in favour of the civil law approach in his last monograph Unjust Enrichment (2nd Edition, Clarendon Law Series, 
OUP 2005), that view has not earned a wide support in England: See Visser (n 464), 997. 
470 Article 703 of the Civil Code (Japan); See Takahashi, Damages for Breach of a Choice of Court Agreement: 
Remaining Issues (n 393) 83. 
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Applicable Law of a Restitutionary Claim 
The connecting factors for a restitutionary claim depend on the precise formulation of the 
applicable choice of law rules. The applicable choice of law rules in turn are determined by 
the nature of the substantive obligation and the specific policy goals of the choice of law 
regime. For the purposes of both English substantive private law characterization and English 
private international law characterization pursuant to Articles 4 and 10 of the Rome II 
Regulation, restitution for unjust enrichment is to be differentiated from restitution for 
wrongs.471 In the case of restitution for a wrong there has been a breach by the defendant of 
a primary duty owed to the claimant.472 Where one is dealing with restitution for a wrong, 
the relevant event or cause of action is the wrong and the enrichment purely goes to the 
remedial question of whether the claimant is entitled to restitution, rather than the more 
usual compensation. As a result of an event or cause of action based characterization, 
restitution for wrongs should be subject to Article 4 of the Rome II Regulation whereas 
restitution for unjust enrichment should be regulated by Article 10 of the Rome II 
Regulation.473 The alternative consequence based approach would subsume both restitution 
for wrongs and restitution for unjust enrichment under Article 10 of the Rome II 
Regulation.474 The lack of a definitive CJEU authority on the matter means that the more 
                                                          
471 For the differentiated English substantive private law characterization of restitution for unjust enrichment 
and restitution for wrongs see, Andrew Burrows, A Restatement of the English Law of Unjust Enrichment 
(Oxford University Press 2012) s 1(3), 26-28; Graham Virgo, The Principles of the Law of Restitution (2nd Edition, 
OUP 2006) Chapter 15; Professor Birks originally treated restitution for wrongs as founded on the reversal of 
unjust enrichment in Peter Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (Clarendon Press, OUP 1989) 313, 
but he subsequently altered his position in Birks, Unjust Enrichment (n 469) 12-16; Mitchell (n 465) 1333-1334; 
That restitution for wrongs is not founded on the unjust enrichment principle was recognised by Millett J in 
Macmillan Inc v Bishopsgate Investment Trust plc (No 3) [1995] 1 WLR 978, 988; cf Halifax Building Society v 
Thomas [1996] Ch 217, 224 (Peter Gibson LJ); For the differentiated English private international law 
characterization of restitution for unjust enrichment and restitution for wrongs in relation to Article 10 and 
Article 4 of the Rome II Regulation respectively see, Dickinson, The Rome II Regulation (n 446) 302; Ivo Bach, 
‘Article 4’ in Peter Huber (ed.), Rome II Regulation (Sellier European Law Publishers, Munich 2011) 66; Plender 
and Wilderspin, The European Private International Law of Obligations (n 432) 24-085; Plender and Wilderspin, 
The European Private International Law of Obligations (2015) (n 446) 728; Collins, Dicey, Morris and Collins on 
the Conflict of Laws (n 344) 2209 (‘although the matter is not free from doubt’); George Panagopoulos, 
Restitution in Private International Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2000) 16-17; Adeline Chong, ‘Choice of Law for 
Unjust Enrichment/Restitution and the Rome II Regulation’ (2008) 57 ICLQ 863, 890-892; Adam Rushworth and 
Andrew Scott, ‘Rome II: Choice of Law for Non Contractual Obligations’ [2008] LMCLQ 274, 286. 
472 A right to restitution founded on a civil wrong including restitution for torts, restitution for breach of 
contract and restitution for the equitable wrongs of breach of fiduciary duty (including breach of trust) or 
breach of confidence. 
473 See FN 471 above. 
474 Fawcett and Carruthers (n 446) 825 argue that a better alternative would be for situations falling within the 
category of restitution for wrongdoing be subsumed under the unjust enrichment by subtraction category. 
Article 10 would then apply to both categories; Takahashi prefers an Article 10 classification for restitutionary 
damages for breach of a jurisdiction agreement: See Takahashi, Damages for Breach of a Choice of Court 
Agreement: Remaining Issues (n 393) 88. 
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elegant differentiated approach to both categories in English law will prevail, at least for the 
time being. 
A choice of law analysis pursuant to Article 4 of the Rome II Regulation is considered above 
under the section titled ‘Applicable Law of the Tortious Claim for Damages’. In case Article 
10 is deemed to apply in relation to restitution for wrongs or the claim for restitution lacks 
the element of fault and is akin to subtractive unjust enrichment, it will be necessary to 
examine the connecting factors in Article 10 of the Rome II Regulation. The development of 
an autonomous European concept of unjust enrichment as an aid in the characterization 
process will be considered first.     
Recital 11 of the Rome II Regulation requires the integration of the prevalent diverse 
approaches to unjust enrichment in the EU Member States into an autonomous European 
concept of unjust enrichment. An autonomous, unitary definition of unjust enrichment will 
be an indispensable aid in the characterization of claims and for distinguishing unjust 
enrichment from claims in contract, tort and negotiorum gestio. In the context of a 
substantive law action for unjust enrichment against the European Commission under EU 
law the Grand Chamber of the ECJ has held that unjust enrichment does not require fault or 
conduct by the defendant but merely proof that the defendant has been enriched without 
any legal basis475 for the enrichment and that the claimant has been impoverished in a way 
that is linked to the defendant’s enrichment.476 The definition proffered by the ECJ is very 
similar to the definition of the Draft Common Frame of Reference:477 
[A]n enrichment which is not legally justified, with the result that, if it is obtained by 
one person and is attributable to another’s disadvantage, the first person may, 
subject to legal rules and restrictions, be obliged to that other to reverse the 
enrichment.   
Where the restitution concerns an existing relationship between the parties arising out of a 
contract or a tort/delict, the choice of law rules of some countries may give priority to the 
                                                          
475 In contrast to the approach in civil law legal systems, which determine the ‘unjust question’ by reference to 
whether there has been an ‘absence of basis’, the best interpretation of English law is that this question is 
approached by requiring the claimant to establish an ‘unjust factor’: See Burrows, A Restatement of the English 
Law of Unjust Enrichment (n 471) s 3(2)-(5), 31-32; cf Birks, Unjust Enrichment (n 469) in his final writings 
preferred the continental conception of ‘absence of basis’. 
476 P Masdar (UK) v Commission (C-47/07) [2008] ECR I-9761. 
477 Christian von Bar and others (eds), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law: Draft 
Common Frame of Reference (Sellier, Munich 2008) Annex 1 at 343. Dickinson follows this model in his 
suggested definition of unjust enrichment for the Rome II Regulation, See Dickinson, The Rome II Regulation (n 
446) 10.19-10.21; Beaumont and McEleavy (n 382) Chapter 14, 681-682. 
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law that governs that relationship.478 Under such choice of law rules, a restitutionary claim 
seeking to strip away the gain which has resulted from a breach of a choice of court 
agreement will be governed by the law that governs the choice of court agreement. As to 
what law governs a choice of court agreement, reference should be made to the discussion 
above in the section titled ‘Applicable Law of the Contractual Claim for Damages’. 
Where there is no pre-existing relationship between the parties, the Rome II Regulation 
provides for the application of the lex domicilii communis i.e. the law of the country in which 
both parties to the unjust enrichment have their habitual residence.479 In accordance with 
the objective of parallel interpretation and the internal coherence and consistency of 
provisions within the Rome II Regulation, Article 10(2) of the Rome II Regulation is almost 
identical to Article 4(2) and as such reference may be made to the commentary on Article 
4(2) in interpreting Article 10(2).  
Under the choice of law rules of some countries, the governing law of a restitutionary claim 
will be the law of the country where the causal facts have taken place or, more precisely, the 
law of the place where the gain has accrued.480 If such rules are applied to the cases where a 
restitutionary claim is made to strip away the gain which has resulted from a breach of a 
choice of court agreement, which places would they point to? It is easy to imagine that the 
place of causal facts will be localised in the forum first seised since, the institution of the 
action in breach of a choice of court agreement can be deemed to be the fact causing the 
gain. It is equally likely that the place of gain will also be localised in the forum first seised 
since, the gain can be deemed to have accrued in that forum through the costs order and 
the judgment on the merits. 
The choice of law rules of some countries may contain a rule of displacement under which 
the otherwise applicable law is displaced by the law of the place with which the restitution is 
‘manifestly more closely connected’ in the light of all the circumstances of the case.481 It 
should be noted that the ‘escape clause’ provided in Article 10(4) of the Rome II Regulation 
                                                          
478 Article 10(1) of the Rome II Regulation; See Peter Huber and Ivo Bach, ‘Article 10’ in Peter Huber (ed.), Rome 
II Regulation: Pocket Commentary (Sellier European Law Publishers, Munich 2011) 286-300; Plender and 
Wilderspin, The European Private International Law of Obligations (2015) (n 446) 729-731. 
479 Article 10(2) of the Rome II Regulation; See Huber and Bach (n 478) 295-296; Plender and Wilderspin, The 
European Private International Law of Obligations (2015) (n 446) 731-732. 
480 Article 10(3) of the Rome II Regulation; See Huber and Bach (n 478) 296-299; Plender and Wilderspin, The 
European Private International Law of Obligations (2015) (n 446) 732-734. 
481 Article 10(4) of the Rome II Regulation; See Huber and Bach (n 478) 299; Plender and Wilderspin, The 
European Private International Law of Obligations (2015) (n 446) 734-735. 
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sets a high threshold: the unjust enrichment obligation must be manifestly more closely 
connected with a law other than with the law deemed applicable under Articles 10(1) to 
(3).482  
The choice of law rules of some countries may allow the parties to choose the governing law 
before the event causing unjust enrichment takes place and may give the party autonomy 
precedence over the objective connecting factors.483 Under such rules, effect will be given to 
an express choice of law agreement specifically made for disputes arising from the breach of 
a choice of court agreement, if it is framed in terms wide enough to cover a claim in 
restitution. As noted in the section above titled ‘Applicable Law of the Contractual Claim for 
Damages’, such an express choice of law agreement is, albeit not wholly inconceivable, 















                                                          
482 Chong (n 471) 889; Plender and Wilderspin, The European Private International Law of Obligations (2015) (n 
446) 735, note that the phrase ‘manifestly more closely connected’ is intended to impose a ‘strict test’ and 
suggest that the language in Article 10(4) should be construed so as to reflect an approach akin to that adopted 
under Article 4(3) of the Rome II Regulation.  
483 Article 14(1)(b) of the Rome II Regulation but only if the choice is made by an agreement freely negotiated 
between parties pursuing a commercial activity. 
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Damages in Equity 
Does a Substantive Equitable Right Not to be Sued Abroad Vexatiously Exist? 
Having examined the contractual and tortious legal bases for a claim of damages for breach 
of a choice of court agreement, it is now time to turn towards a claim of damages based on 
equitable principles. The existence of a substantive equitable right not to be subjected to 
vexatious and oppressive foreign litigation or not to be affected by unconscionable conduct 
in the pursuit of foreign legal proceedings which is capable of supporting a claim for 
damages has been doubted by English courts and commentators alike. The issue of the 
existence of a substantive equitable right not to be sued abroad vexatiously and oppressively 
is common to both the legal basis of non-contractual anti-suit injunctions and the legal basis 
of non-contractual damages for breach of a choice of court agreement.  
Borrowing from the jurisprudence of non-contractual anti-suit injunctions, there is a strong 
argument that although the court may be exercising an equitable power when granting an 
anti-suit injunction, it is not necessarily doing so to protect any substantive equitable 
right.484 In similar vein, Fentiman argues that equitable rights are not substantive but 
remedial in nature.485 The infringement of an equitable right is merely a legal conclusion 
drawn from the fact that the respondent’s conduct has been held unconscionable.486 Briggs 
refers to the notion of an equitable right as a ‘troublesome expression’ and prefers to 
describe the behaviour of the respondent as vexatious or oppressive, bearing in mind that 
England is the natural forum for the litigation.487 Outside the context of the court’s practice 
of granting anti-suit injunctions there is no identifiable basis for a general substantive 
equitable right; therefore it is circular to invent retrospectively a notional equitable right to 
fit the situations where the remedy would be granted in any event.488 However, as a matter 
of principle, a private law remedy should be based on the infringement of a substantive 
right.489 Where the basis of the remedy extends beyond the vindication of private law rights 
and into the domain of public or procedural law, a substantive right is no longer required as 
                                                          
484 Raphael (n 330) 67-71, 69. 
485 Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (2015) (n 315) 497; Fentiman, International Commercial 
Litigation (2010) (n 367) 560. 
486 Ibid. 
487 Briggs, Private International Law in English Courts (n 318) 399. 
488 Raphael (n 330) 69-70. 
489 Ubi jus, ibi remedium (Latin: where there is a right, there is a remedy); See Lord Chief Justice Holt in Ashby v 
White (1703) 14 St Tr 695, 92 ER 126. 
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a justification for an anti-suit injunction.490 Instead, the need to protect the judicial 
processes of the forum grounds the grant of the anti-suit injunction.491 It is submitted that, 
the significance of the need to keep the private law and public law justifications of the non-
contractual anti-suit injunction separate cannot be overstated.492 The lack of logical order 
and clarity in the anti-suit injunction right/remedy conundrum is the result of conflating the 
private and public law justifications for the award of non-contractual anti-suit injunctions. 
Secondly, it is submitted that, the need to ‘invent’ a substantive equitable right has 
application beyond the realm of non-contractual anti-suit injunctions. The existence of a 
substantive equitable right is crucial for the legal basis of equitable damages for breach of a 
choice of court agreement.   
In Masri v Consolidated Contractors493, Lawrence Collins LJ494, who accepted obiter with 
some reluctance that the authorities supported the existence of a legal or equitable right in 
‘single forum’495 cases, held after full argument that there was no relevant equitable right in 
‘alternative forum’496 cases. Raphael in his monograph, The Anti-Suit Injunction, argues that 
as a matter of principle there is no obvious reason why if there is a right not to be sued 
abroad vexatiously in single forum cases there cannot be a right not to be sued abroad 
vexatiously in alternative forum cases.497 On the other hand, Briggs argues against the 
preferential treatment of single forum cases and advocates that the same set of rules and 
principles should apply to all cases of restraint of vexatious or oppressive behaviour.498 
Raphael further argues that if the ramifications of the existence of a substantive equitable 
right were neutral, there would be much to be said for casting aside ‘an essentially fictitious 
substantive right’.499 However, the continued existence and development of a substantive 
equitable right affects and is affected by other extraneous issues and should not be decided 
                                                          
490 Briggs, Private International Law in English Courts (n 318) 403-405. 
491 See Masri v Consolidated Contractors International (UK) Ltd (No 3) [2008] EWCA Civ 625, [2009] QB 503; 
Ahmed v Mehmet [2014] EWCA Civ 277 (instituting proceedings in respect of a matter which has already been 
adjudicated in England with a view to undermining the English judgment). 
492 Sim (n 356) 708. 
493 Masri v Consolidated Contractors International (UK) Ltd (No 3) [2008] EWCA Civ 625, [2009] QB 503 
(Lawrence Collins LJ); See also, British Airways Board v Laker Airways Ltd [1985] AC 58; Airbus Industrie GIE v 
Patel [1999] 1 AC 119. 
494 Longman LJ and Sir Anthony Clarke MR agreeing. 
495 In a single forum case the foreign claim can only be brought in the foreign country. 
496 In an alternative forum case the claim which is being made in the foreign action can be heard either in 
England or abroad, or even in both jurisdictions. The possible actions in the competing jurisdictions do not 
need to be identical, provided that they are substantially similar. 
497 Raphael (n 330) 71. 




without reference to those factors. Thus, the existence of a substantive equitable right is 
supported by the possibility that, in the absence of such an equitable right, the court will 
have no power to serve claims for final anti-suit injunctions out of the jurisdiction under CPR 
6.20, which would be an undesirable result.500 On the other hand, grounding the non-
contractual anti-suit injunction on a substantive equitable right would pose choice of law 
issues. The implications of a choice of law analysis of the substantive equitable right not to 
be sued abroad vexatiously and oppressively are considered in the appropriate sub-section 
below. 
Choice of Law and Equity 
Equitable doctrines and remedies have historically presented challenges for a 
straightforward and seamless choice of law analysis.501 In broad terms, at one end of the 
spectrum equity traditionalists argue that when the court’s equitable jurisdiction is invoked, 
it leads to the application of the law of the forum without any reference to choice of law 
rules. At the other end of the spectrum is the view that equitable doctrines themselves 
should be subject to choice of law analysis; that the equitable principles of the forum should 
be applied only if the forum’s choice of law rules identify the law of the forum as the lex 
causae (applicable law).502 
In his seminal monograph, Yeo outlines three possible frameworks for analyzing choice of 
law for equitable doctrines.503 The first is that equity has its own choice of law rules.504 The 
second is that there is a single choice of law system, but one which has distinct categories 
for equitable doctrines.505 The third, which Yeo favours, is that the division of common law 
and equity is only relevant after English law has been determined as the applicable law by 
choice of law rules.506 The essential argument supporting this latter framework is that 
drawing a distinction between legal and equitable wrongs perpetuates a domestic law 
distinction, which is only relevant if choice of law analysis has identified that an issue should 
be determined by a legal system which draws such a distinction. The process of 
                                                          
500 Sim (n 356) 707. 
501 ibid 720-721; Collins, Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Laws (n 344) Chapter 34, 2188-2189. 
502 Garnett, Substance and Procedure in Private International Law (n 332) 107-108, 111-112; Briggs, The 
Unrestrained Reach of an Anti-Suit Injunction (n 356); cf Harris, Anti-Suit Injunctions – A Home Comfort (n 449); 
Fawcett and Carruthers (n 446) 459–460; See also, Sparka (n 370) 97-98. 
503 TM Yeo, Choice of Law for Equitable Doctrines (Oxford Private International Law Series, OUP 2004) 56-66. 
504 Ibid 56-57. 
505 Ibid 57-61. 
506 Ibid 61–66. 
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characterization is to bring together functionally similar issues, irrespective of historical 
origins or domestic classification. 
There has been a recent shift away from the bland application of the lex fori to subjecting 
equitable claims to choice of law analysis achieved by identification of the closest 
established category of characterization.507 An issue is not to be classified as procedural 
simply because it has the capacity to interfere with English notions of equity. Whilst some 
may approach the non-contractual anti-suit injunction without recourse to choice of law 
principles, the sole application of the law of the forum is an indulgence which promotes 
forum shopping, curbs international harmony in decision making and militates against the 
contemporary trend of allocating a potentially larger sphere of operation for the applicable 
law (lex causae). 
Equitable Damages 
There is no precedent in English law where damages have been sought in equity for wrongful 
foreign litigation (breach of an equitable obligation not to sue abroad vexatiously and 
oppressively) and there is no principle of the traditional rules of equity on which it could be 
based.508 The historical development of the anti-suit injunction is implicitly inconsistent with 
the existence of a right to damages. 
As observed above, it is uncertain whether there is a substantive equitable right which 
underpins general non-contractual anti-suit injunctions. Even if such a substantive equitable 
right does exist, its support for a claim for equitable damages or compensation is not 
without doubt.509 It may well be that any substantive equitable right will support only an 
injunction and no more. 
Further, if an equitable right to damages did exist, it would confront and create serious 
problems. First, the scope of the equitable right would presumably have to match, or at least 
                                                          
507 Plender and Wilderspin, The European Private International Law of Obligations (2015) (n 446) 728, argue 
that the better view is to characterize equitable wrongs, for choice of law purposes, under one of the four main 
categories of obligations: tort, contract, property and restitution; Layton, Anti-Arbitration Injunctions and Anti-
Suit Injunctions (n 441) 134; For example in OJSC Oil Co Yugraneft v Abramovich [2008] EWHC 2613 (Comm) a 
claim for unjust enrichment based on knowing assistance was characterised as a tort and subject to English law, 
while a claim for unjust enrichment based on knowing receipt was held to be subject to Russian law as the law 
having the closest and most real connection with the obligation to make restoration; See Yeo, Choice of Law for 
Equitable Doctrines (n 503) 320. 
508 Raphael (n 330) 336. 
509 Ibid 337. 
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be related to, the scope of the injunction.510 In particular, it would be undesirable if an 
equitable right to damages were to exist in many cases where an injunction should be 
refused as a matter of comity or discretion. 
Second, if a substantive equitable right to damages does exist, it will face the obvious choice 
of law hurdle. The question of how choice of law rules apply to equitable claims is complex 
and uncertain. But it is probable that, if there were a substantive equitable right capable of 
supporting a claim in damages for wrongful civil litigation, then such a right would in 
principle be indistinguishable from a claim in tort. Consequently, it is likely that the Rome II 
Regulation’s choice of law regime for non-contractual obligations will apply.511 The right not 
to be sued reflects precisely the sort of ‘fault’ based remedial concept which Rome II is 
intended to capture under the broad definition of tort/delict contained in Article 4(1).512 
Article 4(1) of Rome II Regulation prescribes the lex loci damni as the general rule for the 
determination of the applicable law. The applicable law is that of the country in which the 
damage occurs, irrespective of where the event, or indirect consequences of the event, that 
give rise to the damage occurred. In the context of wrongful litigation, this seems to point 
away from the forum and towards the place of the ‘immediate effect’ of the conduct in 
bringing proceedings.513 However, if proceedings are pending between the same parties in 
the forum at the time of the commencement of the foreign proceedings, the parties may be 
said to be in a ‘pre-existing relationship’, which then triggers the applicability of the lex fori 
by reason of Article 4(3).514 
Arguments directed against the lex causae selected by the choice of law rule prescribed by 
the Rome II Regulation are strictly irrelevant. Fears that applying the law of the place where 
the wrong was committed, or the law which has the closest connection to the claim, might 
‘wreak havoc’ by leading to the application of the law of the place where proceedings were 
being brought (and the alleged likelihood that this would mean that no relevant wrong had 
been committed) are predicated on a refusal to accept the relevance of foreign law. In the 
present context, the application of foreign law will usually preclude any claim based on a 
substantive equity, let alone for damages in equity or equitable compensation.   
                                                          
510 Ibid. 
511 Layton, Anti-Arbitration Injunctions and Anti-Suit Injunctions (n 441) 134-135; Yeo, Choice of Law for 
Equitable Doctrines (n 503) 66. 
512 Sim (n 356) 724; Dickinson, The Rome II Regulation (n 446) 356. 
513 Layton, Anti-Arbitration Injunctions and Anti-Suit Injunctions (n 441) 135; Sim (n 356) 724; Dickinson, The 
Rome II Regulation (n 446) 357. 
514 Sim (n 356) 724; Dickinson, The Rome II Regulation (n 446) 357. 
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Raphael suggests that one way of resolving the friction between choice of law and equitable 
principles that arises if a substantive right not to be vexed by litigation abroad is considered 
to exist, is to attenuate the substantive content of the right.515 The more any right becomes 
a right to an injunction and no more, the easier it becomes to view it as not analogous to a 
claim in tort, but instead as akin to a matter of procedure, and thus legitimately a matter of 
English law alone, as the lex fori.516 However, it is submitted, that there is no principled basis 
for devising a half-way house based on convenience from the hallowed substantive 
equitable right which supports an injunction but will be incapable of supporting a claim in 
damages. This is without prejudice to the statutory power to award damages in lieu of an 
injunction under Section 50 of the Senior Court Act 1981, which will be considered in the 
next section. 
In similar vein, Dickinson suggests that the most obvious way of circumventing the choice of 
law impasse would be to reject the view of Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough that anti-suit 
injunctions should be seen as being based on ‘wrongful conduct’ and instead to treat them 
as procedural measures ancillary to an existing or future claim before the courts of the 
forum state.517 In Masri v Consolidated Contractors, Lawrence Collins LJ expressed the obiter 
view that an interim anti-suit injunction qualifies as a protective measure within Article 31 of 
the Brussels I Regulation, being designed to protect the claimant’s underlying rights and the 
integrity of the English substantive proceedings in which it was granted.518 On this view anti-
suit injunctions outside the contractual context may be characterized as being procedural in 
nature and falling outside the Rome II Regulation, by reason of the exclusion of matters of 
evidence and procedure in Article 1(3). Nevertheless, the Rome II Regulation would, 
apparently, continue to apply to ‘single forum’ cases.519 
                                                          
515 Raphael (n 330) 338. 
516 Thomas Raphael’s pragmatic truncation of the substantive right not to be vexed by litigation abroad by 
limiting it to cases of cross border injunctive relief may be unprincipled as the necessary implication is for the 
procedural law of the forum to apply. The English common law has adopted a wide view of procedural matters 
as a result of its traditional right/remedy approach, whereas, recent developments in other commonwealth 
jurisdictions such as Australia and Canada have given rise to a larger ‘outcome determinative’ role for the 
applicable law as compared to a more limited ‘mode or conduct of proceedings’ sphere of operation for the 
procedural law of the forum. The Rome I and Rome II Regulations also accord a wider scope to the applicable 
law as compared to the English common law. See Garnett, Substance and Procedure in Private International 
Law (n 332) Chapter 2. 
517 Dickinson, The Rome II Regulation (n 446) 358; See Turner v Grovit [2001] UKHL 64, [2001] 1 WLR 107, [24] 
(Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough). 
518 Masri v Consolidated Contractors [2008] EWCA Civ 625, [2008] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 301, [66] (Lawrence Collins LJ)  
519 Ibid [42]-[44], [56] (Lawrence Collins LJ). 
150 
 
A principled criticism of the pragmatic workaround highlighted by Raphael and Dickinson is 
that the application of Rome II Regulation choice of law rules may well preclude the grant of 
non-contractual anti-suit injunctions or non-contractual claims for damages in many cases 
but the rules seek to determine the rights of the parties under the most appropriate legal 
system, rather than a blanket application of the lex fori which leads to the creation of 
essentially fictitious rights. Under a choice of law analysis, the rules of the forum are only 
applied when the choice of law rules of the forum indicate that the lex fori is the lex causae. 
This choice of law methodology is indeed more principled than reversing the accepted order 
of analysis of a conflict of law issue and applying the law of the forum without reservation or 
restraint. A choice of law analysis of non-contractual anti-suit injunctions and claims for non-
contractual damages may also give a role to comity in matters of choice of law, in addition to 
its more traditional role as a factor taken into consideration when the court exercises its 
















                                                          
520 See generally, Sim (n 356): A conception of ‘comity’ as an expression of justice in cases involving foreign 
elements which serves as the catalyst for taking account of foreign law assuages concerns about interfering 
with foreign courts. 
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Damages in Lieu of an Injunction: Section 50 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 
Power to award damages as well as, or in substitution for, injunction or specific 
performance. 
Where the Court of Appeal or the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain an 
application for an injunction or specific performance, it may award damages in 
addition to, or in substitution for, an injunction or specific performance.521  
Where the court has power to grant an injunction, it can in its discretion award damages in 
addition to, or in substitution for an injunction under Section 50 of the Senior Courts Act 
1981, which restates the powers granted by Lord Cairns’ Act.522 Where the court decides to 
exercise its discretion to award damages, damages are assessed on the same basis as 
common law damages for breach of contract.523 It has been suggested by some prominent 
English common law commentators that this power could justify the award of the damages 
remedy in place of an anti-suit injunction.524 For instance, Clare Ambrose anticipates no 
problems with the grant of damages under Section 50.525 Likewise, Chee Ho Tham also 
considers that damages under this provision should be available in an appropriate case.526 A 
grant of damages under the statutory power would have the advantage, in contrast to a 
substantive equitable right to damages, that the award of damages under Section 50 is 
discretionary, and thus flexible.527 
This argument is further supported by the traditional justification for the availability of the 
injunction remedy; that common law damages would be inadequate. The justification 
presupposes that damages, but for their supposed inadequacy, would have been the proper 
response to such breaches. Therefore, if the courts will grant anti-suit injunctions to restrain 
breaches of choice of court clauses, they must necessarily have the corollary power to award 
damages in response to such breaches as well. 
                                                          
521 Section 50, Senior Courts Act 1981. 
522 The power to grant damages in lieu of an injunction was originally granted to the Court of Chancery by the 
Chancery Amendment Act 1858, section 2, commonly known as Lord Cairns’ Act. 
523 Johnson v Agnew [1980] AC 367, 400; cf Surrey CC v Bredero Homes Ltd [1993] 1 WLR 1361, 1366-67; 
McKendrick, Contract Law (n 327) Chapter 21, 382. 
524 Raphael (n 330) 338-340; For a discussion of Section 50 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 and damages for 
breach of an arbitration agreement, see, Steven Gee, ‘Lord Bingham, Anti-Suit Injunctions and Arbitration’ in 
Mads Andenas and Duncan Fairgrieve (eds.), Tom Bingham and the Transformation of the Law: A Liber 
Amicorum (OUP 2009) 635, 638-643. 
525 Clare Ambrose, ‘Can Anti-Suit Injunctions Survive European Community Law’ (2003) 52 ICLQ 401, 416. 
526 Tham (n 360) 68. 
527 Raphael (n 330) 339. 
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Raphael questions whether it would be legitimate to grant damages in lieu of an injunction 
under Section 50 in respect of vexatious litigation, if damages of that nature could not in 
principle be awarded at common law or equity for such a wrong.528 Tham affirms the 
legitimacy of damages in such situations by stating that the damages are available as long as 
the court has jurisdiction to grant an injunction or make an order of specific performance, 
even if there is no cause of action at common law.529 On the contrary, it is suggested, that 
apart from the clear case of contractual damages, Section 50 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 
does not provide a useful route to recover damages for allegedly wrongful foreign litigation. 
This reasoned observation is predicated on the prevailing doubts concerning the existence of 
a substantive legal or equitable right not to be sued abroad vexatiously and if such a right 
does exist, whether its breach can support a cause of action for tortious or equitable 
damages. In the case of contractual damages, the existence and breach of a legal right not to 
be sued abroad in a non-contractual forum provides a sound legal basis for both contractual 
anti-suit injunctions and contractual damages for breach of a choice of court agreement.  
Potential issues relating to choice of law for the statutory provision would also need to be 
addressed. However, the need for a choice of law analysis will turn on the appropriate 
characterization of the statutory power to award damages as an issue of substance or 
procedure. If the provision is classified as being premised on the substantive right not to 
sued abroad vexatiously, it will be subject to the Rome II Regulation and the choice of law 
rules contained therein. However, it is arguable that claims for damages in lieu of an 
injunction are a purely procedural matter governed by the lex fori regit processum530 rule 
without reference to any underlying substantive equitable obligation not to be subject to 
wrongful civil litigation requiring a choice of law analysis. Furthermore, the Rome II 
Regulation applies to ‘non-contractual obligations in civil and commercial matters’531 but not 
to matters of ‘evidence and procedure’.532 Article 15 of the Rome II Regulation provides that: 
‘The law applicable to non-contractual obligations under this Regulation shall govern in 
particular……..(c) the existence, the nature and the assessment of damage or the remedy 
claimed’.533 However, it is submitted, that if there is no relevant non-contractual obligation 
                                                          
528 Ibid. 
529 Tham (n 360) 67. 
530 Procedure is governed by the law of the forum. 
531 Article 1(1) Rome II Regulation. 
532 Article 1(3) Rome II Regulation. 
533 Article 15(c) Rome II Regulation. 
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within the scope of the Regulation, then logically the need for any remedy to be governed by 
the applicable law under Article 15 does not arise in the first place.  
Last but not least, even if the power to award damages in lieu of an injunction does exist in 
general, it is doubtful whether it can be exercised in a situation where the power to grant an 
anti-suit injunction has been removed by the Court of Justice of the European Union in its 



















                                                          
534 Turner v Grovit C-159/02 [2004] ECR I-3565. 
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Recognition and Enforcement of the English Judgment Awarding Damages for Breach of a 
Choice of Court Agreement 
Introduction 
Where a judgment has been rendered by the English courts awarding damages for breach of 
a choice of court agreement or in exceptional circumstances ordering restitution of the gain 
which had resulted from the breach, if the judgment debtor does not have sufficient assets 
in the jurisdiction, the judgment creditor may wish to seek recognition and enforcement 
abroad.535 
The crucial question is the likelihood of the recognition and enforcement of an award of 
damages536 where for all practical purposes the enforcement of such a judgment bears very 
close resemblance to the effects of an anti-suit injunction on the jurisdiction and judgments 
apparatus of the foreign court. Indeed, the enforcement of the judgment awarding damages 
may render the future commencement or continuance of proceedings on the substantive 
contract in the foreign court futile or contradict an actual judgment of the foreign court on 
the substantive contract by second guessing and nullifying or reversing its effects. In this 
regard, Briggs admits that an English judgment awarding damages for breach of a jurisdiction 
agreement is ‘in reality unlikely to have international legs’.537 However, Yeo and Tan have 
suggested that a judgment awarding damages would, unlike an anti-suit injunction, be 
enforceable under the Brussels I Regulation.538 
Moreover, Tan in a separate article has argued that the damages remedy has a potentially 
greater reach than the anti-suit injunction.539 At common law foreign courts do not generally 
enforce equitable remedies such as injunctions but they have been more willing to enforce 
liquidated money judgments rendered by foreign courts.540 Foreign common law courts may 
                                                          
535 See Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (2015) (n 315) Chapter 2: Enforcement risk is a 
constituent part of Litigation risk and has to be factored into the costs associated with entering into a particular 
cross border commercial transaction. It may be defined as the risk that a judgment debtor with worldwide 
assets will disperse or conceal those assets, and the risk that a judgment obtained in one court will be 
unenforceable elsewhere.  
536 See Takahashi, Damages for Breach of a Choice of Court Agreement: Remaining Issues (n 393) 97-99. 
537 Briggs, Agreements (n 320) 321. 
538 Nik Yeo and Daniel Tan, ‘Damages for Breach of Exclusive Jurisdiction Clauses’ in Sarah Worthington (ed.), 
Commercial Law and Commercial Practice (Hart Publishing 2003) Chapter 14, 416. 
539 Daniel Tan, ‘Damages for Breach of Forum Selection Clauses, Principled Remedies, and Control of 
International Civil Litigation’ (2005) 40 Texas International Law Journal 623, 645. 
540 See Peter Barnett, Res Judicata, Estoppel, and Foreign Judgments: The Preclusive Effects of Foreign 
Judgments in Private International Law (Oxford Private International Law Series, OUP 2001) 49-54; It is a basic 
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therefore assist the English courts by enforcing such damages awards, even in circumstances 
where they would not enforce an anti-suit injunction. An award of damages is accordingly 
more effective because it is, at least in theory, enforceable by common law courts overseas 
and not restricted to the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court. 
It will be useful to first evaluate the recognition and enforcement of the English judgment 
awarding damages for breach of a jurisdiction agreement under the Brussels I Regulation 
followed by a consideration of the recognition and enforcement of such judgments under 
national rules of private international law. 
Recognition and Enforcement under the Brussels I Regulation and the Recast Regulation 
The classical ‘double convention’ model is characteristic of the original Brussels Convention 
(1968) and both its successor instruments, the Brussels I Regulation and the Brussels I 
Regulation (Recast). Under such a multilateral jurisdiction and judgments framework, 
mandatory and non-discretionary rules of direct jurisdiction are complemented by a 
simplified and near automatic regime for the recognition and enforcement of judgments. 
The principle of mutual recognition of Member State judgments both underpins and informs 
the corpus of jurisprudence on the Brussels I Regulation developed by the CJEU and the 
courts of the Member States. The principles of mutual trust and effectiveness of EU law 
(effet utile) have been deployed by the CJEU to prevent interference by anti-suit injunctions 
issued by English courts with the civil jurisdictional and judgments apparatus of Member 
State courts.  
In Gothaer v Samskip the CJEU adjudicated that a decision of a Member State to decline 
jurisdiction on the basis of a jurisdiction agreement in favour of another Member State is a 
judgment which qualifies for recognition under Chapter III of the Brussels I Regulation.541 
Moreover, the necessary underpinning for the operative part of the judgment must also be 
recognised.542  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
principle of common law enforcement that only money judgments are enforceable at common law; and 
therefore anti-suit injunctions, like other injunctions, are not enforceable at common law.  
541 Case C-456/11 Gothaer Allgemeine Versicherung AG v Samskip GmbH EU:C:2012:719, [2013] QB 548. 
542 Ibid [40]-[41]; The recognition of both the result and the reasons underpinning the decision was referred to 
by the counsel for the defendants in argument before Flaux J in [2014] EWHC 3068 (Comm) as a ‘Euro-
estoppel’. Mutual trust between the courts of the Member States necessitates the recognition of the 
equivalence of judicial decisions from all Member States; For a critical analysis of the CJEU’s ruling in Gothaer v 
Samskip and the development of the concept of European Res Judicata, see Elisa Torralba-Mendiola and Elena 
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Recognition is subject to the limited defences to recognition in Articles 34 and 35 of the 
Brussels I Regulation, including if the recognition of the judgment is manifestly contrary to 
the public policy of the Member State in which recognition is sought.543 Since the award of 
damages for breach of a choice of court agreement by the English courts is potentially 
prohibited by the jurisprudence of the CJEU, the courts of the Member State called upon to 
recognise and enforce the judgment may choose to refer the matter for a preliminary ruling 
to the CJEU. The question referred would seek a clarification on the grounds for refusing 
recognition to a Member State judgment and in particular whether a judgment awarding 
damages (and declaratory relief) for breach of a jurisdiction agreement falls foul of the 
public policy defence. It is submitted that the principle of mutual trust is the ‘bedrock upon 
which EU justice policy should be built’544 and may be considered to be a component of 
European Union public policy.545 Hence, a judgment which undermines the principles of 
mutual trust and the effectiveness of EU law (effet utile) may be deemed to be contrary to 
EU public policy and be refused recognition.546 However, the CJEU has recently adjudicated 
that where there is an infringement of EU law in the judgment of the Member State of 
origin:547 ‘the public-policy clause would apply only where that error of law means that the 
recognition of the judgment concerned in the State in which recognition is sought would 
result in the manifest breach of an essential rule of law in the EU legal order and therefore in 
the legal order of that Member State’. In that particular case, the infringement of EU 
trademark law was not deemed to be a manifest breach of an essential rule of law in the EU 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Rodriguez-Pineau, ‘Two’s Company, Three’s a Crowd: Jurisdiction, Recognition and Res Judicata in the 
European Union’ (2014) 10 Journal of Private International Law 403. 
543 Article 34(1) of the Brussels I Regulation; Article 45(1)(a) of the Brussels I Regulation (Recast). 
544 The EU Justice Agenda for 2020 - Strengthening Trust, Mobility and Growth within the Union COM (2014) 
144 final; See Matthias Weller, ‘Mutual trust: in search of the future of European Union private international 
law’ (2015) 11 Journal of Private International Law 64, 79-80. 
545 For a discussion of a European public policy exception to the rules regarding the enforcement of judgments: 
See, Jonathan Fitchen, ‘Chapter 13 – Article 45’ in Andrew Dickinson and Eva Lein (eds.), The Brussels I 
Regulation Recast (OUP 2015) 432, 440-450; Mills, The Confluence (n 354) Chapter 4, 194-198; Jerca 
Kramberger Škerl, ‘European Public Policy (With an Emphasis on Exequatur Proceedings)’ (2011) 7 Journal of 
Private International Law 461, 468-474; Alex Mills, ‘The Dimensions of Public Policy in Private International 
Law’ (2008) 4 Journal of Private International Law 201, 214; It is not for the CJEU to define the content of the 
public policy of the Contracting State but the Court of Justice has adopted the view that the limits of public 
policy are a question of interpretation of the Brussels Convention and are therefore a matter which must be 
determined by it: Case C-7/98 Krombach v Bamberski [2000] ECR I-1935 [22]-[23]; Case C-38/98 Renault v 
Maxicar [2000] ECR I-2973 [27]-[28]; Case C-394/07 Marco Gambazzi v Daimler Chrysler Canada Inc [2009] ECR 
I-2563 [26]-[28]; Case C-420/07 Meletis Apostolides v David Charles Orams [2009] ECR I-3571 [56]-[57]; Case C-
619/10 Trade Agency Ltd v Seramico Investments Ltd ECLI:EU:C:2012:531 [49]; Case C-302/13 flyLAL-
Lithunanian Airlines ECLI:EU:C:2014:2319 [47]. 
546 European public policy operates as a form of flexibility in the application of uniform rules throughout Europe 
and unlike national public policy it does not need to be attenuated. See Mills, The Confluence (n 354) 197. 
547 See Case C-681/13 Diageo Brands BV v Simiramida ECLI:EU:C:2015:471 [50] (emphasis added). 
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legal order.548 Nevertheless, it is submitted that a fundamental contravention of the 
principles that animate the multilateral jurisdiction and judgments order of the Brussels I 
Regulation may still fall within the purview of the public policy exception. Hence, there may 
be room to argue that an infringement of the principles underlying EU private international 
law rules may be more significant than an infringement of EU private law rules per se for the 
purposes of the public policy exception. 
Recognition and Enforcement under National Private International Law Rules 
Significant lessons may be learnt from the developing jurisprudence on the recognition and 
enforcement of anti-suit injunctions549 by national courts applying national private 
international law rules for the purposes of assessing the likelihood of recognition and 
enforcement of a judgment awarding damages for breach of a jurisdiction agreement. 
Civil law jurisdictions usually do not recognise anti-suit injunctions as a technique for 
controlling the conflicts of jurisdictions. Therefore, the sceptical attitude towards common 
law jurisdictions issuing such remedies and the subsequent enforcement of these measures 
in civil law jurisdictions is not without reason. However, there is at least some precedent of a 
civil law jurisdiction enforcing an anti-suit injunction order to the detriment of its own 
proceedings in order to enforce an exclusive jurisdiction agreement. 
French courts have traditionally refused to enforce anti-suit injunctions against French 
proceedings, considering them to be infringing the sovereignty of France and contrary to 
French public policy.550 However, in In Zone Brands International Inc. v In Beverage 
                                                          
548 Ibid [51]. 
549 See George A Bermann, ‘Parallel Litigation: Is Convergence Possible?’ in K Boele-Woelki, T Einhorn, D 
Girsberger and S Symeonides (eds), Convergence and Divergence in Private International Law – Liber Amicorum 
Kurt Siehr (Eleven International Publishing, 2010) 579, 587-588; Tang (n 333) 167-168. 
550 Stolzenberg v Diamler Chrysler Canada Inc [2005] ILPr 24, is a French Cour de Cassation decision adjudicating 
that Mareva injunctions were not contrary to international public policy under Chapter III of the Brussels 
Convention, 1968 and were thus enforceable. An observation concerning anti-suit injunctions was made at [4]: 
‘That prohibition on the debtor, preventing him from disposing of his assets anywhere at all insofar as 
necessary to preserve the legitimate rights of his creditors, does not prejudice any of the debtor’s fundamental 
rights or (even indirectly) foreign sovereignty and, in particular, unlike the so-called “anti-suit” injunctions, does 
not affect the jurisdiction of the State in which enforcement is sought’ (Emphasis added); See Rev Crit DIP 
(2004) 815; Louis Perreau-Saussine, ‘Forum Conveniens and Anti-Suit Injunctions Before French Courts: Recent 
Developments’ (2010) 59 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 519, 524; Horatia Muir-Watt notes that 
the observation concerning anti-suit injunctions in Stolzenberg must be interpreted in light of the decision in 
Banques Brachot v Worms [2003] Rev Crit DIP 816, note H Muir Watt, where the French courts awarded a 
remedy resembling an anti-suit injunction in the context of pre Regulation insolvency proceedings. The order 
was for the parties to desist from judicial proceedings abroad sanctioned by an ‘astreinte’ (a sum of money by 
way of a private penalty to be paid to the claimant per day of non performance/obedience to the order): 
Horatia Muir Watt, ‘Injunctive Relief in the French Courts: A Case of Legal Borrowing’ (2003) 62 Cambridge Law 
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International,551 a case outside the scope of the Brussels I Regulation, the French Cour de 
Cassation has upheld the enforcement in France of an American anti-suit injunction to 
enforce an exclusive jurisdiction agreement and rejected arguments that anti-suit 
injunctions were an infringement of French judicial sovereignty or an interference with a 
party’s right of access to a court.552 In a brief, yet very pragmatic judgment, the Cour de 
Cassation referred to ‘the jurisdiction clause freely accepted by the parties’ and that access 
to justice was not an issue since ‘the decision adopted by the Georgian court [America] had 
precisely as its object to decide on its own jurisdiction and as its ultimate purpose to ensure 
that the jurisdiction clause agreed by the parties was complied with.’553 An anti-suit 
injunction (outwith the scope of the Brussels-Lugano regime) to ‘sanction the breach of a 
pre-existing contractual obligation’ was held to be ‘not contrary to international public 
policy.’554   
German courts, however, take a very different approach.555 In a German case, the 
Oberlandesgericht (Regional Court of Appeal) of Dusseldorf refused to serve on the 
respondent the anti-suit injunction granted by the English High Court under Article 13 of the 
Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extra Judicial Documents in Civil and 
Commercial Matters 1965.556 The anti-suit injunction was aimed at preventing the 
respondent from continuing proceedings in German courts in breach of an arbitration 
agreement selecting the London Court of International Arbitration as the forum prorogatum. 
The German court decreed that the injunction infringed the jurisdiction of Germany because 
the German court, representing the state’s sovereignty, alone has the power to adjudicate 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Journal 573; See also, Rapport of Madame Pascal (Juge-Rapporteur) in In Zone Brands International Inc v In 
Beverage International.      
551 In Zone Brands International Inc v In Beverage International [2010] ILPr 30 (French Cour de Cassation). 
552 Ibid [4]; See Raphael, Updating Supplement (n 420) 1-5; Perreau-Saussine (n 550) 523-525; Horatia Muir-
Watt, ‘Surprise? Yes and No’ (Conflictoflaws.net, 22 October 2009) < http://conflictoflaws.net/2009/surprise-
yes-and-no/> accessed 1 February 2015; Thomas Raphael, ‘The Execution of the Anti-Suit Injunction’ 
(Conflictoflaws.net, 20 October 2009)< http://conflictoflaws.net/2009/the-execution-of-the-anti-suit-
injunction/> accessed 1 February 2015.    
553 In Zone Brands International Inc v In Beverage International (n 551) [4]. 
554 Ibid. 
555 In similar vein, the Brussels Civil Court has held that an American anti-suit injunction could not be 
recognised in Belgium because it was repugnant to Belgian public policy in combination with Article 6 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights: Belgium Civ Bruxelles, 18 December 1989, RW 1990-1991, 676; The 
Luxembourg Court of Appeal has also held that as a matter of principle there can be no such thing as an anti-
suit injunction (let alone an extra territorial anti-suit injunction) under Luxembourg law: 24 February 1988, 
Numero 10047. 
556 Re the Enforcement of an English Anti-Suit Injunction (Case 3 VA 11/95) (Oberlandesgericht, Dusseldorf) 
[1997] ILPr 320, [14]-[19]; In Phillip Alexander Securities and Futures Limited v Bamberger [1997] ILPr 73, the 
German courts have reiterated their stance on English anti-suit injunctions as an infringement of their 
sovereignty and have refused to enforce them. 
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upon its jurisdiction and no instruction shall be taken from a foreign court on the matter.557 
The German court rejected the justification provided by the English courts that the 
injunction was granted against the respondent instead of the foreign court. An injunction 
restraining the respondent from access to the German court directly influenced the court’s 
adjudicatory function and was deemed to be equivalent to an injunction directed at the 
court itself.558 
From the foregoing it is apparent that the strict territorial objection to the use of anti-suit 
injunctions within the European Union should be limited to the specific architecture of the 
Brussels I Regulation and not on the cultural incompatibility of extraterritorial injunctive 
relief with the civilian tradition.559 The breach of a pre-existing contractual obligation in a 
choice of court agreement may warrant the recognition and enforcement of the foreign 
judgment rendering an anti-suit injunction or damages award by the French courts.   
This chapter has examined the legal basis of the damages remedy in the law of contract, 
tort, restitution, equity and under statute pursuant to Section 50 of the Senior Courts Act 
1981. Jurisdiction to enforce the choice of court agreement has been considered alongside 
issues of applicable law under the Rome II Regulation and the recognition and enforcement 
of the judgment awarding the damages remedy. Prior to the assessment of the legal basis, 
the practical preliminary issue of drafting undertakings, indemnity clauses and liquidated 
damages clauses to enforce the breach of the choice of court agreement have been 
considered. 
The next chapter will provide an overview of the emerging case law on the damages remedy 
for breach of choice of court agreements. Significantly, two recent decisions of the Court of 
Appeal of England and Wales in the context of the Brussels I Regulation are instructive as 
they may be taken to illustrate that the unilateral national private law remedy for enforcing 
choice of court agreements may run counter to the ethos of the multilateral jurisdiction and 
judgments order which seeks to prioritize the principle of mutual trust and the principle of 
effectiveness of EU law (effet utile).   
 
 
                                                          
557 Ibid [14]. 
558 Ibid [16]. 
559 Muir Watt (n 550) 576; Perreau-Saussine (n 550) 525. 
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Chapter 6 - An Overview of the Case Law on the Damages Remedy for Breach 
of Exclusive Jurisdiction Agreements: Firmly Entrenched or a Nascent Remedy 
in Need of Development? 
The concept of awarding damages for breach of a jurisdiction agreement is a brainchild560 of 
the common law tradition which draws no dogmatic distinction in character between 
jurisdiction agreements and substantive contracts.561 It has not formed part of the corpus of 
rules of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements562 nor has it been discussed 
by the draftsmen in the official explanatory report.563 
Briggs traces the origins of the damages remedy for breach of jurisdiction agreements to the 
decision in Ellerman Lines Ltd. v. Read.564 Summarizing the facts, an English jurisdiction 
agreement was breached when a salvor arrested a ship in Turkey and brought successful 
proceedings before the Turkish court. According to Briggs, this decision of the English Court 
of Appeal to allow damages, expressed in strikingly assertive language, made this an early 
but clear illustration of the rule that damages may be recovered for breach of an agreement 
which provided for the exclusive jurisdiction of an English court or tribunal.565 However, 
Harris contends that although the ship was arrested to found jurisdiction in Turkey and the 
Turkish judgment caused the loss, the damages claimed were actually for the costs of 
rescuing the ship and for its lost value.566 Both Harris and Raphael recognise that the case 
provides only indirect support for the availability of damages for breach of a jurisdiction 
agreement as the Court of Appeal drew no distinction between damages recoverable as a 
result of the breach of contract and damages recoverable for fraud.567 In any case, it still 
                                                          
560 Koji Takahashi, ‘Damages for breach of a Choice of Court Agreement’ (2008) 10 Yearbook of Private 
International Law 57, 58. 
561 Ibid 88. 
562 Adopted at the 20th Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, The Hague, 30th June 
2005. 
563 See Trevor Hartley and Masato Dogauchi, Explanatory Report of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements. 
564 Ellerman Lines Ltd. v. Read [1928] 2 KB 144 (CA); Adrian Briggs, Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of 
Law (Oxford Private International Law Series, OUP 2008) 301-302; cf However, Edwin Peel has previously  
noted that there is no English authority for an action for damages for breach of an exclusive jurisdiction 
agreement and no reported case in which the argument has ever been advanced: See Edwin Peel, ‘Exclusive 
Jurisdiction Agreements: Purity and Pragmatism in the Conflict of Laws’ [1998] LMCLQ 182, 225. 
565 Briggs, Agreements (n 564) 301-302. 
566 Jonathan Harris, ‘Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: Where Next?’ [2009] LMCLQ 537, 544. 
567 Ibid; Raphael notes that the Turkish ship arrest proceedings were in breach of contract and also involved a 
fraud. The claimant recovered damages for tug and crew expenses as a result of the arrest, legal expenses 
incurred in an attempt to obtain the ship’s release, and the value of the ship which had been lost due to the 
arrest. However, the courts drew no distinction between damages recoverable as a result of the breach of 
contract, and damages recoverable for fraud. Thus, the decision casts a shadow of doubt on the precise legal 
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took a further seventy years before this novel remedy was applied in the context of modern 
international commercial litigation before the English courts. 
In the leading English Court of Appeal decision of Union Discount Co Ltd v Zoller and Others, 
568 parties to a financial services contract had agreed to the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
English courts and in breach of that agreement Zoller brought proceedings in the courts of 
New York. An application to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds was granted by the New York 
court, but the court had no power to award costs against Zoller. Proceedings were brought 
against Zoller in London, claiming as damages for breach of contract the sums which 
represented the loss sustained by Union Discount in securing the dismissal of the New York 
proceedings. Zoller applied to have the claim struck out on the basis of a rule of English 
domestic law which prohibits the claimant from bringing a claim for damages to top up an 
award of costs which falls short of a complete indemnity. 
Delivering the leading judgment in the Court of Appeal, Schiemann L.J. ruled: 
In our judgment, just as a malicious prosecutor should not be able to rely for his own 
benefit on any policy consideration which is designed to keep down the cost of 
litigation, so a person who starts totally unnecessary proceedings in a foreign 
jurisdiction in breach of an exclusive jurisdiction clause should not be able to rely on 
such policy considerations.569 
The Court of Appeal made it clear that the claimant had a right to the damages which were 
being claimed. It reasoned that there was a general contractual entitlement to damages; 
that an award of damages in respect of losses incurred in the form of legal costs in America 
did not contradict anything which the American court had decided and that the rule which 
prohibited an action for damages to top up an English costs order had no application to the 
claim for damages in respect of losses caused by Zoller’s breach of contract by suing abroad.  
However, Schiemann L.J. took care to highlight the unique features of Union Discount Co Ltd 
v Zoller and that applications for damages for breach of an exclusive jurisdiction agreement 
would have to be treated case by case: 
It is important to emphasise that in the present case the following unusual features 
are all present: (i) The costs which the claimant seeks to recover in the English 
proceedings were incurred by him when he was a defendant in foreign proceedings 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
basis for the recovery of damages being a breach of contract per se: See Thomas Raphael, The Anti-Suit 
Injunction: Updating Supplement (Oxford Private International Law Series, OUP 2010) 66. 
568 [2001] EWCA Civ 1755, [2002] 1 WLR 1517. 
569 [2002] 1 WLR 1517, 1522 at [12]. 
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brought by the defendant in the English proceedings, (ii) The claimant in the foreign 
proceedings brought those proceedings in breach of an express term, the exclusive 
jurisdiction clause, which, it is assumed for present purposes, has the effect of 
entitling the English claimant to damages for its breach, (iii) The rules of the foreign 
forum only permitted recovery of costs in exceptional circumstances. (iv) The foreign 
court made no adjudication as to costs.570 
In concluding its decision, the Court of Appeal was at pains to limit its judgment to cases as 
clear as Union Discount Co Ltd v Zoller: “Treading cautiously in a field not much explored in 
recent litigation we do not propose to go further. One can envisage more doubtful cases.”571 
In Donohue v Armco Inc.572, the House of Lords lent indirect support to the proposition that 
an action for damages could be founded on the allegation that a jurisdiction agreement had 
been breached. Some of the parties involved in the proceedings had agreed to an exclusive 
jurisdiction clause in favour of the English courts. When proceedings were initiated in the 
United States of America by those who were parties to the jurisdiction agreement, and by 
others associated with them but not privy to the forum selection agreement, an application 
for an anti-suit injunction was made. This motion was defeated by the argument that the 
anti-suit injunction would only restrain those who were party to the choice of court 
agreement and thus considerations of the orderly resolution of disputes trumped the issue 
of the enforcement of the jurisdiction agreement.  
From the standpoint of the damages remedy for breach of jurisdiction agreements, counsel 
for the respondent conceded in argument that if his client, a party to the jurisdiction 
agreement, were to pursue a claim before the American courts which could not have been 
successfully brought before the English courts, it would face liability for damages. Lord 
Bingham of Cornhill573 and Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough574 were prepared to accept this 
concession without formally deciding on the merits that it was well founded and Lord Scott 
of Foscote575 was prepared to accept it to the extent that costs and expenses were incurred 
in the United States. Commenting on the decision, Daniel Tan and Nik Yeo note that: ‘[t]heir 
lordships' comments were in reply, and were not the subject of any further analysis.’576 
                                                          
570 Ibid 1524 at [18]. 
571 Ibid 1526 at [35]. 
572 [2001] UKHL 64, [2002] 1 All ER 749, [2002] CLC 440. 
573 [2002] CLC 440, 454 at [36]. 
574 ibid, 457 at [48]. 
575 Ibid, 462 at [75]. 
576 D Tan and N Yeo, Breaking Promises to Litigate in a Particular Forum: Are Damages an Appropriate Remedy? 
[2003] LMCLQ 435, 436 FN 3. 
163 
 
In A/S D/S Svendborg v Akar577 the court ordered damages and an indemnity in respect of 
reasonable costs and expenses incurred in defeating claims brought in breach of a 
jurisdiction agreement for the English courts before the courts of Hong Kong and Guinea. 
The High Court held that costs were available even if they could be recovered abroad. In 
National Westminster Bank plc v Rabobank Nederland578, it was held, in broad language 
capable of covering the case of a breach of a choice of court agreement, that damages 
would be awarded for the costs incurred in restraining proceedings in California which had 
been brought in breach of an agreement not to bring any action i.e. an anti-suit agreement.   
In the decision in Sunrock Aircraft Corp Ltd v Scandinavian Airline Systems Denmark-Norway-
Sweden579 the Court of Appeal noted that:580 
It is established that damages can be awarded for a loss incurred by the failure to 
comply with the terms of an exclusive jurisdiction clause or alternative dispute 
resolution clause: for example, in Union Discount v Zoller [2002] 1 WLR 1517, this 
court held that a party was entitled to claim as damages the costs reasonably 
incurred by it in foreign proceedings which had been brought in breach of an 
exclusive jurisdiction clause. 
Commenting on the line of English judicial authority quoted above, Briggs submits that ‘The 
proposition appears to have gone from novelty to banality in a very short time.’581 However, 
it is submitted that the damages remedy for breach of exclusive jurisdiction agreements in 
the English courts is at a phase in its development where clarification is needed in the more 
doubtful ‘penumbral’582 cases.583 For instance, Black notes that most of these cases 
recognise the new cause of action only inferentially or in obiter.584 Similarly, Tett is sceptical 
of the damages remedy and opines that it ‘is not free from doubt’.585  
This is evident from the present state of the law which is ambivalent as to the full 
implications of whether this new stream of cases permits an action to be started to claw 
                                                          
577 [2003] EWHC 797 (Comm). 
578 [2007] EWHC 1056 (Comm). 
579 [2007] EWCA Civ 882. 
580 Ibid at [37]. 
581 Briggs, Agreements (n 564) 307. 
582 See HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd Ed, Clarendon Press, OUP 1994) 121-150; HLA Hart, ‘Positivism and 
the Separation of Law and Morals’ (1958) 71 Harvard Law Review 593. 
583 Takahashi (n 560) 58: ‘The remedy is at an early stage of development’; James Ruddell, ‘Monetary Remedies 
for Wrongful Foreign Proceedings’ [2015] LMCLQ 9, 12, comments that ‘much of the jigsaw remains 
incomplete’ in relation to the development of the damages remedy for breach of jurisdiction agreements.  
584 Vaughan Black, ‘Review Essay of Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law’ [2010] Canadian Business 
Law Journal 300, 306. 
585 Richard Tett, ‘Donohue v Armco: A Sensible and Pragmatic Approach to Anti-suit Injunctions’ 109 (2003) 
British Insurance Law Association Journal 7, 14. 
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back substantive damages (over and above costs) which had been ordered to be paid by the 
non-contractual forum after a decision on the merits of the claim. Furthermore, the 
damages remedy for breach of an exclusive jurisdiction agreement is as yet untested in the 
context of the European Union’s Brussels I Regulation. At the outset, it seems that the 
damages remedy will not take root and make much headway before the pre-dominantly 
civilian Court of Justice of the European Union with its strong emphasis on the primacy of 
the doctrine of mutual trust between the courts and institutions of the Member States of 
the EU. Quantification of damages also presents a significant practical impediment to the 
rational development of the remedy. The interaction of the availability of the remedy with 
principles of res judicata and the finality of international dispute resolution also cannot be 
ignored.  
Before moving on towards a detailed assessment of the dynamics of the damages remedy in 
theory and practice, it is worth noting a significant decision of the Spanish Tribunal Supremo 
(Supreme Court) with potentially far reaching ramifications concerning the fundamental 
nature and consequences of choice of court agreements.586 Summarizing the facts, a 
contract was concluded between a Spanish company and a foreign company and under 
Clause 14 of the agreement, they agreed to submit any dispute arising from the contract to 
the courts of Barcelona, and chose the law of Spain as the applicable law. The Spanish 
company sued the other contracting party in Florida, USA and this initiation of proceedings 
in a non-chosen forum, as per common law principles at least, is tantamount to a breach of 
contract, and resulted in the incurrence of extra costs (such as fees for local lawyers hired). 
The crucial question confronting the Spanish courts was whether a conception of a choice of 
court agreement analogous to the English common law’s pragmatic approach of a wronged 
party being able to recover compensation for breach of a choice of court agreement could 
be invoked from within the Spanish civil law legal system. It should be noted that, the instant 
case is outside the scope of application of the Brussels I Regulation and that Spain has no 
                                                          
586 Sogo USA Inc v Angel Jesus, STS (Sala de lo Civil, Sección 1ª), 12 January 2009, Repertorio de Jurisprudencia 
2009/544; See Marta Requejo, ‘On the Value of Choice of Forum and Choice of Law Clauses in Spain’ 
(Conflictoflaws.net, 24 April 2009) <http://conflictoflaws.net/2009/on-the-value-of-choice-of-forum-and-
choice-of-law-clauses-in-spain/> accessed 15 February 2014; Santiago Alvarez Gonzalez, ‘The Spanish Tribunal 
Supremo Grants Damages for Breach of a Choice of Court Agreement’ [2009] IPRax 529; Miguel Torres, ‘USA 
Sogo Inc v Angel Jesus: Case Comment’ (2009) 20 International Company and Commercial Law Review 44;  Koji 
Takahashi, ‘Damages for Breach of a Choice of Court Agreement: Remaining Issues’ (2009) 11 Yearbook of 
Private International Law 73, 77; Adrian Briggs, ‘What should be done about Jurisdiction Agreements’ (2010) 12 
Yearbook of Private International Law 311, 324; Sara Sanchez Fernandez, ‘Choice of Court Agreements: Breach 
and Damages within the Brussels I Regime’ (2010) 12 Yearbook of Private International Law 377, 382-385. 
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agreement on recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters 
with the United States of America.587 
On 12th January 2009, the Tribunal Supremo did award the damages remedy for breach of 
the choice of court agreement to the wronged party. Apart from the English courts, this is 
the first or at least one of the first decisions in Europe to deal with this controversial issue at 
the highest appellate level.588 In the process, the Tribunal Supremo overturned two prior 
rulings of the Court of First Instance (Juez de Primera Instancia) and Court of Appeals 
(Audiencia Provincial) respectively, both of which had favoured the procedural character of 
the choice of court agreement. Under the procedural conception of a choice of court 
agreement, the breach of such an agreement does not give rise to a claim for damages. 
The inconsistency between the decision of the Tribunal Supremo on the one hand and the 
lower courts on the other can be attributed to the ongoing debate in the Spanish legal 
system over the proper and legitimate characterization of a choice of forum clause.589 For 
the Court of First Instance and the Spanish company, the jurisdiction agreement is not part 
of the substantive contract, nor is it a contract itself; on the contrary, it is an agreement of 
an adjectival or procedural nature. Its breach (the non-submission of the parties to the 
nominated court) has a restrictive effect: depending on the willingness of the counterparty, 
the claim before the non-chosen court will not be decided by that court. The law provides no 
other penalty for failure to comply with the clause. 
The Court of Appeals followed the Court of First Instance’s opinion, noting that: “the 
principle of contractual freedom does not work the same way in cases where only private 
interests are at stake, and in case of procedural covenants to submit to jurisdiction”, the 
latter having limitations of a public-procedural order; “agreements of contractual contents 
(economic agreements) and procedural covenants to submit to jurisdiction cannot be 
assimilated”; “the pact to submit to a certain jurisdiction is a subsidiary one; it only comes 
into play when the contract has to be enforced or interpreted.” The Court also said that 
there is no causal link between the breach of the covenant and the damages claimed by the 
foreign company in Spain: these damages being due for the proceedings before the Courts of 
                                                          
587 Alvarez Gonzalez (n 586) 529. 
588 ibid 529; STS (Civil) 23 February 2007, Repertorio de Jurisprudencia 2007/2118 was the first case where 
damages were awarded by the Tribunal Supremo for breach of a Spanish choice of court agreement. However, 
it is the 2009 decision that shows an awareness of the complex issues raised by such a case. 
589 Requejo, On the Value of Choice of Forum and Choice of Law Clauses in Spain (n 586). 
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Florida, they must be labelled as “costs of the proceedings” (legal costs); and only the Florida 
Court could determine the costs to be paid. 
The claimant’s (the foreign company) thesis, relying on Spanish and foreign academics, is the 
opposite: the choice of forum agreement should be treated like any other substantive 
contractual clause. The claimant also reiterated the fact that there was a Spanish choice of 
law agreement over and above the choice of court agreement for the courts of Barcelona. 
Finally, the claimant averred bad faith on part of the defendant. The sole purpose of the 
defendant’s claim (of several hundred million dollars) in Florida was to cause injury and to 
intimidate the claimant. 
The Tribunal Supremo ruled in favour of the claimant. The court expressly stated that “[the 
choice of forum agreement] is incorporated to the contractual relationship as one of the 
rules of conduct to be observed by the parties; it creates a duty (albeit an accessory one); 
failure to comply with it (…) must be judged in relation to the significance that such failure 
may have in the economy of the contract, as this Court has consistently maintained (…) that 
breaches determining the economic frustration of contract for one party are to be regarded 
as having substantial meaning (…)”. The Tribunal Supremo goes on saying that “(…) in the 
instant case, the choice of the applicable law and jurisdiction may have been crucial when 
deciding whether to establish the relationship. If so, they would have clear significance for 
the economy of the contract, given that Spanish law establishes a concrete contractual 
framework for the assessment of damages (for instance, it excludes punitive damages, which 
on the contrary may be awarded under the law of the United States of America);” ” The 
conscious breach of the covenant, raising a claim where the law of the U.S. was to applied 
(…) and asking for punitive damages , has created the counterparty the need for a defense, 
generating costs that go beyond the predictable expenses in the normal or the pathological 
development of the contractual relationship”. 
Finally, the Tribunal Supremo denied that costs can only be imposed by the court in Florida. 
In this regard, the Tribunal Supremo said that neither the attorneys’ fees nor other damages 
claimed by the claimant are considered “costs” in the U.S. The Tribunal Supremo also added 
that even if they were to be deemed so, this would not have hindered the claim for damages 
for breach of contract: the only effect would have been the reduction of the amount that 
could be claimed. Hence the Tribunal Supremo quashed the Court of Appeal ruling, without 
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entering to determine whether the Spanish company acted in bad faith or with abuse of her 
right to litigate. 
Recent English Court of Appeal decisions further illustrate the proactive stance adopted by 
the English courts in protecting and enforcing jurisdiction agreements.590 In Bank St 
Petersburg OJSC & Anor v Arkhangelsky & Ors, the contracting parties had agreed that the 
substantive dispute between them was to be resolved exclusively in England,591 the Court of 
Appeal was prepared to grant an anti-enforcement injunction to prevent the claimants from 
breaching the relevant jurisdiction agreement by attempting to enforce Russian judgments 
concerning the same matters that were now before the English courts.592 Counsel for the 
claimants stated that the only example of the grant of an anti-enforcement injunction by the 
English courts was in the case of Ellerman Lines v Read.593 The case falls outside the ambit of 
the Brussels I Regulation as the Russian judgments originate from outside the European 
Union and the jurisdiction agreement is agreed between two non EU domiciliaries.594 
Therefore, the prohibition on anti-suit injunctions within the European Judicial Area will not 
preclude or even act as an impediment to the enforcement of the private law rights and 
obligations of the parties in relation to the exclusive jurisdiction agreement.595 There is an 
argument that an anti-enforcement injunction may be permitted under the Brussels I 
Regulation (Recast) as it does not interfere with another Member State court’s right to 
determine its own jurisdiction and could be employed to postpone enforcement of a 
Member State court judgment in breach of an arbitration agreement until a proper 
determination of the substantive issues in dispute by the arbitral tribunal.596 Nevertheless, 
the right of a Member State court to determine its own jurisdiction is arguably an emanation 
of the mutual trust principle which is premised on the simplified system for the mutual 
                                                          
590 Bank St Petersburg OJSC & Anor v Arkhangelsky & Ors [2014] EWCA Civ 593, [2014] 1 CLC 670 (Longmore LJ 
with whom Kitchin LJ and McCombe LJ concurred) (anti-enforcement injunction); Caresse Navigation Ltd v 
Zurich Assurances MAROC (‘The Channel Ranger’) [2014] EWCA Civ 1366 (anti-suit injunction); cf Royal Bank of 
Scotland Plc v Highland Financial Partners LP [2013] EWCA Civ 328 (Appellant refused anti-suit injunction on 
the basis of the ‘unclean hands’ defence). 
591 [2014] EWCA Civ 593, [2014] 1 CLC 670 [28]. 
592 Ibid [29]; See Ust-Kamenogorsk Hydropower Plant JSC v AES Ust-Kamenogorsk Hydropower Plant LLP [2013] 
UKSC 35, [2013] 1 WLR 1889, [25]-[27] (Lord Mance). 
593 Bank St Petersburg OJSC & Anor v Arkhangelsky & Ors [2014] EWCA Civ 593, [2014] 1 CLC 670, [36]; Ellerman 
Lines v Read [1928] 2 KB 144 (CA). 
594 Article 23(3) of the Brussels I Regulation; cf Article 25(1) of the Brussels I Regulation (Recast). 
595 Turner v. Grovit (Case C-159/02) [2005] ECR I-3565; [2004] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 169; West Tankers Inc v Allianz SpA 
(The Front Comor) (Case C 185/07) [2009] 1 AC 1138. 
596 Simon P Camilleri, ‘Recital 12 of the Recast Regulation: A New Hope?’ (2013) 62 ICLQ 899, 906-907, regards 
anti-enforcement injunctions as compatible with the CJEU’s reasoning in West Tankers but considers such 
injunctive relief as a ‘remedy without any teeth’. 
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recognition of civil and commercial judgments in Europe. The anti-enforcement injunction 
actually hampers the cross border recognition and enforcement of judgments and may fall 
foul of the principle of mutual trust and the effectiveness of EU law (effet utile).  
It is now time to examine two recent English Court of Appeal decisions which have 
adjudicated upon the validity of the damages remedy in the context of the Brussels I 
Regulation. Commensurate to the significance of these significant decisions, separate 
sections now proceed to grapple with whether and to what extent the decision is faithful to 
the principle of mutual trust underlying and animating the European Union law of 





















The English Court of Appeal Validates the Damages Remedy for Breach of English Exclusive 
Jurisdiction Agreements: The Principle of Mutual Trust and Interference with the 
Effectiveness of the Multilateral Jurisdiction and Judgments Order of the Brussels I 
Regulation? 
The damages remedy for breach of an exclusive choice of court agreement is as yet untested 
in the context of the Brussels I Regulation by the Court of Justice of the European Union and 
the matter has not been addressed by the European legislature. However, the English Court 
of Appeal has recently awarded damages for breach of a choice of court agreement in a case 
falling within the ambit of the Brussels I Regulation in Starlight Shipping Co v Allianz Marine 
& Aviation Versicherungs AG (The Alexandros T).597 At the outset, it should be noted that, 
the decision is controversial as the systemic implications of the pragmatic remedy may affect 
the operation of the multilateral jurisdiction and judgments regime established by the 
Brussels I Regulation.  
In brief, the initial proceedings arose from the loss of the vessel The Alexandros T off the 
coast of South Africa. In 2006, Starlight sued the insurers in England. Starlight’s claim was 
denied by the insurers on the basis that the vessel was unseaworthy with the privity of 
Starlight. In response, Starlight made a number of serious allegations against the insurers 
including allegations of misconduct involving tampering with and bribing of witnesses. These 
proceedings settled pursuant to Tomlin orders, and the settlement agreements contained 
English exclusive jurisdiction clauses. However, in 2009 Starlight launched nine sets of 
proceedings in Greece against the insurers, reiterating the same allegations that had been 
raised and settled in England, although they were expressed as torts actionable in Greece. In 
2011, the insurers applied to the English courts to enforce the terms of the 2006 
settlements, and brought new proceedings in England for damages, an indemnity and 
declarations concerning the breach of that settlement. Starlight applied for a stay of these 
proceedings, firstly pursuant to Article 28598 then Article 27599 of the Brussels I Regulation.600 
                                                          
597 Starlight Shipping Co v Allianz Marine & Aviation Versicherungs AG (The Alexandros T) [2014] EWCA Civ 1010 
(Longmore LJ with whom Rimer LJ and Lord Toulson agreed); See M Ahmed, ‘The enforcement of settlement 
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598 Article 28 (Brussels I Regulation) 
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The judge refused to grant a stay under Article 28 and gave summary judgment to the 
insurers.601 The Court of Appeal held that it was bound to stay the 2006 proceedings under 
Article 27, which provides for a mandatory stay, and it was not therefore necessary to reach 
a final determination of the position under Article 28.602 Before the Supreme Court of the 
UK, the insurers challenged the correctness of the Court of Appeal’s conclusion under Article 
27 and submit that the judge was correct to refuse a stay under Article 28. 
In principle, a claim in damages for breach of a choice of court agreement is distinct and 
separate from the substantive claim in the foreign court which infringes the agreement. The 
UK Supreme Court concluded that such a claim is not prevented by Article 27 of the Brussels 
I Regulation (Article 29 of the Recast Regulation).603 The claim may fall within Article 28 of 
the Brussels I Regulation (Article 30 of the Recast Regulation), being a related action, but the 
Supreme Court confirmed the line of authority that the existence of the choice of court 
agreement has the effect that a court will not exercise its discretion to stay its 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
  1. Where related actions are pending in the courts of different Member States, any court other than the court 
first seised may stay its proceedings. 
  2. Where these actions are pending at first instance, any court other than the court first seised may also, on   
the application of one of the parties, decline jurisdiction if the court first seised has jurisdiction over the actions 
in question and its law permits the consolidation thereof. 
  3. For the purposes of this Article, actions are deemed to be related where they are so closely connected that 
it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from 
separate proceedings.  
599 Article 27 (Brussels I Regulation) 
  1. Where proceedings involving the same cause of action and between the same parties are brought in the 
courts of different Member States, any court other than the court first seised shall of its own motion stay its 
proceedings until such time as the jurisdiction of the court first seised is established. 
  2. Where the jurisdiction of the court first seised is established, any court other than the court first seised 
shall decline jurisdiction in favour of that court. 
600 Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil 
and commercial matters (Brussels I) [2001] OJ L12/1 (‘Brussels I Regulation’). In accordance with Article 81 of 
the Brussels I Regulation (Recast), the Recast Regulation shall apply as of 10 January 2015 to legal proceedings 
instituted (and to judgments rendered) on or after that date. As The Alexandros T litigation in the English courts 
was governed by the Brussels I Regulation, reference to its articles is supplemented by the Recast Regulation’s 
closest equivalent provisions in the footnotes. New provisions and provisions that override aspects of the 
operation of the Brussels I Regulation in relation to parallel proceedings and the enforcement of jurisdictional 
party autonomy in the EU are considered in the course of examining the UK Supreme Court decision.      
601 Starlight Shipping Co v Allianz Marine & Others [2011] EWHC 3381 (Comm); [2012] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 162 
(Burton J). 
602 Starlight Shipping Co v Allianz Marine & Others [2012] EWCA Civ 1714; [2013] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 217 (Longmore, 
Toulson and Rimer LJJ). 
603 Starlight Shipping Co v Allianz Marine & Aviation Versicherungs AG (The Alexandros T) [2013] UKSC 70 (Lords 
Neuberger, Mance, Clarke, Sumption and Hughes); Continental Bank NA v Aeakos Compania Naviera SA [1994] 
1 WLR 588, 595H-596C (Steyn LJ) (giving the judgment of the Court of Appeal); Alfred C Toepfer International 
GmbH v Molino Boschi Sarl [1996] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 510, 513 (Mance J); Toepfer International GmbH v Société 
Cargill France [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 98, 106 (Colman J); Sinco, [50] and[54] (Beatson J); WMS Gaming Inc v 
Benedetti Plus Giocolegale Ltd [2011] EWHC 2620 (Comm), [32] (Simon J). 
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proceedings.604 As a result, proceedings in both the English and the Greek courts were 
allowed to continue in parallel. 
Thereafter, the case was remitted back to the Court of Appeal for adjudication on the 
substantive issues and the court has handed down its judgment.605 Although, the Court of 
Appeal’s judgment builds upon the prior decision of the UK Supreme Court on the issue of 
Articles 27 and 28 of the Brussels I Regulation – in particular, the finding of the Supreme 
Court that the claims in the two proceedings did not concern the same cause of action – it is 
likely that the Court of Appeal would have reached the same decision even if the Article 27 
issue was not raised and adjudicated upon in the first place. The court decided that the 
Greek proceedings fell within the scope of the jurisdiction provisions of the underlying 
insurance contract and the settlement agreement. The Court of Appeal has upheld the ruling 
of Burton J at first instance by granting declarations and damages for breach of English 
exclusive jurisdiction agreements. However, the full repercussions of the English judgment 
granting damages for breach of an exclusive jurisdiction agreement for the jurisdiction of the 
Greek court were not discussed by Longmore LJ.606  
In the UK Supreme Court judgment, Lord Clarke had expressed the opinion that a final 
judgment of the English courts will be recognisable in Greece and will assist the Greek 
court.607 Therefore, he opined that the principles of mutual trust upon which the Brussels I 
Regulation is founded will be respected and the risk of irreconcilable judgments will be 
eliminated. However, in practical terms the Court of Appeal’s judgment awarding damages 
reassesses and nullifies or reverses the effect of the foreign proceedings. On the expectation 
measure, the damages award would recoup the loss sustained in terms of the costs of the 
proceedings and claw back any substantive damages awarded in the foreign proceedings. 
                                                          
604 Starlight Shipping Co v Allianz Marine & Aviation Versicherungs AG (The Alexandros T) [2013] UKSC 70; 
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Nullifying or reversing the effect of the foreign judgment is undoubtedly contrary to the 
principle of mutual trust and the obligation not to question the jurisdiction of another 
Member State court608 (which emanates from the principle of mutual trust). The multilateral 
double convention framework of common rules of direct jurisdiction and the resulting 
simplified regime for the recognition and enforcement of Member State judgments is firmly 
anchored to the principle of mutual trust. An award of damages would reverse the effects of 
a Member State judgment and indirectly subvert Article 27 of the Brussels I Regulation by 
questioning the assumption of jurisdiction by the court first seised.609 Given the effect of 
Article 27, a party is entitled to test the validity and effect of the jurisdiction agreement in 
any Member State court.610 Arguably, to penalize such conduct would undermine that 
party’s right to seise its preferred court, embodied in Article 27. It might also be 
characterized as an assault on the entitlement of that court to determine whether it has 
jurisdiction.611 In similar vein, declarations for breach of English exclusive jurisdiction 
agreements may also infringe the mutual trust principle. A declaratory order stating that 
English exclusive jurisdiction agreements have been breached implies that proceedings in 
other Member State courts within the scope of the jurisdiction provisions are wrongfully 
pursued. A declaratory order explicitly stating that proceedings in another Member State are 
in breach or blatantly in breach of an English exclusive jurisdiction agreement are even more 
confrontational and necessarily at odds with the mutual trust principle. As observed, Article 
27 of the Brussels I Regulation allows a party to test the jurisdiction agreement in any 
Member State court. As such, the declaratory relief might also be characterized as an assault 
on the entitlement of a Member State court to determine whether it has jurisdiction. 
However, arguably, a declaration raises far fewer mutual trust concerns than an anti-suit 
injunction or the damages remedy in similar circumstances. A declaration that an exclusive 
choice of court agreement is binding will provide an effective anticipatory defence to 
recognition of a judgment obtained in breach of the clause.612 Declaratory relief has been 
employed as a shield to deny recognition to a judgment from another Member State court in 
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breach of an English arbitration agreement.613 Declarations that a clause is contractually 
binding may also provide a springboard for claims for damages; and depending on the 
private international law rules of the foreign court, may be used to establish a res judicata 
abroad.614     
Even though the UK Supreme Court has held that Articles 27 and 28 of the Brussels I 
Regulation are not applicable and that the English and Greek proceedings do not share the 
same cause of action, the judgment of the Court of Appeal may still interfere with the right 
of the Greek court to determine its jurisdiction and may render the continuance of the Greek 
proceedings or for that matter the institution of any other foreign proceedings futile as any 
potential sum recovered under a future Greek or other foreign judgment would have to be 
reversed, clawed back and used to indemnify the insurers as a breach of the English 
exclusive jurisdiction agreements. Thus, the damages award may have a restraining or 
preclusive effect on the foreign proceedings very similar to an anti-suit injunction. It may be 
argued that if the specific performance of a jurisdiction agreement can no longer be granted 
due to the constraints imposed by the European Union law of international civil procedure, 
the common law remedy of damages may equally not be awarded.615 After all both anti-suit 
injunctions and the damages remedy for breach of choice of court agreements are grounded 
on the same contractual right not to be sued in a non-elected forum.616 Therefore, if the 
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Alexander Layton, ‘The Prohibition on Anti-Suit Injunctions and the Relationship Between European Rules on 
Jurisdiction and Domestic Rules on Procedure’ in Pascal de Vareilles-Sommieres (ed.), Forum Shopping in the 
European Judicial Area (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2007) 91, 97. 
615 For a similar contention in relation to damages for breach of an arbitration agreement as being incompatible 
with the Brussels I Regulation and the CJEU’s interpretation in the West Tankers decision, see, Martin Illmer, 
‘Chapter 2 – Article 1’ in Andrew Dickinson and Eva Lein (eds.), The Brussels I Regulation Recast (OUP 2015) 79. 
616 Donohue v Armco Inc. [2001] UKHL 64, [2002] 1 All ER 749, [36] (Lord Bingham of Cornhill), [48] (Lord 
Hobhouse of Woodborough); The breach of an arbitration agreement, if it is governed by English law, also gives 
a right to damages: See Ust-Kamenogorsk Hydropower Plant JSC v AES Ust-Kamenogorsk Hydropower Plant LLP 
[2013] UKSC 35, [2013] 1 WLR 1889, [25] (Lord Mance); In Case C-536/13 Gazprom OAO ECLI:EU:C:2015:316, 
the Grand Chamber of the CJEU adjudicated that the Brussels I Regulation does not preclude a court of a 
Member State from recognising and enforcing, or from refusing to recognise and enforce an arbitral award 
prohibiting a party from bringing certain claims before a court of that Member State since the Regulation does 
not govern the recognition and enforcement in a Member State of an arbitral award issued by an arbitral 
tribunal in another Member State; The CJEU’s ruling in Gazprom retrospectively confirms the decision in West 
Tankers Inc. v Alliance SpA [2012] EWHC 854 (Comm) [78], where Flaux J determined that the arbitral tribunal 
‘was not deprived, by reason of European law, of the jurisdiction to award equitable damages for breach of the 
obligation to arbitrate.’; cf Hartley had casted doubt on Flaux J’s decision and argued that imposing damages 
for suing in the ‘wrong’ court would prevent the party concerned from even trying to sue in the other Member 
State: ‘Such a ruling would be an antisuit injunction in all but name.’ See TC Hartley, ‘The Brussels I Regulation 
and Arbitration’ (2014) 63 ICLQ 843, 862-864; cf On the contrary, Gazprom endorses the view that an arbitral 
tribunal may award damages because the Brussels I Regulation recognises that a tribunal has a freedom which 
is not extended to a court in a Member State, see CMA CGM SA v Hyundai Mipo Dockyard Co Ltd [2008] EWHC 
2792 (Comm), [2009] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 213 (Burton J); cf For a more cautious doubting the veracity of Burton J’s 
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intrusive anti-suit injunction enforcing the underlying contractual right not to be sued in a 
non-elected forum falls foul of the European Union law of international civil procedure, the 
damages remedy may also succumb to a similar fate. Even if a procedural characterization of 
anti-suit injunctions is preferred, the availability of damages in lieu or in addition to specific 
performance also highlights the concomitant and coextensive nature of the remedies.617 The 
overarching principle of mutual trust and the principle of the effectiveness of Regulation are 
undermined by the Court of Appeal’s judgment as the English court is seeking to force its 
own view on the validity and effectiveness of the settlement and jurisdiction agreements on 
the Greek court. As a result, the Greek court’s right to determine its own procedural 
jurisdiction (kompetenz-kompetenz) and to rule on the substance of the case may be 
overridden by the recognition of the Court of Appeal’s judgment in the Greek courts under 
Chapter III of the Brussels I Regulation. 
From the perspective of effective dispute resolution, it should be noted that dispute 
resolution is itself undermined if the English courts attempt to re-open or second guess a 
foreign court’s decision on the basis that the English court is the chosen venue. The dispute 
is effectively protracted618 and not resolved with the incidence of satellite or sub-litigation 
and the increased potential for conflicting Member State judgments.619 For the litigants, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
reasoning, see National Navigation Co v Endesa Generacion SA (The Wadi Sudr) [2009] EWCA Civ 1397, [2010] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep 193, [54]-[56] (Waller LJ), [115]-[118] (Moore-Bick LJ); cf However, the pragmatic CJEU ruling in 
Gazprom and paragraph 2 of Recital 12 of the Recast Regulation will reverse the Court of Appeal’s decision in 
The Wadi Sudr by liberally construing the arbitration exception; See A Briggs, Private International Law in 
English Courts (OUP 2014) 1000; The Swiss Bundesgericht (Case No 4A_232/2013 of 30 September 2013) has 
also upheld an arbitral award which granted damages for breach of an arbitration agreement. The arbitral 
tribunal was composed of Michael M Collins, Lord Hoffmann, and Pierre-Yves Gunter. See Matthias Scherer, 
‘Damages as a Sanction for Commencing Court Proceedings in Breach of an Arbitration Agreement’ (Kluwer 
Arbitration Blog, 21 February 2014) <http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2014/02/21/damages-as-a-
sanction-for-commencing-court-proceedings-in-breach-of-an-arbitration-agreement/> accessed 30 May 2015. 
617 See Section 50 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 (England & Wales) which restates the powers originally granted 
to the Court of Chancery by Section 2 of the Chancery Amendment Act 1858, commonly known as the Lord 
Cairns’ Act. 
618 Arnaud Nuyts, ‘The Enforcement of Jurisdiction Agreements Further to Gasser and the Community Principle 
of Abuse of Right’ in Pascal de Vareilles-Sommieres (ed.), Forum Shopping in the European Judicial Area (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford 2007) 57. 
619 Andrew Dickinson, ‘Brussels I Review – Choice of Court Agreements’ (Conflictoflaws.net, 11 June 2009) 
<http://conflictoflaws.net/2009/brussels-i-review-choice-of-court-agreements/> accessed 15 December 2014; 
Andrew Dickinson, ‘Response to the Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on 
Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters’ (Europa.eu, 
30 June 2009) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/0002/contributions/civil_society_ngo_academics_others
/mr_andrew_dickinson_en.pdf> accessed 15 December 2014, para 24;  
Response of the Law Society of England and Wales,   
Review of Regulation 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 




protracted litigation will result in higher costs and expenses.620 To quote Briggs, ‘In other 
words, litigation about where to litigate will be replaced by litigation about where the 
litigation should have taken place.’621 However, there is a strong argument that litigation 
about where litigation should have taken place is neither an efficient nor effective method of 
dispute resolution in international commercial litigation.622 Above all, the damages remedy 
fails to deliver what many potential claimants desire most, particularly in an action in debt; it 
cannot deliver prompt, summary judgment on the merits in the agreed court.623 Hence, 
damages for breach of a forum selection agreement and their deterrent value are a ‘second-
best solution’ to a uniform EU wide mechanism for the avoidance of parallel proceedings ab 
initio, as was suggested in the Commission proposal.624 Where available, an anti-suit 
injunction is likely to be a commercial litigant’s preferred option.625   
Notwithstanding any arguments to the contrary, the Court of Appeal held that the claims for 
declarations and damages for breach of the exclusive jurisdiction agreements did not breach 
EU law even though the matter has not yet been adjudicated upon by the CJEU nor resolved 
by EU legislation. Moreover, it considered it unnecessary to send a preliminary reference 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
/law_society_england_wales_en.pdf > accessed 15 December 2014, para 12; cf Bar Council of England and 
Wales’ Response to the Brussels I Regulation Green Paper, para 3.9. 
620 Dickinson, Brussels I Review – Choice of Court Agreements (n 619); Dickinson, Response to the Green Paper 
(n 619). 
621 Adrian Briggs, ‘The Impact of Recent Judgments of the European Court on English Procedural Law and 
Practice’ (2005) Vol. II, No. 124 Zeitschrift fur Schweizerisches Recht 231-262; Oxford Legal Studies Research 
Paper No. 11/2006 <Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=899689> accessed 15 December 2014, 20. 
622 See Luboš Tichý, ‘Protection against Abuse of Process in the Brussels I Review Proposal?’ in Eva Lein (ed.), 
The Brussels I Review Proposal Uncovered (BIICL, London 2012) 103, 189: Professor Tichý refers to the damages 
remedy as ‘a weak consolation’ due to the need for separate enforcement proceedings; For a similar argument 
in relation to the inadequacy of the damages remedy for breach of an arbitration agreement in the English 
courts, see, Sheffield United Football Club Ltd v West Ham United Football Club plc [2008] EWHC 2855 (Comm), 
[22] (Teare J): ‘However, it is well established that the remedy of damages is not regarded as an adequate 
remedy for breach of an arbitration clause’; Starlight Shipping Co v Tai Ping Insurance Co [2007] EWHC 1893 
(Comm), [12] (Cooke J): ‘Damages would, for all the reasons given in the authorities, be an inadequate remedy 
for breach of such a clause since its very nature requires the parties to have their disputes determined in 
arbitration. A party to such an agreement should not be put to the trouble of having disputes determined 
elsewhere in a manner contrary to the express contract between the parties’; See Gary B Born, International 
Commercial Arbitration (2nd Edition, Kluwer Law International 2014) Chapter 8, 1304: ‘It was frequently (and 
correctly) remarked, however, that damages for breach of an arbitration agreement are an uncertain and 
inadequate means of enforcement’; Nigel Blackaby and Constantine Partasides with Alan Redfern and Martin 
Hunter, Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (5th Edition, OUP 2009) 20: ‘an agreement to arbitrate 
is a contract of imperfect obligation. If it is broken, an award of damages is unlikely to be a practical remedy, 
given the difficulty of quantifying the loss sustained’. 
623 Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (2010) (n 604) 90; Richard Fentiman, ‘Parallel Proceedings 
and Jurisdiction Agreements in Europe’ in Pascal de Vareilles-Sommieres (ed.), Forum Shopping in the European 
Judicial Area (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2007) 45; Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (2015) (n 604) 
113. 
624 Illmer, The Brussels I Regulation Recast (n 615) 80 (discussing damages for breach of arbitration agreements 
but the same analysis applies to damages for breach of jurisdiction agreements by parity of reasoning). 
625 Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (2015) (n 604) 113; A Briggs, Private International Law in 
English Courts (OUP 2014) 399; Stephen Males, ‘Comity and Anti-Suit Injunctions’ [1998] LMCLQ 543, 550. 
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under Article 267 TFEU to the CJEU on the legality and legitimacy of the declarations and 
damages remedy in the European Judicial Area despite repeated requests from Starlight.626 
It may be argued that this issue did warrant a preliminary reference to the CJEU as it would 
have helped clarify whether the CJEU’s ruling in Turner v Grovit does preclude the recovery 
of damages for breach of an exclusive jurisdiction agreement. Had a preliminary reference 
on the issue been sent to the CJEU, the answer received would have probably been very 
different from the one delivered by the Court of Appeal.627 It is highly unlikely that the CJEU 
would have favoured a contractual remedy for the European conflicts of jurisdiction which 
has made its way through the back door as an ingenious alternative to the defunct anti-suit 
injunction.628 With the Gasser loophole closed, the prospects of a party pleading a sham 
                                                          
626 The English courts, in the litigation that followed the CJEU’s West Tankers ruling, appear to be very reluctant 
to refer matters to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling. It seems that the negative perception of the CJEU’s 
decisions in West Tankers, Turner, and Gasser in the eyes of the English courts may have a part to play in this 
reluctance to refer matters for a preliminary ruling. Moreover, the English courts may wish to continue to rely 
on alternatives to anti-suit injunctions regardless of their potential incompatibility with the Brussels I 
Regulation as interpreted by the CJEU. See Illmer, English Court of Appeal Confirms Damages Award for Breach 
of a Jurisdiction Agreement (n 597); Dickinson, Once Bitten – Mutual Distrust in European Private International 
Law (n 597) 190-191. 
627 See Albert Dinelli, ‘The Limits on the Remedy of Damages for Breach of Jurisdiction Agreements: The Law of 
Contract Meets Private International Law’ [2015] MelbULawRw 9; (2015) 38 Melbourne University Law Review 
1023, 1028. 
628 See Illmer, The Brussels I Regulation Recast (n 615) 79; Gilles Cuniberti and Marta Requejo, ‘La sanction des 
clauses d'élection de for par l'octroi de dommages et intérêts’, ERA Forum 2010-1 (SSRN, February 18, 2010) 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1689417> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1689417> accessed 15 December 
2014; Briggs, Agreements (n 564) Chapter 8, 330-338; TC Hartley, Choice of Court Agreements under the 
European and International Instruments (OUP 2013) Chapter 10, 220; Fentiman, International Commercial 
Litigation (2015) (n 604) 115; Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (2010) (n 604) 90; Harris, 
Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: Where Next? (n 566) 547; CJS Knight, ‘The Damage of Damages: 
Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law ’ [2008] Journal of Private International Law 501, 509; Edwin 
Peel, ‘Introduction’ in Pascal de Vareilles-Sommieres (ed), Forum Shopping in the European Judicial Area (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford University Press 2007) 1, 15-17; Fentiman, Parallel Proceedings and Jurisdiction Agreements 
in Europe (n 623) 43-45; Nuyts (n 618) 57; Petr Briza, ‘Choice-of-Court Agreements: Could the Hague Choice of 
Court Agreements Convention and the Reform of the Brussels I Regulation be the way out of the Gasser-Owusu 
Disillusion?’ [2009] Journal of Private International Law 537, 548-554; cf Raphael (n 614) 294; Felix Blobel and 
Patrick Späth, ‘The Tale of Multilateral Trust and the European Law of Civil Procedure’ (2005) 30 European Law 
Review 528, 545-546, highlight the counterproductive effects of secondary remedies on the principle of mutual 
trust in the European Union; P Gottwald, ‘art 23 EuGVVO’ in T Rauscher, J Wenzel and P Wax (eds.), Münchener 
Kommentar zur Zivilprozessordnung (3rd Edition, Beck 2008) [79]; Peter Mankowski, ‘Ist eine vertragliche 
Absicherung von Gerichtsstandsvereinbarungen möglich?’ (2009) IPRax, 23-35, argues that all claims that 
directly or indirectly sanction a claim not to sue in a forum derogatum militate against the ratio underpinning 
the inhibition of anti-suit injunctions in Turner v. Grovit since a right not to sue abroad is not recognised under 
the Brussels I regime; For another analysis of the relevance of Turner v. Grovit for the damages remedy, see, 
Thomas Pfeiffer, ‘Die Absicherung von Gerichtsstandsvereinbarungen durch Vereinbarung eines materiell-
rechtlichen Kostenerstatungsanspruchs’ in Wolfgang Hau and Hubert Schmidt (eds.), Facetten des 
Verfahrensrecht Liber amicorum Walter F. Lindacher (Heymanns 2007) 77, 81ff; Anatol Dutta and Christian 
Heinze, ‘Prozessführungsverbote im englischen und europäischen Zivilverfahrensrecht’ Zeitschrift für 
Europäisches Privatrecht (ZEuP) (2005) 428, 458-461, suggest that damages in relation of the foreign court’s 
substantive liability award are impermissible, but that damages in respect of litigation costs are more 
defensible, although still doubtful; Alexander J. Belohlávek, ‘Rome Convention - Rome I Regulation’ (Volume I, 
Juris Publishing 2011) 360, does not entirely exclude the possibility of a claim for damages in this context; 
Guido Carducci, ‘The New EU Regulation 1215/2012 of 12 December 2012 on Jurisdiction and International 
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jurisdiction agreement under the Brussels I Regulation (Recast) may grant a new lease of life 
to the damages remedy, at least until the matter is addressed by a CJEU decision or 
considered by the European Union legislature. 
It will, of course, be a matter for the Greek courts to decide whether to recognise the English 
judgments in The Alexandros T litigation. In Gothaer v Samskip the CJEU decided that a 
decision of a Member State to decline jurisdiction on the basis of a jurisdiction agreement in 
favour of another Member State is a judgment which qualifies for recognition under Chapter 
III of the Brussels I Regulation.629 Moreover, the necessary underpinning for the operative 
part of the judgment must also be recognised.630 However, recognition is subject to the 
limited defences to recognition in Articles 34 and 35 of the Brussels I Regulation, including if 
the recognition of the judgment is manifestly contrary to the public policy of the Member 
State in which recognition is sought.631 In this case, the decision on the scope of the 
jurisdiction agreements is intertwined with the decision to award damages and declaratory 
relief for the breach of such agreements. Since the latter rulings are potentially prohibited by 
the jurisprudence of the CJEU, the Greek court may choose to refer the matter for a 
preliminary ruling from the CJEU. The question referred would seek a clarification on the 
grounds for refusing recognition to a Member State judgment and in particular whether a 
judgment awarding damages and declaratory relief for breach of a jurisdiction agreement 
falls foul of the public policy defence. It is submitted that the principle of mutual trust is the 
‘bedrock upon which EU justice policy should be built’632 and may be considered to be a 
component of European Union public policy.633 Hence, a judgment which undermines the 
principles of mutual trust and the effectiveness of the Regulation may be deemed to be 
contrary to EU public policy and be refused recognition.634 However, the CJEU has recently 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Arbitration’ (2013) 29 Arbitration International 467, 489, is more optimistic regarding the compatibility of 
damages for breach of an arbitration agreement with the Brussels I Regulation; See also the Opinion of 
Advocate General M. Wathelet in Case C-536/13 Gazprom OAO [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2414, FN 87, who 
regarded an award of damages as compatible with the Brussels I Regulation, although it was not in issue in that 
case. AG Wathelet referred to the European Parliament resolution of 7 September 2010 on the implementation 
and review of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 in support of his averment. (P7_TA(2010)0304, recital M). 
629 Case C-456/11 Gothaer Allgemeine Versicherung AG v Samskip GmbH EU:C:2012:719, [2013] QB 548. 
630 Ibid [40]-[41]; See FN 542 in Chapter 5 above for the concepts of European res judicata and Euro-estoppel.  
631 Article 34(1) of the Brussels I Regulation; Article 45(1)(a) of the Brussels I Regulation (Recast). 
632 The EU Justice Agenda for 2020 - Strengthening Trust, Mobility and Growth within the Union COM (2014) 
144 final; See Matthias Weller, ‘Mutual trust: in search of the future of European Union private international 
law’ (2015) 11 Journal of Private International Law 64, 79-80. 
633 For CJEU case law and secondary sources discussing a European public policy exception to the rules 
regarding the enforcement of judgments: See FN 545 in Chapter 5 above. 
634 European public policy operates as a form of flexibility in the application of uniform rules throughout Europe 
and unlike national public policy it does not need to be attenuated. See A Mills, The Confluence of Public and 
Private International Law (CUP 2009) 197. 
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adjudicated that where there is an infringement of EU law in the judgment of the Member 
State of origin:635 ‘the public-policy clause would apply only where that error of law means 
that the recognition of the judgment concerned in the State in which recognition is sought 
would result in the manifest breach of an essential rule of law in the EU legal order and 
therefore in the legal order of that Member State’. In that particular case, the infringement 
of EU trademark law was not deemed to be a manifest breach of an essential rule of law in 
the EU legal order.636 Nevertheless, it is submitted that a fundamental contravention of the 
principles that animate the multilateral jurisdiction and judgments order of the Brussels I 
Regulation may still fall within the purview of the public policy exception. Hence, there may 
be room to argue that an infringement of the principles underlying EU private international 
law rules may be more significant than an infringement of EU private law rules per se for the 
purposes of the public policy exception.      
The lack of a higher authority based on pure European principles means that the pragmatic 
virtues of the decision in Starlight Shipping Co v Allianz Marine & Aviation Versicherungs AG 











                                                          
635 See Case C-681/13 Diageo Brands BV v Simiramida ECLI:EU:C:2015:471 [50] (emphasis added). 
636 Ibid [51]. 
637 [2014] EWCA Civ 1010. 
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Recovering Damages for the Tort/Delict of Inducing Breach of a Choice of Court Agreement 
against a Claimant’s Legal Advisers: The English Court of Appeal Adjudicates on Whether 
England is the Place Where the Economic Loss Occurred under Article 5(3) of the Brussels I 
Regulation?638 
Apart from the prospects of recovering contractual damages for breach of an English 
exclusive choice of court agreement from the counter party,639 it has been argued that in 
some instances, it may make sense to extend the scope of the recovery beyond the parties’ 
privy to the jurisdiction agreement.640 Potential third parties may include the directors and 
senior management of the company, the legal advisers of the company, another company 
within the group of companies or even a competitor company. However, in order to sue a 
third party, the English courts must have jurisdiction over the matter and a specific cause of 
action must lie against the third party under the applicable law of the particular legal 
relationship. 
Where an exclusive choice of court agreement is binding between A and B and a third party, 
C, who is in practical control of B, has directed B to breach the agreement, the English courts 
have accepted that anti-suit injunctions or claims for damages, could be founded on the tort 
of inducing breach of contract.641 In Kallang Shipping SA v Axa Assurances Senegal ("The 
Kallang") (No.2), where Axa Senegal had induced their insureds to breach an arbitration 
clause by orchestrating proceedings before the courts of Senegal, Jonathan Hirst QC, sitting 
as a deputy High Court judge, awarded damages against Axa Senegal for procuring a breach 
                                                          
638 Marzillier, Dr Meier & Dr Guntner Rechtsanwaltsgesellschaft MbH v AMT Futures Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 143 
(Christopher Clarke LJ with whom Tomlinson LJ and Laws LJ agreed); See M Ahmed, 'Case Comment: Marzillier, 
Dr Meier & Dr Guntner Rechtsanwaltsgesellschaft MbH v AMT Futures Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 143' (2015) 6 
Aberdeen Student Law Review 118; See, generally, M Lehmann, ‘Where Does Economic Loss Occur?’ (2011) 7 
Journal of Private International Law 527; A Dickinson, The Rome II Regulation (OUP 2008) Chapter 4, 327-330; E 
Lein, ‘Chapter 4 - Article 7(2)’ in A Dickinson and E Lein (eds.), The Brussels I Regulation Recast (OUP 2015) 155-
172. 
639 See Union Discount Co Ltd v Zoller and Others [2001] EWCA Civ 1755, [2002] 1 WLR 1517 (Schiemann LJ); 
Donohue v Armco Inc [2001] UKHL 64, [2002] 1 All ER 749, [36] (Lord Bingham of Cornhill) and [48] (Lord 
Hobhouse of Woodborough); A/S D/S Svendborg v Akar [2003] EWHC 797 (Comm) (Julian Flaux QC J); National 
Westminster Bank plc v Rabobank Nederland (No 3) [2007] EWHC 3163 (Comm), [2008] 1 All ER (Comm) 266 
(Sir Anthony Colman J); Starlight Shipping Co v Allianz Marine & Aviation Versicherungs AG (The Alexandros T) 
[2014] EWCA Civ 1010 (Longmore LJ): A significant recent Court of Appeal decision endorsing the damages 
remedy in the context of the Brussels I Regulation. 
640 Briggs accepts that the claim for compensation may be characterized as ‘tortious or non-contractual’ and 
that such a cause of action may fit more easily into the ‘public law’ rubric of the Brussels I Regulation, but does 
not explore the issue any further: Briggs, Agreements (n 564) 326-327, 337; cf Raphael describes the possibility 
of an award of damages outside the contractual case as ‘unexplored territory’, but in contrast to Briggs argues 
that, where there is no clear and concrete personal contractual obligation to enforce, it is harder to avoid the 
conclusion that the award of damages inherently involves an assessment of the jurisdiction of another Member 
State court, and is thus prohibited: Raphael (n 614) 296, 331, 341. 
641 See Raphael (n 614) 335-336. 
180 
 
of contract.642 However, as Jonathan Hirst QC stressed, both parties agreed that this issue 
was to be determined in accordance with English law and no case on Senegalese law was 
pleaded.643 
In the context of the Brussels I Regulation, the English High Court held that, in principle, a 
claim in damages may lie against a claimant’s lawyers (a German law firm) for the tort of 
inducing breach of contract where it can be established that the claimant was advised by 
them to bring pre-emptive proceedings in breach of a choice of court agreement.644 In such 
cases, the potential impediment is not the existence of the cause of action or legal basis,645 
but satisfying an English court that it has jurisdiction under Article 5(3) of the Brussels I 
Regulation.646 The High Court has held that, such jurisdiction exists, pursuant to Article 5(3) 
of the Brussels I Regulation, because to induce breach of an English choice of court 
agreement is to deprive the claimant of the benefit of a clause conferring exclusive 
jurisdiction on the English courts, which constitutes harm suffered in England.647 
The German law firm responsible for inducing the breach of the choice of court agreement 
appealed the High Court decision on the issue of whether or not the English courts have 
jurisdiction to entertain the action under the Brussels I Regulation. Overturning the first 
instance decision, the Court of Appeal held that the English court had no jurisdiction over 
the claim. Both the event giving rise to the damage and the damage itself occurred in 
Germany, not in England. That was the place of the ‘harmful event’ for the purposes of 
Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation. The Court of Appeal relied on the leading CJEU 
                                                          
642 Kallang Shipping SA v Axa Assurances Senegal ("The Kallang") (No.2) [2008] EWHC 2761 (Comm), [2009] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep 124, [90]-[94] (Jonathan Hirst QC J); See also The Duden [2008] EWHC 2762 (Comm), [2009] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep 145 (Jonathan Hirst QC J); See Joseph (n 604) 493-494; Raphael, The Anti-Suit Injunction: Updating 
Supplement (n 567) 69. 
643 Kallang Shipping SA v Axa Assurances Senegal ("The Kallang") (No.2) [2008] EWHC 2761 (Comm), [2009] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep 124, [90]. 
644 AMT Futures Ltd v Marzillier, Dr Meier & Dr Guntner Rechtsanwaltsgesellschaft MbH [2014] EWHC 1085 
(Comm) (Popplewell J). 
645 Liability for the tort of inducing breach of contract was established in English law by the famous case of 
Lumley v Gye (1853) 2 E & B 216 and the actionable wrong was recognised as part of Scots law in British Motor 
Trade Association v Gray 1951 SC 586, 1951 SLT 247 (Lord Russell). OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 
1 is the current leading authority on the tort of inducing breach of contract in English law and was followed by 
Lord Hodge in Global Resources Group v MacKay 2008 SLT 104, 106-107: Lord Hodge identified five 
characteristics which appear to the essential elements of the delict: (1) Breach of contract (2) Knowledge on 
the part of the inducing party that this will occur (3) Breach which is either a means to an end for the inducing 
party or an end in itself (4) Inducement in the form of persuasion, encouragement or assistance (5) Absence of 
lawful justification. See J MacLeod, ‘Offside Goals and Induced Breaches of Contract’ (2009) 13 Edinburgh Law 
Review 278; J Thomson, Delictual Liability (Bloomsbury Professional 2014) 44-47. 
646 Article 7(2) of the Brussels I Regulation (Recast). 
647 AMT Futures Ltd v Marzillier [2014] EWHC 1085 (Comm) (Popplewell J). 
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authorities648 and reached the conclusion that the German law firm procured the former 
clients to start proceedings in Germany in consequence of which AMT Futures Ltd suffered 
loss predominantly in Germany.649 The court rejected an argument that the harm suffered 
was the loss of the benefit promised to the claimant – that they would only be sued in 
England. The harm was the commencement of proceedings in Germany and the damage 
suffered was the cost and expense caused by the litigation, which was suffered in Germany.  
The localization of economic loss in Germany is line with the principle that the victim’s 
domicile should be avoided when determining the location of the economic loss unless the 
direct and immediate loss occurred there.650 This principle of localizing economic loss was 
followed by the CJEU in its recent decision in Harald Kolassa v Barclays Bank plc where it 
ruled that the courts in the Member State of the investor’s domicile have jurisdiction ‘in 
particular when the loss occurred itself directly in the applicant’s bank account held with a 
bank established in the area of jurisdiction of those courts’.651 In Kronhofer,652 the ECJ stated 
that in determining the place of loss, the fact the ultimate adverse effects of the damaging 
behaviour were felt in Austria, where the claimant lived and where his assets were 
concentrated, could not be taken into account.653 The court gave two reasons for this. First, 
to hold otherwise would run counter to the objectives of the Brussels Convention, which 
aims at enabling the claimant to easily identify the court in which he may sue and the 
defendant to reasonably foresee in which court he may be sued.654 Secondly, to take into 
account the location of the claimant’s assets would give jurisdiction to the courts of the 
claimant’s home, a solution that is generally not favoured by the Brussels Convention.655 
That said, Christopher Clark LJ stated that the first instance judge’s analysis is a powerful656 
and attractive one as there is much to be said for the determination of what is in essence an 
                                                          
648 Case 21/76 Bier v Mines de Potasse d’Alsace [1976] ECR 1735; Case C-220/88 Dumez France and Tracoba v 
Hessiche Landesbank (Helba) [1990] ECR I-49; Marinari v Lloyd’s Bank plc [1996] QB 217; Reunion Europeene SA 
v Spliethoff Bevrachtingskantoor BV [2000] QB 690; Case C-168/02 Kronhofer [2004] ECR I-6009. 
649 Marzillier v AMT Futures Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 143 (Christopher Clarke LJ with whom Tomlinson LJ and Laws 
LJ agreed). 
650 Lehmann (n 638) 537-540. 
651 Case C-375/13 Harald Kolassa v Barclays Bank plc ECLI:EU:C:2015:37, [2015] WLR (D) 32; Universal Music 
International Holding BV v Michael Tétreault Schilling and Others (Case C-12/15) is a pending preliminary 
reference before the CJEU from the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden (Netherlands) on Article 5(3) of the Brussels I 
Regulation including the questions of how a court should establish whether an economic loss is an ‘initial loss’ 
or a ‘consequential loss’ and in which country does the economic loss occur. 
652 Case C-168/02 Kronhofer [2004] ECR I-6009. 
653 Ibid [21]. 
654 Ibid [20]. 
655 Ibid. 
656 [2015] EWCA Civ 143 [49] (Christopher Clarke LJ). 
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ancillary claim in tort for inducement of breach of contract to be made in the court which 
the contract breaker agreed should have exclusive jurisdiction in respect of that contract, 
rather than in the courts of the country where the inducement and breach occurred.657 
However, the former consideration is not a determining factor in the allocation of 
jurisdiction under the Brussels I Regulation. It is submitted, that the arguments favouring the 
pragmatic and remedy driven quest of localizing the economic loss in England militate 
against a reasoned and systemic response to the issue of multilateral jurisdictional allocation 
within the Brussels I Regulation regime.  
Counsel for the German law firm also advanced an additional ground of appeal, which was 
not argued before the judge.658 Hugh Mercer QC, argued that the High Court could not 
exercise jurisdiction over the German law firm in relation to the subject matter of the action 
because any such claim necessarily and unavoidably offended against EU law principles. 
Insofar, as an injunction was claimed it would, involve the court in being asked to grant an 
order restraining a party from commencing proceedings before a properly constituted court 
of a Member State.659 Insofar, as damages were sought it involved the court being asked to 
determine issues which breached the principle of effectiveness of EU law (effet utile) and the 
principle of mutual trust, and constituted a collateral attack on the assumption of 
jurisdiction by the German courts and of judgments or court settlements obtained by 
investors in Germany, when under the Regulation any such attack was permitted only in the 
court where the substantive proceedings had been commenced. 
However, Christopher Clarke LJ observed obiter that the additional ground of appeal was not 
well founded.660 In doing so he emphasized the divide between issues of jurisdiction which 
were a matter for the German courts and the private law rights and obligations of the 
parties in relation to the contractual choice of court agreement and ancillary claims in tort 
for inducing breach of the choice of court agreement. In support of his contention, 
Christopher Clarke LJ also cited and reiterated the recent landmark ruling of Longmore LJ in 
Starlight Shipping Co v Allianz Marine & Aviation Versicherungs AG (The Alexandros T),661 
that EU law was no obstacle to enforcing a cause of action for the award of damages for 
                                                          
657 Ibid [57]. 
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Front Comor) [2009] 1 AC 1138. 
660 [2015] EWCA Civ 143 [61] (Christopher Clarke LJ). 
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breach of an exclusive jurisdiction clause.662 However, it should be noted that the Longmore 
LJ’s ruling on the compatibility of the damages remedy with EU law is itself not free from 
controversy. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that the CJEU would on a preliminary reference 
from the English courts adjudicate that a unilateral private law remedy arising from the 
contractual right not to be sued in a non-elected forum is compatible with the principle of 
mutual trust which animates the double convention modelled jurisdiction and judgments 
order of the Brussels I Regulation.663 It is submitted that the relative effect of jurisdiction 
agreements as subsisting, independent and enforceable contractual obligations will 
necessarily distort the international allocative or distributive function of such agreements 
within a multilateral jurisdiction and judgments order such as the Brussels I Regulation.       
Marzillier v AMT Futures Ltd is the first case in the English courts concerning Article 5(3) of 
the Brussels I Regulation in relation to the tort of inducing breach of a contract. The Court of 
Appeal’s localization of the economic loss in Germany may end up inhibiting future claims 
for damages for inducing breach of an English choice of court agreement in the English 
courts. The decision may also be significant for the English courts when approaching the 
localization of economic loss under Article 7(2) of the Brussels I Regulation (Recast) more 
generally. It is submitted that, the approach of the Court of Appeal in localizing economic 
loss is firmly rooted in European Union private international law principles and the CJEU’s 
leading authorities which favour neither the place where the country in which the event 
giving rise to the damage occurred nor the country or countries in which the indirect 
consequences of that event occur. This mature and systemic approach to the localization of 
loss seeks to ensure that the rights of the claimant and the defendant are evenly balanced 
without unduly prejudicing either. The immediate pragmatic value of localizing the economic 
loss in England would have sacrificed the certainty and predictability of the European Union 
private international law regime and accorded dubious jurisdictional precedence to the place 
where the indirect consequences of the economic loss occur.  
The Court of Appeal decision may have significant implications for the applicable law of the 
cause of action as well. Article 4(1) of the Rome II Regulation uses the same criterion of the 
‘place where the damage occurred’ that is the second prong of the tort jurisdiction under 
                                                          
662 [2015] EWCA Civ 143 [62] (Christopher Clarke LJ). 
663 See FN 628 above for a comprehensive review of the secondary sources which support the contention that 
the damages remedy is not compatible with the principles of mutual trust and the effectiveness of EU law (effet 
utile) that animate the Brussels I Regulation as interpreted by the Court of Justice of the EU.  
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Art 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation664 (now Art 7(2) Brussels I Regulation (Recast)) in order 
to determine the applicable law of the tort. As the parallel interpretation and coherence of 
the European instruments on private international law is an objective in its own right,665 the 
applicable law for the tort of inducing breach of contract may also localize in Germany.666 
However, it may be argued that English law is the law governing the tort by virtue of the 
choice of law agreement being construed as extending its cover to cases of tortious liability 
under Article 14 of the Rome II Regulation.667 Secondly, it may also be argued that the 
applicable law under Article 4(1) can be displaced in favour of the manifestly closer 
relationship based on a contract that is closely connected with the tort in question.668 
Arguably, the English dispute resolution agreement is closely connected with the tort of 
inducing breach of contract. However, as indicated by the use of the word ‘manifestly’, a 
high threshold of connection must be passed for Article 4(3) to apply.669 As a result, the 
escape clause can only be resorted to in exceptional circumstances. 
                                                          
664 In Case 21/76 Bier v Mines de Potasse d’Alsace [1976] ECR 1735, the European Court of Justice has 
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Rome II Regulation; cf A Briggs, ‘Choice of Choice of Law?’ [2003] LMCLQ 12; For the English substantive private 
law position allowing claims for concurrent liability, see Henderson v Merrett Syndicates [1995] 2 AC 145 (HL) 
(Lord Goff of Chieveley); cf Lord Justice Jackson, ‘Concurrent Liability: Where Have Things Gone Wrong?’ 
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669 Recitals 14 and 18 of the Rome II Regulation; See, generally, CSA Okoli and GO Arishe, ‘The Operation of the 
Escape Clauses in the Rome Convention, Rome I Regulation and Rome II Regulation’ (2012) 8 Journal of Private 
International Law 513, 536. 
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The UK Supreme Court has recently granted permission to appeal to AMT Futures Ltd (the 
‘Appellant’).670 From the foregoing, it is likely that the UK Supreme Court will prefer the 
principled stance of the CJEU case law in relation to the jurisdictional allocation of tort claims 
as opposed to a more pragmatic approach which would accord questionable jurisdictional 
precedence to the place where the indirect consequences of the economic loss occur. 
Moreover, if it is held that the English court does possess jurisdiction over the claim then a 
re-examination of the principal issue underlying Longmore LJ’s decision in Starlight Shipping 
Co v Allianz Marine & Aviation Versicherungs AG may become necessary – whether the 
damages remedy is indeed compatible with the principle of effectiveness of EU law (effet 
utile) and the principle of mutual trust.671 A preliminary reference to the CJEU from the 
highest court of a Member State is mandatory on a question of EU law that is necessary for 
the outcome of the case and is not clear beyond reasonable doubt without any case law 
from the CJEU or where the national court cannot decide the answer to the question simply 
by following the existing case law of the CJEU.672 
It should be observed that institutionalizing an action of damages for the tort of inducing 
breach of an English exclusive choice of court agreement will endorse the view that it was 
wrong for the other party to have sued in another EU Member State where the rules of the 
Brussels I Regulation allow for such a jurisdictional possibility. Moreover, law firms are 
regulated and owe duties both to their Member State’s legal system and to their clients. Any 
attempt by the English courts to police the conduct of law firms in EU Member States and 
hold them liable in tort for giving their clients advice on jurisdictional matters is bound to 
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Chapter 7 - Assessing the Damages Remedy for Breach of Choice of Court 
Agreements  
Having examined the state of the judicial authorities on the damages remedy for breach of 
choice of court agreements, the time is ripe for an exploration of the arguments of principle 
for and against this novel remedy.673 The necessary identification and articulation of these 
core arguments and their potential impact on the viability of the damages remedy will help 
us to ascertain the proper and legitimate scope of the remedy in private international law. 
Moreover, this exercise will help us to anticipate how the damages remedy may yet develop 
in the context of the European Union private international law regime personified in the 
Brussels I Regulation. Clarity with regard to the relative pros and cons of the remedy will also 
shed light on whether a claim of substantive claw-back damages which effectively reverse or 
nullify the decision of the foreign court should be allowed. Last but not least, a balanced and 
nuanced perspective on the arguments in support of and in opposition to the damages 
remedy will assist us in drawing conclusions towards the end of the thesis.    
Arguments in Favour of the Damages Remedy for Breach of Choice of Court Agreements 
1. Recognizing a general right to claim damages is the approach that best accords with 
existing English common law domestic contract law principles 
By analogy with courts awarding damages in response to ordinary breaches of contractual 
agreements, there is some substance in the argument that they should also do so when the 
agreement breached is one embodied in a jurisdiction clause. On the other hand, this 
domestic contract law analogy can only be pushed as far as the private international law 
framework (both the European Union and the residual common law jurisdictional regime) of 
choice of court agreements allows. Thus, in equal measure, there is also some substance in 
the argument that ordinary contract law principles cannot be imported verbatim into a 
private international law context which incorporates and prioritises both procedural and 
substantive private law elements.   
The viability of the claim for recovery of damages for breach of a jurisdiction agreement will 
also raise broader questions over the proper and legitimate role of remedies in private 
international law. The role of remedies in private international litigation is a relatively 
neglected but crucial area so much so that causes of actions are often referred to by the 
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remedy sought. For instance, we refer to an ‘action’ for an anti-suit injunction instead of an 
action for breach of the underlying substantive legal or equitable right. A possible 
explanation for the lack of order and clarity in the anti-suit injunction right/remedy 
‘pudding’674 is that the very existence of the underlying substantive equitable right is the 
subject of debate. This notion of allowing the right to masquerade as the remedy, brings to 
mind Lord Mance’s statement in the foreword to the first edition of Fentiman’s International 
Commercial Litigation: ‘Ubi jus, ibi remedium might, for a practitioner, read ubi remedium, 
ibi jus.’675 To a substantial extent, the challenge of rationalizing private international law 
remedies involves the identification, articulation and development of the outer limits placed 
on the remedies. It is clear that when a party seeks a remedy in domestic courts to influence 
litigation abroad (be it an anti-suit injunction or damages) comity and other private 
international law policies are actively engaged which demand that limits be placed on the 
parties right to such an outcome, even where domestic law principles would readily award a 
remedy to the party as of right. 
Nevertheless, the private international law nature of choice of court clauses should not give 
rise to a blanket prohibition on the award of damages in each and every circumstance. 
Undoubtedly, the international ramifications of choice of court agreements call for a 
measured approach and unless it can be ascertained that the damages remedy cannot 
legitimately be awarded under any circumstances whatsoever, should the courts bar the 
cause of action altogether.  
2. The damages remedy allows the court to preserve certainty, maintain the sanctity 
of the contractual bargain and control forum shopping 
A clause in a cross border commercial contract nominating in advance the forum in which 
disputes are to be litigated is an essential precondition to the certainty and predictability we 
have come to expect from modern international business transactions.676 
Litigation focussed on the ‘conflicts of jurisdiction’ and their massive untapped potential 
began to dominate the subject of English private international law towards the last quarter 
                                                          
674 Cameron Sim, ‘Choice of Law and Anti-Suit Injunctions: Relocating Comity’ [2013] ICLQ 703. 
675 Richard Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (OUP 2010) Foreword vii. 
676 Ibid Chapter 2.  
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of the twentieth century.677 As a consequence, choice of law was relegated to a secondary 
position. This development was premised on the notion that, the forum where parties 
litigate their dispute influences the result of the case and that it is often outcome 
determinative.678 Well-advised parties often try to direct litigation into fora where they can 
litigate with the most advantage to themselves and with the maximum disadvantage to their 
opponents. This practice is referred to as ‘forum shopping’.679 
One of the goals of the discipline of private international law is to discourage unfair and 
opportunistic forum shopping.680 The principle of fairness demands that the claimant not be 
allowed an unfettered right to arbitrarily commence proceedings in any forum he wishes. 
The classical view against forum shopping is born out of a desire for fairness to the 
defendant and the need to curb the claimant’s unfettered and arbitrary choice of forum. 
Forum shopping also leads to burdensome litigation across multiple jurisdictions and is often 
accompanied by protracted litigation about where to litigate. As such, forum shopping 
wastes both private and judicial resources. The risk of irreconcilable judgments emanating 
from different jurisdictions is ever present and poses serious problems for the orderly 
resolution of disputes and the recognition and enforcement of judgments. 
The uncertainty inherent in the concept of forum shopping is manifested by the fact that a 
party can only be certain of the law applicable to a transaction after the claimant has made a 
choice of forum. The prevalence of forum shopping in modern international commercial 
litigation is encouraged by the fact that litigation of the same dispute in different fora 
produces different outcomes.681 One basic reason for the variation in the outcome between 
different fora is that courts draw a fundamental distinction between issues of substance and 
issues of procedure.682 Where an issue is characterized as procedural the courts apply the 
                                                          
677 Adrian Briggs, Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law (Oxford Private International Law Series, OUP 
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law of the forum (lex fori regit processum) rather than the applicable law of the transaction. 
Therefore, where the outcome determinative issue is likely to be characterized as 
procedural, the parties will attempt to litigate in the forum that possesses the most 
advantageous set of procedural rules. In other words, by selecting the forum, they can 
directly choose the rule that decides the merits of the case.    
Even where an issue is characterized as substantive, each forum will apply its own choice of 
law rules to the substantive legal category in order to determine the applicable law. As 
choice of law rules vary from forum to forum, different courts—each applying different 
choice of law regimes—may end up applying different substantive governing laws to decide 
the merits of the case, again leading to different outcomes on the merits. By choosing the 
forum, the parties indirectly choose the substantive legal rules that apply to their case. Dr 
Andrew Bell, SC of the Sydney Bar explains how these differences are the motivating forces 
behind the concept of forum shopping:683 
The raison d’être for forum shopping lies in lack of uniformity throughout the world’s 
legal systems, in terms both of internal laws and choice of law rules and the 
procedural rules developed by different countries to facilitate the enforcement of 
those laws. To overlook or understate the significance of these differences to litigants 
“is to fly in the face of reality.” for lack of uniformity in any one of these three areas 
produces the consequence that the legal result in any given fact situation may vary 
according to the forum in which litigation takes place. 
Other matters, such as difficulties in establishing the proof of the content of foreign law, 
overriding public policies, and mandatory rules of the forum only add to the possibility of 
divergent results.684 Even where the substantive rules are the same, differences in legal 
culture, judicial attitudes and competence may result in courts applying apparently identical 
rules in radically different ways. 
Consequently, having to litigate in a non-contractual forum is not a trivial matter of arguing 
the merits in a different location. Where the parties have explicitly agreed to resolve their 
disputes relying on the procedural rules, the choice of law rules, and the judicial attitudes of 
particular courts, it is certainly no substitute for a party to have to resolve the dispute before 
the courts of another country. 
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Summing up, the choice of court agreement is vital to interpreting the substantive 
obligations embodied in an agreement since by agreeing to such a clause, the parties agree 
that the express terms of their agreement will be adjudicated by a particular court applying 
its own particular procedural rules and its particular choice of law rules to determine the 
substantive law that governs the contract. The selection of a non-contractual forum to 
adjudicate the issue will make it difficult for parties to discern with any degree of certainty 
the precise rights and obligations they have bound themselves to.  
3. The Damages Remedy Provides the Court with Another Tool with Which to Control 
International Litigation 
In addition to guaranteeing and promoting the cherished values of certainty and 
predictability in international commercial transactions, an award of damages is a potentially 
useful tool to control international civil and commercial litigation. The courts may want to 
control international litigation for two primary reasons. First, it serves to curb unfair and 
opportunistic forum shopping and prevents the undesirable consequences of that practice. 
Second, the courts may for policy reasons want to channel litigation into certain courts.685 If 
properly developed, the damages remedy can be effective in both controlling forum 
shopping and channelling litigation into the appropriate fora. 
To influence and control international commercial litigation, the common law courts have 
thus far relied on two separate devices:686 a dismissal or stay of local proceedings based on 
forum non conveniens principles and an anti-suit injunction to enjoin foreign proceedings. 
Lord Goff in Airbus v. Patel commented on the limitations of these devices (albeit in the 
context of controlling parallel proceedings in general):687 
I must stress again that, as between common law jurisdictions, there is no system as 
such, comparable to that enshrined in the Brussels Convention. The basic principle is 
that each jurisdiction is independent. There is therefore, as I have said, no embargo 
on concurrent proceedings in the same matter in more than one jurisdiction. There 
are simply these two weapons, a stay (or dismissal) of proceedings and an anti-suit 
injunction. Moreover, each of these has its limitations. The former depends on its 
voluntary adoption by the state in question, and the latter is inhibited by respect for 
comity. It follows that, although the availability of these two weapons should ensure 
that practical justice is achieved in most cases, this may not always be possible. 
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As Lord Goff observes, the stay (or dismissal) device requires voluntary adoption and the 
anti-suit injunction is limited by demands of comity. The stay device is relevant only where 
the proceedings are in the English courts. Where proceedings are brought before the English 
courts in breach of a choice of court clause, the courts will ordinarily uphold the agreement 
by staying their own proceedings. But where a party breaches a choice of court clause by 
commencing proceedings in a foreign court, the English courts will ordinarily enjoin the 
foreign proceedings with an anti-suit injunction. Such an approach is fully consistent with the 
desire of the courts to uphold certainty, predictability and to impede attempts at forum 
shopping. These policy aims dictate that there should be some judicial response, be it an 
anti-suit injunction or damages, to deter parties from breaching choice of court or 
arbitration agreements. 
However, the anti-suit injunction is constrained in its ability to control international 
litigation. First, the ability of the court to influence and control foreign proceedings with 
anti-suit injunctions is limited by respect and deference to the concept of comity and also by 
the uncertainty that comes with applying such an enigmatic constraining factor.688 Second, 
anti-suit injunctions are often ignored by litigants, especially where the party against whom 
the order is made has the ability to keep present and future commercial operations outside 
the jurisdiction of the issuing court. Third, anti-suit injunctions only operate in personam and 
cannot usually be issued against a person who is not within the jurisdiction of the issuing 
court. 
Thus, the anti-suit injunction may be inadequate, by itself, to deal with the excesses of 
international litigation.689 A damages action, working in tandem with the anti-suit injunction, 
may provide more leverage and flexibility. An award of damages is more adaptable because 
the court can vary the quantum of the award to suit the circumstances and policy aims of 
any particular case. The anti-suit injunction, however, being of an all or nothing nature, does 
not have the same flexibility to provide a measured response to the varied situations that 
arise in international litigation. 
An award of damages, together with the anti-suit injunction, empowers the courts to control 
international commercial litigation effectively and with greater flexibility. The availability of 
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two related but differing remedies enables the court to provide customized remedial action 
to suit the circumstances of the case. 
4. The Damages Remedy Allows the Court to Give Effect to Public Policy 
Considerations While Reconciling the Private Interests of the Contracting Parties 
The court will not always give effect to a choice of court agreement by dismissing or staying 
local proceedings commenced in breach of it.690 Nor will the court always grant an anti-suit 
injunction to enjoin foreign proceedings commenced in breach of such clauses.691  
For example, the private interests of the parties to litigate in the contractual forum may 
sometimes be subordinated to public interests such as preventing irreconcilable judgments 
and the waste of judicial resources in trying identical or similar issues again in different 
courts. In such a case, despite the private interest of one party, evidenced in the choice of 
court clause, to have his dispute tried in the contractual forum, the court may decide that 
the private interests of the other party and the public interests of the case cumulatively 
demand that the matter be tried elsewhere. Taking this example further, where the court 
decides that the matter should be tried in a non-contractual forum, should the prejudiced 
party just accept that his private right to litigate in the contractual forum has become 
meaningless because of these other public concerns and private interests? The injustice of 
the situation is particularly evident if the party then litigates in the non-contractual forum at 
great inconvenience and has to put up with a radically different outcome compared to the 
result that would have been reached in the contractual forum. Instead of making no attempt 
to redress the imbalance in the private rights of the contracting parties inter se, the courts 
must consider if an award of damages might mitigate the injustice of having to litigate the 
dispute in the non-contractual forum.692 Damages ameliorate the disparity between 
litigating in the contractual and non-contractual forum. In this way, an award of damages 
not only provides the courts with a guilt-free way to channel disputes into more appropriate 
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non-contractual fora to achieve wider policy concerns, but it also serves as a corrective 
device to rebalance the private interests of the parties. 
Arguments against the Damages Remedy for Breach of Choice of Court Agreements 
1. A Choice of Court Agreement Is a Special Contractual Term, the Breach of Which 
Does Not Give Rise to a Right to Damages 
The simple retort to the argument that the breach of a choice of court agreement should 
give rise to an action for damages is that a jurisdiction agreement is a contract which 
regulates procedure (a ‘procedural contract’) or a special contractual term; the breach of 
which does not give rise to a right in damages. The procedural contract conception of a 
jurisdiction agreement can be compared to a choice of law agreement so much so that such 
agreements may be conceived of as a joint expression of intention or expectation by the 
parties, or a request or direction to the court.693 Furthermore, clauses of this nature do not 
give rise to a right to damages where the contractual expectation is not fulfilled.694 On 
balance, this argument is not entirely satisfactory. First, the argument is premised on the 
assumption that the breach of a choice of law agreement does not give rise to a right to 
damages. The veracity of this assumption is open to debate following the observation made 
by Justice Brereton of the New South Wales Supreme Court in Ace Insurance v Moose695 that 
an appropriately worded choice of law agreement can give rise to a promise not to sue in a 
jurisdiction that will disregard or not give full effect to the choice of law agreement.696 
Second, even if we concede for the purposes of argument that the choice of law agreement 
is not promissory and is merely declaratory in nature and does not ground an action for 
damages, the argument still presupposes that choice of court agreements are analogous to 
choice of law clauses, such that if damages were unavailable for one, they must also be 
unavailable for the other. Although contracting parties tend to negotiate both choice of law 
and choice of court agreements in a comprehensive dispute resolution agreement, the 
analogy between the two clauses does not extend to make their fundamental nature and 
consequences identical. 
 
                                                          
693 See Andrew Dickinson, ‘Restitution and Incapacity: A Choice of Law Solution?’ (1997) Restitution Law Review 
66, 68–69. 
694 Ibid 69, FN 26. 
695 Ace Insurance v. Moose Enterprise Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 724. 




Choice of law agreements and choice of court agreements are fundamentally different. In 
the case of a choice of law agreement, should the courts choose not to rely on the applicable 
law specified by the clause, it is more difficult to localise the fault in the actions of either 
party. This makes it difficult to say that either contracting party breached its promise 
contained in the choice of law agreement. On the other hand, a choice of court agreement 
can only be breached where a party wilfully institutes proceedings in a non-contractual 
forum. The choice of court agreement can only be breached by the deliberate and wilful act 
of a party. This deliberate act causes loss to an identifiable innocent party to whom the court 
ought to award compensatory damages. Therefore, it is not inconsistent for the courts to 
order the breaching party to pay damages when a jurisdiction clause is breached while 
denying damages for breaches of choice of law clauses. 
Third, although attractive in simplicity, the argument that jurisdiction agreements are special 
contractual terms is an a priori argument—it assumes the very thing that it seeks to prove. 
The argument does not explain why, and in what way, these clauses are special nor does it 
advance any reasons for its purported conclusion that damages are not payable where they 
are breached. 
2. Courts Are Not Bound by Choice of Court Agreements on Ordinary Principles of 
Privity of Contract 
A related argument posits that the courts, being third parties to the contract, are not bound 
by choice of court agreements on ordinary principles of privity of contract. Because courts 
are not bound by such agreements, damages are unavailable when courts refuse to uphold 
them. It is submitted, that this argument is not persuasive and provides no more than a 
contractual justification for why jurisdiction agreements are not binding on the courts. It 
does not seek to demonstrate why, as between the two contracting parties, the party who 
has breached his promise should be absolved from the ordinary obligation to pay damages. 
Moreover, it is simpler and more realistic to say that the courts are the ultimate arbiters of 
the grounds for the existence and exercise of jurisdiction, and they will not be bound or 
constrained by private agreements that attempt to dictate whether they should take up or 
reject jurisdiction.697 There is no need to explain why the courts are not bound by the 
parties’ agreement by forcing a contractual straitjacket on an essentially jurisdictional issue. 
                                                          
697 Adrian Briggs, Private International Law in English Courts (OUP 2014) 345. 
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That the courts, not the parties, ultimately decide matters of jurisdiction is the reasoning 
advanced by Edwin Peel on why courts are not obliged to exercise jurisdiction in accordance 
with the jurisdiction agreement.698 He finds it strange that there are few other contractual 
provisions that can be overridden at the discretion of the courts,699 and he posits that this is 
because there must be some limit on the parties’ right to influence the exercise of 
jurisdiction.700 Even so, this only explains the court’s unfettered discretion to exercise 
jurisdiction as it sees fit. It does not explain why damages should not be allowed if one of the 
parties deliberately breaches the jurisdiction agreement. As the next argument explains, 
even where the courts refuse to specifically enforce or give practical effect to the jurisdiction 
agreement, it would not be inconsistent for the court to award damages to vindicate the 
breach. 
3. Where the Court Refuses to Enforce the Choice of Court Agreement, It Would Be 
Inconsistent for the Court to Then Award Damages for Its Breach 
It seems logical to say that where the court refuses to give effect to the choice of court 
agreement, it should not award damages for the breach that it has just condoned. This is a 
contradiction in terms and comparable to the doctrine of approbation and reprobation.701 
But crucially, this argument fails to appreciate that even where the court refuses specific 
relief (for example, by refusing to grant an injunction or an order of specific performance) 
and permits the wrong to continue, it still retains the power to award damages to vindicate 
the breach. Thus, where the court does not specifically enforce the clause, it does not 
necessarily mean that it is barred from resorting to the common law remedy of damages. On 
the contrary, the court may revert to the remedy of common law damages even if the 
equitable remedy is unavailable or inappropriate. As such, there is no real merit to an 
argument that the availability of damages is directly linked to the availability of specific 
relief. 
4. A Right to Damages Would Be Too Difficult and Inefficacious, If Not Impossible, to 
Quantify and Should Accordingly Be Disallowed on This Basis 
                                                          
698 See Peel (n 690). 
699 ibid 221. 
700 Ibid. 
701 Adrian Briggs & Peter Rees, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments (3d ed. 2002) 294, comment that: ‘when in a 
domestic case a court is applied to for, but declines to order, an injunction to restrain a breach of contract, [it] 
does not follow that there is no breach. Rather the claimant is left to his common law remedy of damages.’ 
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Difficulties in quantification pose a significant practical problem to an award of damages for 
breach of choice of court agreements and present a formidable obstacle to developing the 
damages remedy into a predictable response to breaches of jurisdiction agreements.702 
Contractual damages are compensatory in nature as they aim to protect the expectation 
interest of the claimant by placing him in the position that he would have been in had the 
contract been performed.703 According to the expectation measure, where a choice of court 
agreement is breached, the appropriate measure of damages—to put the party in a position 
he would be in had the contract not been breached—would be the difference between the 
judgment obtained (or that will be obtained) in the contractual forum and the judgment 
obtained (or that will be obtained) in the non-contractual forum. 
Applying the expectation measure in that way to quantify damages is problematic. To 
quantify damages where foreign litigation commenced in breach of the clause has been 
concluded, the court must determine the outcome that would have resulted had the 
litigation taken place in the contractual forum and award the difference between the 
judgment obtained in the foreign forum and the judgment that would have been obtained in 
the contractual forum. 
Where litigation has been commenced but not concluded in the non-contractual forum, the 
situation is twice as dire—in such a situation, the court must determine not only the 
hypothetical result in the contractual forum, but also the hypothetical result in the non-
contractual forum, and then award the defendant the difference between the two 
hypothetical judgments. 
                                                          
702 OT Africa Line Ltd v Magic Sportswear Corp [2005] EWCA Civ 710, [2005] 1 CLC 923, [33] (Longmore LJ): 
‘damages will not be easily calculable and can indeed only be calculated by comparing the advantages and 
disadvantages of the respective fora. This is likely to involve an even graver a breach of comity than the 
granting of an anti-suit injunction.’; See Briggs, Private International Law in English Courts (n 697) 399: 
‘assessment of damages for breach of a jurisdiction clause is liable to be problematic, and any attempt at 
quantification not much more than speculative’; Francisco Garcimartin, ‘Chapter 11 – Article 31(2)-(4)’ in 
Andrew Dickinson and Eva Lein (eds.), The Brussels I Regulation Recast (OUP 2015) 338; Martin Illmer, ‘Chapter 
2 – Article 1’ in Andrew Dickinson and Eva Lein (eds.), The Brussels I Regulation Recast (OUP 2015) 80: ‘The 
calculation of the actual damage will potentially be very difficult and time consuming, carrying a considerable 
degree of uncertainty.’; Gary B Born, International Commercial Arbitration (2nd Edition, Kluwer Law 
International 2014) Chapter 8, 1304: ‘calculating the quantum of damages is difficult and speculative’; Nigel 
Blackaby and Constantine Partasides with Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter, Redfern and Hunter on 
International Arbitration (5th Edition, OUP 2009) 20: ‘an agreement to arbitrate is a contract of imperfect 
obligation. If it is broken, an award of damages is unlikely to be a practical remedy, given the difficulty of 
quantifying the loss sustained’. 




It is easy to see the difficulty that the courts face. They are understandably reluctant to 
engage in such judicial second guessing: it is difficult to predict the likely outcome of foreign 
litigation and how the matter would be tried in a foreign court (especially because of 
differing procedural rules, rules of evidence, public policies, choice of law rules, and legal 
cultures resulting in apparently similar substantive rules being applied differently). Such an 
exercise would be cumbersome, time consuming, and, ultimately, may be nothing more than 
an exercise in pure speculation and conjecture. It may even result in an embarrassing 
spectacle if the court makes evidently mistaken assumptions of how litigation would have 
been carried out in the foreign courts. 
Nevertheless, difficulties in quantification should not mandate a blanket rule disallowing 
damages in every case where a choice of court agreement is breached.704 First, where the 
foreign proceedings have not been completed, the quantification problem is admittedly 
more difficult. The contractual forum may well find it difficult to predict the outcome of 
foreign litigation with any degree of accuracy. But are these difficulties so intractable that a 
blanket bar on such claims is necessary? At the very least, in clear-cut cases, the courts 
should be prepared to undertake a rough and ready assessment of damages (for example, 
where litigation takes place in a jurisdiction that has substantially similar rules of procedure) 
or where the result in the foreign jurisdiction can be readily ascertained (for example, where 
the action will inevitably fail in the foreign court because of a well-established mandatory 
rule or an applicable time bar). That quantification may be very difficult in some 
circumstances is no justification for a rule that, because of those difficulties, the courts must 
deny the damages cause of action. 
Second, the court will not always face such seemingly insurmountable problems. Where the 
forum court deciding the damages action is itself the contractual forum, or the forum in 
which proceedings are instituted in breach of contract, the court need only determine how it 
would itself have decided the case. The forum court is only hypothesizing the likely outcome 
of one set of proceedings instead of two —since it should not be too difficult to work out 
how proceedings would have panned out in the forum court. In such a case, especially where 
the award in the relevant foreign forum is either already rendered or abundantly clear on 
the merits, the quantification objection is very much weakened. 
                                                          
704 See Chaplin v Hicks [1911] 2 KB 786: The defendant, by his breach of contract, denied the claimant the 
opportunity to participate in a beauty contest. The jury awarded her damages of £ 100 to represent her loss of 
a chance to win the contest and the Court of Appeal upheld the award; See Tan, Damages for Breach of Forum 
Selection Clauses (n 673) 653-656 
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Third, where the cause of action is clear and certain, the courts seldom regard difficulties in 
quantifying damages as barring the right to damages. Instead, the courts view the difficulties 
relating to quantification as an issue going to proof of damages; not as a bar to the right to 
claim damages. Furthermore, the courts are particularly unwilling to dismiss claims simply 
because the actual loss suffered by the claimant would be difficult to prove.  
Fourth, in cases where quantification is difficult, a reasonable estimate of the damages 
suffered may even suffice. The rationale being that “substantial justice is better than exact 
justice.” 
Fifth, costs and expenses incurred in defending proceedings brought in breach of jurisdiction 
agreements are usually easily quantifiable. There is really no reason why the courts should 
not award the innocent party the costs and expenses of having to defend the proceedings 
brought in breach of a forum selection agreement. 
Accordingly, where the breach of a choice of court agreement has clearly caused some 
compensable loss, difficulties of quantification ought not to bar the right to claim damages. 
The innocent party must be allowed, perhaps even on less onerous terms, to attempt to 
prove his loss in every case. A blanket rule preventing him from proving his loss, generalizing 
that damages for breach of jurisdiction agreements are too difficult to quantify, is 
inconsistent with existing authorities. 
5. A Right to Damages Would Infringe on International Comity to an Unacceptable 
Extent 
Damages awarded for litigating in a foreign non-contractual court have far reaching 
implications and may have a drastic impact on comity. On the issue of whether damages for 
breach of choice of court agreements should be allowed, if the domestic right to contractual 
damages is the highly persuasive force, comity is the immovable object. 
The far reaching effects of anti-suit injunctions are both a blessing and a bane. An anti-suit 
injunction is a device that the courts can use to indirectly influence the course of foreign 
litigation. But the injunction also indirectly interferes with the jurisdiction of the foreign 
court. For this reason, the common law courts never fail to emphasize that an anti-suit 
injunction is an order directed at the litigant and not against the foreign court. But the 
reality is that the anti-suit injunction undoubtedly interferes with the judicial processes of 
the foreign court. 
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Because of the potential impact on comity, the courts exercise caution when granting anti-
suit injunctions. It is submitted that such caution should also extend to the damages remedy. 
The next section will examine the concept of comity primarily in relation to the private law 























The Principle of Comity and the Damages Remedy 
Introduction 
Comity is a recurring concept across the discipline of private international law, but is 
considered to be vague, opaque and open textured. The vagueness associated with the 
notion of comity can be attributed in part to the lack of a sustained effort to precisely define 
or at least delineate the outer dimensions of the concept. In this regard, the Supreme Court 
of Canada in Morguard v De Savoye705 cited the famous US decision in Hilton v Guyot:706 
Comity is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the 
legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to 
international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other 
persons who are under the protection of its law. 
A positive conception of comity may provide a justification for the recognition of the effects 
of foreign pending proceedings, just as it has long been seen as a justification for the 
application of foreign law.707 But comity also has a negative function. It serves as a short 
hand expression for the rules of jurisdiction in public international law, that limit the extent 
to which one state may permissibly intervene in the affairs of another. It has been in this 
sense that common law courts have consistently used comity as a factor limiting the grant of 
anti-suit injunctions.708 
English courts are aware that anti-suit injunctions can be perceived as inherently opposed to 
the concept of comity and have always endeavoured to reconcile anti-suit injunctions with 
the principle of comity. Lord Hobhouse in Turner v Grovit emphasized that English law 
attaches high importance to international comity and the English court has in mind how the 
‘restraining order’709 will be perceived by foreign courts. 
Two Conceptions of Comity 
English jurisprudence reveals the existence of two competing theories or concepts of comity 
in the case law. They have not yet been synthesized or resolved into an improved solution 
                                                          
705 [1990] 3 SCR 1077, 1096 (Supreme Court of Canada). 
706 159 US 113 (1895). 
707 Campbell McLachlan, Lis Pendens in International Litigation (Pocketbooks of the Hague Academy of 
International Law, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden & Boston 2009) Chapter 1, 73-90. 
708 Ibid Chapter 2, 172-179. 
709 ‘Restraining order’: Alternative terminology for an anti-suit injunction adopted by Lord Hobhouse in Turner v 
Grovit. However, subsequent English decisions have not adopted the term ‘restraining order’ and have 
continued to utilize the conventional nomenclature. 
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bringing about a more harmonious interface between anti-suit injunctions and comity. Only 
one of these concepts strictly represents the current state of the law. The development of 
the anti-suit injunction in English law is premised on a narrow interpretation of the principle 
of comity.710 According to this approach, the demands of comity are satisfied provided that 
the English court has an interest in granting the relief.711 Inspired by judicial authority from 
other common law jurisdictions, other English courts have sometimes adopted a broader 
interpretation of comity. The broad conception of comity has found expression in the 
judgments of Hoffman J in Re Maxwell Communications Corporation (No 2),712 and Toulson 
LJ in Deutsche Bank AG v Highland Crusader Offshore Partners LP.713 The broad theory of 
comity limits anti-suit injunctions to situations where the foreign court has exercised an 
exorbitant jurisdiction, save to protect its own jurisdiction, or otherwise enforce public 
policy. The strong conception potentially precludes the restraint of foreign proceedings 
except in cases involving an abuse of process of the English courts, and perhaps where the 
enforcement of contractual rights is sought. Lord Goff’s position in Airbus Industrie v Patel 
prevails as a matter of authority, and only that view is consistent with the current approach 
of the English courts. But it remains possible that the compatibility of anti-suit injunctions 
with international comity will in the future come before the Supreme Court of the United 
Kingdom.714 
Comity and the Enforcement of Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements by the English 
Courts 
It has been doubted whether comity is a consideration where relief is sought to enforce an 
English arbitration agreement or exclusive choice of court agreement.715 In such cases it has 
been said that ‘the true role of comity is to ensure that the parties’ agreement is respected’, 
not to inhibit the grant of relief. In an important passage, Millett LJ drew a distinction 
                                                          
710 Alex Mills, The Confluence of Public and Private International Law: Justice, Pluralism and Subsidiarity in the 
International Constitutional Ordering of Private Law (Cambridge University Press 2009) 224; Lawrence Collins, 
‘Comity in Modern Private International Law’ in James Fawcett (ed.), Reform and Development of Private 
International Law: Essays in Honour of Sir Peter North (Oxford University Press 2002) 89; Briggs, Agreements (n 
677) 538; Adrian Briggs, ‘The Principle of Comity in Private International Law’ (2012) 354 Recueil des Cours 65, 
181-182. 
711 Airbus Industrie GIE v Patel [1999] 1 AC 119. 
712 Re Maxwell Communications Corporation plc (No 2) [1992] BCC 757 (Hoffman J). 
713 Highland Crusader LP v Destsche Bank AG [2009] EWCA Civ 725 (Toulson LJ). 
714 Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (2015) (n 677) 537; Fentiman, International Commercial 
Litigation (2010) (n 675) 580. 
715 Collins, Comity in Modern Private International Law (n 710) 102; Fentiman, International Commercial 
Litigation (2015) (n 677) 528; Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (2010) (n 675) 582; Richard 
Fentiman, ‘Comity and Antisuit Injunctions’ (1998) 57 Cambridge Law Journal 467, 467. 
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between cases where breach of contract is alleged, and those where the abusive nature of 
the respondent’s conduct is in issue. In the latter case, comity may be an issue, but not it 
seems in the former:716 
In my judgment, the time has come to lay aside the ritual incantation that this is a 
jurisdiction which should only be exercised sparingly and with great caution. There 
have been many statements of great authority warning of the danger of giving an 
appearance of undue interference with the proceedings of a foreign court. Such 
sensitivity to the feelings of a foreign court has much to commend it where the 
injunction is sought on the ground of forum non conveniens or on the general ground 
that the foreign proceedings are vexatious or oppressive but where no breach of 
contract is involved. In the former case, great care may be needed to avoid casting 
doubt on the fairness or adequacy of the procedures of the foreign court. In the 
latter case, the question whether proceedings are vexatious or oppressive is primarily 
a matter for the court before which they are pending. But in my judgment there is no 
good reason for diffidence in grating an injunction to restrain foreign proceedings on 
the clear and simple ground that the defendant has promised not to bring them.  
The role of comity in cases involving breach of contractual dispute resolution clauses was 
recently asserted by the UK Supreme Court.717 Although the Supreme Court confirmed the 
grant of the injunction enforcing the agreement but Lord Mance observed that there will be 
cases involving the breach of such agreements where ‘the appropriate course will be to 
leave it  to the foreign court to recognise and enforce the parties’ agreement on forum’.718   
The near irrelevance of comity in cases involving a breach of an exclusive choice of court 
agreement or arbitration agreement can be hard to justify in principle. The English court has 
derived its right to intervene from the parties’ contractual choice of England as the forum for 
the substantive disputes. However, from a truly international systemic perspective this may 
not be enough to justify the award of an anti-suit injunction or damages for breach of an 
exclusive jurisdiction agreement. It has been argued that, in order for an anti-suit injunction 
or the damages remedy in such a case to be reconcilable with comity, there would at least 
have to be some system-transcendent reason why it was appropriate for English private 
international law rules to be given overriding effect, and for the English courts to 
intervene.719 Possible contenders for a system transcendent rationale include the principle 
of freedom of contract or pacta sunt servanda: if the parties have elected to contract under 
a particular system of law, including that system’s conflict of laws rules, and for the exclusive 
                                                          
716 The Angelic Grace [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 87, 96 (CA) (Millett LJ). 
717 Ust-Kamenogorsk Hydropower Plant JSC v AES Ust-Kamenogorsk Hydropower Plant LLP [2013] UKSC 35, 
[2013] 1 WLR 1889; [2013] 1 CLC 1069. 
718 Ibid [61] (Lord Mance delivering the judgment of the UK Supreme Court). 
719 Thomas Raphael, The Anti-Suit Injunction (Oxford Private International Law Series, OUP 2008) Chapter 1, 23. 
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jurisdiction of that system’s courts, then their personal choices should be respected, and 
their personal obligations enforced; and it is legitimate for the chosen court to enforce those 
obligations. 
However, the existence of a ‘system transcendent rationale’ underpinning the enforcement 
of exclusive jurisdiction agreements via anti-suit injunctions and the damages remedy may 
be challenged.720 First, the use of the term ‘system transcendent rationale’ alludes to the 
fact that the justification offered is descriptive and of general applicability. However, the 
very concept of a system transcendent postulate is undermined by the relative inability of 
any legal system to overcome its own normative biases and prejudices. Therefore, it may not 
be appropriate at all to use the term ‘system transcendent rationale’, where a legal system’s 
approach towards a seemingly ‘neutral’ or ‘value free’ concept is laden with normative and 
interpretive meaning. For instance, the conception that exclusive jurisdiction agreements 
are ordinary contractual obligations that can be enforced in the same way as other 
contractual obligations is not adhered to in many civil law legal systems.721 Notwithstanding 
any argument premised on a fallacious system transcendent rationale, the right to rely on 
the foreign court’s law and policy choices still cannot be overridden. 
Having realised the futility of postulating and relying on a ‘system transcendent rationale’, it 
essentially comes down to a fundamental choice between values: Does the importance that 
comity places on the sovereignty of other legal systems and their right to impose their own 
law and policy choices, require non-intervention, irrespective of any system transcendent 
rationale? Or the importance of achieving practical justice, and enforcing a party’s personal 
obligations, according to the originating system’s own perception of what is right (tempered, 
of course, by the widest possible conception of a system transcendent rationale that is 
necessarily ‘internationalist’ in spirit), be sufficient to warrant an order against the party 
concerned, even at the price of tensions with comity? The English common law conflict of 
laws chooses the latter result. 
It should be noted that, the insistence on non-intervention is not a neutral solution either. 
Non-intervention would result in a freely assumed obligation being overridden by an 
applicable legal system. A practical example of viewing the same case from different 
perspectives and value systems is offered by West Tankers: Is it a question of whether the 
                                                          
720 Raphael acknowledges that a system transcendent rationale will ultimately reflect the English court’s view 
of transcendence: Raphael (n 719) 24. 
721 cf the ‘procedural contract’ conception of choice of court agreements examined in Chapter 4 above. 
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English court trusts the Italian court or whether Italian or English private international law 
rules and contract law should be applied to determine whether an English arbitration clause 
providing for arbitration in England is valid, effective and binding? Briggs aptly likens the 
mutual interface between the English common law approach to jurisdiction and that of the 
Brussels I Regulation to the Chinese proverb describing the dialogue between the ‘chicken 
and the duck’.722 It is submitted that the different fundamental values attributed to 
jurisdiction agreements and jurisdiction in general by the common law on the one hand and 
the multilateral jurisdiction and judgments system of the Brussels I Regulation on the other 
offers an insight into the different functional responses developed by each paradigm for the 
assumption and exercise of jurisdiction, combating parallel proceedings and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments.       
Two Fundamental Confusions 
The foregoing excursus describes the current conceptual uncertainty regarding the role 
played by comity in the grant of anti-suit injunctions by the English courts. Much of the 
uncertainty can be attributed to two fundamental confusions between the concepts of 
obligation and regulation and between issues of substance and procedure.723 
Difficulty has been caused by a failure to distinguish between civil and regulatory issues, 
between a court’s jurisdiction to provide private remedies and its jurisdiction to regulate the 
conduct of the litigants – between matters of obligation and regulation. In other words, the 
confusion lies in a failure to appreciate the distinction between ‘original’ and ‘enforcement’ 
jurisdiction, the jurisdiction to grant injunctions being the latter.724 
Where a civil remedy is sought (damages in tort or contract, for instance) it is surely 
sufficient, as national jurisdiction regimes invariably confirm, that a court has personal 
                                                          
722 Adrian Briggs, ‘The Impact of Recent Judgments of the European Court on English Procedural Law and 
Practice’ (2005) Vol. II, No. 124 Zeitschrift fur Schweizerisches Recht 231-262; Oxford Legal Studies Research 
Paper No. 11/2006 <Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=899689> accessed 5 February 2014, 11; 
Briggs, Agreements (n 677) 201. 
723 R Fentiman, ‘The Scope of Transnational Injunctions’ (2013) 11 New Zealand Journal of Public and 
International Law 323, 342-344. 
724 FA Mann, ‘The Doctrine of International Jurisdiction Revisited after Twenty Years’ (1984) 186 Recueil des 
Cours 13; FA Mann, Further Studies in International Law (Clarendon Press, OUP 1990) Chapter 1; For an 
appraisal of FA Mann’s seminal contribution to the doctrine of jurisdiction in public international law and the 
conflict of laws, see, Lawrence Collins, ‘F.A. Mann (1907-1991)’ in Jack Beatson and Reinhard Zimmermann, 
Jurists Uprooted: German-Speaking Émigré Lawyers in Twentieth Century Britain (OUP 2004) 382, 408-410; 
Campbell McLachlan employs the terms ‘judicial’ and ‘enforcement’ jurisdiction to describe ‘original’ and 
‘enforcement’ jurisdiction: See Campbell McLachlan, ‘International Litigation and the Reworking of the Conflict 
of Laws’ (2004) 120 LQR 580, 596-599; See also Campbell McLachlan, ‘The Jurisdictional Limits of Disclosure 
Orders in Transnational Fraud Litigation’ (1998) 47 ICLQ 3. 
205 
 
jurisdiction over the defendant. Subject matter jurisdiction is not also required. A court is no 
less competent to hear a claim in damages against an English resident just because the 
contract was broken abroad. But injunctions are different. Consider, for example, the 
operation of orders attaching to a defendant’s assets in those jurisdictions where they 
operate in rem. Even if the propriety effect of such relief is limited, principle suggests that 
such relief can be granted only in respect of local assets, because principle ordains that only 
the lex situs has jurisdiction in propriety matters. Consider, by contrast, anti-suit injunctions 
in English law. Such injunctions involve an instruction to the enjoined party to abstain from 
forbidden conduct. The order is intended to control abusive behaviour, backed by judicial 
sanctions for disobedience. Such orders threaten a defaulting defendant with a regulatory, 
court imposed penalty for contempt. They also have a procedural public character in so far 
as disobedience is not merely a wrong done to the applicant seeking relief, but an abuse of 
the English court’s process and an infringement of the respondent’s duty to the court. 
In relation to the second confusion, between substance and procedure, the grant of 
transnational injunctions has often been approached as if the existence of a ground for relief 
– the need to prevent unjust conduct – is the only question.725 In this regard, Hoffman J’s 
observations in Mackinnon v Donaldson, Lufkin and Jenrette Securities Corp.,726 with specific 
reference to FA Mann’s Hague Academy Lectures are instructive:727 
I think this argument confuses personal jurisdiction, i.e., who can be brought before 
the court, with subject matter jurisdiction, i.e., to what extent the court can claim to 
regulate the conduct of those persons. It does not follow from the fact that a person 
is within the jurisdiction and liable to be served with process that there is no 
territorial limit to the matters upon which the court may properly apply its own rules 
or the things which it can order such a person to do. As Dr Mann observed in a 
leading article, ‘The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law’, (1964) III Recueil 
des Cours 146: ‘The mere fact that a state’s judicial or administrative agencies are 
internationally entitled to subject a person to their personal or “curial” jurisdiction 
does not by any means permit them to regulate by their orders such person’s 
conduct abroad. This they may do only if the state of the forum also has substantive 
jurisdiction to regulate conduct in the manner defined in the order. In other words, 
                                                          
725 Commenting on Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines 731 F. 2d 909 (1984), FA Mann, Foreign 
Affairs in English Courts (OUP 1986) 141, states: ‘In the Sabena case the American courts once again confused 
in personam, that is procedural jurisdiction and legislative, that is substantive jurisdiction. They undoubtedly 
had the power, but lacked the right in accordance with international law to restrain a Belgian defendant from 
applying against a British plaintiff to the British courts for injunctive relief.’ 
726 Mackinnon v Donaldson, Lufkin and Jenrette Securities Corp. [1986] Ch 482. 
727 Ibid, 493; For an alternative discussion of the difference between ‘adjudicative’ (also termed personal, in 
personam or judicial jurisdiction) and ‘subject matter’ jurisdiction in the context of transnational private 
litigation, see, Cedric Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International Law (OUP 2008) 11-15. 
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the international validity of an order, not only its making, but also its content must be 
authorised by substantive rules of legislative jurisdiction.’ 
Arguably, FA Mann’s strict territorial conception of international jurisdiction was informed 
by the confluence of public international law and private international law and the interplay 
between municipal and international law.728  
Returning to our assessment of anti-suit injunctions, the issue of a court’s jurisdiction to 
restrain foreign proceedings has been ignored on the assumption that if equity demanded 
relief it should be granted. Only when the singular facts of Airbus Industrie v Patel arose 
were the courts forced to consider their jurisdiction explicitly. Similarly, when restraining 
foreign proceedings, it is tempting to ignore considerations of comity, or merely to pay lip 
service to such concerns. 
The courts’ previous tendency to overlook the jurisdiction to grant relief, and the more 
current failure to recognise the importance of comity, reflect the idea that jurisdiction is 
supplied by the existence of a ground for relief and that comity can be no problem if that is 
the case.729 The ideology of equity persuades us that the court can do as it likes to prevent 
unconscionable conduct. To adapt a phrase, we assume that extremism in the pursuit of 
material justice in the individual instance is no vice. As this suggests, underlying the 
confusion between the substantive and the procedural, most obviously in the context of 
anti-suit injunctions, lies a more fundamental distinction – between an equitable approach, 
led by the imperative of avoiding material injustice in the individual case, and an 
international approach, driven by concerns about jurisdictional connection, comity and 
conflicts justice. 
                                                          
728 FA Mann, Studies in International Law (OUP 1972) 15; FA Mann considered that the development of the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens was evidence of the fact that ‘judges are to a far greater extent than in 
earlier days guided by international law: is it reasonably consistent with the demands of international 
jurisdiction and its essentially territorial character that the case should proceed in the English or the foreign 
court?’: Mann, Foreign Affairs in English Courts (n 725) 143; For a discussion of the interface between public 
and private international law in the writings of FA Mann, Kurt Lipstein and Otto Kahn Freund, see, Peter North, 
‘Private International Law in Twentieth Century England’ in in Jack Beatson and Reinhard Zimmermann, Jurists 
Uprooted: German-Speaking Émigré Lawyers in Twentieth Century Britain (OUP 2004) 483, 508-510. 
729 For the difference between ‘jurisdiction to prescribe’ (subject matter jurisdiction) and ‘jurisdiction to 
adjudicate’ and the negative international repercussions of relying exclusively on the existence of the latter in 
cross border civil and commercial litigation before the English courts, see, Masri v Consolidated Contractors (No 
2) [2008] EWCA Civ 303, [2009] 2 WLR 621, [35] (Lawrence Collins LJ), a Court of Appeal decision concerning a 
receivership order in respect of foreign assets of a foreign company: ‘Consequently the mere fact that an order 
is in personam and is directed towards someone who is subject to the personal jurisdiction of the English court 
does not exclude the possibility that the making of the order would be contrary to international law or comity, 
and outside the subject matter jurisdiction of the English court.’ (Emphasis added); Trevor C Hartley, 
‘Jurisdiction in conflict of laws - disclosure, third-party debt and freezing orders’ (2010) 126 LQR 194, 194-202; 
Adam Johnson, ‘Morrison v National Australia Bank: Foreign Securities and the Jurisdiction to Prescribe’ in 




The ramifications of a broad approach to comity enunciated in Amchem are potentially far 
reaching. Outside the domain of multilateral jurisdictional regimes730 and international 
conventions premised on qualified mutual trust,731 a unilateral model of civil jurisdiction 
such as the one developed by the English common law conflict of laws imposes very few 
limitations on the extraterritorial or exorbitant exercise of adjudicatory authority. The 
sufficient interest or connection requirement for the award of an anti-suit injunction may 
not provide the necessary safeguards to promote private international law’s aspiration 
towards an ‘international systemic perspective’.732 It is submitted, that the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s decision in Amchem is premised on a mature and balanced conception of private 
international law where anti-suit injunctions are employed in exceptional circumstances so 
that the public function of private international law as a structural coordinating framework 
for the allocation of regulatory authority is not compromised. However, the ‘jungle of 
separate, broadly based, jurisdictions all over the world’733 may necessitate the use of anti-
suit injunctions and the damages remedy to achieve practical justice between the parties in 
some individual cases.  
Lord Goff’s speech in Airbus Industrie v Patel contains an elaborate discussion of the 
differing approaches which the United States federal courts have taken to the role of comity 
in anti-suit injunctions.734 There is a division of authority between the Circuits. There is what 
has been described as the laxer standard, under which the court will grant an anti-suit 
injunction if the foreign proceedings are vexatious or oppressive and cause inequitable 
hardship. This approach is adopted by the Fifth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits and involves 
consideration of the effect on the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign as one factor relevant to 
the grant of relief, but requires evidence that comity is likely to be impaired. The stricter 
                                                          
730 Brussels I Regulation (Recast); Lugano Convention (2007). 
731 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (30 June, 2005); New York Convention (1958) 
732 See Mills, The Confluence (n 710) Chapter 1; Collins, Comity in Modern Private International Law (n 710) 107-
110. 
733 Airbus Industrie GIE v Patel [1999] 1 AC 119, 132-133. 
734 Ibid 138-140; See Collins, Comity in Modern Private International Law (n 710) 103; McLachlan, Lis Pendens in 
International Litigation (n 707) 165-172; George A Bermann, ‘Parallel Litigation: Is Convergence Possible?’ in K 
Boele-Woelki, T Einhorn, D Girsberger and S Symeonides (eds), Convergence and Divergence in Private 
International Law – Liber Amicorum Kurt Siehr (Eleven International Publishing, 2010) 579, 586-587, FN 23: 
Professor Bermann notes that some US circuit courts of appeal are said to issue anti-suit injunctions rather 
liberally ( e.g. the 7th Circuit and 9th Circuit), while others are said to do so, restrictively, that is, only to protect 
their own jurisdiction or to safeguard a paramount public policy (e.g. the 3rd Circuit and 6th Circuit). He also 
states that other circuits have sought to strike an intermediate position (e.g. the 1st Circuit); Margaret L Moses, 
The Principles and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (CUP 2012) 96-97. 
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standard (espoused by the Second and Sixth Circuits and the District of Columbia Circuit) 
requires the court to consider international comity and to grant an injunction only to protect 
its own jurisdiction or to prevent its public policies from being invaded. This latter approach 
reflects the Canadian Supreme Court’s decision in Amchem whilst the former approach 
resembles the more pragmatic English attitude towards comity when granting anti-suit 
injunctions.   
The International Law Association’s Leuven/London Principles on Declining and Referring 
Jurisdiction in Civil and Commercial Litigation735 take a restrictive approach to anti-suit 
injunctions.736 Subject to the exception in Principle 7.3, Principle 7.1 accepts that there is no 
place for such a remedy where both states are parties to an international convention 
specifying common rules for the exercise of original jurisdiction. Nor indeed should such a 
remedy be ordered where the court is satisfied that the other court will apply the Principles 
(Principle 7.2). In this way, the Committee sought to build the idea that ordinarily deference 
should be given to the court seised of the substantive proceedings, at least where that court 
has rules permitting it to decline jurisdiction in certain cases.737 However, importantly 
Principle 7.3 qualifies both of the previous paragraphs by permitting an exception in the case 
of a manifest breach of an exclusive jurisdiction clause under the law of both states. 
However, the International Law Institute’s Resolution on The Principles for Determining 
when the Use of the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens and Anti-suit Injunctions is 
Appropriate738 adopts a more liberal approach towards anti-suit injunctions:739  
Courts which grant anti-suit injunctions should be sensitive to the demands of 
comity, and in particular should refrain from granting such injunctions in cases other 
than (a) a breach of a choice of court agreement or arbitration agreement; (b) 
unreasonable or oppressive conduct by a plaintiff in a foreign jurisdiction; or (c) the 
protection of their own jurisdiction in such matters as the administration of estates 
and insolvency. 
                                                          
735 Resolution 1/2000, (2000) 69 ILA Rep. Conf. 13; Report (2000), 69 ILA Rep. Conf. 137. 
736 McLachlan, Lis Pendens in International Litigation (n 707) 439-448. 
737 See Amchem Products Inc v Workers Compensation Board (1993) 102 DLR (4th) 96. 
738 International Law Institute, Bruges Session 2003, Second Commission, 2nd September 2003 (Rapporteur: Sir 
Lawrence Collins, Co-rapporteur: M Georges Droz) in ‘Texts, Materials and Recent Developments’ (2003) 5 
Yearbook of Private International Law 337, 338. 
739 Ibid Principle 5; Marie-Laure Niboyet, ‘Le Principe de Confiance Mutuelle et Les Injonctions Anti-Suit’ in 
Pascal de Vareilles-Sommieres (ed.), Forum Shopping in the European Judicial Area (Hart Publishing, Oxford 
2007) 77, 85, highlights that the 2003 Bruges Resolution states that anti-suit injunctions are not, in principle, 
contrary to international law. However, the nature and scope of the exercise of the power to grant the 
injunction determines whether their use is appropriate.     
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As observed, the broad concept of comity accords greater deference to the territorial 
sovereignty of the foreign court by drastically limiting the scope for anti-suit injunctions and 
the damages remedy. As such the judicial self-restraint embodied in the broad interpretation 
of comity provides a solution to parallel proceedings which is based on deference to the 
adjudicatory authority of the foreign court and the realization that important lessons can be 
learnt from the emerging idea of judicial cooperation in federal systems of private 
international law. Thus, the conception of private international law as a truly international 
system for the allocation of regulatory authority drastically reduces the unilateral need to 
control and manage parallel proceedings through the pre-emptory exercise of exorbitant 
jurisdiction. However, the path towards judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters 
at a global level is an aspiration which has encountered substantial obstacles most recently 
in the form of the failed Hague Judgments Convention. The variable geometry exhibited by 
unilateral civil jurisdictional regimes outside the confines of the federal systems of private 
international law may necessitate the use of anti-suit injunctions and the damages remedy 
to achieve practical justice between the parties in some individual instances.  
It has been observed, that the broad concept of comity may accommodate anti-suit 
injunctions to curb the exercise of exorbitant and extraterritorial jurisdiction by a foreign 
court:740 ‘The foreign court, not having, itself, observed the rules of comity, cannot expect its 
decision to be respected on the basis of comity.’ The broad concept may also permit the 
English courts to restrain the breach of an arbitration agreement or an exclusive jurisdiction 
agreement. Moreover, a court should also be entitled to preserve the integrity of its own 
process. 
 






                                                          
740 Amchem Products Inc v Workers Compensation Board (1993) 102 DLR (4th) 96. 
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A Comparison of the Damages Remedy with Contractual Anti-suit Injunctions: Implications 
for Comity and the Relative Effectiveness of Each Remedy 
Where proceedings are about to be commenced or have been commenced in breach of a 
choice of court agreement nominating a common law jurisdiction, the defendant may apply 
for an anti-suit injunction from the chosen courts to restrain the claimant from instituting or 
continuing with the proceedings.741 As an established remedy for breach of choice of court 
agreements, a contractual anti-suit injunction offers a useful point of comparison with the 
damages remedy. The two aspects on which a particularly illustrative comparison may be 
made are implications for international comity and the relative effectiveness of each 
remedy. 
The perceived incompatibility of an anti-suit injunction with the concept of international 
comity has been the subject of vigorous debate especially along the English common law / 
European civil law divide.742 The English common law courts have left no stone unturned in 
their attempt to put up a spirited defence of the anti-suit injunction by highlighting it’s in 
personam nature and that it is not issued against the civil jurisdictional apparatus of the 
foreign court but against the conscience of the claimant in the foreign proceedings. A similar 
argument may be made743 to obviate any concern about the negative impact on comity 
which a damages award for breach of a choice of court agreement may have, by 
emphasizing that it is only a response to the claimant’s wrongful or unconscionable conduct 
of commencing proceedings in a non-chosen court, rather than a criticism of the foreign 
court itself. It should be noted that the award of damages is indeed not incompatible with 
admitting that the foreign court’s decision is correct under the law which it is supposed to 
apply in accordance with its own choice of law regime.744 
It may further be argued that the damages remedy is in a sense less antagonistic and 
intrusive towards the territorial sovereignty of a country than an anti-suit injunction since 
they are not in general awarded until after the foreign court has ruled on its jurisdiction or 
the merits of the case, whereas an anti-suit injunction, if obeyed by the respondent, 
effectively derails the foreign proceedings in its tracks. The opposite view, however, could 
                                                          
741 Donohue v Armco Inc [2002] 1 All ER 749 (HL). 
742 Re the Enforcement of an English Anti-suit Injunction, [1997] ILPr 320 (Oberlandesgericht Dusseldorf). 
743 See e.g. Clare Ambrose, ‘Can Anti-Suit Injunctions Survive European Community Law’ (2003) 52 ICLQ 401, 
415; Adrian Briggs, ‘Distinctive aspects of the conflict of laws in common law systems: Autonomy and 
agreement in the conflicts of laws’, Doshisha Law Review (2005), para. 40. 




just as easily be justified by recourse to the fact that, unlike an anti-suit injunction, the 
damages remedy practically reverses or nullifies the effect of the foreign decision. It may be 
observed, that a contractual anti-suit injunction is a pre-emptive tactical weapon used to 
enforce the English courts verdict on the validity of the jurisdiction agreement in ‘litigation 
about where to litigate’. Whereas, the damages remedy is concerned with compensating a 
party for the violation of a jurisdiction agreement in the eyes of English law in ‘litigation 
about where litigation should have taken place’. 
An illuminating comparison can also be made in relation to the relative effectiveness of each 
remedy.745 In OT Africa Line Ltd v. Magic Sportswear Corp746, the Court of Appeal of England 
and Wales observed that the damages remedy was not as effective as an anti-suit injunction 
because of the negation of the decision of the foreign court (comity) in the former and the 
difficulties in quantifying loss. It should be emphasized that, since an anti-suit injunction 
bites earlier in time than the damages remedy, it may provide a more cost effective solution 
for parties with limited financial resources, especially SMEs747 and individuals. 
On the other hand, the versatility of the remedy of damages shows strength over the rigidity 
of an anti-suit injunction in some cases. Thus, in a multi-party suit involving parties some of 
whom are bound by a choice of court agreement while others are not, an anti-suit injunction 
restraining only the proceedings between the parties bound by the agreement would negate 
the advantages of a consolidated multi-party action such as the avoidance of irreconcilable 
decisions and the efficient administration of justice. On the other hand, if the damages 
remedy is tailored to target only the costs between the parties bound by the agreement, 
could to that extent realise the financial interests embodied in the agreement while at the 
same time keeping intact the advantages of a consolidated multi-party action. Thus, in 
                                                          
745 It has often been judicially pronounced that damages are an inadequate remedy for breach of an exclusive 
forum agreement: See Continental Bank NA v Aeakos Compania Naviera SA [1994] 1 WLR 588, 598 (CA) (Steyn 
LJ): ‘a claim for damages for breach of contract would be a relatively ineffective remedy. An injunction is the 
only effective remedy for the defendants’ breach of contract.’; The Angelic Grace [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 87, 96 
(CA) (Millett LJ): ‘The justification for the grant of the injunction in either case is that without it the plaintiff will 
be deprived of its contractual rights in a situation in which damages are manifestly an inadequate remedy’; 
Voest Alpine [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 279, 285 (CA) (Hobhouse LJ); OT Africa Line Ltd v Hijazy (The Kribi) (No 1) 
[2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 76, [87]; cf Ambrose (n 743), suggests that damages can be an adequate remedy; Peel (n 
690) 207-209, suggests that the English domestic private law approach of considering in each case whether 
damages may not be an adequate remedy before granting an injunction should be followed in the private 
international law context as well.  
746 OT Africa Line Ltd v Magic Sportswear Corp [2005] EWCA Civ 710, [2005] 1 CLC 923, [33] (Longmore LJ). See 
FN 702 above for secondary sources noting the substantial difficulties encountered when quantifying damages. 
747 Small and Medium Enterprises. 
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Donahue v. Armco,748 the English court refused to issue an anti-suit injunction against a New 
York action involving parties some of whom were bound by an English choice of court 
agreement. But damages were held to be recoverable for breach of the agreement as 
between the parties to the agreement. Similarly, where the foreign court finds a breach of a 
choice of court agreement but nevertheless decides to hear the case, as where the claimant 
has been time barred from suing in the chosen forum but the court finds that he had not 
acted unreasonably in failing to sue within the time, it may not be appropriate or even 
possible to issue an anti-suit injunction, not least because the foreign proceedings may not 
in such circumstances be seen as vexatious or oppressive. Nevertheless, there is room to 
award damages for breach of the choice of court agreement to allow recovery of the 
unrecovered costs so that the financial purpose of the agreement is, if only partially, 
attained. 
Damages may have another advantage over an anti-suit injunction in relation to 
enforceability. An anti-suit injunction, being an in personam order, is not effective unless the 
respondent obeys it. If the respondent disobeys an injunction and is found guilty of 
contempt of court, he may be imprisoned or have his assets sequestrated.749 Those 
sanctions, however, do not necessarily bring about the intended effect of the injunction. On 
the other hand, if the award of damages is not voluntarily complied with, its enforcement 
would realise its intended pecuniary effect, although it must be acknowledged that the 
enforceability of an award of damages for breach of a choice of court agreement outside the 





                                                          
748 [2002] 1 All ER 749 (HL). 
749 A party who fails to comply with an anti-suit injunction will be in contempt of an English court order, which 
is a criminal offence punishable by up to two years' imprisonment. Committal orders may be made against 
directors of a company to which an injunction is addressed (CPR 81.4(3)), provided a copy of the order 
containing the injunction has been served in accordance with CPR 81.5-81.8 and was brought to the attention 
of the relevant director. An application for committal against a director of the company who was actively 
involved in the breach of an anti-suit injunction succeeded in Trafigura Pte Ltd v Emirates General Petroleum 
Corp (EMARAT) [2010] EWHC 3007 (Comm) (Teare J), where the director was committed to prison for a period 
of 12 months. Furthermore, any foreign judgment obtained in breach of anti-suit injunction will not be 
enforceable in England. 
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Chapter 8 - An in Depth Examination of the Damages Remedy for Breach of 
Exclusive Jurisdiction Agreements under the English Common Law 
Jurisdictional Regime 
In Agreements750, Briggs examines the application of the damages remedy for breach of 
jurisdiction agreements in various hypothetical factual scenarios. His purpose is to 
extrapolate the principle espoused by the English Court of Appeal in Union Discount v Zoller 
to more doubtful penumbral cases in need of clarification. These fact patterns are evaluated 
below to highlight some of the difficulties arising from a wider application of the damages 
remedy outside the narrower confines of cases analogous to Union Discount v Zoller.  
It will be observed, that where a jurisdiction agreement is breached in a foreign court and is 
valid in the eyes of English private international law, a remedy in damages may be 
available.751 However, the very availability of the damages remedy raises complex and 
sensitive questions as it may place the English courts on a collision course with the civil 
jurisdiction and judgments apparatus of the foreign courts.752 Thus, there exists an 
underlying need to synthesize the pragmatism of contract theory, under which the parties 
should be held to their agreement, with the principled imperatives of private international 
law, which acknowledges that the exercise of the court’s civil jurisdiction and judgments 
regime does not represent a purely private interest to be left solely to the redistributive will 
of the parties. A unilateral jurisdiction and judgments regime with a private law remedy and 
‘dispute resolution’ emphasis will necessarily distort the regulatory and systemic effect of 
private international law rules within a multilateral constitutional ordering of private law 
such as the EU and damage private international law’s aspiration of becoming an 
international system functioning as a structural coordinating framework for the allocation of 
regulatory authority.753 The yearning for a mature and sophisticated private international 
                                                          
750 Adrian Briggs, Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law (Oxford Private International Law Series, OUP 
2008) Chapter 8. 
751 R Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (2nd Edition, OUP 2015) 113; R Fentiman, International 
Commercial Litigation (OUP 2010) 86; J Harris, ‘Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: Where Next?’ 
[2009] LMCLQ 537, 544-548; Jonathan Hill and Adeline Chong, International Commercial Disputes: Commercial 
Conflict of Laws in English Courts (4th Revised Ed, Hart Publishing 2010); T Raphael, The Anti-Suit Injunction 
(OUP 2008) 321-341; Lord Collins and others (eds), Dicey Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Laws (Sweet and 
Maxwell 2012) Para 12-164 – 12-165; JJ Fawcett and JM Carruthers, Cheshire, North and Fawcett’s Private 
International Law (OUP 2008) 470; David Joseph QC, Jurisdiction and Arbitration Agreements and their 
Enforcement (2nd Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, London 2010) 487. 
752 Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (2015) (n 751) 114; Fentiman, International Commercial 
Litigation (2010) (n 751) 86; Harris, Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: Where Next? (n 751) 544-
548. 
753 See Alex Mills, The Confluence of Public and Private International Law (CUP 2009) 12-14; Henri Battifol, 
Aspects Philosophiques du Droit International Privé (Librairie Dalloz, Paris 1956) 311-335; Christa Roodt, ‘Border 
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law has borne fruition within the supranational architecture of the European Union where it 
complements the principle of mutual recognition.754 The Brussels I Regulation is the most 
successful instrument on judicial cooperation in the European Judicial Area.755 Both the 
regulatory and systemic coordinating function of private international law and the more 
pragmatic objective of substantive justice in the individual instance have to be reconciled as 
far as possible. The issue of the effective enforcement of jurisdiction agreements by private 
law remedies falls to be considered within the opposing demands of public procedural order 
and private justice and fairness.  
From the perspective of a litigant in the English Commercial Court seeking an effective 
remedy to resolve the dispute, “Nothing can be more material to the obligation of a contract 
than the means of enforcement.”756 It is hoped, that a critical assessment of the damages 
remedy in the paragraphs below will assist us in calibrating an appropriate balance between 
the objective of international systemic order and the demands of individual private justice. It 
should be noted, that references to “foreign court(s)” for the purposes of the analysis in this 
section exclude the courts of Member States of the European Union. The legality and 
legitimacy of the damages remedy where pre-emptive proceedings are launched in a 
Member State of the European Judicial Area are examined in a separate section below.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Skirmishes between Courts and Arbitral Tribunals in the EU: Finality in Conflicts of Competence’ (2011) 13 
Yearbook of Private International Law 91, 97-98; Campbell McLachlan, Lis Pendens in International Litigation 
(Brill 2009) 453-454, 460, notes that private international law facilitates choices between parallel exercises of 
adjudicatory authority in two different states where the same parties and the same cause of action are 
involved. He argues that judicial cooperation is the most appropriate method by which to achieve this vision. 
See The Leuven/London Principles on Declining and Referring Jurisdiction in International Civil and Commercial 
Litigation, Adopted as Resolution No 1/2000 at the 69th ILA Conference, London, United Kingdom, 25-29 July 
2000. 
754 Cf There is a certain tension between European Union law and private international law. European Union 
law is concerned with the principle of mutual recognition and whether the imposition of a rule constitutes a 
restriction to the internal market. On the other hand, private international law does not seek to neutralise the 
disadvantages that result from differences between national laws but instead tries to locate the geographical 
centre of the legal relationship. See Jan-Jaap Kuipers, EU Law and Private International Law (Brill 2011); Jacco 
Bomhoff, ‘The Constitution of the Conflict of Laws’ in Horatia Muir Watt and Diego P Fernandez Arroyo (eds.), 
Private International Law and Global Governance (OUP 2014) 262, 276, refers to the ‘rather problematic 
constitutionalism of an incipient area of freedom, security and justice’, where the unreformed Brussels I 
Regulation (2001) is oblivious towards individuals not domiciled in an EU Member State or to litigation pending 
in third state courts; See also, Alexander Layton, ‘The Brussels I Regulation in the International Legal Order: 
Some Reflections on Reflectiveness’ in Eva Lein (ed.), The Brussels I Review Proposal Uncovered (British 
Institute of International and Comparative Law, London) 75. 
755 Burkhard Hess, Thomas Pfeiffer and Peter Schlosser, The Brussels I Regulation 44/2001: Application and 
Enforcement in the EU (Verlag CH Beck Munchen 2008) (‘Heidelberg Report’) 17; The Brussels I Regulation has 
also been referred to as ‘the most prominent cornerstone of the European law of international civil procedure’ 
in U Magnus and P Mankowski, Brussels I Regulation (2nd Revised Ed, Sellier European Law Publishers 2012); 
Roy Goode, Herbert Kronke, Ewan McKendrick and Jeffrey Wool, Transnational Commercial Law: Text, Cases 
and Materials (OUP 2007) 793, assess the Brussels I Regulation as ‘the most successful instrument on 
international civil procedure of all times’.  
756 Van Hoffman v City of Quincy, 71 US 4 Wall 535, 552 (1866). 
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It is now time to consider, assess and evaluate this ‘problematic’757 remedy in four factual 
scenarios in order to highlight the difficulties encountered in its practical application in 
private international law disputes before the English courts under the common law 
jurisdictional regime: 
1. If the foreign court declines jurisdiction, damages might be claimed by the 
defendant in those proceedings which represent any costs and expenses 
irrecoverable in the foreign proceedings.758 
 
2. If the foreign court declines jurisdiction, damages might be claimed by the 
defendant in those proceedings even though costs were recoverable in the foreign 
proceedings.  
 
3. If the foreign court accepts jurisdiction but the claimant in those proceedings loses, 
the defendant might seek to recover its costs. 
 
4. If the foreign court asserts jurisdiction and subsequently awards damages to the 
claimant, the defendant might seek to recover the sum awarded by way of claw back 
damages in the English courts. 
Fentiman notes that a distinction must be drawn between three separate grounds on which 
the foreign court might deny effect to the English jurisdiction agreement.759 First, the foreign 
court may hold that the jurisdiction agreement is contractually ineffective. If the foreign 
court asserts jurisdiction on the basis that the English jurisdiction agreement is invalid, or if 
valid is non-exclusive, it is arguable that the plea of res judicata or issue estoppel would 
defeat the claim for damages. The foreign court’s finding that the jurisdiction agreement is 
ineffective may prevent attempts to enforce it in English proceedings unless the foreign 
court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate over the matter or other defences to recognition 
                                                          
757 Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (2015) (n 751) 113; Fentiman, International Commercial 
Litigation (2010) (n 751) 86. 
758 As in Donohue v Armco Inc [2001] UKHL 64, [2002] 1 All ER 749, [2002] CLC 440; Union Discount Co v Zoller 
[2001] EWCA Civ 1755, [2002] 1 WLR 1517. 
759 Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (2015) (n 751) 114; Fentiman, International Commercial 
Litigation (2010) (n 751) 87. 
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apply such as the foreign judgment is contrary to public policy or the foreign judgment is 
irreconcilable with a prior English judgment or it is irreconcilable with another prior foreign 
judgment which is entitled to recognition in England.760 Secondly, the foreign court may 
conclude that the agreement is ineffective under its procedural law to oust its jurisdiction 
without addressing its contractual effect. Thirdly, the foreign court may deny effect to the 
agreement because it is incompatible with the public policy or mandatory rules of the forum. 
The plea of res judicata or issue estoppel (denying a claim in damages for breach of the 
agreement) might arise in the first situation, but not on the second or third. Provided that 
the foreign court’s finding does not impugn the contractual validity of the agreement, but is 
confined to findings founded on local procedural or mandatory law or public policy, the 
foreign court’s decision creates no estoppel which precludes an action for breach of 
contract. 
In situation (1) (cases analogous to Union Discount v Zoller), if the foreign court holds that 
the jurisdiction agreement is valid and exclusive (and declines jurisdiction on that basis) that 
finding will give rise to an issue estoppel and found (rather than preclude) the claimant’s 
case for damages for breach of the English jurisdiction agreement. The law in relation to 
Zoller type cases from the perspective of English common law jurisdictional regime is quite 
clear – damages may be awarded in such circumstances.  
With regard to situation (2), Briggs suggests that a successful claim for costs in the foreign 
court should not prevent an action for damages for breach of jurisdiction agreement in the 
English courts. However, Section 34 of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982761 bars 
the relitigation of claims and provides that no proceedings may be brought in England and 
Wales or Northern Ireland on a cause of action in respect of which a judgment has been 
given in proceedings between the same parties, unless that judgment is not entitled to 
recognition and enforcement in England and Wales or Northern Ireland.762 Harris suggests 
                                                          
760 See A Briggs, The Conflict of Laws (3rd Edition, OUP 2013) 177ff. 
761 The text of Section 34 of the CJJA 1982 is reproduced verbatim: ‘No proceedings may be brought by a 
person in England and Wales or Northern Ireland on a cause of action in respect of which a judgment has been 
given in his favour in proceedings between the same parties, or their privies, in a court in another part of the 
United Kingdom or in a court of an overseas country, unless that judgment is not enforceable or entitled to 
recognition in England and Wales or, as the case may be, in Northern Ireland.’ 
762 See Republic of India v India Steamship Co Ltd; The Indian Endurance and The Indian Grace [1998] AC 878 
(HL) (Lord Steyn with whom Lords Browne-Wilkinson, Hoffman, Cooke of Thorndon and Hope of Craighead 
agreed); Adrian Briggs, ‘Foreign Judgments and res judicata’ (1997) 68 British Yearbook of International Law 
355; Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (2015) (n 751) 471; For an in depth discussion of the 
preclusive effect of the plea of former recovery under Section 34 of the CJJA 1982 see, Peter Barnett, Res 
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that, it may be argued that the nature of the cause of action in the foreign court is for relief 
for breach of the jurisdiction clause and the relief granted is costs.763 Similarly, C.J.S. Knight 
suggests that the damages action commenced in the English court is barred by virtue of 
Section 34 of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, which is the statutory reflection 
of the underlying English public policy of not permitting undue relitigation of foreign cases 
which have been adjudicated.764 However, the foreign court must have rendered a final and 
conclusive judgment on the merits if it is to have preclusive effect in England.765 Whereas, 
the issue of jurisdiction can be res judicata for issue estoppel purposes by reason of being an 
issue determined ‘on the merits’,766 there is authority to suggest that dismissals for want of 
jurisdiction are not themselves decisions on the cause of action thus dismissed.767  
In relation to situation (3), Briggs goes on to consider the case where a foreign court 
accepted that there was a breach of contract but refused jurisdictional relief, before 
deciding in favour of the defendant in the foreign proceedings. Briggs notes that the 
successful party would have incurred costs and expenses in defending the proceedings on 
the merits. However, the successful party would have also incurred costs had the 
proceedings taken place in the nominated forum. Briggs argues that the costs of defending 
proceedings in England should not be subtracted from the sum awarded, at least unless the 
party in breach can show that he would have sued in England had he not breached the 
jurisdiction agreement. By way of response, it can be argued that if the overseas claimant 
had a contractual right to sue in England, it may not be right to place the burden of proof on 
him to show that he intended to exercise this, and that this would have caused loss to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Judicata, Estoppel, and Foreign Judgments: The Preclusive Effects of Foreign Judgments in Private International 
Law (Oxford Private International Law Series, OUP 2001) 98-116. 
763 Harris, Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: Where Next? (n 751) 545. 
764 CJS Knight, ‘The Damage of Damages: Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law’ [2008] Journal of 
Private International Law 501, 510. 
765 Barnett (n 762) 52-54; See Section 1(2)(a) of the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 
(Applicable in England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland for judgments from countries including 
Australia, Canada (except Quebec), India, Pakistan and Israel); See also, Trevor C Hartley, International 
Commercial Litigation (CUP 2009) 345. 
766 The Sennar (No 2) [1985] 1 WLR 490, 494 (HL) (Lord Denning): ‘What [on the merits] means in the context of 
judgments delivered by courts of justice is that the court has held that it has jurisdiction to adjudicate upon an 
issue raised in the cause of action to which the particular set of facts give rise.’ Peter Barnett highlights the 
significance of the use of the word ‘adjudicate’ as opposed to dismissing the matter procedurally: Barnett (n 
762) 52-53; cf Lord Brandon of Oakbrook in The Sennar (No 2) [1985] 1 WLR 490, 499 (HL); For the general 
principle that an issue estoppel can arise from an interlocutory or interim finding by a foreign court on a 
procedural or non-substantive matter, see, Desert Sun Loan Corp v Hill [1996] CLC 1132; For an Australian 
authority on the applicability of the doctrine of issue estoppel to the interpretation and enforcement of 
jurisdiction clauses, see, Armacel Pty Ltd v Smurfit Stone Container Corporation [2008] FCA 592 (Jacobson J) 
(Federal Court of Australia); See also, Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (2015) (n 751) 476-477.  
767 Barnett (n 762) 54; See Hines v Birkbeck College (No 2) [1992] Ch 33 (CA). 
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other party.768 Although it could be contended that in view of his breach, the claimant 
should not benefit from a presumption that he would have litigated in the chosen forum.769  
From another perspective, given that the foreign court has agreed with the aggrieved party 
on both the jurisdictional point (albeit refusing jurisdictional relief) and on the merits there 
would appear to be a judgment in the English claimant’s favour twice over.770 If the foreign 
court failed to award full costs to the defendant in the foreign proceedings, which is possible 
if the litigation is conducted in an obstructive manner, it should not be for an English court 
to second guess the point and reopen the foreign proceedings.771 Knight submits that 
Colman J. failed to acknowledge such a policy argument by awarding costs in the English 
proceedings on an indemnity basis partly because the foreign proceedings were an abuse of 
the foreign court.772 He questions how the English Commercial Court is in any position to 
adjudicate upon an alleged abuse of process in another jurisdiction.773 
On the contrary and from a more pragmatic and practice oriented standpoint, Steven Gee 
QC justifies the award of damages on an indemnity basis by Colman J by observing that:774  
An award of costs on the standard basis allows questions of proportionality to arise, 
whilst costs on an indemnity basis reflects what might have been recovered by way 
of costs for breach of contract. The principle is that where costs are incurred as a 
direct result of breach of the arbitration clause, fairness requires the contract 
breaker to provide an indemnity against those costs to the other party. 
A closer scrutiny of the dynamics of situation (4) will serve to illustrate the difficulties 
associated with the damages remedy for breach of an English jurisdiction agreement. Where 
the party claiming damages in the English court is defeated on the merits in the foreign court 
the matter is particularly problematic. In the words of Dr. Andrew Bell SC of the Sydney 
Bar:775 
In these circumstances, the theoretical availability of damages is not particularly 
practicable or desirable alternative. This is because their assessment would entail the 
effective relitigation of a dispute already tried, with or without third parties who may 
                                                          
768 Harris, Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: Where Next? (n 751) 545. 
769 Ibid. 
770 Knight (n 764) 510. 
771 Ibid. 
772 Ibid; National Westminster Bank v Rabobank Nederland (No. 3) [2007] EWHC 1742 (Comm); [2008] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep 16. 
773 Knight (n 764) 510. 
774 Steven Gee, ‘Lord Bingham, Anti-Suit Injunctions and Arbitration’ in Mads Andenas and Duncan Fairgrieve 
(eds.), Tom Bingham and the Transformation of the Law: A Liber Amicorum (OUP 2009) 635, 640. 
775 Andrew S Bell, Forum Shopping and Venue in Transnational Litigation (Oxford Private International Law 
Series, OUP 2003) 203. 
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have participated in the original hearing, and an award of anything more than 
nominal damages would carry the conclusion that the court in which proceedings 
took place abroad erred in its determination.  
If the foreign court rejects the jurisdictional application and decides in favour of the party in 
breach of the jurisdiction agreement in proceedings on the merits, the unsuccessful party in 
the foreign proceedings may want to claim claw-back damages in the English courts. Briggs 
consistently maintains that the resulting judgment of the foreign court is not entitled to 
recognition because of Section 32 of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982.776 Section 
32 of the CJJA 1982 provides that a foreign judgment shall not be recognised or enforced if 
the bringing of those proceedings it relates to in that court ‘was contrary to an agreement 
under which the dispute in question was to be settled otherwise than by proceedings in the 
court of that country’ providing that there was no counterclaim or other submission to the 
foreign court.777 It is made clear in section 32(3) that no decision of the foreign court will 
bind the English court in determining whether the conditions just stated are met. However, 
the successful party would argue that the judgment of the foreign court is rendered res 
judicata778 in the eyes of the law and that by defending on the merits the unsuccessful party 
has submitted to the jurisdiction of the foreign court.779  
Briggs contends that the fact that the foreign court has ruled against the unsuccessful party 
on the jurisdictional application does not imply that it has accepted their findings on the 
jurisdictional issue or waived the breach of contract. The unsuccessful party is just seeking to 
assert its rights on the merits regardless of the outcome of the jurisdictional application. 
Briggs himself highlights, that this gives the unsuccessful party two bites at the cherry: it will 
accept the foreign court’s ruling if it wins on the merits and reject if it loses. Harris compares 
                                                          
776 Briggs, Agreements (n 750) 314; See Section 32 of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 (UK) and 
Section 7(4)(b) of the Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth) (Australia); For a recent illustration and general 
comments on Section 32 of the CJJA 1982, see, AES Ust-Kamenogorsk Hydropower Plant LLP v Ust-
Kamenogorsk Hydropower Plant JSC. [2011] EWCA Civ 647, [2011] 2 CLC 51, [149]-[165], [2012] 1 WLR 920, 
971-972 (Rix LJ); The judgment of the Court of Appeal was affirmed by the UK Supreme Court without detailed 
consideration of Section 32: [2013] UKSC 35, [2013] 1 WLR 1889; See also, Collins, Dicey, Morris and Collins on 
the Conflict of Laws (2012) (n 751) 712. 
777 It should be noted that a party participating in the foreign proceedings in an attempt to avoid judgment 
against him, while nevertheless seeking to avoiding submitting to the jurisdiction of the foreign court, has to 
tread ‘a legal tightrope’: as submitted in argument by Peter Gross QC in The Angelic Grace [1994] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 
168, 180 (Commercial Court); See also, Sir Peter Gross, ‘Anti Suit Injunctions and Arbitration’ [2005] LMCLQ 10, 
13. 
778 ‘A final judgment already decided between the same parties or their privies on the same question by a 
legally constituted court having jurisdiction is conclusive between the parties, and the issue cannot be raised 
again.’ Jowitt’s Dictionary of English Law (3rd Ed. Sweet & Maxwell 2009). 
779 Gee (n 774) 641. 
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this argument of Briggs’s to the approbation and reprobation principle.780 However, Briggs 
insists that this is not a case of approbation and reprobation as the unsuccessful party is 
relentless in its claim that the foreign judgment was obtained in breach of a valid jurisdiction 
agreement. However, Harris argues that one who rejects the jurisdictional competence of a 
foreign court should withdraw from it once the jurisdictional motion is lost, knowing that if 
the English courts take a different view, Section 32 of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments 
Act 1982 will prevent the recognition of the foreign judgment.781 It is submitted, that a party 
who chooses to defend itself on the merits in the foreign court may be taken to have waived 
its contractual right to be sued in the courts of England. Furthermore, the recovery of claw-
back damages in England is tantamount to re-examining and negating the foreign judgment 
on the merits. The recovery of damages for breach of a jurisdiction agreement in the present 
fact pattern is arguably an infringement of the principles of res judicata and the comity of 
nations. Whilst it may seek to enforce a private contractual bargain, it has a negative impact 
on the public, international and systemic character of private international law functioning 
as a structural coordinating framework for the allocation of regulatory authority. 
Questions of causation and remoteness of loss may also arise in an action for damages for 
breach of a jurisdiction agreement.782 For instance, if the cause of the foreign judgment was 
a witness being believed in a civil law jurisdiction where he could not be cross-examined, 
one would question whether that impediment was sufficiently connected with the breach of 
the choice of forum clause to have been caused by it, or whether this type of loss was too 
remote to be fairly recoverable for breach of the clause.783 On the other hand, one can 
envisage a case where the foreign court granted judgment because a defence which would 
have been conclusive in London arbitration was simply not available in the foreign court.784 It 
is submitted that the selection of the forum would have been the causative event that led to 
the foreign judgment in the latter case. 
                                                          
780 Harris, Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: Where Next? (n 751) 546; approbate and reprobate: 
‘To accept and reject. A person is not allowed to accept the benefit of a document (e.g. a deed of gift) but 
reject any liabilities attached to it.’ Jonathan Law and Elizabeth A Martin (ed.), Oxford Dictionary of Law (7th 
Edition, OUP 2009). 
781 Ibid. 
782 For an account of remoteness and causation in the English and Scots substantive private law of contract 
respectively, see, Ewan McKendrick, Contract Law (Palgrave Macmillan Law Masters, 9th Edition, Palgrave 
Macmillan 2011) 354-360; Gillian Black, Woolman on Contract (Greens Concise Scots Law, 4th Edition, W Green 
2010) 145-149. 




Quantification of damages for breach of jurisdiction agreements raises its own troublesome 
issues.785 Firstly, one might effectively need an extended mini-trial in order to determine 
what the English courts would have decided on the merits and how it would have quantified 
the award of damages.786 Secondly, this might prove to be a significant burden on the court’s 
resources if the findings of the foreign court on the merits are not deemed as res judicata 
because the unsuccessful party in the foreign court was constant in its claim that the party in 
breach of the jurisdiction agreement did not have the right to bring an action there.787 
Another argument against the recovery of damages for breach of jurisdiction agreements is 
that, as a matter of public policy such claims should not be encouraged since they give rise 
to the question where the action should have been brought after the foreign court has 
addressed a similar question of equal complexity i.e. whether it has jurisdiction.788 It may 
therefore be thought that such a claim should be precluded by the general principles of 
procedural law, such as those of good faith and abuse of process. 
A wide conception of res judicata may be harnessed to control and manage the incidence of 
‘litigation about where litigation should have taken place’ just as a wide notion of lis pendens 
may be used to manipulate the incidence of parallel proceedings. The idea of employing a 
wide conception of res judicata to regulate the enforcement of jurisdiction agreements by 
the English courts has not been articulated or explored hitherto. The extended doctrine of 
res judicata based on abuse of process789 or the importation of the concept of constructive 
                                                          
785 OT Africa Line Ltd v Magic Sportswear Corp [2005] EWCA Civ 710, [2005] 1 CLC 923, [33] (Longmore LJ): 
‘damages will not usually be an adequate remedy in fact, since damages will not be easily calculable and can 
indeed only be calculated by comparing the advantages and disadvantages of the respective fora. This is likely 
to involve an even graver a breach of comity than the granting of an anti-suit injunction.’; See A Briggs, Private 
International Law in English Courts (OUP 2014) 399: ‘assessment of damages for breach of a jurisdiction clause 
is liable to be problematic, and any attempt at quantification not much more than speculative’; Francisco 
Garcimartin, ‘Chapter 11 – Article 31(2)-(4)’ in Andrew Dickinson and Eva Lein (eds.), The Brussels I Regulation 
Recast (OUP 2015) 338; Martin Illmer, ‘Chapter 2 – Article 1’ in Andrew Dickinson and Eva Lein (eds.), The 
Brussels I Regulation Recast (OUP 2015) 80: ‘The calculation of the actual damage will potentially be very 
difficult and time consuming, carrying a considerable degree of uncertainty.’; Gary B Born, International 
Commercial Arbitration (2nd Edition, Kluwer Law International 2014) Chapter 8, 1304: ‘calculating the quantum 
of damages is difficult and speculative’; Nigel Blackaby and Constantine Partasides with Alan Redfern and 
Martin Hunter, Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (5th Edition, OUP 2009) 20: ‘an agreement to 
arbitrate is a contract of imperfect obligation. If it is broken, an award of damages is unlikely to be a practical 
remedy, given the difficulty of quantifying the loss sustained’. 
786 Raphael (n 751) 330; Harris, Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: Where Next? (n 751) 546. 
787 Harris, Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: Where Next? (n 751) 546. 
788 Koji Takahashi, Damages for Breach of a Choice of Court Agreement (2008) 10 Yearbook of Private 
International Law 57, 77-78. 
789 For the domestic doctrine of abuse of process in English law, see, Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100 
(Wigram V-C); Johnson v Gore Wood & Co [2002] AC 1 (Lord Bingham of Cornhill); For the international 
dimension of the doctrine of abuse of process, see, House of Spring Gardens v Waite [1991] 1 QB 241, 251; 
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res judicata790 into the international commercial litigation sphere may preclude the litigation 
of subject matter which could and should have been adjudicated upon in previous foreign 
proceedings. The rule in Henderson v Henderson is to the effect that the parties to litigation 
before a court of competent jurisdiction must bring forward their whole case and cannot 
later re-open the litigation by relying on matters which ought to have been brought forward 
but were omitted due to negligence, inadvertence or accident. If a party to the choice of 
court agreement is sued in a non-contractual forum, the extended doctrine of res judicata 
will necessitate that the aggrieved party must exhaust all available remedies in the foreign 
court. A challenge to the assumption and exercise of jurisdiction by the foreign court should 
include an application for stay of proceedings based on the jurisdiction clause and a claim to 
recover monetary compensation for the breach of the choice of court agreement in the 
foreign court prior to approaching the English courts for an anti-suit injunction or the 
damages remedy for breach of the jurisdiction agreement.  
There are arguments which may undermine the viability of such an approach. First, the 
constructive res judicata approach will work best where the other legal system has a 
comparable civil jurisdictional regime allowing the stay of proceedings or damages for 
breach of a jurisdiction agreement.791 The potential utility of the constructive res judicata 
approach in relation to other common law jurisdictions may help obviate or at least alleviate 
the need to resort to unilateral and confrontational methods for the control and 
management of parallel proceedings. The possibility of a stay of proceedings by the foreign 
court on the basis of the jurisdiction agreement may not present a significant legal risk. An 
award of costs may reimburse the aggrieved party for wasted expenditure in defending 
proceedings in the foreign court. If costs cannot be recovered as per the costs regime of the 
foreign court, the aggrieved party may attempt to counterclaim the costs as damages for 
breach of the choice of court agreement in the same proceedings.792 In A v B (No 2),793 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Desert Sun Corp v Hill [1996] 2 All ER 847, 859, 864; See Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (2015) (n 
751) 478-479; Barnett (n 762) Chapter 6. 
790 See Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act No. V of 1908) (Explanation IV) (Applicable in India, 
Pakistan and Bangladesh): ‘Any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack 
in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit.’; See 
Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd v. Janapada Sabha 1961 AIR 964, 1962 SCR (1) 1 (Supreme Court of India). 
791 In Amchem Products Inc v Workers Compensation Board (1993) 102 DLR (4th) 96, 120 (Sopinka J) (Supreme 
Court of Canada) it was held that an anti-suit injunction should not be granted unless the foreign court took 
jurisdiction ‘on a basis which is inconsistent with our rules of private international law.’ 
792 Peel advances the possibility of a counterclaim for damages for breach of the jurisdiction agreement in the 
same proceedings: Edwin Peel, ‘Exclusive Jurisdiction Agreements: Purity and Pragmatism in the Conflict of 
Laws’ [1998] LMCLQ 182, 224. 
793 A v B (No 2) [2007] EWHC 54 (Comm), [9] (Colman J). 
223 
 
Colman J adopted the view that in England, separate proceedings for damages could not be 
commenced because, when there was a breach of a jurisdiction agreement, the cause of 
action for the relief of staying proceedings and the cause of action for the relief of damages 
were normally the same.794  
Secondly, the position is different where the foreign court proceeds to hear the case on the 
merits and decides in favour of the party in breach. It is unlikely that the foreign court will 
award damages for breach of the choice of court agreement where such an order will 
reverse or nullify the effect of the foreign court’s judgment regarding the substantive 
dispute.795 However, Peel argues that an award of damages for breach of a foreign 
jurisdiction agreement by the English courts in cases where the English courts have refused 
to stay proceedings in deference to the foreign jurisdiction agreement is a compromise 
position which seeks to balance private interest and public interest.796 It has been argued 
that this approach is not tenable797 as it places the strong public interest on a direct collision 
course with the private law right and it is highly unlikely that the private law right will escape 
unscathed. However, there are cases where the English courts have assumed jurisdiction and 
refused to stay proceedings regardless of the foreign jurisdiction agreement798 and cases 
where the English courts have declined to issue an anti-suit injunction for breach of an 
English exclusive jurisdiction agreement because the ends of justice would be best served by 
a single composite trial abroad.799 Donohue v Armco falls in the latter category, where the 
Appellate Committee of the House of Lords accepted a concession by counsel,800 without 
deciding the issue on the merits, that damages may be available for breach of the English 
exclusive jurisdiction agreement. Therefore, as there is room to argue that the flexible 
                                                          
794 In English law, costs incurred in defending the action which go beyond the sum awarded by a costs order are 
not recoverable as damages under the principle established in Quartz Hill Consolidated Gold Mining Co v Eyre 
(1883) 11 QBD 674 (CA). 
795 See Takahashi, Damages for Breach of a Choice of Court Agreement (n 788) 73. 
796 Peel (n 792) 224-226; Daniel Tan and Nik Yeo, ‘Breaking Promises to Litigate in a Particular Forum: Are 
Damages an Appropriate Remedy?’ [2003] LMCLQ 435, 438; cf Nicholas S Shantar, ‘Forum Selection Clauses: 
Damages in Lieu of Dismissal?’ (2002) 82 Boston University Law Review 1063, 1078-1088, argues that in relation 
to forum selection clauses in consumer adhesion contracts, a court should allow a consumer to pay damages in 
lieu of dismissal. In doing so he seeks to reconcile the interests of consumers by avoiding the unnecessary 
harshness of specific enforcement and sophisticated parties who are allowed to recover the costs of litigating 
in the consumer’s home forum as damages for breach of the jurisdiction agreement.  
797 Knight (n 764) 508. 
798 The Fehmarn [1958] 1 WLR 159, 161-162 (CA) (Lord Denning); Carvalho v Hull Blyth Ltd [1979] 1 WLR 1228, 
[1979] 3 All ER 280, [1980] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 172 (CA); The Hollandia (The Morviken) [1983] AC 565, [1982] 3 WLR 
1111, [1982] 3 All ER 1141, [1983] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 1 (HL). 
799 Donohue v Armco Inc [2001] UKHL 64; [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 425. 
800 Concession by Lord Grabiner QC representing Armco in Donohue v Armco Inc [2001] UKHL 64; [2002] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep. 425, [36] (Lord Bingham of Cornhill). 
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damages remedy may operate to balance the public and private interests where the English 
courts assume jurisdiction, refuse to stay proceedings and awards damages for breach of the 
foreign jurisdiction agreement, conversely, where the foreign court assumes jurisdiction and 
refuses to stay proceedings, it may too award damages for breach of the English exclusive 
jurisdiction agreement.801        
Thirdly, it may be argued that a claim for damages for breach of a choice of court agreement 
is recognised as a distinct cause of action in its own right and as a result should not be 
precluded on the basis of res judicata as identity of cause of action with the substantive 
claim does not exist. The pragmatic techniques of severability and kompetenz-kompetenz as 
applied to jurisdiction agreements confirm such a logical conclusion. However, the extended 
doctrine of abuse of process or constructive res judicata does not warrant a technical 
application premised on identity of cause of action and parties as they apply to claims which 
could and should have been raised in the foreign court.802 Moreover, the doctrine of abuse 
of process may engage in the absence of an earlier decision capable of amounting to res 
judicata. 
Both the jurisdiction agreement and the substantive claim arise from the same factual 
matrix. If the substantive claim is raised in the foreign court, a cause of action based on the 
breach of the jurisdiction agreements may also be raised there. In this regard, it should be 
noted that Lord Neuberger recognised that a claim based on the dispute resolution 
agreement in the English courts may be ‘logically inconsistent’ with the substantive claim 
before the Greek courts but together they were ‘commercially pointless’.803 He was referring 
to the fact that the practical effect of the judgment of the English court was akin to an anti-
                                                          
801 See Commonwealth Bank v White (No 2) [2004] VSC 268, [5] (Mandie J) (Supreme Court of Victoria), where 
an English company sought to stay proceedings brought in Victoria in breach of an English exclusive jurisdiction 
agreement. Mandie J noted that ‘it is at least arguable’ that if the defendant succeeded in its defence on the 
merits before the Victorian court then ‘it might have a claim for damages for breach of contract 
notwithstanding that……the court refused to stay the……….proceeding on a number of occasions when the 
defendant so applied.’; In Incitec Ltd v Alkimos Shipping Corp [2004] FCA 698, [67] (Allsop J), the Federal Court 
of Australia refused to stay its proceedings which had been brought in breach of an English jurisdiction 
agreement in order to avoid inconsistent decisions since the action involved parties who were not bound by 
the agreement. The court alluded to the breach of the jurisdiction agreement in holding that it would hear the 
parties on costs, implying that the breach of the jurisdiction agreement would be taken into account in the 
application of the normal costs rules; See Albert Dinelli, ‘The Limits on the Remedy of Damages for Breach of 
Jurisdiction Agreements: The Law of Contract Meets Private International Law’ [2015] MelbULawRw 9; (2015) 
38 Melbourne University Law Review 1023, 1025 FN 5; Richard Garnett, ‘Jurisdiction Clauses Since Akai’ [2013] 
University of Melbourne Law School Research Series 6, FN 110-FN 111; Takahashi, Damages for Breach of a 
Choice of Court Agreement (n 788) 74. 
802 See Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (2015) (n 751) 479. 
803 The Alexandros T [2013] UKSC 70, [132] (Lord Neuberger). 
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suit injunction and will render the future Greek judgment nugatory. Moreover, the sheer 
futility of enforcing the ‘commercially pointless’ judgments of the English and Greek courts 
in a third state may help shed light on the inherent limitations of the contractual 
enforcement of jurisdiction agreements in managing concurrent proceedings on a global 
multilateral level.  
The potential for the extended doctrine of abuse of process to be rationally developed into a 
global multilateral solution for managing parallel exercises of adjudicatory authority needs 
to be explored. In that capacity it may also act an effective control mechanism for regulating 
the unilateral use of primary and secondary remedies for breach of choice of court 
agreements by the English courts in situations where the foreign court has a comparable civil 
jurisdictional regime permitting the primary and secondary enforcement of English exclusive 
jurisdiction agreements.        
Bearing in mind that the recognition criteria and the res judicata criteria are coextensive in 
the English common law,804 a wider conception of res judicata may be instrumental in 
facilitating a more liberal regime for the recognition and enforcement of judgments and in 
promoting a stronger notion of comity and judicial cooperation. The use of a wide 
conception of res judicata as an effective control mechanism in the parallel exercises of 
adjudicatory authority may also help private international law unlock the full potential 
inherent in its internationalist aspirations. The jurisprudence on anti-suit injunctions may yet 
move towards more stringent requirements for granting such injunctive relief by articulating 
the role of comity as a distinct factor in the exercise of the discretion to grant the equitable 
remedy.805 A comparable development in relation to the role of constructive res judicata in 
the emerging jurisprudence of the damages remedy for breach of jurisdiction agreements 
may aid in the process of synthesizing global solutions to lis pendens and eventually help 
forge a new paradigm of jurisdiction.806 A paradigm which effectively responds to the 
increasingly complex interplay between international law, EU law and national law, public 
                                                          
804 Barnett (n 762) 37. 
805 Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (2015) (n 751) 537; Fentiman, International Commercial 
Litigation (2010) (n 751) 580. 
806 ‘If this traditional image of sovereignty is inadequate under conditions of globalization, as is frequently 
claimed, then both paradigms are inadequate as well, and both sides must come together to create a new, 
third paradigm of jurisdiction.’: (Emphasis added) Ralf Michaels, ‘Two Paradigms of Jurisdiction’ [2006] 
Michigan Journal of International Law 1003, 1069; See McLachlan, Lis Pendens in International Litigation (n 
753) 438; Alex Mills, ‘Rethinking Jurisdiction in International Law’ (2014) 84 British Yearbook of International 
Law 187, 237. 
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law and private law and procedure and substance at the very heart of lis pendens and the 
effective enforcement of jurisdiction agreements in a globalized world. 
Relying on the jurisprudence of the superior courts of England and Wales since the decision 
in Union Discount Co v Zoller, it may be observed that damages are, in principle, available for 
breach of an exclusive jurisdiction agreement. However, apart from cases analogous to 
Union Discount Co v Zoller, the practical issue of recovery of damages in each of the 
instances referred to in the analysis above is laden with complex and sensitive issues 
including the possibility of indirect interference with the civil jurisdiction and judgments 
apparatus of foreign courts. It is submitted, that these significant issues invite us to reflect 
on the adverse effects of the growing market driven contractualization drive on the inherent 
nature and function of private international law.807 Employing the terminology utilized but 
not their respective priorities for Briggs in the preface of Agreements, the primary function 
of private international law should be the “regulation of civil relations” within which 
“dispute resolution” should operate as one of the most significant objectives. To posit 
“dispute resolution” as the essential function of private international law (as Briggs does) 
would necessarily displace the very significant public and systemic objectives to the 
periphery and undermine the discipline’s inherent ability to act as a structural coordinating 
framework for the allocation of regulatory authority.808 In view of the arguments premised 
on the global regulatory function of private international law, it is this author’s considered 
view that the damages remedy should only have a limited role to play in a measured and 
mature conception of private international law. Widespread application of the private law 
remedy by the English courts, guided by the redistributive will of the parties, and seeking to 
redress the adverse effects of pre-emptive proceedings in breach of an English choice of 
court agreement will actually impede judicial cooperation between states, infringe a strong 
notion of comity, derail mutual trust between EU Member States and render the finality of 
dispute resolution nugatory.  
                                                          
807 Muir Watt is critical of the ‘commercial dispute resolution’ emphasis in the English common law of conflict 
of laws as it obscures private international law doctrine and method which should inform the role, nature and 
content of law beyond the state: Horatia Muir Watt, ‘The Relevance of Private International Law to the Global 
Governance Debate’ in Horatia Muir Watt and Diego P Fernandez Arroyo (eds.), Private International Law and 
Global Governance (Law and Global Governance Series, OUP 2014) 1, 1-2. 
808 Alex Mills, ‘Variable Geometry, Peer Governance, and the Public International Perspective on Private 
International Law’ in Horatia Muir Watt and Diego P Fernandez Arroyo (eds.), Private International Law and 
Global Governance (Law and Global Governance Series, OUP 2014) 245, 252-253. 
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In fact, dispute resolution is itself undermined if the English courts attempt to re-open or 
second guess a foreign court’s decision on the basis that the English court is the chosen 
venue. The dispute is effectively protracted809 and not resolved with the incidence of 
satellite or sub-litigation and the increased potential for conflicting Member State 
judgments.810 For the litigants, protracted litigation will result in higher costs and 
expenses.811 To quote Briggs, ‘In other words, litigation about where to litigate will be 
replaced by litigation about where the litigation should have taken place.’812 However, there 
is a strong argument that litigation about where litigation should have taken place is neither 
an efficient nor effective method of dispute resolution in international commercial 
litigation.813 Above all, the damages remedy fails to deliver what many potential claimants 
desire most, particularly in an action in debt; it cannot deliver prompt, summary judgment 
                                                          
809 Arnaud Nuyts, ‘The Enforcement of Jurisdiction Agreements Further to Gasser and the Community Principle 
of Abuse of Right’ in Pascal de Vareilles-Sommieres (ed.), Forum Shopping in the European Judicial Area (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford 2007) 57. 
810 Andrew Dickinson, ‘Brussels I Review – Choice of Court Agreements’ (Conflictoflaws.net, 11 June 2009) 
<http://conflictoflaws.net/2009/brussels-i-review-choice-of-court-agreements/> accessed 15 September 2014; 
Andrew Dickinson, ‘Response to the Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on 
Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters’ (Europa.eu, 
30 June 2009) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/0002/contributions/civil_society_ngo_academics_others
/mr_andrew_dickinson_en.pdf> accessed 3 September 2014, para 24;  
Response of the Law Society of England and Wales,   
Review of Regulation 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters -“Brussels I” (Europa.eu, July 2009) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/0002/contributions/civil_society_ngo_academics_others
/law_society_england_wales_en.pdf > accessed 3 September 2014, para 12; cf Bar Council of England and 
Wales’ Response to the Brussels I Regulation Green Paper, para 3.9. 
811 Dickinson, Brussels I Review – Choice of Court Agreements (n 810); Dickinson, Response to the Green Paper 
(n 810). 
812 Adrian Briggs, ‘The Impact of Recent Judgments of the European Court on English Procedural Law and 
Practice’ (2005) Vol. II, No. 124 Zeitschrift fur Schweizerisches Recht 231-262; Oxford Legal Studies Research 
Paper No. 11/2006 <Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=899689> accessed 15 December 2014, 20. 
813 See Luboš Tichý, ‘Protection against Abuse of Process in the Brussels I Review Proposal?’ in Eva Lein (ed.), 
The Brussels I Review Proposal Uncovered (British Institute of International and Comparative Law, London 
2012) 103, 189: Professor Tichý refers to the damages remedy as ‘a weak consolation’ due to the need for 
separate enforcement proceedings; For a similar argument in relation to the inadequacy of the damages 
remedy for breach of an arbitration agreement in the English courts, see, Sheffield United Football Club Ltd v 
West Ham United Football Club plc [2008] EWHC 2855 (Comm), [22] (Teare J): ‘However, it is well established 
that the remedy of damages is not regarded as an adequate remedy for breach of an arbitration clause’; 
Starlight Shipping Co v Tai Ping Insurance Co [2007] EWHC 1893 (Comm), [12] (Cooke J): ‘Damages would, for 
all the reasons given in the authorities, be an inadequate remedy for breach of such a clause since its very 
nature requires the parties to have their disputes determined in arbitration. A party to such an agreement 
should not be put to the trouble of having disputes determined elsewhere in a manner contrary to the express 
contract between the parties’; See Born (n 785) Chapter 8, 1304: ‘It was frequently (and correctly) remarked, 
however, that damages for breach of an arbitration agreement are an uncertain and inadequate means of 
enforcement’; Blackaby and Partasides (n 785) 20: ‘an agreement to arbitrate is a contract of imperfect 
obligation. If it is broken, an award of damages is unlikely to be a practical remedy, given the difficulty of 
quantifying the loss sustained’. 
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on the merits in the agreed court.814 Hence, damages for breach of a forum selection 
agreement and their deterrent value are a ‘second-best solution’ to a uniform EU wide 
mechanism for the avoidance of parallel proceedings ab initio, as was suggested in the 
Commission proposal.815 Where available, an anti-suit injunction is likely to be a commercial 
litigant’s preferred option.816 
It has been observed, that the contractual damages remedy for breach of a jurisdiction 
agreement may be available under the English common law jurisdictional regime. However, 
outside the narrower confines of cases analogous to Union Discount v Zoller, the damages 
remedy raises complex and sensitive issues which require careful analysis and examination. 
The remedy still needs clarification and elucidation in the more doubtful penumbral cases, 
before the course of the remedy can be fully mapped. A decision of the foreign court on 
costs or on the merits may preclude the damages action by reliance on the res judicata 
effect of the foreign judgment. Quantification of damages is a significant practical 
impediment and may require a trial within a trial. The concept of the extended doctrine of 
res judicata based on abuse of process or the importation of the notion of constructive res 
judicata may be applied in the international litigation sphere to limit the claim for damages 
to the foreign court as it could and should have been raised there in the first place. Thus a 
more discriminating approach employing the notion of methodological pluralism will limit 
the private law remedy to the foreign court and may act as an effective control mechanism. 
In any case, damages are a second best solution to problems of lis pendens. 
It is submitted that the damages remedy should have a very limited role to play in 
international commercial litigation. In addition to doubts about the practical effectiveness of 
the remedy, it can damage the reputation and coherence of private international law as an 
international system functioning as a structural coordinating framework for the allocation of 
regulatory authority. Chapter 9 will examine the dynamics of the damages remedy in the 
context of the Brussels I Regulation, the role played by the private law remedy in the process 
of reform leading up to the finalization of the Recast Regulation and whether the remedy 
                                                          
814 Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (2010) (n 751) 90; Richard Fentiman, ‘Parallel Proceedings 
and Jurisdiction Agreements in Europe’ in Pascal de Vareilles-Sommieres (ed.), Forum Shopping in the European 
Judicial Area (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2007) 45; Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (2015) (n 751) 
113. 
815 Illmer (n 785) 80 (discussing damages for breach of arbitration agreements but the same analysis applies to 
damages for breach of jurisdiction agreements by parity of reasoning). 
816 Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (2015) (n 751) 113; Briggs, Private International Law in 
English Courts (n 785) 399. 
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may be employed to supplement the legal regulation of choice of court agreements under 


























Chapter 9 – The Damages Remedy and the Brussels I Regulation 
The Viability of the Damages Remedy under the Brussels I Regulation: Will the Backdoor 
Approach of the English Common Law be Permitted? 
It is uncertain whether and to what extent the damages remedy for the enforcement of the 
jurisdiction agreements can operate in cases subject to the European Union private 
international law regime’s Brussels I Regulation.817 The uniform enforcement of choice of 
court agreements in the European Judicial Area took a setback with the decision of the Court 
of Justice of the EU in Erich Gasser v MISAT Srl.818 As a consequence of the Gasser ruling, 
where actions are pending between the same parties on the same cause of action in the 
courts of two Member States, the court seised second must stay its proceedings until the 
court first seised has declined jurisdiction in accordance with the rules of the Brussels I 
Regulation which give precedence to the proceedings in the court first seised even if the 
court seised second considers itself to have been nominated by an exclusive choice of court 
agreement. Moreover, the ECJ’s rulings in Turner v. Grovit819 and West Tankers820 articulated 
the fact that the English courts cannot apply their own discretionary remedial devices in the 
form of anti-suit injunctions to safeguard forum selection clauses. Therefore; the need arose 
to provide adequate protection to choice of court agreements in the European Judicial Area, 
especially in cases of ‘torpedo’ actions where the court first seised principle was patently 
abused to block proceedings in the contractual forum for an extended period of time.821 This 
                                                          
817 Adrian Briggs, Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law (Oxford Private International Law Series, OUP 
2008) 330-338; David Joseph QC, Jurisdiction and Arbitration Agreements and their Enforcement (2nd Edition, 
Sweet & Maxwell, London 2010) 494-495; Trevor Hartley, Choice of Court Agreements under the European and 
International Instruments (OUP 2013) 216-220; T Raphael, The Anti-Suit Injunction (OUP 2008) 294-296, 340-
341; R Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (2nd Edition, OUP 2015) 115-120. 
818 Erich Gasser v. MISAT Srl. (C-116/02) [2003] ECR I-14693; See ZS Tang, Jurisdiction and Arbitration 
Agreements in International Commercial Law (Routledge 2014) 180-184: ZS Tang classifies the English approach 
to exclusive jurisdiction agreements prior to Gasser as ‘contract priority’, the approach of AG Leger as an 
intermediate position and the approach of the ECJ decision in Gasser as ‘procedure priority’. The English courts 
have adopted an instrumental approach in the application of Articles 27 and 28 of the Brussels I Regulation in 
cases where there is an English choice of court agreement: See The Alexandros T [2013] UKSC 70; [2014] 1 All 
ER 590 (Lords Neuberger, Mance, Clarke, Sumption and Hughes); See Tang (n 818) 185-188. 
819 Turner v. Grovit (Case C-159/02) [2005] ECR I-3565; [2004] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 169. 
820 Allianz SpA (formerly Riunione Adriatica di Sicurta SpA) v. West Tankers Inc (The Front Comor) (Case C-
185/07) [2009] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 413. 
821 Mario Franzosi, ‘Worldwide Patent Litigation and the Italian Torpedo’ [1997] European Intellectual Property 
Review 382; Martin Gebauer, ‘Lis Pendens, Negative Declaratory-Judgment Actions and the First-in-Time 
Principle’ in E Gottschalk, R Michaels, G Ruhl and J von Hein (eds.), Conflict of Laws in a Globalized World (CUP 
2007) 89, 94. 
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precarious predicament is further exacerbated by the slow moving civil judicial systems of 
some Member States of the European Union.822  
The English common law, with its strong emphasis on the contractual private law nature of 
jurisdiction agreements, has an offering which can potentially fill this lacuna in the 
enforcement of jurisdiction agreements with the damages remedy. The Heidelberg Report 
on the application of the Brussels I Regulation in the courts of the Member States alludes to 
the possibility of strengthening jurisdiction agreements by an action for damages.823 This 
novel remedy also found its way into the EU Commission’s Green Paper824 for the reform of 
the Brussels I Regulation but was not part of the final Proposal825 for the reform of the EU 
Judgments Regulation. The admissibility of the damages remedy into the jurisdictional 
framework of the Brussels I Regulation is still an ‘open question’ which needs to be 
answered.826 This section will examine the permissibility of the damages remedy for breach 
of choice of court agreements in the context of the Brussels I Regulation. 
In this regard, it should be noted that the Brussels I Regulation only regulates the recognition 
and enforcement of final judgments and does not explicitly regulate res judicata and issue 
estoppel arising from the recognition and enforcement of judgments.827 However, if a final 
judgment must be recognised under the Brussels I Regulation, it no doubt follows that any 
findings which underpin the judgment must also be recognised.828 The concept of mutual 
trust between the courts of the Member States necessitates the recognition of the 
                                                          
822 Andrew Dickinson, ‘A Charter for Tactical Litigation in Europe?’ Turner v Grovit [2004] LMCLQ 273. 
823 B Hess, T Pfeiffer and P Schlosser, ‘Report on the Application of Regulation Brussels I in the Member States’ 
(Study JLS/C4/2005/03, September 2007) (‘Heidelberg Report’) [462]. 
824 Green Paper on the review of Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, COM (2009) 175. 
825 Proposal for the review of Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, COM (2010) 748 final. 
826 Magnus and Mankowski, Brussels I Regulation (Sellier 2012) 511; U Magnus and P Mankowski, ‘Brussels I on 
the Verge of Reform – A Response to the Green Paper on the Review of the Brussels I Regulation’ (2010) 109 
ZVglRWiss 1, 13; U Magnus, ‘Choice of Court Agreements in the Review Proposal for the Brussels I Regulation’ 
in Eva Lein (ed.), The Brussels I Review Proposal Uncovered (The BIICL, London 2012) 89-90. 
827 R Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (OUP 2010) 88; Fentiman, International Commercial 
Litigation (2015) (n 817) 118; Christa Roodt, ‘Border Skirmishes between Courts and Arbitral Tribunals in the 
EU: Finality in Conflicts of Competence’ (2011) 13 Yearbook of Private International Law 91, 134; Peter Barnett, 
Res Judicata, Estoppel, and Foreign Judgments: The Preclusive Effects of Foreign Judgments in Private 
International Law (Oxford Private International Law Series, OUP 2001) Chapter 7, 273. 
828 See, in particular, the recent CJEU decision in: Case C-456/11 Gothaer Allgemeine Versicherung AG v 
Samskip GmbH EU:C:2012:719, [2013] QB 548, [40]-[41]; For a critical analysis of the CJEU’s ruling in Gothaer v 
Samskip and the development of the concept of European Res Judicata, see Elisa Torralba-Mendiola and Elena 
Rodriguez-Pineau, ‘Two’s Company, Three’s a Crowd: Jurisdiction, Recognition and Res Judicata in the 
European Union’ (2014) 10 Journal of Private International Law 403. 
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equivalence of judicial decisions from all Member States.829 If not, the conclusion that is 
worthy of recognition is undermined. Alternatively, it has been suggested that national law 
operates in such cases.830 The justification is that the Regulation requires a national court to 
treat a judgment capable of recognition as if it were one of its own, which may extend to 
treating as binding any findings upon which the judgment depends. If this is correct, issue 
estoppel operates as much in a Regulation case as in others. 
Let’s first delve into the situation where the court first seised upholds the jurisdiction 
agreement and declines jurisdiction. The decision of the court first seised on the validity and 
effect of the choice of court agreement has to be recognised in England.831 Prima facie, the 
foreign court’s finding supports rather than prevents any claim for damages. However, 
Fentiman argues that merely because the claimant in the court first seised was wrong about 
the agreement does not mean that it was in the wrong to have sued there.832 Given the 
effect of Article 27, (confirmed in Gasser) that party is entitled to test the effect of the 
jurisdiction agreement there. Arguably, to penalize such conduct would undermine the 
party’s right to seise its preferred court, embodied in Article 27. It might also be 
characterized as an assault on the entitlement of that court to determine whether it has 
jurisdiction.  
In English domestic law, it is not possible to bring an action for damages to claim the 
difference between the costs awarded by an English court in a previous action and the actual 
costs incurred in (successfully) defending the action.833 The reason is that the ‘extra’ costs 
are not a recoverable loss: the award of costs is regarded as being all that the losing party is 
legally obliged to pay. 
Consequently, for the English court to allow a party to recover its ‘extra’ costs where the first 
proceedings were brought in another Member State would involve treating the foreign order 
                                                          
829 The recognition of both the result and the reasons underpinning the decision was referred to by Steven Gee 
QC (counsel for the defendants) in argument before Flaux J in Starlight Shipping Co v Allianz Marine & Others 
[2014] EWHC 3068 (Comm) as a ‘Euro-estoppel’. 
830 Adrian Briggs and Peter Rees, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments (5th Edition, Informa Law 2009) 449-450; 
Louise Merrett, ‘The Enforcement of Jurisdiction Agreements within the Brussels Regime’ (2006) 55 ICLQ 315, 
332-334. 
831 See Article 32 of the Brussels I Regulation and the Lugano Convention (2007); Article 2(a) of the Brussels I 
Regulation (Recast); Francisco Garcimartin, ‘Chapter 11 – Article 31(2)-(4)’ in Andrew Dickinson and Eva Lein 
(eds.), The Brussels I Regulation Recast (OUP 2015) 338; Hartley, Choice-of-Court Agreements Under the 
European and International Instruments (n 817) 217. 
832 Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (2015) (n 817) 120; Fentiman, International Commercial 
Litigation (2010) (n 827) 88-89. 
833 Cotterell v Jones (1851) 11 CB 713; 21 LJ (CP) 2; 138 ER 655; Quartz Hill Consolidated Gold Mining Co v Eyre 
(1883) LR 11 QBD 674 (CA). 
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for costs as having a lesser effect than an equivalent English order. This would run counter to 
the policy of EU law in general834 and the Brussels I Regulation in particular.835 The same 
policy considerations that led the English courts to develop the principle in an English 
context apply equally where the first judgment was given by a court in another Member 
State. 
In broader terms, a judgment that a party is entitled to a given sum necessarily involves the 
proposition that he is not entitled to a greater sum. This is obviously true of an award of 
damages; there is no reason why it should not also be true with regard to an award of costs. 
The fact that the new claim is brought on a different legal basis (breach of contract) should 
make no difference: it is the same claim. To allow a party to bring proceedings for the extra 
costs would infringe the obligation laid down in the Regulation to recognise the foreign 
judgment, including the foreign costs order.836 
The same result should follow where Y could have obtained an order for costs but chose not 
to do so, or where costs were not recoverable under the foreign law. 
Briggs himself recognises two possible objections to the availability of damages where the 
court first seised upholds the jurisdiction agreement and declines jurisdiction. As a judgment 
from another Member State of the European Union has to be accorded in the state of 
recognition the same legal consequences it has under the law of the state of origin,837 it is 
possible that an award in respect of costs precludes a further action for damages, i.e. ‘the 
obligation to recognise the costs order may prevent a further damages action’.838 Secondly, 
Briggs refers to the CJEU’s judgment in De Wolf v Cox839 which implies that under the 
Brussels I Regulation the procedure for recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment 
                                                          
834 Article 18 TFEU provides ‘Within the scope of application of the Treaties, and without prejudice to any 
special provisions contained therein, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited.’ The CJEU 
has interpreted this provision broadly, not only combat discrimination on the basis of nationality but also 
discrimination on other grounds that in fact lead to the same result. In the field of legal procedure, it has been 
held to preclude a Member State from requiring a party from another Member State to provide security for 
costs in circumstances in which this would not be required of a local party: Case C-323/95 Hayes v 
Kronenberger [1997] ECR I-1711. 
835 The general principle is that when a foreign judgment is recognised, it should be given the same effect in the 
Member State addressed as it has in the Member State of origin: Case C-145/86 Horst Ludwig Martin Hoffman 
v Adelheid Krieg [1988] ECR 645, [9]-[11]. 
836 Article 33(1) of the Brussels I Regulation and the Lugano Convention (2007); Article 36(1) of the Brussels I 
Regulation (Recast). 
837 Briggs, Agreements (n 817) 333 referring to Case C-145/86 Hoffman v Krieg [1988] ECR 645. 
838 Briggs, Agreements (n 817) 333. 
839 Case C-42/76 Jozef de Wolf v Harry Cox BV [1976] ECR 1759, where it was held that if a foreign judgment is 
enforceable in a Member State under the Brussels I Regulation, a party is not permitted to bring new 
proceedings for the same sum under national law. 
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is the only way for the judgment creditor to enforce his claim – he may not bring fresh 
proceedings on the underlying cause of action. The question is whether an order for costs 
from the court first seised may prevent a further action for damages.840 This depends on 
whether an action for damages for breach of a jurisdiction agreement might be seen as a 
separate and distinct cause of action, sufficiently different from the cause of action 
underlying the proceedings in the court first seised.841 It should be noted that the Court of 
Justice interprets ‘cause of action’ quite broadly in order to prevent to the maximum 
possible extent the occurrence of irreconcilable judgments.842 The Court of Justice can only 
authoritatively answer the question whether an award of damages for breach of a 
jurisdiction agreement is irreconcilable with an order awarding costs of the proceedings in 
which the court has declined jurisdiction. For the time being, serious doubts persist as to 
whether the damages remedy in this situation would conform to the mutual trust principle 
and to the provisions on judgments recognition as interpreted by the Court of Justice of the 
European Union. 
The next possibility is that the Member State court decides that the choice of court 
agreement is invalid or ineffective and assumes jurisdiction. However, the foreign court gives 
judgment for the defendant on the merits. It awards costs to the aggrieved party but the 
sum awarded is insufficient to cover his actual costs. The same arguments based on the 
effects of the foreign judgment and the preclusion of a cause of action to recover ‘extra’ 
costs is equally applicable in this situation. The aggrieved party’s costs may be greater 
because it has to defend the case on the merits but nevertheless the English court cannot 
reject the ruling of the Member State court that it had jurisdiction. 
 
In the course of Chapter 8 of Agreements, Briggs examines a hypothetical fact pattern where 
an Italian court adjudicates that no valid jurisdiction clause in favour of the English courts 
exists.843 He suggests that one would have to carefully and meticulously construe the Italian 
court’s decision, which may have found that the Article 23 formality requirements were not 
satisfied or that it was superseded by another provision in the jurisdictional hierarchy of the 
                                                          
840 Briggs, Agreements (n 817) 333. 
841 Cf Hartley, Choice-of-Court Agreements Under the European and International Instruments (n 817) 218-219: 
Hartley contends that a separate legal basis in breach of contract should make no difference as the cause of 
action would infringe the obligation in the Regulation to recognise the foreign judgment including the costs 
order.  
842 See eg Case C-406/92 The Tatry [1994] ECR I-05439. 
843 Briggs, Agreements (n 817) 334. 
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Regulation. In effect, the ruling of the Italian court only determines the procedural effect of 
the jurisdiction agreement under the Brussels I Regulation. Briggs employs his dual 
characterization of jurisdiction agreements to demonstrate that the inability of the clause to 
prorogate jurisdiction does not prevent it from being a valid inter partes private agreement. 
In the words of Briggs:844  
The foundation for this argument is that there is a distinction between two issues: 
whether the jurisdiction agreement is effective in law to prorogate or derogate from 
the jurisdiction of a court, and whether there was a private and binding agreement 
on seizing a court with jurisdiction, or on the issue of proceedings. 
Therefore, the claim in the English court would not be reopening the Italian court’s decision 
regarding Article 23 as it would simply be enforcing a private agreement between the 
parties.  
Fentiman doubts whether the distinction between the procedural and contractual effects of 
jurisdiction agreements is of any real value as it is difficult to fathom a jurisdiction 
agreement being declared inapplicable, invalid or ineffective pursuant to Article 23 of the 
Brussels I Regulation and nevertheless enjoying an enforceable contractual inter partes 
existence.845 Secondly, employing general contractual principles, it may be asked how the 
party seeking damages could have suffered loss if the foreign court has definitively 
determined that it is inapplicable, invalid or ineffective.846 Muir Watt notes that the 
emphasis placed on the private law perspective to jurisdiction agreements in the English 
common law of conflict of laws is ‘clearly culturally conditioned’.847 She further asserts that 
the position of the English courts in relation to the bifurcated conception of jurisdiction 
agreements stands in stark contrast to that of the CJEU and the courts of the continental 
tradition, for whom the obligational content of a contract (its effects in personam) cannot be 
dissociated from the effects it can produce under a public law rule (effects in rem).848 The 
‘privatization’849 or contractualization of private international law resulting from courts 
                                                          
844 Ibid. 
845 Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (2015) (n 817) 119; Fentiman, International Commercial 
Litigation (2010) (n 827) 89. 
846 ibid; Garcimartin (n 831) 338. 
847 Horatia Muir Watt, ‘”Party Autonomy” in International Contracts: From the Makings of a Myth to the 
Requirements of Global Governance’ (2010) 6 European Review of Contract Law 1, 30; Horatia Muir Watt, 
‘Injunctive Relief in the French Courts: A Case of Legal Borrowing’ (2003) 62 Cambridge Law Journal 573, 573, 
refers to ‘the Justizkonflikt between the models of adjudication in the common law and civilian worlds’ which  
‘is clearly linked to profound cultural differences’ including ‘the perceived requirements of comity (or, in 





willing to enforce jurisdiction agreements as between the parties despite a public law rule 
allocating exclusive jurisdiction to another court appears to perpetuate the notion that the 
courts are only there to serve the private ‘dispute resolution’ needs of the business 
community850 and have little or no regard for the allocative function of private international 
law.851 In this regard, Bomhoff has applied McLachlan’s recent observation that Dicey’s 
conception of the nature of sovereignty and his strict separation between public and private 
law have left much of the common law world ‘relatively underprepared to adopt a coherent 
approach to the extraterritorial rights and duties of states in the present century’852 to 
explain the inward focus of the common law of conflict of laws and its reluctance to easily 
yield to the constitutional function of private international law rules as multilateral 
secondary rules for the allocation of regulatory authority.853 On the other hand, the close 
affinity between jurisdiction agreements and arbitration agreements seems only natural 
within the common law’s ‘dispute resolution’854 focused private international law and given 
the fact that the arbitrators investiture proceeds directly from the will of the parties to the 
contract.   
In view of the distinctly multilateral countervailing ethos of the European Union private 
international law regime’s Brussels I Regulation, it is submitted, that the English proceedings 
                                                          
850 See the High Court of Australia in Pan Foods Co Importers and Distributors Pty Ltd v Australia and New 
Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2000) 170 ALR 579, [24] (Kirby J) discussed in Briggs, Agreements (n 817) 527. 
851 See Alex Mills, The Confluence of Public and Private International Law (CUP 2009). 
852 Campbell McLachlan, ‘The Allocative Function of Foreign Relations Law’ (2013) 84 British Yearbook of 
International Law 349, 356. 
853 Jacco Bomhoff, ‘The Constitution of the Conflict of Laws’ in Horatia Muir Watt and Diego P Fernandez 
Arroyo (eds.), Private International Law and Global Governance (OUP 2014) 262, 267. 
854 Briggs, Agreements (n 817) Preface, viii: ‘The view taken here is that the common law of private 
international law is much more about the resolution of civil disputes than the regulation of civil relations’; 
Horatia Muir Watt, ‘Private International Law Beyond the Schism’ (2011) 2 Transnational Legal Theory 347 (HAL 
Archive, 3 April 2014) <https://hal-sciencespo.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00973084> accessed 1 May 2015, 40; 
Robert Wai, ‘Private v Private: Transnational Private Law and Contestation in Global Economic Governance’ in 
Horatia Muir Watt and Diego P Fernandez Arroyo (eds.), Private International Law and Global Governance (OUP 
2014) 34, 50-52, highlights the existence of a broader range of regulatory concerns behind the ‘smooth’ market 
for international dispute resolution – the distributional consequences of international dispute resolution 
agreements for third parties and weaker contracting parties may be neglected by national courts pro-actively 
seeking to enforce choice of forum and choice of law agreements; H Muir Watt, ‘The Relevance of Private 
International Law to the Global Governance Debate’ in Horatia Muir Watt and Diego P Fernandez Arroyo (eds.), 
Private International Law and Global Governance (OUP 2014) 1; Many scholars have expressed concern that 
party autonomy may enable private parties to evade the regulatory power of states interested in the dispute 
and its consequences: See Muir Watt, Party Autonomy in International Contracts (n 847); Robert Wai, 
‘Transnational Liftoff and Juridical Touchdown: The Regulatory Function of Private International Law in an Era 
of Globalization’ (2001-02) 40 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 209, 218; cf Gilles Cuniberti, ‘The 
Merchant Who Would Not be King: Unreasoned Fears About Private Lawmaking’ in Horatia Muir Watt and 
Diego P Fernandez Arroyo (eds.), Private International Law and Global Governance (OUP 2014) 142. 
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to enforce the private contractual agreement are in fact revisiting the Italian court’s decision 
on the procedural effects of the jurisdiction agreement. 
It is now time to consider the situation where the aggrieved party seeks to recover both 
substantive claw back damages (reflecting any substantive damages awarded to the other 
party in the courts of another Member State) and wasted costs and expenses for defending 
foreign proceedings before the English courts. In order to succeed in the claim for monetary 
compensation, the aggrieved party would have to show that if proceedings had been 
commenced in the English courts, it would have won on the merits. However, for the English 
court to entertain the damages action for breach of the choice of court agreement would be 
tantamount to reconsidering issues already decided by the courts of another Member State. 
Thus, this factual scenario will directly impair the operation of the Brussels I Regulation’s 
regime for the recognition and enforcement of judgments.855 Article 32 of the Brussels I 
Regulation requires an English court to enforce any foreign judgment against the party who 
seeks to recover damages.  
Moreover, allowing a party to recover damages for breach of a jurisdiction agreement 
indirectly impairs the effectiveness of the European jurisdictional regime.856 It qualifies the 
foreign court’s finding that its jurisdiction is not ousted by Article 23. It indirectly undermines 
the principle that the court first seised has exclusive competence to determine the effect of 
a jurisdiction agreement. It also deters the other party from exercising its right to invoke the 
competence-competence of any court in the European Union. The Court of Justice of the EU 
has refused to countenance similar indirect impairments to the integrity of the Brussels I 
Regulation. Any distinction between regulating the conduct of the party who sues in the 
courts of a Member State, and questioning that court’s right to determine its own 
jurisdiction is given short shrift.857 Where another court has found that the jurisdiction 
agreement is invalid or ineffective, any subsequent finding by an English court that the 
claimant abroad is in breach of contract may thus subvert Article 27, if only indirectly. Nor 
may it cohere with the Brussels regime to penalize the infringement of a jurisdiction 
agreement in any way, when the regime refrains from doing so. The Brussels I Regulation 
                                                          
855 Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (2015) (n 817) 120; Fentiman, International Commercial 
Litigation (2010) (n 827) 89; Hartley, Choice-of-Court Agreements Under the European and International 
Instruments (n 817) Chapter 10, 219. 
856 Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (2015) (n 817) 120; Fentiman, International Commercial 
Litigation (2010) (n 827) 89-90. 
857 Turner v. Grovit (Case C-159/02) [2005] ECR I-3565; [2004] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 169; West Tankers Inc v Allianz SpA 
(The Front Comor) (Case C 185/07) [2009] 1 AC 1138. 
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requires a judgment to be enforced even if the enforcing court considers that it was 
obtained in breach of such an agreement.858 
It seems that in every conceivable situation, damages cannot be claimed where the court in 
which the other proceedings were brought was in a Brussels or Lugano State and the case 
comes within the subject-matter scope of the Brussels I Regulation or Lugano Convention. 
Therefore, Briggs’s argument regarding the possible application of the damages remedy in 
the European Judicial Area has very limited prospects of succeeding before the Court of 
Justice of the European Union.859 The principle of mutual trust between the courts of the 
Member States and the effet utile of EU law is high on the list of priorities for the Court of 
Justice, which necessarily limits the likelihood of success of a private law remedy for breach 
of jurisdiction agreements as it may distort the systemic effect of the multilateral and 
constitutional ordering of private law in the EU. A preliminary reference to the CJEU from 
the English courts regarding the legality and legitimacy of the damages remedy, may be 
viewed as yet another attempt to reassert the role of the common law of conflict of laws 
and to circumvent the uniform codified rules of the Brussels I Regulation. 
The next section of this chapter evaluates the role of the damages remedy in the process of 
reform leading up to the finalization of the text of the Recast Regulation and examines the 
amendments to the choice of court agreement provision and the provision on lis pendens. 
 
                                                          
858 Article 33 of the Brussels I Regulation; cf Section 32 of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982: 
Overseas judgments given in proceedings brought in breach of agreement for settlement of disputes shall not 
be recognised or enforced in the United Kingdom. (Geographical Extent: England and Wales, Scotland and 
Northern Ireland); See Hartley, Choice-of-Court Agreements Under the European and International Instruments 
(n 817) 186-187. 
859 See Martin Illmer, ‘Chapter 2 – Article 1’ in Andrew Dickinson and Eva Lein (eds.), The Brussels I Regulation 
Recast (OUP 2015) 79; Gilles Cuniberti and Marta Requejo, ‘La sanction des clauses d'élection de for par l'octroi 
de dommages et intérêts’, ERA Forum 2010-1 (SSRN, February 18, 2010) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1689417> 
or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1689417> accessed October 5, 2014; Hartley, Choice-of-Court Agreements 
Under the European and International Instruments (n 817) Chapter 10, 220; J Harris, ‘Agreements on 
Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: Where Next?’ [2009] LMCLQ 537, 547; Edwin Peel, ‘Introduction’ in Pascal de 
Vareilles-Sommieres (ed.), Forum Shopping in the European Judicial Area (Hart Publishing, Oxford University 
Press 2007) 1, 15-17; Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (2015) (n 817) 115; Fentiman, International 
Commercial Litigation (2010) (n 827) 90; Arnaud Nuyts, ‘The Enforcement of Jurisdiction Agreements Further to 
Gasser and the Community Principle of Abuse of Right’ in Pascal de Vareilles-Sommieres (ed.), Forum Shopping 
in the European Judicial Area (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2007) 57; Petr Briza, ‘Choice-of-court Agreements: Could 
the Hague Choice of Court Agreements Convention and the Reform of the Brussels I Regulation be the way out 
of the Gasser–Owusu Disillusion’? (2009) 5 Journal of Private International Law 537, 548-554; cf Raphael (n 
817) 294; Felix Blobel and Patrick Späth, ‘The Tale of Multilateral Trust and the European Law of Civil 
Procedure’ (2005) 30 European Law Review 528, 545-546, highlight the counterproductive effects of secondary 
remedies on the principle of mutual trust in the European Union. 
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Choice of Court Agreements and the Brussels I Regulation (Recast) 
In April 2009, the EU Commission adopted a Green Paper on the review of the Brussels I 
Regulation, asking interested parties to comment on potential improvements to the 
Regulation, including the role of choice of court agreements. (‘Green Paper’)860 The Green 
Paper emphasized the importance of ensuring that choice of court agreements are accorded 
the fullest possible effect due to their significance in international commerce.861 In 
particular, the need to strengthen choice of court agreements in the event of parallel 
proceedings was highlighted.862 After an extensive public debate on the proposed changes, 
the EU Commission tabled its proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on the jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters (‘Proposal’).863 
The Proposal included two major amendments to the Brussels I Regulation aimed at 
improving the effectiveness of choice of court agreements.864 Where the parties have 
designated a particular court or courts to resolve their dispute, the Proposal gave priority to 
the chosen court to decide on its jurisdiction, regardless of whether it is first or second 
seised.865 Any other court had to stay proceedings until the chosen court had established or 
in case the agreement was invalid declined jurisdiction. This modification was intended to 
augment the effectiveness of choice of court agreements and eliminate the incentives for 
abusive litigation in non-competent courts. Moreover, the proposal introduced a 
harmonised choice of law rule on the substantive validity of choice of court agreements, 
                                                          
860 Green Paper on the review of Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, 21 April 2009, COM (2009) 175 final. See Magnus 
and Mankowski, Brussels I on the Verge of Reform (n 826) 11-16; Ulrich Magnus and Peter Mankowski, ‘Joint 
Response to the Green Paper on the Review of the Brussels I Regulation’ 3.3 Permitting Contractual Remedies 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/0002/contributions/civil_society_ngo_academics_others
/prof_magnus_and_prof_mankowski_university_of_hamburg_en.pdf> accessed 15 February 2014. 
861 Green Paper (n 860) 5. 
862 Ibid. 
863 Proposal for the review of Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, COM (2010) 748 final. See Ulrich Magnus and Peter 
Mankowski, ‘The Proposal for the Reform of Brussels I’ (2011) 110 ZVglRWiss 252, 272-285; Magnus, Choice of 
Court Agreements in the Review Proposal for the Brussels I Regulation (n 826); Burkhard Hess, ‘The Brussels I 
Regulation: Recent Case Law of the Court of Justice and the Commission’s Proposed Recast’ (2012) 49 Common 
Market Law Review 1075, 1100-1112; JM Carruthers, ‘The Brussels I Regulation recast’ [2011] Scots Law Times 
31, 31-32; ZS Tang, ‘Conflicts of Jurisdiction and Party Autonomy in Europe’ (2012) LIX Netherlands 
International Law Review 321, 351-359; Ilaria Queirolo, ‘Prorogation of Jurisdiction in the Proposal for a Recast 
of the Brussels I Regulation’ in Fausto Pocar, Ilaria Viarengo and Francesca C Villata (eds), Recasting Brussels I 
(CEDAM 2012) 183. 




thus ensuring a similar decision on this issue wherever the court seised.866 Both 
modifications reflected the solutions established in the Hague Convention on the Choice of 
Court Agreements, thereby facilitating a possible conclusion of this Convention by the 
European Union.867  
The Council and the European Parliament have adopted all of the proposed amendments 
relating to choice of court agreements, including the most significant changes to the lis 
pendens rules, albeit with some modifications in the Brussels I Regulation (Recast).868 The 
Brussels I Regulation (Recast) was adopted on 12 December 2012 and applies to legal 
proceedings commenced on or after 10 January 2015.869 The new Regulation will have a 
significant impact in augmenting jurisdictional party autonomy and minimizing opportunities 
for abusive tactical ploys in cross border litigation in Europe. Perhaps the most significant of 
these reforms in relation to choice of court agreements at least is the reversal of the effects 
of the CJEU’s notorious decision in Erich Gasser Gmbh v MISAT Srl.870 This section will 
examine the amendments to the choice of court agreement provisions in the Recast 
Regulation. 
Before venturing into the details of the new choice of court agreement provisions in the 
Brussels I Regulation (Recast), it may be useful to consider whether contractual remedies for 
breach of choice of court agreements have had any role to play in the reform process. Anti-
suit injunctions restraining proceedings in the courts of EU Member states have already 
been decommissioned by the CJEU as an affront to the principle of mutual trust.871 However, 
the demise of the anti-suit injunction in the EU has led some English common law academics 
to suggest that damages may be awarded for breach of choice of court agreements.872 The 
damages remedy has also found support in the decisions of the superior courts of England 
and the Spanish Tribunal Supremo.873  The Heidelberg Report on the application of the 
                                                          
866 Ibid. 
867 Ibid. 
868 Council Regulation (EU) 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast) [2012] 
OJ L351/1; See Andrew Bowen, ‘New Brussels I Regulation and Choice of Court Agreements’ (2014) 24 Scots 
Law Times 99. 
869 Article 81 of the Brussels I Regulation (Recast). 
870 Erich Gasser Gmbh v MISAT Srl Case C-116/02 [2004] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 222. 
871 See Turner v. Grovit (Case C-159/02) [2005] ECR I-3565; [2004] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 169; Allianz SpA (formerly 
Riunione Adriatica di Sicurta SpA) v. West Tankers Inc (The Front Comor) (Case C-185/07) [2009] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 
413. 
872 See Briggs, Agreements (n 817) Chapter 8. 
873 See Union Discount Co Ltd v Zoller and Others [2001] EWCA Civ 1755, [2002] 1 WLR 1517; Donohue v Armco 
Inc [2001] UKHL 64, [2002] 1 All ER 749; Sogo USA Inc v Angel Jesus, STS (Sala de lo Civil, Sección 1ª), 12 January 
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Brussels I Regulation alludes to the possibility of awarding damages for breach of choice of 
court agreements:874 
Exclusion of Anti-Suit Injunctions – Exclusion of Damages? 
An additional support to the efficiency of jurisdiction agreements may be achieved by 
granting damages for breach of that agreement. An alternative might be to refer the 
parties to collateral agreements securing compliance with the jurisdictional system, 
in particular with choice of forum agreements, in that the parties agree to 
compensate the costs of proceedings instituted with a court lacking jurisdiction 
including follow up damages e.g. arising from the delay or the exercise of default 
clauses in loan agreements. The judgment of the ECJ in Turner excluding anti-suit 
injunctions issued by a court purporting to avoid “abusive” proceedings does not 
seem to directly exclude the possibility of such collateral undertakings between the 
parties and their enforcement by the courts. However, the issue appears not to be 
fully explored.   
Thus the Heidelberg Report suggests that damages may be awarded for breach of a choice of 
court agreement in order to act as a deterrent and secure compliance with the agreement. 
Collateral agreements awarding damages for breach of the choice of court agreement are 
also mentioned. It is submitted that such collateral agreements being independent and not a 
constituent part of the choice of court agreement may offer an alternative route to the 
award of the damages as compensation for Member States of the EU that rely on a 
‘procedural contract’ conception of choice of court agreements. The ‘procedural contract’ 
conception of choice of court agreements conceives the function of such agreements as 
primarily focused on invoking the jurisdiction of a court without giving rise to an 
independent and subsisting contractual obligation to sue only in the nominated forum. The 
independent collateral agreement will circumvent the procedural limitations of the choice of 
court agreement and award damages for breach of choice of court agreements. However, it 
is argued in the course of this chapter that when a preliminary reference on the issue of the 
compatibility of the damages remedy with the Brussels-Lugano regime is sent to the CJEU for 
clarification, it is likely that the damages remedy may too succumb to the same fate as anti-
suit injunctions. 
The Green Paper also mentioned the award of damages for breach of choice of court 
agreements as one of the options to pursue in the reform of the Brussels I Regulation:875 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
2009, Repertorio de Jurisprudencia 2009/544 (Spanish Tribunal Supremo); Starlight Shipping Co v Allianz 
Marine & Aviation Versicherungs AG (The Alexandros T) [2014] EWCA Civ 1010 (Authority for damages remedy 
under the Brussels I Regulation). 
874 The Heidelberg Report (n 823) para [407], page 117. 
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The efficiency of jurisdiction agreements could also be strengthened by the granting 
of damages for breach of such agreements, arising for instance from the delay or the 
exercise of default clauses in loan agreements.    
Legal practitioners in England voiced mixed opinions on the damages remedy. The General 
Council of the Bar of England and Wales expressed a view in favour of the remedy:876 
Damages. The Green Paper suggests that “the efficiency of jurisdiction agreements 
could also be strengthened by the granting of damages for breach of such 
agreements”. The Bar Council endorses this suggestion. A party should not be able to 
breach his contract by litigating in another forum than the chosen forum without 
suffering the contractual consequences. The right to damages should be enshrined in 
Community law and, subject to the principle of effectiveness of such law, the 
assessment of such damages could be left to the law of the forum.  
However, the Law Society of England and Wales expressed a view against it.877 The European 
Union Committee of the United Kingdom House of Lords also expressed a view against 
enshrining the damages remedy in the Brussels I Regulation.878 
It has been argued that allowing contractual remedies for breach of choice of court 
agreements would bolster the strength and force of such agreements.879 At present it is not 
clear whether a collateral clause for liquidated880 damages or a genuine penalty clause 
would be upheld in the light of the CJEU’s decision in Turner v Grovit.881 In similar vein, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
875 Green Paper (n 860) 5. 
876 Bar Council of England and Wales, ‘Response of the Bar Council of England and Wales to the Commission’s 
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879 Magnus and Mankowski, Brussels I on the Verge of Reform (n 826) 13. 
880 See HG Beale, ‘Damages’ in HG Beale and others (eds), Chitty on Contracts (Volume I, 31st Edition, Sweet and 
Maxwell, London 2012) Chapter 26, 1761: The term liquidated damages is applied where the damages have 
been agreed and fixed by the parties in a way which complies with the criteria developed by the courts for the 
validity of penalty clauses. 
881 Peter Mankowski, ‘Ist eine vertragliche Absicherung von Gerichtsstandsvereinbarungen möglich?’ (2009) 
IPRax, 23-35; Magnus and Mankowski, Brussels I on the Verge of Reform (n 826) 13; Magnus and Mankowski, 
Joint Response to the Green Paper (n 826) 8-9. 
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recognition of a cause of action of damages for breach of jurisdiction agreements would 
create a massive incentive for parties to stay loyal to the agreement.882 
However, an EC law remedy for ‘breach’ of choice of court agreements strays into the realm 
of substantive contract law and would appear outside the Community’s competence under 
Title IV of the Treaty.883 It would also promote satellite litigation, increasing costs and the 
potential for conflict between Member State judgments.884 
The Proposal does not address the issue of remedies for breach of choice of court 
agreements.885 There is a view that it is doubtful whether damages can be awarded for 
breach of a choice of court agreement, unless the parties have expressly stipulated 
liquidated damages or a penalty for such a breach.886 The dichotomy between exclusive 
choice of court agreements as substantive contracts to sue only in the nominated forum and 
choice of court agreements as procedural contracts exclusively concerned with the 
procedural relationship between the parties has led to a debate regarding the legal basis of 
the damages remedy in the EU.887 Under Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation the issue of 
damages for breach of a choice of court agreement is unresolved.888 A preliminary reference 
on the point would help clarify matters but the likelihood of the contractual remedy 
surviving an inquisition by the CJEU of its compatibility with the Brussels-Lugano regime is 
minimal.  
The first area of reform in relation to choice of court agreements in the Brussels I Regulation 
(Recast) focusses on reversing the effects of the ‘Italian torpedo’. The ‘Italian torpedo’ is an 
abusive litigation tactic that relies on a combination of the Brussels I Regulation’s first come 
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first served rule on lis pendens889 and the protracted delays in proceedings that occur in 
certain EU Member States with slow moving civil justice systems to allow unscrupulous 
litigants to block proceedings against them in other Member States. The lis pendens rule 
applies where proceedings involving the same cause of action and between the same parties 
are brought in the courts of different Member States. Article 27 of the Brussels I Regulation 
requires the court second seised to stay its own proceedings before it until the jurisdiction of 
the court first seised is established. If the court first seised concludes that it has jurisdiction, 
the other court must decline jurisdiction. 
The ‘Italian torpedo’ was the brainchild of an Italian avvocato, Mario Franzosi, who 
conceived it as a tactic by which patent infringers could effectively block proceedings against 
them in other Member States.890 Mario Franzosi’s idea was that persons facing imminent 
patent infringement actions could protect themselves by pre-empting and commencing 
proceedings in Italy for a declaration of non-liability. Under Article 27 of the Brussels I 
Regulation proceedings for a declaration of non-liability in one Member State and 
proceedings for the positive assertion of liability in another Member State have the same 
cause of action.891 Thus the lis pendens rule effectively blocks proceedings for a patent 
infringement action in any Member State other than the court first seised. Even if the party 
relying on the torpedo tactic is eventually bound to lose on the merits of the case, the Italian 
proceedings could continue for many years, thus buying time to negotiate a settlement. It 
did not matter if the Italian courts lacked jurisdiction, since it would take a long time indeed 
for a definitive ruling to this effect to be obtained.892 
The legitimacy of the torpedo tactic came before the Court of Justice of the EU in the 
notorious case of Erich Gasser v MISAT.893 Gasser was an Austrian firm which entered into a 
contract with MISAT, an Italian company, under which Gasser sold children’s clothing to 
MISAT. A choice of court agreement selected a court in Austria. When a dispute arose, 
MISAT had the first strike and brought proceedings before a court in Italy, claiming that the 
contract had been terminated and that it had not breached it. After the Italian court was 
seised, Gasser brought proceedings before the Austrian court selected in the choice of court 
                                                          
889 Article 27 of the Brussels I Regulation. 
890 Franzosi (n 821). 
891 Gubisch Maschinenfabrik KG v Palumbo (Case C-144/86) [1987] ECR 4861; The Tatry (Case C-406/92) [1999] 
QB 515. 
892 See Transport Castelletti v Hugo Trumpy (C-159/97) [1999] ECR I-1597: The Italian court in this case took 
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agreement. MISAT claimed that these proceedings were precluded as a result of its prior 
action in Italy. 
The case was referred to the Court of Justice of the EU by an Austrian appeal court. The main 
issue was the relationship between the lis pendens894 provision and the provision on choice 
of court agreements.895 The provision on choice of court agreements stated that the court 
designated by such agreements ‘shall have exclusive jurisdiction’ but what if another court is 
seised first? Is a court elected in a choice of court agreement required to stay proceedings 
whilst the court first seised rules on its jurisdiction including the validity and effectiveness of 
the choice of court agreement? The courts of Member States of the EU with slow moving 
civil justice systems would compound the problem by blocking proceedings for a protracted 
length of time. The United Kingdom government made submissions that the designated 
court should be entitled to decide these questions for itself and if it finds that the choice of 
court agreement is valid, effective and covers the case, it should go ahead without waiting 
for the other court to terminate the proceedings before it. 
The CJEU held that the nominated court must stay the proceedings before it until the court 
first seised has established that it has no jurisdiction.896 It makes no difference if the court 
first seised is a Member State where legal proceedings take an inordinately long period of 
time.897 The court designated in a choice of court agreement may also not consider whether 
the proceedings in the court first seised were brought in bad faith as a delaying tactic.898 The 
ruling in Gasser seriously jeopardized the effectiveness of choice of court agreements in the 
EU.899 Some commentators even suggested that the decision would lead to a general 
preference for arbitration over litigation in the European Judicial Area.900 
The amendments to the Brussels I Regulation (Recast) reversing the effects of the Gasser 
decision were subject to considerable discussion.901 The main provision on lis pendens902 is 
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now subject to Article 31(2) of the Recast Regulation. It may be of use to reproduce Articles 
31(2) to 31(4) of the Recast Regulation for the sake of illustration:903 
2. Without prejudice to Article 26, where a court of a Member State on which an 
agreement as referred to in Article 25 confers exclusive jurisdiction is seised, any 
court of another Member State shall stay the proceedings until such time as the 
court seised on the basis of the agreement declares that it has no jurisdiction under 
the agreement.  
3. Where the court designated in the agreement has established jurisdiction in 
accordance with the agreement, any court of another Member State shall decline 
jurisdiction in favour of that court.  
4. Paragraphs 2 and 3 shall not apply to matters referred to in Sections 3, 4 or 5 
where the policyholder, the insured, a beneficiary of the insurance contract, the 
injured party, the consumer or the employee is the claimant and the agreement is 
not valid under a provision contained within those Sections. 
Article 31(2) is the provision which expressly overrides the lis pendens rule. It is itself subject 
to Article 26 which incorporates the principle of voluntary submission to jurisdiction.904 
Article 25 is the new provision on choice of court agreements.905 The result is that Article 
31(2) provides that where an exclusive jurisdiction agreement selects the courts of a 
Member State, a court in another Member State even if it was seised first must stay 
proceedings until such time as the selected court declares that it does not possess 
jurisdiction pursuant to a choice of court agreement. The selected court would declare that 
it lacked jurisdiction under a choice of court agreement if the clause was invalid or did not 
cover the dispute. Article 31(3) provides that where the selected court finds that it has 
jurisdiction pursuant to the choice of court agreement, courts in other Member States must 
give up jurisdiction. 
Article 31(2) thus enshrines a reverse lis pendens rule in that the court first seised must stay 
proceedings in deference to the selected court. The elected court determines the validity of 
the choice of court agreement. Article 25(1) provides that the substantive validity of a 
jurisdiction agreement is to be decided by the law of the designated court including its 
private international law rules. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
agreements goes beyond the solution adopted by the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (30 
June, 2005) as it creates a rule on conflicts of jurisdiction (lis pendens) which accords priority to the chosen 
court. This is one example where the Brussels I Regulation will be able to make deference to party autonomy 
greater within the European Judicial Area than is possible globally under the Hague Convention.  
902 Article 29(1) of the Brussels I Regulation (Recast). 
903 Articles 31(2), 31(3) and 31(4) of the Brussels I Regulation (Recast). 
904 Article 24 of the Brussels I Regulation. 
905 Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation. 
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Recital 22 clarifies that the designated court “has priority to decide on the validity of the 
agreement and on the extent to which the agreement applies to the dispute pending before 
it”, even if it is second seised and even if the other court has not already decided on the stay 
of proceedings.906 Where, however, there is a conflict as to whether both courts have been 
chosen, then the court first seised will determine the validity of the jurisdiction clause.907   
The result is that under the Recast Regulation, the ‘Italian torpedo’ will no longer preclude 
the nominated court in a jurisdiction agreement from hearing the case, even if another 
Member State court was seised first, and even if the latter court has not stayed the 
proceedings before it. 
The risk of the solution adopted by the Recast Regulation was outlined by Advocate General 
Leger in his Opinion in Gasser.908 He thought that such a solution might encourage delaying 
tactics by an unscrupulous party by alleging the existence of an agreement and bringing an 
action before the court allegedly chosen in order deliberately to delay judgment until that 
court had declared that it had no jurisdiction. The central issue is whether there is an 
agreement or disagreement to the jurisdiction of a court?909 Briggs doubts whether we are 
justified in assuming, even generally and provisionally, that the party seeking to rely on a 
choice of court agreement is the one more likely to have right on his side.910 He laments 
common law academics and the Heidelberg Report for letting the allegedly chosen court to 
go first as this solution is not axiomatic.911 Thus the presumption created in favour of party 
autonomy as an exception to the lis pendens mechanism presupposes the existence of a 
valid and effective choice of court agreement where they may be none.  
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Briggs, ‘What should be done about Jurisdiction Agreements’ (2010) 12 Yearbook of Private International Law 
311, 319-322; Tena Ratkovic´ and Dora Zgrabljic´ Rotar, ‘Choice-of-Court Agreements under the Brussels I 
Regulation (Recast)’ (2013) 9 Journal of Private International Law 245, 263-265; Queirolo (n 863) 195; Justin P 
Cook, ‘Pragmatism in the European Union: Recasting the Brussels I Regulation to Ensure the Effectiveness of 
Exclusive Choice-of-Court Agreements’ (2013) 4 Aberdeen Student Law Review 76, 85; Briza (n 859) 556-559 cf 
Trevor C Hartley, ‘Choice-of-Court Agreements and the New Brussels I Regulation’ (2013) 129 LQR 309, 312-
313. 
909 Briggs, What should be done about Jurisdiction Agreements? (n 908) 319; Adrian Briggs, ‘The Brussels I bis 
Regulation Appears on the Horizon’ [2011] LMCLQ 157, 162-164. 
910 Briggs, What should be done about Jurisdiction Agreements? (n 908) 322; Briggs, The Brussels I bis 
Regulation Appears on the Horizon (n 909) 164. 
911 Briggs, What should be done about Jurisdiction Agreements? (n 908) 322; Briggs, The Brussels I bis 
Regulation Appears on the Horizon (n 909) 162. 
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In relation to the operation of the Article 31(2), the obligation on the non-designated court 
to stay proceedings arises only if the other court actually is nominated.912 This essentially 
means that there is a dispute before the non-designated court as to whether there actually 
is a choice of court agreement. The obligation to stay does not come into operation on the 
mere empty claims of one of the parties as to the existence of a valid and effective 
jurisdiction agreement.913 Something more substantial than empty claims is needed. 
However, the non-designated court cannot decide for itself whether the choice of court 
agreement is valid, effective and covers the dispute.914 Recital 22 expressly states that the 
nominated court has priority to adjudicate on these issues. This leaves the non-designated 
court with room to decide whether the claim that another court has been selected is entirely 
spurious. It can therefore require the party requesting a stay to present a prima facie case915 
that there was a choice of court agreement electing the court in question.916 Once the 
standard of a prima facie case is met, the stay should be granted.  However, it may be 
questioned whether a prima facie case that there was a choice of court agreement selecting 
the court would actually help where there was a genuine dispute as to the validity and 
effectiveness of the jurisdiction agreement requiring detailed examination. It may be that 
the court first seised where the prima facie case is made out has a genuine claim to 
jurisdiction in the event that the designated court eventually decides that there was no valid 
and effective choice of court agreement in the first place. Therefore, reducing the scope for 
abusive tactical litigation in the guise of the ‘Italian torpedo’ may give rise to a new breed of 
torpedoes where the presumption in favour of party autonomy is abused to advance the 
interests of litigants seeking to exploit the international civil procedural lacunas in the new 
Brussels I Regulation (Recast). 
The potential problems posed by sham agreements giving rise to the new breed of 
torpedoes are exacerbated by the non-adoption of a six month rule for the nominated court 
to determine its jurisdiction under a choice of court agreement.917 Breaches of the six month 
                                                          
912 Hartley, Choice-of-Court Agreements and the New Brussels I Regulation (n 908) 312. 
913 Ibid 313. 
914 Ibid. 
915 Prima facie [from Latin prima facies, first appearance] A case that has been supported by sufficient evidence 
for it to be taken as proved should there be no adequate evidence to the contrary. See Jonathan Law and 
Elizabeth A Martin (ed.), Oxford Dictionary of Law (7th Edition, OUP 2009). 
916 Hartley, Choice-of-Court Agreements and the New Brussels I Regulation (n 908) 313. 
917 Ratkovic´ and Rotar (n 908) 264-265; Briggs, What should be done about Jurisdiction Agreements? (n 908) 




rule could potentially be enforced by the CJEU against Member States918 through either 
infringement proceedings919 or the doctrine of state liability.920 However, implementing a 
strict six month rule without an EU wide uniform procedure to dispose of jurisdictional 
challenges could give rise to intractable difficulty. A clear distinction between preliminary 
matters of jurisdiction and the substance of the dispute does not exist in the civil procedural 
rules of some Member States. Given the fact that some civil procedural regimes of Member 
States require the simultaneous evaluation of questions of jurisdiction and the substance of 
the claim,921 the six month rule seems unrealistic. The concept of variable geometry in a 
multi speed Europe also militates against the imposition of a timeframe rule. The 
comparative state of civil justice922 in the Member States of the EU varies considerably and 
may not as yet allow a timeframe rule without the EU first regulating preliminary matters of 
jurisdiction to a degree and providing the necessary institutional support to implement such 
a rule. 
The lacuna permitting reliance on sham agreements giving rise to a new breed of torpedoes 
may just grant the damages remedy for breach of exclusive jurisdiction agreements a new 
lease of life under the Brussels I Regulation (Recast). In cases where the allegedly chosen 
court is not actually nominated, that court being seised will still have the kompetenz-
kompetenz or procedural jurisdiction to adjudicate on the validity of the choice of court 
agreement. The defendant in those proceedings may then claim the wasted costs and 
expenses as damages for breach of an exclusive jurisdiction agreement in the nominated 
court. As observed, the prospects of a preliminary reference regarding the legality and 
legitimacy of the claim for damages succeeding before the Court of Justice of the EU are 
minimal. However, even though the preponderance of juristic opinion points away from the 
                                                          
918 Case C-224/01 Gerhard Köbler v Republic of Austria [2003] ECR I-10239, paras 30–50; See Marten Breuer, 
‘State Liability for Judicial Wrongs and Community Law: the Case Gerhard Kobler v Austria’ in Guy Canivet and 
others (eds), Independence, Accountability and the Judiciary (BIICL 2006). 
919 Article 258 TFEU. 
920 Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v Federal Republic of Germany and The Queen v 
Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd and Others [1996] ECR I-01029, para 32. 
921 Heidelberg Report (n 823) paras [170]-[171], pages 49-50. 
922 See Dickinson, A Charter for Tactical Litigation in Europe? (n 822) 278-280: Professor Dickinson states that in 
reports completed in 2003 on the judicial systems of seven of the 10 accession states, the EU Commission 
identified difficulties in various areas, including the length of judicial proceedings, public confidence in the 
judiciary and judicial corruption. Thus, the mutual trust principle may open avenues for abuse and tactical 
litigation as the ground realities in the courts of the EU Member States vary considerably. See ‘2003 Monitoring 
Reports for Accession States Prepared by the EU Commission’ (Europa.eu) 
<http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2003/index.htm> accessed 15 June 2014; For a recent 
critical survey of the comparative state of the civil justice systems of the EU Member States as an impediment 
to enhanced mutual trust, see, Matthias Weller, ‘Mutual trust: in search of the future of European Union 
private international law’ (2015) 11 Journal of Private International Law 64, 66-67. 
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use of the remedy, the issue is still unresolved in the context of the Brussels I Regulation and 
may continue to be for some time at least under the Recast Regulation. Therefore, for the 
time being, the pragmatic concerns of a litigant seeking redress for breach of an exclusive 
choice of court agreement may be answered with compensation in the form of an award of 
damages.   
Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation does not contain an express provision on the 
substantive validity of a choice of court agreement.923 However, the new Brussels I 
Regulation (Recast) applies the law of the forum prorogatum including its rules of private 
international law to the issue of the substantive validity of a choice of court agreement.924 
Under the new Article 25(1) the elected court shall have jurisdiction ‘unless the agreement is 
null and void as to its substantive validity under the law of that Member State‘.925 The policy 
basis animating the selection of the law of the chosen court including its choice of law rules 
is to render the Brussels I Regulation (Recast) compatible with the Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements. The wording of the rules for substantive validity for choice of 
court agreements in the both instruments is almost identical.926 This has facilitated the 
approval of the Hague Convention by the European Union and ensures the consistent 
treatment of issues of substantive validity of choice of court agreements under both the 
Recast Regulation and under the Hague Convention.927 
                                                          
923 See Beaumont and McEleavy (n 901) Chapter 8, 249-255; Briggs, Agreements (n 817) Chapter 7; Tang, 
Jurisdiction and Arbitration Agreements (n 818) Chapter 2, 22-25; cf Louise Merrett, ‘Article 23 of the Brussels I 
Regulation: A Comprehensive Code for Jurisdiction Agreements?’ (2009) 58 ICLQ 545, argues that the 
requirements of Article 23 are both necessary and sufficient conditions for the material validity of jurisdiction 
agreements in Brussels I Regulation cases and if any other tool is needed to deal with cases where the 
jurisdiction agreement itself is directly impeached, a Community notion of good faith is the appropriate way to 
deal with such cases; Andrew Dickinson, ‘Surveying the Proposed Brussels I bis Regulation – Solid Foundations 
but Renovation Needed’ (2010) 12 Yearbook of Private International Law 247, 301, contends that a solution to 
the issue is unnecessary and that the CJEU has already achieved a high level of legal certainty by affirming that 
the consent of the parties is to be determined solely by reference to the requirements of Article 23 of the 
Brussels I Regulation. Moreover, Dickinson argues that the new provision should not be used by Member State 
courts to permit a challenge to the validity of choice of court agreements on grounds which the CJEU has 
interpreted autonomously, i.e. CJEU jurisprudence should not be reversed; Catherine Kessedjian, 
‘Commentaire de la refonte du règlement n° 44/2001’ (2011) 47 Revue trimestrielle de droit européen 117, 126-
127, foresees that the introduction of a choice of law element into the substantive validity of jurisdiction 
agreements will have the knock on effect of increasing the number of disputes concerning the validity of such 
agreements; A Briggs, Private International Law in English Courts (OUP 2014) 251-252, terms the reference to 
the law of the chosen court including its private international law rules to assess matters of substantive validity 
as ‘retrograde’. 
924 Article 25(1) and Recital 20 of the Brussels I Regulation (Recast). 
925 Ibid. 
926 Article 25(1) of the Brussels I Regulation (Recast); Article 5(1) of the Hague Convention. 
927 Adopted at the 20th Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, The Hague, 30th June 
2005; On 1 October 2015, the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements entered into force in 28 States 
(Mexico and all Member States of the EU, except Denmark). The Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments (Hague 
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According to Recital 20 of the Brussels I Regulation (Recast) the reference to the nominated 
court’s law includes both its substantive law and its choice of law rules. Therefore it is clear 
that the inclusion of renvoi within the new Article 25 is intended and the question whether a 
choice of court agreement is materially valid is therefore to be ascertained under the 
substantive law to which the choice of law rules of the Member State of the chosen court 
refer.928 
Some academic commentators question whether renvoi should be applied in determining 
the substantive validity of a choice of court agreement.929 They argue that contractual 
relations governed by party autonomy should exclude renvoi from the application of choice 
of law rules.930 The exclusion of renvoi from the choice of law regimes of the Rome I931 and 
Rome II932 Regulations is evidence that certainty and predictability may be compromised by 
the application of renvoi. However, in some cases it would be unreasonable to apply the 
substantive law of the forum prorogatum to the issue of capacity.933 The forum chosen by 
the parties is often due to its neutrality and efficient dispute resolution and the chosen 
forum may have a tenuous connection with the actual dispute. In such cases it may be 
preferable to apply the choice of law rules of the chosen forum to determine the capacity of 
a party to enter into a choice of court agreement. The application of renvoi in these cases 
will lead to the application of a law closely connected to the dispute. In similar vein, where 
the parties have made an express choice of law that differs from the substantive law usually 
applied before the forum prorogatum, renvoi to the chosen law should be applied to respect 
the principle of party autonomy.934 On the other hand, in cases of fraud, duress and the plea 
of non est factum, it is not clear how renvoi can help in determining the substantive validity 
of a choice of court agreement. The substantive law of the chosen court may provide an 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 2005) Regulations 2015, SI 2015/1644, have brought the Hague 
Convention into force in the UK. 
928 For a discussion of renvoi, see Lawrence Collins and others (eds), Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of 
Laws (Sweet & Maxwell 2012) Chapter 4; JJ Fawcett and JM Carruthers, Cheshire North and Fawcett: Private 
International Law (OUP 2008) Chapter 5; Beaumont and McEleavy (n 901) Chapter 4, 100-109. 
929 Hess (n 863) 1107; Peter Hay, ‘Notes on the European Union’s Brussels-I “Recast” Regulation’ (2013) 13 The 
European Legal Forum 1, 3; K Takahashi, ‘Damages for Breach of a Choice of Court Agreement: Remaining 
Issues’ [2009] Yearbook of Private International Law 73, 85; Briggs, Private International Law in English Courts 
(923) 252. 
930 Peter E Nygh, Autonomy in International Contracts (Oxford Private International Law Series, OUP 1999) 83-
84. 
931 Article 20 of Regulation 593/2008 EC on the law applicable to contractual obligations [2008] OJ L177/6 
(‘Rome I Regulation’). 
932 Article 24 of Regulation 864/2007 EC on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations [2007] OJ L199/40 
(‘Rome II Regulation’). 
933 Ratkovic´ and Rotar (n 908) 258. 
934 Beaumont and McEleavy (n 901) Chapter 8, 254-255. 
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appropriate legal regime to govern these issues, making a reference to the choice of law 
rules of the chosen court unnecessary. The factors pointing away from the law of the forum 
prorogatum in the case of matters of capacity may not exert the same pull in relation to 
issues of fraud, duress and the plea of non est factum. Indeed, the law of a neutral forum 
may negative any advantage available under a law closely connected to the dispute such as 
the lex causae of the main contract. The doctrines of severability935 and Dépeçage936 allow 
the choice of court agreement to be governed by a law separate from the law governing the 
substantive contract. In fact a separate law governing the choice of court agreement may 
ensure the continued validity of such agreements where the entire contract is impeached. 
Difficult issues of proof of foreign law arise with the application of the doctrine of renvoi. 
Unlike civil law legal systems, foreign law is a question of fact in the English common law.937 
Therefore, the party relying on foreign law is required to plead and prove the content of 
foreign law.938 When applying the doctrine of renvoi, evidence of the foreign rules on renvoi 
and foreign choice of law rules have to be pleaded and proved in the English common law 
courts.939 In civil law legal systems, evidence of the foreign choice of law rules will suffice for 
the application of the doctrine of renvoi.940 However, an inherent advantage of the English 
common law treating issues of proof of foreign law as questions of fact is that the parties 
can choose not to rely on the foreign law by not pleading it.941 English law as lex fori is 
applied instead.942 Secondly, the English courts usually apply English law as a fallback where 
the content of the foreign law is not proved.943 An analogy can be drawn between the 
parties not relying on the foreign law and a delayed choice of English law to govern the 
dispute.944 A flexible approach to proof of foreign law in English courts may help the litigants 
ignore the doctrine renvoi altogether by not pleading and proving the lex causae.  
                                                          
935 Article 25(5) of the Brussels I Regulation (Recast); Article 3(d) of the Hague Convention. 
936 See ‘Dépeçage’ (‘Splitting the applicable law’): See Article 3(1) of the Rome I Regulation and the Rome 
Convention; Collins, Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Laws (n 928) Chapter 32, 1789-1792; Beaumont 
and McEleavy (n 901) Chapter 10, 454-455. 
937 Adrian Briggs, The Conflict of Laws (3rd Edition, OUP 2013) Chapter 1, 7-13. 
938 Ibid. 
939 Hartley, Choice of Court Agreements (n 817) Chapter 7, 165-167: Reference to the “foreign court” or “double 
renvoi” or “total renvoi” theory adopted by England and many other common law countries.  
940 Ibid: Reference to the “single renvoi” theory adopted by France and Germany. 
941 Briggs, The Conflict of Laws (n 937). 
942 Ibid. 
943 Ibid. 
944 See Article 3(2) of the Rome I Regulation and the Rome Convention; Collins, Dicey, Morris and Collins on the 
Conflict of Laws (n 928) Chapter 32, 1805-1806; Beaumont and McEleavy (n 901) Chapter 10, 455-456. 
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The Rome I Regulation does not apply to choice of court agreements.945 National choice of 
law rules will govern the issue of the substantive validity of a choice of court agreement.946 
The lack of harmonization of national choice of law rules may lead to uncertainty in the 
determination of the applicable law of the choice of court agreement. For instance, in 
English law the ‘proper law’ of the choice of court agreement, which is quite often the lex 
causae of the substantive contract, applies.947 The proper law is the term which was used at 
common law to signify the law by which the validity of the contract was tested, and is used 
in this context to acknowledge that the identification of the law which governs a choice of 
court agreement is a matter for the common law rules of the conflict of laws. 
The Brussels I Regulation (Recast) includes a new provision on the severability of choice of 
court agreements:948   
An agreement conferring jurisdiction which forms part of a contract shall be treated 
as an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract.  
The validity of the agreement conferring jurisdiction cannot be contested solely on 
the ground that the contract is not valid. 
Severability of choice of court agreements was established by the CJEU jurisprudence even 
prior to the explicit provision in the Recast Regulation.949 In Benincasa v Dentalkit the CJEU 
found that a void provision of the contract does not render the choice of court agreement 
void as well.950 
The technique of severability serves to insulate or protect the choice of court agreement 
from the invalidity of the main contract. A challenge to the existence and validity of the 
substantive contract will not on its own impugn the existence and validity of the choice of 
court agreement. However, a specific attack on the existence and validity of the choice of 
court agreement may impeach it. The doctrines of severability and Dépeçage allow the 
                                                          
945 Article 1(2)(e) of the Rome I Regulation; Article 1(2)(d) of the Rome Convention; See Mario Giuliano and Paul 
Lagarde, ‘Report on the Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations’ [1980] OJ C282/1, 11-12; 
Collins, Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Laws (n 928) Chapter 32, 1788; Beaumont and McEleavy (n 
901) Chapter 10, 434-439. 
946 Heidelberg Report (n 823) paras [326]-[327] page 92. 
947 Collins, Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Laws (n 928) Chapter 12, 603-604; Joseph (n 817) 182; 
Briggs, The Conflict of Laws (n 937) 231; See Sulamerica CIA Nacional de Seguros SA and others v Enesa 
Engenharia SA and others [2012] EWCA Civ 638, [2012] 1 All ER (Comm) 795. 
948 Article 25(5) of the Brussels I Regulation (Recast). 
949 Case C-214/89, Powell Duffryn plc v Wolfgang Petereit [1992] ECR I-01745; Case C-269/95, Francesco 
Benincasa v Dentalkit Srl [1997] ECR I-03767; Case C-159/97 Trasporti Castelletti Spedizioni Internazionali SpA v 
Hugo Trumpy SpA [1999] ECR I-01597. 
950 Francesco Benincasa v Dentalkit Srl, (n 913), [24]–[29]. See also Trasporti Castelletti Spedizioni 
Internazionali SpA v Hugo Trumpy SpA, (n 913), [34], [49], [51]. 
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choice of court agreement to be governed by a law separate from the law governing the 
substantive contract. In fact a separate law governing the choice of court agreement may 
ensure the continued validity of such agreements where the entire contract is impugned. 
The principles of party autonomy and legal certainty provide the justification and legal basis 
for the technique of severability. 
According to Article 23(1) of the Brussels I Regulation, at least one of the parties has to be 
domiciled in an EU Member State for the provision to apply. The other connecting factor for 
the operation of Article 23 is that the courts of an EU Member State have to be the 
designated court. The new Brussels I Regulation (Recast) provides:951 
If the parties, regardless of their domicile, have agreed that a court or the courts of a 
Member State are to have jurisdiction to settle any disputes which have arisen or 
which may arise in connection with a particular legal relationship, that court or those 
courts shall have jurisdiction……… 
Thus, under the Brussels I Regulation (Recast) two non EU residents can choose a Member 
State court and if that choice is valid under the rules of the Regulation, the designated court 
will have jurisdiction over the dispute. This amendment reflects deference to the principle of 
party autonomy as the constraint of at least one of the parties being domiciled in the EU is 
shed. The result is that the scope of application of Article 25 has widened. 
It is to be seen how the amendments to the choice of court agreement provisions in the 
Brussels I Regulation (Recast) fare before the CJEU and the national courts of the EU 
Member States. Under the Recast Regulation, the designated court in an exclusive choice of 
court agreement will have jurisdiction and all other courts are required to stay and 
eventually decline jurisdiction. The strengthening of choice of court agreements affected by 
reversing the lis pendens mechanism in favour of party autonomy should be welcomed. 
However, if there is a genuine conflict in relation to the existence and validity of the choice 
of court agreement, it may be difficult to apply a rule which makes a presumption in favour 
of party autonomy. Sham agreements on jurisdiction may be used to seise a court and block 
proceedings for a substantial amount of time in other courts of competent jurisdiction. The 
torpedo may thus survive by donning the guise of a sham jurisdiction clause choosing the 
courts of an EU Member State with a slow moving civil justice system. It has been argued in 
this section that the damages remedy for breach of choice of court agreements may 
continue to be of relevance under the Brussels I Regulation (Recast) by providing disgruntled 
                                                          
951 Article 25(1) of the Brussels I Regulation (Recast) (Emphasis added). 
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litigants with compensation. The lack of CJEU authority on this contentious issue may 
therefore permit the continued use of this contractual remedy to render pragmatic solutions 
for the European conflicts of jurisdictions.  
In relation to the choice of law rule on the substantive validity of a choice of court 
agreement, the application of the rules of renvoi may give rise to uncertainty. Another, 
arguably, practical concern is the difficult proof of foreign law issues arising from the 
application of renvoi. These issues may cause delay and increased expense in the 
determination of the applicable law of a choice of court agreement. However, this does not 
detract from the benefits associated with subjecting the material validity of a jurisdiction 
agreement to the national law of a Member States of the EU.     
It has been observed that the damages remedy for breach of an exclusive choice of court 
agreement is as yet untested in the context of the Brussels I Regulation by the Court of 
Justice of the EU. The English Court of Appeal has however recently granted damages for 
breach of a choice of court agreement in a case covered by the Brussels I Regulation.952 It is 
submitted that the full implications of the English judgment granting damages for breach of 
a jurisdiction agreement for the jurisdiction of the Greek court were not discussed by 
Longmore LJ.953 It is submitted that the judgment of the English Court of Appeal will render 
the continuance of the Greek proceedings futile as any sum recovered under a future Greek 
judgment would have to be clawed back and used to indemnify the insurers as a breach of 
the English exclusive choice of court agreements. In other words, the overarching principle 
of mutual trust is undermined by the Court of Appeal judgment as the English court is 
seeking to force its own view on the validity and effectiveness of the settlement and choice 
of court agreements on the Greek court. As a result, the Greek court’s right to determine its 
own jurisdiction and rule on the substance of the case will be overridden by the future 
recognition and enforcement of the English Court of Appeal’s judgment by the Greek court 
under the Brussels I Regulation.954 The English court held that the claims for declarations and 
damages for breach of the choice of court agreements did not breach European Union 
                                                          
952 Starlight Shipping Co v Allianz Marine & Aviation Versicherungs AG (The Alexandros T) [2014] EWCA Civ 1010 
(Longmore LJ); See Martin Illmer, ‘English Court of Appeal confirms Damages Award for Breach of a Jurisdiction 
Agreement’ (Conflictoflaws.net, 31 July 2014) <http://conflictoflaws.net/2014/english-court-of-appeal-
confirms-damages-award-for-breach-of-a-jurisdiction-agreement/> accessed 31 July 2014. 
953 Starlight Shipping Co v Allianz Marine & Aviation Versicherungs AG (The Alexandros T) [2014] EWCA Civ 1010 
(Longmore LJ) paras 15-17. 
954 Chapter III of the Brussels I Regulation. 
256 
 
law.955 Moreover, it considered it unnecessary to send a preliminary reference to the CJEU 
on the legality and legitimacy of the damages remedy in the European Judicial Area despite 
repeated requests from Starlight.956 It has been argued that this issue did warrant a 
preliminary reference to the CJEU as it would have helped clarify whether the CJEU’s ruling 
in Turner v Grovit957 does preclude the recovery of damages for breach of a choice of court 
agreement.958 Had a preliminary reference on the issue been sent to the CJEU, the answer 
received would have probably been very different from the one delivered by the English 
Court of Appeal. It is highly unlikely that the CJEU would have favored a remedy for the 
European conflicts of jurisdiction which has made its way through the back door as an 
alternative to the defunct anti-suit injunction.  
 












                                                          
955 Starlight Shipping Co v Allianz Marine & Aviation Versicherungs AG (The Alexandros T) [2014] EWCA Civ 1010 
(Longmore LJ) [16] and [18]. 
956 Ibid [16]. 
957 Turner v. Grovit (Case C-159/02) [2005] ECR I-3565; [2004] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 169. 
958 Illmer (n 952) Short Note, para 2; Simon Camilleri in Illmer (n 952) Comments. 
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The Scope for Pre-Emptive Proceedings and the Damages Remedy for Breach of Choice of 
Court Agreements in the Brussels I Regulation (Recast): Rendered Redundant or 
Bequeathed a New Lease of Life? 
Having examined the amendments to the choice of court agreement provisions in the 
Brussels I Regulation (Recast) and the reversal of the effects of the CJEU decision in 
Gasser,959 we now turn our attention towards whether and to what extent the damages 
remedy survives the transition to the Recast Regulation. The solution proffered in the Recast 
Regulation is not perfect or complete and it is to be observed whether the lacunas in the 
legal regulation of choice of court agreements leave room for pre-emptive proceedings in 
breach of such agreements and whether the aggrieved party can seek monetary 
compensation for that breach.     
It may be argued that the reversal of the notorious decision in Gasser should also mark the 
simultaneous demise of a contractual remedy which seeks to compensate the aggrieved 
party for the loss suffered in defending protracted torpedo proceedings in the court first 
seised.960 On the contrary, it may also be averred that the conferral of procedural 
jurisdiction or kompetenz-kompetenz on the chosen court in an exclusive choice of court 
agreement by the Recast Regulation may implicitly permit the chosen court to entertain 
proceedings in breach of the exclusive choice of court agreement. Moreover, the 
observation that the protective cover of Article 31(2) is not comprehensive, Gasser survives 
in some cases and significantly that the protective cover may not extend to asymmetric 
jurisdiction agreements lends supports to the continued use of actions for damages for 
breach of a choice of court agreements in the English courts. As a consequence, the lacunas 
in the governance of choice of court agreements in Europe may be supplemented and 
reinforced by the English common law’s pragmatic remedy tailored and calibrated to suit the 
needs of cross border commercial litigants. However, it should be noted, that arguments 
premised on the contractual remedy undermining the principles of mutual trust and the 
effectiveness of EU law (effet utile) derived from the CJEU’s decision in Turner v Grovit still 
present a separate and possibly substantial impediment to the rational development of the 
                                                          
959 See Felix M Wilke, ‘The impact of the Brussels I Recast on important “Brussels” case law’ (2015) 11 Journal 
of Private International Law 128, 129-131. 
960 Garcimartin (n 831) 338: Garcimartin notes that cases seeking damages for breach of an exclusive choice of 
court agreement should become rare under the Recast Regulation. 
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damages remedy by the English courts.961 For instance, if the court first seised adjudicates 
that the jurisdiction clause is inapplicable, ineffective or invalid and arrives at the decision 
prior to the commencement of proceedings in the chosen court or if no proceedings are 
instituted in the chosen court at all,962 the judgment awarding damages for breach of the 
choice of court agreement by the chosen court would reassess and reverse the judgment of 
the court first seised and arguably infringe upon the principles of mutual trust and the 
effectiveness of EU law (effet utile). Such scenarios are likely to arise where an action in tort 
is commenced in the court first seised and an action with a contractual legal basis is 
instituted before the chosen court. Questions relating to the scope of the res judicata effect 
of the judgment from the court first seised may also preclude reliance on an alternative 
cause of action in the chosen court.963   
Before delving into this crucial issue, a short detour examining the prospects of pre-emptive 
proceedings in the Lugano Convention (2007) in breach of an English exclusive jurisdiction 
agreement is called for. The variable geometry created by the existence of two materially 
different legal regimes for the regulation of choice of court agreements in Europe 
contributes towards increasing venue risk.964 However, the availability of damages for 
breach of a choice of court agreement in the English courts may both act as an effective 
deterrent965 and respond to the breach by compensating the disgruntled party.  
 
 
                                                          
961 Case C-159/02 Turner v Grovit [2004] ECR I-3565; See R Fentiman, ‘National Law and the European 
Jurisdiction Regime’ in Arnaud Nuyts and Nadine Watté (eds.), International Civil Litigation in Europe and 
Relations with Third States (Bruylant 2005) 83, 106ff. 
962 See Quim Forner-Delaygua, ‘Changes to jurisdiction based on exclusive jurisdiction agreements under the 
Brussels I Regulation Recast’ (2015) 11 Journal of Private International Law 379, 392; Monica Herranz 
Ballesteros, ‘The Regime of Party Autonomy in the Brussels I Recast: The Solutions Adopted for Agreements on 
Jurisdiction’ (2014) 10 Journal of Private International Law 291, 307. 
963 See S Harder, ‘The Effects of Recognized Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters’ (2013) 62 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 446, 453. 
964 The two substantially different legal regimes are the Lugano Convention (2007) and the Brussels I Regulation 
(Recast); The other existing legal regimes which will become increasingly less relevant are the English common 
law jurisdictional regime and the Brussels I Regulation. On 1 October 2015, The Hague Convention on Choice of 
Court Agreements (30 June, 2005) has entered into force in 28 states including all the Member States of the EU 
(except Denmark) and Mexico. The Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments (Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements 2005) Regulations 2015, SI 2015/1644, have brought the Hague Convention into force in the UK.  
965 Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (2015) (n 817) 113; For the deterrent value of damages for 
breach of an arbitration agreement, see, Gary B Born, International Commercial Arbitration (2nd Edition, Kluwer 
Law International 2014) Chapter 8, 1304. 
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Pre-emptive proceedings in the Lugano Convention966 
Cases involving parallel proceedings governed by the Lugano Convention are not ubiquitous, 
but the situation has significance in practice where the parties to English proceedings have 
agreed to the jurisdiction of a Swiss court, or where they have agreed to the English court’s 
jurisdiction and pre-emptive proceedings have been initiated in Switzerland.967 The Lugano 
Convention’s rules mirror those of the unamended Brussels I Regulation, and in principle 
confer jurisdiction on the designated court. It is possible that pre-emptive proceedings in a 
Lugano Convention state preclude proceedings in an English court pursuant to a jurisdiction 
agreement, as they did under the unamended Brussels I Regulation following the decision of 
the CJEU in Gasser v MISAT.968 Significantly, however, decisions of the CJEU are not binding 
on non EU Member States party to the Lugano Convention, although they are of persuasive 
authority.969 Arguably, now that the effects of Gasser have been reversed in cases arising 
between two EU Member States, the courts of non EU Lugano states such as Switzerland 
should also decline to follow Gasser in the interests of uniformity.970 The Gasser doctrine will 
no doubt be expressly reversed in the Lugano Convention when it is next revised since it is 
                                                          
966 Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters: OJ 2009, L 147/5. For the Explanatory Report by Professor Fausto Pocar, see OJ 2009, C 319/1; If the 
decision in Gasser survives in the context of the Lugano Convention, a conflict of instruments between the 
Lugano Convention and the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (30th June, 2005) may also arise 
leading to differing results in the EU Member State courts depending on the applicable regime. See Article 
26(2) of the Hague Convention; Hartley, Choice of Court Agreements (n 817) Chapter 6, 114-116; TC Hartley and 
M Dogauchi, Explanatory Report of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements [271]-[278]. 
967 See Lehman Brothers Finance A.G. (In liquidation) v Klaus Tschira Stiftung GmbH, Dr H C Tschira Beteiligungs 
GmbH & Co KG [2014] EWHC 2782 (Ch) (David Richards J): The initiation of conciliation proceedings by the 
lodging of a written request for conciliation fell within Article 30 of the Lugano Convention (2007) as being the 
first procedural step in a civil claim before the Swiss courts. The conciliation authorities fell within the 
definition of "court" for the purposes of Articles 27 to 30 of the Lugano Convention (2007) given their place in 
Swiss civil procedural law. The juridical basis for a broad interpretation of the lis pendens provision in the 
Brussels Convention was laid down in Case C-116/02 Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl [2003] ECR I-14693, [41].  
See Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (2015) (n 817) 380. 
968 Case C-116/02 Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl [2003] ECR I-14693. 
969 Article 1(1) of Protocol 2 on the Uniform Interpretation of the Lugano Convention; The courts of a 
Contracting State applying the Lugano Convention shall ‘pay due account’ to the principles laid down by any 
relevant decisions on the Lugano Convention (1988), Brussels I Regulation, Brussels I Regulation (Recast), 
Brussels Convention and the Convention between the EU and Denmark applying the Brussels I Regulation to 
that Member State. See Hartley, Choice of Court Agreements Under the European and International 
Instruments (n 817) 15-18. 
970 Hartley, Choice-of-Court Agreements and the New Brussels I Regulation (n 908) 314; Hartley, Choice of Court 
Agreements Under the European and International Instruments (n 817) 231; Fentiman, International 
Commercial Litigation (2015) (n 817) 96; Garcimartin (n 831) 343; cf I Bergson, ‘The Death of the Torpedo 
Action? The Practical Operation of the Recast’s Reforms to Enhance the Protection for Exclusive Jurisdiction 
Agreements within the European Union’ (2015) 11 Journal of Private International Law 1, 29, argues that 
fidelity to the text of the Lugano Convention should not be evaded through the guise of interpretation. 
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contrary to the current general scheme and objectives of the European jurisdictional 
order.971 
In the event that the decision in Gasser survives in such cases, the effect is to create the 
possibility of, for example, pre-emptive proceedings in Switzerland intended to circumvent 
an English jurisdiction agreement. The consequence is to force the party relying on the 
agreement to defend the proceedings, exposing it to delay and possible irrecoverable costs, 
and possibly precipitating a settlement.972 Where such proceedings involve a claim identical 
with that in any English proceedings, as where declaration of non-liability is sought, Article 
27 of the Lugano Convention will engage, and prevent English proceedings pursuant to the 
agreement.973 Where they are merely related, engaging Article 28, an English court is likely 
to refuse a stay of the proceedings given the existence of the agreement.974 
In such cases, it may be difficult to argue that the decision in Turner v Grovit975 does not 
apply equally to cases subject to the Lugano Convention as to cases subject to the EU 
regime. If so, an English court would be unable to restrain such pre-emptive proceedings by 
an anti-suit injunction. This will depend, however, on whether the principle of mutual trust, 
central to Turner, is regarded as a principle special to the relations between EU Member 
States, or a principle underlying the technical operation of both the Lugano Convention and 
the EU regime. If an anti-suit injunction is unavailable, a party relying on such a jurisdiction 
agreement may seek to recover its wasted costs and expenses incurred in defending the 
foreign proceedings in an action for damages for breach of contract against the counterparty 
or its legal advisers.  
Pre-emptive proceedings in an EU Member State under Brussels I Regulation (Recast) 
Under the Brussels I Regulation (Recast) kompetenz-kompetenz is conferred on the agreed 
court in a choice of court agreement.976 In relation to proceedings commenced after 10 
January 2015, the agreed court, even if second seised, has priority in determining the effect 
of a jurisdiction agreement. Article 31(2) provides that any court other than the chosen court 
                                                          
971 Hartley, Choice of Court Agreements Under the European and International Instruments (n 817) 231. 
972 Richard Fentiman, ‘Parallel Proceedings and Jurisdiction Agreements in Europe’ in Pascal de Vareilles-
Sommieres (ed.), Forum Shopping in the European Judicial Area (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2007) 27; Richard 
Fentiman, Case C-116/02, Erich Gasser GmbH v. MISAT Srl, judgment of the Full Court of 9 December 2003 
(2005) 42 Common Market Law Review 241. 
973 JP Morgan Europe Ltd v Primacom AG [2005] EWHC 508 (Comm), [2005] 2 Lloyd's Rep 665 (Cooke J). 
974 Starlight Shipping Co v Allianz Marine & Aviation Versicherungs AG (The Alexandros T) [2013] UKSC 70. 
975 Case C-159 Turner v Grovit [2004] ECR I-3565. 
976 Article 31(2) of the Brussels I Regulation (Recast). 
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‘shall stay the proceedings until such time as the court seised on the basis of the agreement 
declares that it has no jurisdiction under the agreement’.977 
The effect of Article 31(2) is to minimize the tactical benefit of proceedings in another court, 
insofar as the effect of such proceedings is no longer to block proceedings in the designated 
court. The solution it offers is, however, incomplete, and four areas of practical difficulty and 
legal risk may be identified:978 
First, it is inherent in any rule of mechanical priority that a party might seek to exploit the 
rule for tactical purposes. A party wishing to pre-empt proceedings in one EU Member 
State’s court might initiate proceedings in another Member State court, alleging the 
existence of a jurisdiction agreement in favour of the court seised, thereby engaging Article 
31(2) and forcing the defendant to defend the proceedings in the allegedly designated 
court.979 The paradoxical effect is to encourage a new generation of torpedo actions in the 
converse case to that illustrated in Gasser. It is uncertain, however, how real a risk this 
presents.980 Depending on the civil procedure rules of the court seised, an unsubstantiated 
claim to jurisdiction would presumably be struck out as an abuse of process981 and penalized 
by an adverse costs order including perhaps an award against the claimant’s legal 
representative.982 
Second, Article 31(2) ameliorates but does not eliminate the risk of pre-emptive 
proceedings. The burden on the aggrieved party of incurring costs and expenses in 
defending pre-emptive proceedings is still a real legal risk. The designated court has 
responsibility for determining the validity and effect of the agreement, and those matters 
clearly cannot be addressed in the court first seised. However, the court first seised will need 
to establish whether its duty to stay is engaged. This in turn depends on whether the choice 
of court agreement confers exclusive jurisdiction on the designated court. At the least, the 
court first seised would need to establish a prima facie case that such an agreement confers 
                                                          
977 See Recital 22 of the Brussels I Regulation (Recast). 
978 Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (2015) (n 817) 100. 
979 Diana Sancho Villa, ‘Jurisdiction over Jurisdiction and Choice of Court Agreements: Views on the Hague 
Convention of 2005 and Implications for the European Regime’ (2010) 12 Yearbook of Private International Law 
399, 404. 
980 Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (2015) (n 817) 100; Paul Beaumont & Burcu Yüksel, 'The 
Reform of the Brussels I Regulation on Choice of Court Agreements and the Preparation for the European 
Union’s Ratification of the Hague Choice of Court Agreements Convention' (2009) 9 Spanish Yearbook of Private 
International Law 129-159. 
981 For the continental notion of Abus de droit in relation to the enforcement of choice of court agreements 
see, Nuyts (n 859) 55. 
982 CPR r 46.8 (England and Wales). 
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jurisdiction on the designated court.983 Therefore, the scope for pre-emptive litigation on the 
threshold issue has not been removed.984 In the presumably unlikely scenario where the 
court first seised carries out an assessment of the validity and effect of the agreement which 
goes beyond the prima facie standard, infringes on the kompetenz-kompetenz of the chosen 
forum and contradicts the logic of Article 31(2), the disgruntled party may be able to recover 
damages on an indemnity basis for wasted costs and expenses for breach of contract in the 
English courts. However, damages may not be recoverable where the validity of the 
jurisdiction agreement is not established and the court first seised assumes jurisdiction. The 
encroachment on the kompetenz-kompetenz of the chosen court and the letter and spirit of 
Article 31(2) by the court first seised beyond the prima facie standard is a matter of degree 
and could possibly be problematic where the civil justice legal system of the court first seised 
is slow and does not determine jurisdiction as a separate and preliminary matter.985    
Third, Article 31(2) assumes that there is a court seised on the basis of the choice of court 
agreement. It engages only if proceedings are commenced in the agreed court. The Gasser 
problem therefore remains unless the defendant in the court first seised initiates 
proceedings in the agreed court. The effect is that a party relying on the jurisdiction 
agreement must initiate proceedings in the agreed court so as to prompt a stay in the court 
first seised.986 This is important in principle, by confirming that Article 31(2) is not concerned 
with enforcing jurisdiction agreements, but about regulating parallel proceedings where the 
jurisdiction of one court has been agreed.987 It ignores the fact that a contracting party has a 
                                                          
983 In practice, it should be sufficient to offer evidence that another court of a Member State has been seised of 
proceedings between the same parties involving the same cause of action and on the basis of the choice of 
court agreement, for example by presenting a copy of the document instituting the proceedings before the 
designated court and a copy of any contract or other instrument containing the choice of court agreement. See 
Garcimartin (n 831) 340; Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (2015) (n 817) 100; Hartley, Choice of 
Court Agreements and the New Brussels I Regulation (n 908) 312-313; Hartley, Choice of Court Agreements 
under the European and International Instruments (n 817) 229; Bergson, The Death of the Torpedo Action? (n 
970) 10-13, argues that the appropriate standard of proof under English law should be a ‘serious issue to be 
tried’ and that the examination of the jurisdiction agreement should be limited to assessing the ‘existence’ of 
the agreement. 
984 Briggs, Private International Law in English Courts (n 923) 315; Fentiman, International Commercial 
Litigation (2015) (n 817) 100; Garcimartin (n 831) 341. 
985 See Heidelberg Report (n 823) paras [170]-[171], pages 49-50. 
986 Cf The negative aspect of an arbitration agreement was enforced by the UK Supreme Court where no 
arbitral proceedings were on foot or proposed. The same approach was held to apply to exclusive choice of 
court clauses in cases subject to the common law jurisdictional regime: Ust-Kamenogorsk Hydropower Plant JSC 
v AES Ust-Kamenogorsk Hydropower Plant LLP [2013] UKSC 35, [2013] 1 WLR 1889 (Lord Mance delivering the 
judgment of the UK Supreme Court); See Richard Fentiman, ‘Antisuit Injunctions and Arbitration Agreements’ 
(2013) 72 Cambridge Law Journal 521. 
987 Garcimartin (n 831) 339; Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (2015) (n 817) 100; Ballesteros (n 
962) 307, argues that the correct interpretation of the Brussels I Recast’s regulation of choice of court 
agreements is that if the defendant does not commence proceedings in the designated court, the court seised 
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legitimate objection to proceedings in breach of an exclusive jurisdiction agreement and 
whether or not that party is contemplating litigation. It suggests that the Regulation is not 
primarily concerned with commercial certainty, or with party autonomy or with respecting 
the parties’ expectations. Rather its preoccupation is with preventing the parallel 
proceedings that might give rise to irreconcilable judgments. The requirement that the 
agreed court is seised is also important in practice. It forces a party seeking to enforce such 
an agreement to initiate proceedings in the agreed court, and to incur the costs of doing so, 
even if does not wish to do so, and thereby encourages litigation. 
Under the Brussels I Regulation it is unclear as a matter of European Union law whether an 
English court can legitimately award damages for breach of a jurisdiction agreement 
involving pre-emptive proceedings in another EU Member State. Despite the lack of a CJEU 
authority on the matter, the English courts have held that the contractual remedy is 
compatible with EU law.988 In cases subject to the Recast Regulation, the position is 
particularly uncertain. The effect of Article 31(2) is to confer primacy on the agreed court to 
determine the effect of the agreement, but the scope of that protection is not 
comprehensive. It may be argued that a party relying on an exclusive jurisdiction agreement 
could elect not to initiate protective proceedings under Article 31(2) in the agreed court and 
rely instead on an action in damages.989 
Fourth, Article 31(2) applies only to exclusive jurisdiction agreements.990 It does not apply 
where the parties seek to confer non-exclusive jurisdiction on a Member State. Significantly 
in practice, this may have the effect that an asymmetric jurisdiction agreement, of the type 
frequently encountered in cross border financial transactions, is not caught by Article 31(2). 
If such agreements are not protected by Article 31(2), there remains the potential for a party 
to an asymmetric agreement to disable the agreement by launching a pre-emptive strike in 
its preferred court. Suppose that A and B agree to the jurisdiction of the English courts. A 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
will adjudicate on the validity of the choice of court agreement. Therefore, the chosen court does not have 
priority to determine the validity of the agreement in all cases. Moreover, if the defendant enters into an 
appearance in the court seised and fails to contest its jurisdiction, then Article 26 of the Brussels I Recast 
applies and the court seised will have jurisdiction on the basis of submission which takes priority over the 
chosen court. 
988 Starlight Shipping Co v Allianz Marine & Others [2014] EWCA Civ 1010 (Longmore LJ, Rimer LJ and Lord 
Toulson). 
989 Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (2015) (n 817) 118; cf FN 1000. 
990 Recital 22 and Article 31(2) of the Recast Regulation; Ratkovic´ and Rotar (n 908) 261-263; Hartley, Choice-
of-Court Agreements and the New Brussels I Regulation (n 908); Hartley, Choice of Court Agreements Under the 
European and International Instruments (n 817) 228; EB Crawford and JM Carruthers, International Private Law: 
A Scots Perspective (4th Edition, W Green, Edinburgh 2015) 181.   
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alone has the right to sue in any other court of competent jurisdiction. B must sue 
exclusively in England. B launches a pre-emptive strike in France and A replies by suing in 
England. The question is whether Article 31(2) is engaged or does Gasser and the court first 
seised rule still prevent A from relying on the agreement.991 
In principle, such hybrid agreements are exclusive against a counterparty, but non-exclusive 
for the benefit of the beneficiary under the clause. This suggests that Article 31(2) should 
engage if the counterparty brings proceedings other than in the designated court in breach 
of its promise to sue only in that court,992 but whether such hybrid agreements are subject 
to Article 31(2) is problematic.993 A fundamental difficulty, going beyond the effect of Article 
31(2), is that such hybrid clauses may be ineffective under the Regulation.994 If such 
agreements are in principle compatible with the Regulation, their status under Article 31(2) 
depends on how the matter is characterized. Arguably, the nature of the agreement is a 
matter concerning the interpretation of the clause, and therefore a matter for the national 
law of the forum.995 Therefore, the effect of such a clause would vary and depend on which 
law the forum applies to that question. An asymmetric jurisdiction agreement might not be 
regarded as exclusive against a counterparty in some legal systems, perhaps because under 
the law governing the agreement only mutually exclusive agreements are regarded as 
exclusive. However, such an agreement would be regarded as exclusive against a 
counterparty where the law governing the contract is English law. Therefore, Article 31(2) 
would apply as the agreement would be treated as an exclusive jurisdiction agreement and 
                                                          
991 See Case C-116/02 Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl [2003] ECR I-14693; cf Article 31(2) of the Recast 
Regulation has effectively reversed the CJEU ruling in Gasser but the exclusion of non-exclusive jurisdiction 
agreements from the scope of Article 31(2) may render such agreements susceptible to the very same torpedo 
tactics that had acquired notoriety under Article 27 of the Brussels I Regulation.   
992 An asymmetric jurisdiction agreement has been held to be exclusive for the borrower in an international 
loan agreement by the English Court of Appeal in a leading case governed by the Brussels Convention: 
Continental Bank NA v Aeakos Compania Naviera SA [1994] 1 WLR 588, 592F-594G (CA) (Steyn LJ) (delivering 
the judgment of the Court of Appeal); Mauritius Commercial Bank Limited v Hestia Holdings Limited and Sujana 
Universal Industries Limited [2013] EWHC 1328 (Comm) (Popplewell J). 
993 Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (2015) (n 817) 101; Garcimartin (n 831) 341; Bergson, The 
Death of the Torpedo Action? (n 970) 22. 
994 Two significant French Supreme Court decisions have invalidated asymmetric jurisdiction agreements under 
Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation and Article 23 of the Lugano Convention respectively: See Ms X v Banque 
Privee Edmond de Rothschild Europe (Societe) Cass civ, 1ere, 26.9.2012, No 11-26.022, [2013] ILPr 12; ICH 
(Societe) v Credit Suisse (Societe) Cass civ, 1ere, 25.3.2015, No 13-27.264, [2015] ILPr 39; cf In Apple Sales 
International v eBizcuss Cass. 1ere Civ, 7.10.2015, No. 14-16.898, the French Supreme Court has validated an 
asymmetric jurisdiction agreement under Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation because the courts possessing 
jurisdiction were objectively identifiable; The CJEU’s position on this matter is unclear and the Recast 
Regulation has not endeavoured to clarify the status of these clauses in the European Union law of 
international civil procedure. 
995 Case C-214/89 Powell Duffryn plc v Wolfgang Peterit [1992] ECR I-1745; A Layton and H Mercer, European 
Civil Practice (Volume I, 2nd Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, London 2004) 706. 
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the provision would prevent a counterparty from suing in a forum other than the designated 
court. 
Notwithstanding any arguments premised on preserving the practice of the English courts in 
relation to asymmetric jurisdiction agreements, it has been argued that the language of 
Article 31(2) (construed in association with Recital 22) limits its application to those 
agreements which confer exclusive jurisdiction simpliciter.996 The definition of an exclusive 
choice of court agreement in Article 3(a) of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements may serve as a guide considering the fact that the Convention is in force in all 
the Member States of the EU (except Denmark):997 
“exclusive choice of court agreement” means an agreement concluded by two or 
more parties that meets the requirements of paragraph c) and designates, for the 
purpose of deciding disputes which have arisen or may arise in connection with a 
particular legal relationship, the courts of one Contracting State or one or more 
specific courts of one Contracting State to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any 
other courts 
Therefore, under an autonomous interpretation of exclusive jurisdiction agreements only 
mutually exclusive jurisdiction agreements would benefit from the exception to the general 
rule on lis pendens.998 
If it is determined that asymmetric jurisdiction agreements fall outside the protective cover 
of Article 31(2) and pre-emptive proceedings are commenced by the borrower in breach of 
his obligation to sue exclusively in the English courts, an action in damages for breach of 
contract may both act as an effective deterrent and respond to the breach by compensating 
the aggrieved financial institution.999 On the other hand, if asymmetric jurisdiction 
agreements are deemed to be exclusive jurisdiction agreements for the purposes of Article 
31(2), the aggrieved party may nevertheless elect not to commence protective proceedings 
in the contractual forum and instead rely on the damages remedy to compensate for the 
breach of contract.1000 However, it should be noted that the availability of damages in such 
                                                          
996 See U Magnus, ‘Gerichtsstandsvereinbarungen unter der reformierten EuGVO’ in N Witzleb, R Ellger, P 
Mankowski, H Merkt and O Remien (eds.), Festschrift für Dieter Martiny zum 70. Geburtstag (Mohr Siebeck, 
Tübingen 2014) 797, 799; P Neilson, ‘The New Brussels I Regulation’ (2013) 50 Common Market Law Review 
503, 521; See also, the definition of an exclusive jurisdiction agreement in Article 3(a) of the Hague Convention. 
997 Emphasis added. 
998 Garcimartin (n 831) 341.   
999 See Starlight Shipping Co v Allianz Marine & Aviation Versicherungs AG (The Alexandros T) [2014] EWCA Civ 
1010, [15]-[22] (Longmore LJ). 
1000 Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (2015) (n 817) 98, suggests that the option of invoking the 
protective cover of Article 31(2) may be substituted by the secondary enforcement of choice of court 
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cases is conjectural and might not be permitted by the CJEU because the party relying on the 
jurisdiction agreement has failed to take advantage of the systemic solution provided by the 
Recast Regulation of seising the chosen court before the court first seised has adjudicated on 
the applicability and validity of the jurisdiction agreement.  
Another area of uncertainty is whether the Recast Regulation’s solution in Article 31(2) also 
extends to related actions underway in the courts of other Member States.1001 It is unlikely 
that the European Union legislature’s intentions and the CJEU’s interpretation of the 
Regulation will permit Article 31(2)’s protective cover to displace related actions in the 
courts of other Member States.1002 However, a more pragmatic approach to the issue would 
ideally seek to displace both identical claims and related actions in order to frustrate a wider 
potential range of pending torpedo actions. The mirror image approach to the same cause of 
action issue under Article 27 of the Brussels I Regulation in The Alexandros T confirms that a 
narrow range of parallel proceedings may trigger the lis pendens provision.1003 This 
necessarily results in a wider scope of operation for Article 28 of the Brussels I Regulation 
which is concerned with entire ‘actions’ rather than ‘claims’ or ‘causes of action’ within 
proceedings.1004 Bearing these factors in mind and in the interests of averting torpedo 
actions and preventing irreconcilable judgments, it may make commercial sense to interpret 
Article 31(2) as disabling both identical claims and related actions. On the other hand, Briggs 
argues that is not necessary that the proceedings be identical or related, but it is clear that 
both actions must be, potentially at least, within the scope of the exclusive jurisdiction 
agreement.1005 It is submitted that, reliance on the scope of the exclusive jurisdiction 
agreement may be a practical method of determining whether the proceedings in the court 
first seised should be stayed and eventually declined. Nevertheless, this is a departure from 
the traditional lis pendens rule and the concept applied in the test to determine whether 
proceedings are precluded in the court second seised. Analysis of the scope of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
agreements via the damages remedy. However, he notes that the availability of damages in such cases is 
‘problematic’. 
1001 See David Kenny and Rosemary Hennigan, ‘Choice of Court Agreements, the Italian Torpedo, and the Recast 
of the Brussels I Regulation’ (2015) 64 ICLQ 197. 
1002 Recital 22 of the Brussels I Regulation (Recast) refers to the solution proffered as an exception to the 
general lis pendens rule and that both the court first seised and the court designated in an exclusive choice of 
court agreement should share the same cause of action and be between the same parties. Therefore, it is 
unlikely that related actions as opposed to identical claims will be precluded by Article 31(2) of the Brussels I 
Regulation (Recast); See Garcimartin (n 831) 339. 
1003 The Alexandros T [2013] UKSC 70; [2014] 1 All ER 590 (Lords Neuberger, Mance, Clarke, Sumption and 
Hughes). 
1004 Case C-406/92 The Tatry v Manciej Rataj [1994] ECR I-5439, [52]; The Alexandros T [2013] UKSC 70; [2014] 1 
All ER 590; Sarrio S.A. v. Kuwait Investment Authority [1999] 1 AC 32 (HL). 
1005 Briggs, Private International Law in English Courts (n 923) 314. 
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jurisdiction agreement rather than identity of cause of action and identity of parties is 
unlikely to find favour in the CJEU even though the difference between the two methods 
may only be semantic in some cases. It may also be argued that the construction of a 
jurisdiction agreement is a matter for the court designated in the jurisdiction agreement and 
hence, the scope of the agreement cannot be employed as a test for the application of the 
lis pendens rule. The court first seised may only conduct a prima facie review of the clause 
which may not involve a detailed assessment of the clause. In cases where Article 28 of the 
Brussels I Regulation is engaged and there is an exclusive choice of court agreement in 
favour of the second seised court, it has been held by the superior courts of England and 
Wales that the court second seised should exercise its discretion in favour of refusing a 
stay.1006     
The analysis in this section demonstrates that the scope of the protection offered by Article 
31(2) is not comprehensive as the legal risk of pre-emptive proceedings in breach of an 
English jurisdiction agreement has been reduced but not definitively eliminated. As a result, 
the damages remedy in the English courts may also metamorphose under the Recast 
Regulation by offering commercial parties pragmatic redress where the principled legal 
regulation of choice of court agreements fails to yield.    
Pre-emptive proceedings and Exclusive Jurisdiction 
Under the Brussels I Regulation (Recast) proceedings in the chosen court under Article 25 
are not prevented on the basis that the foreign court has exclusive jurisdiction under Article 
24. Article 24(2) confers exclusive jurisdiction on the courts of a corporation’s home state in 
proceedings having as their object the validity of the corporation’s decisions. Article 25(4) 
ensures that jurisdiction derived from Article 24 trumps any derived from Article 25, creating 
the risk that corporate defendants might bring pre-emptive proceedings in their home court 
alleging that they lack the power to conclude the disputed transaction, relying on the 
argument that the dispute concerned corporate capacity, and that any proceedings should 
                                                          
1006 The Alexandros T [2013] UKSC 70; [2014] 1 All ER 590; Nomura International Plc v Banca Monte Dei Paschi 
Di Siena SpA [2013] EWHC 3187 (Comm) (Eder J); JP Morgan Europe Ltd v Primacom AG [2005] 2 Lloyd's Rep 
665 (Cooke J); Nordea Bank Norge ASA, Vasonia Shipping Company Limited v Unicredit Corporate Banking SpA, 
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therefore be heard exclusively in their home state. In BVG v JP Morgan Chase Bank NA the 
CJEU blocked the escape route offered by Article 24(2), holding that it does not confer 
exclusive jurisdiction on the courts at a corporation’s seat merely because infringement of 
the corporation’s constitution is alleged.1007 The reasoning of the CJEU in this decision is a 
departure from the formalistic and impractical application of Article 24(4) in GAT v LuK as it 
reposes trust in the contractual forum to decide incidental questions on the validity of a 
right within the ambit of Article 24. As a result, the pragmatic decision in BVG curtails the 
scope for tactical forum shopping and procedural maneuvering by offering a wider 
interpretation of the legitimate and proper ambit of Article 25.    
The next chapter examines the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements and 
whether the scheme of the Convention permits the use of private law remedies to enforce 












                                                          
1007 C-144/10 Berliner Verkehrsbetriebe (BVG) v JP Morgan Chase Bank NA [2011] ECR I-3961; See Richard 
Fentiman, ‘Disarming the Ultra Vires Torpedo’ (2011) 70 Cambridge Law Journal 513; Hartley, Choice of Court 
Agreements Under the European and International Instruments (n 817) 296; Fentiman, International 
Commercial Litigation (2015) (n 817) 102; cf Case C-4/03 Gesellschaft für Antriebstechnik mbH & Co. KG 
v Lamellen und Kupplungsbau Beteiligungs KG (GAT v LuK) [2006] ECR I-6509 where the CJEU adopted a 
different solution in relation to Article 24(4) and held that the defendant pleading the invalidity of the 
registered patent right as a defence to a claim for infringement does not deprive the forum of jurisdiction over 
the infringement action, but if it is not a court of the State of registration it cannot decide the validity issue, 
even as an incidental question. This means that the infringement proceedings have to be suspended so that the 
validity issue can be determined by the court of the State of registration. See Hartley, Choice of Court 
Agreements Under the European and International Instruments (n 817) 300-301. 
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Chapter 10 - The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements: Qualified 
Mutual Trust and the Scope for Contractual Remedies for Breach of Exclusive 
Choice of Court Agreements 
The origins of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements1008 (‘Hague 
Convention’) lie in the efforts to salvage something from the wreckage of the most 
ambitious project undertaken by the Hague Conference on Private International Law1009 – 
The Hague Judgments Convention, (a failed global attempt at a ‘mixed’ convention).1010 The 
Hague Choice of Court Agreements Convention is designed to create a mandatory 
international legal regime for the enforcement of exclusive jurisdiction agreements in 
commercial transactions and the recognition and enforcement of judgments resulting from 
proceedings based on such agreements.1011 The Hague Convention operates in parallel with 
the extremely successful 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards.1012 The choice of court agreement provisions in the Brussels I 
                                                          
1008 Adopted at the 20th Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, The Hague, 30th June 
2005. On 1 October 2015, the Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements has entered into 
force in 28 States (Mexico and all Member States of the European Union, except Denmark). See Marta Requejo, 
‘Ratification of The Choice of Court Agreements Convention’ (Conflictoflaws.net, 14 October 2014) 
<http://conflictoflaws.net/2014/ratification-of-the-choice-of-court-agreements-convention/> accessed 14 
October 2014. 
1009 The Hague Conference of Private International Law is an international intergovernmental organization 
facilitating the negotiation and conclusion of international multilateral conventions on private international 
law. It was founded in 1893 and according to Article 1 of the Statute of the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law its purpose is to ‘work for the progressive unification of the rules of private international 
law’. 
1010 In 2012, the Council on General Affairs and Policy of the Hague Conference on Private International Law 
agreed that work on the ‘Judgments Project’ should resume. In 2016, the Council welcomed the completion by 
the Working Group on the Judgments Project of a Proposed Draft Text, and decided to set up a Special 
Commission to prepare a draft Convention; See Paul Beaumont, ‘The Revised Judgments Project in The Hague’ 
[2014] Nederlands Internationaal Privaatrecht 532, 532-533; Trevor Hartley, Choice of Court Agreements under 
the European and International Instruments (OUP 2013) Chapter 1, 18-19; Ronald A Brand and Paul M Herrup, 
The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, Commentary and Documents (Cambridge 
University Press 2008) Chapter 1; T Hartley and M Dogauchi, Explanatory Report Part I: Preface, ‘Origins of the 
Convention’; Ronald A Brand and Scott R Jablonski, Forum Non Conveniens: History, Global Practice, and Future 
Under the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (CILE Studies, Volume 3, OUP 2007) Chapter 8, 
141-148. 
1011 See generally, Hartley, Choice of Court Agreements (n 1010); Brand and Herrup (n 1010); Andrea Schulz, 
‘The Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements’ [2006] Journal of Private International 
Law 243; TC Hartley, ‘The Hague Choice of Court Convention’ (2006) 31 European Law Review 414; Paul 
Beaumont, ‘Hague Choice of Court Agreements Convention 2005: Background, Negotiations, Analysis and 
Current Status’ [2009] Journal of Private International Law 125; Christian Thiele, ‘The Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements: Was it Worth the Effort?’ in Eckart Gottschalk and others (eds) Conflict of Laws in 
a Globalized World (Cambridge University Press 2007) 63; TC Hartley, International Commercial Litigation: Text, 
Cases and Materials on Private International Law (Cambridge University Press 2009) 201-203. 
1012 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 10 June, 1958, 
330 UNTS 4739; cf Richard Garnett, ‘The Hague Choice of Court Convention: Magnum Opus or Much Ado about 
Nothing?’ (2009) 5 Journal of Private International Law 161, 171-173, doubts whether the Hague Convention is 
a true litigation counterpart of the New York Convention. This may be attributed to the presence of a wider 
range of excluded subject matter under Article 2 compared to international arbitration, the potentially wider 
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Regulation (Recast) have been aligned with the Hague Convention in order to ensure better 
coordination and to secure the consistent enforcement of jurisdiction agreements both 
within the EU and globally.1013 The rules coordinating conflicts between the private 
international law regimes of the Hague Convention and the Brussels I Regulation (Recast) 
have been referred to as ‘tertiary rules’1014 forming part of an increasingly multi layered, 
multilateral and ‘multi-speed’1015 regional and international legal order. According to the 
Hague Convention, the Convention will take precedence over the Brussels I Regulation if 
there is an actual incompatibility between the two instruments but excluding the situations 
when the parties reside exclusively within EU Member States.1016    
Briggs briefly discusses the possible impact of the Hague Convention in the concluding 
chapter of Agreements.1017 He is critical of the exclusion of non-exclusive choice of court 
agreements from the scope of the Convention given ‘their importance in commercial 
contract drafting’1018 in practice and the rigidity of the Convention when it requires the 
mandatory enforcement of a choice of court agreement regardless of the impact on third 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
defences to enforcement of agreements (particularly the ‘manifest injustice’ ground) and the scope for 
Contracting States to remove certain areas from the Convention under Article 21. Moreover, international 
arbitration offers advantages to parties relating to the process itself including neutrality, judicial support and 
arbitral institutions of the seat of arbitration, procedural flexibility, privacy and confidentiality.  
1013 B Hess, T Pfeiffer and P Schlosser, ‘Report on the Application of Regulation Brussels I in the Member States’ 
(Study JLS/C4/2005/03, September 2007) (‘Heidelberg Report’) paras [338]-[344], [390] pages 95-97, 112; Tena 
Ratkovic´ and Dora Zgrabljic´ Rotar, ‘Choice-of-Court Agreements under the Brussels I Regulation (Recast)’ 
(2013) 9 Journal of Private International Law 245, 249-250. 
1014 Alex Mills, ‘Variable Geometry, Peer Governance, and the Public International Perspective on Private 
International Law’ in Horatia Muir Watt and Diego P Fernandez Arroyo (eds), Private International Law and 
Global Governance (Oxford Law and Global Governance Series, OUP 2014) 245, 257; An early version of Alex 
Mills’ chapter was presented to the Sciences Po Workshop on Private International Law as Global Governance 
in March 2012. It is available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2025616> accessed 30 July 2014: Mills 
classifies ‘conflicts of conflict of laws’ as ‘tertiary rules’ because they operate at a level higher than private 
international law rules which he terms ‘secondary rules’ dealing with the allocation of regulatory authority in 
(primary) substantive private law; Nikitas Hatzimihail, ‘General Report: Transnational Civil Litigation Between 
European Integration and Global Aspirations’ in Arnaud Nuyts and Nadine Watté (eds.), International Civil 
Litigation in Europe and Relations with Third States (Bruylant 2005) 595, 654 employs the term ‘conflict of 
conventions’ to describe the interaction of different international instruments, especially those dealing with 
private law matters. 
1015 ‘Multi-speed’ Europe is the term used to describe the idea of a method of differentiated integration 
whereby common objectives are pursued by a group of Member States both able and willing to advance, it 
being implied that the others will follow later. (Europa.eu Glossary) 
<http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/multispeed_europe_en.htm> accessed 30 July 2014. See 
also ‘Enhanced Cooperation’ and ‘Variable-geometry Europe’. 
1016 Article 26 of the Hague Convention; Hartley and Dogauchi, Explanatory Report (n 1010) [267]; Hartley, 
Choice of Court Agreements (n 1010) Chapter 6, 121-126. 
1017 Adrian Briggs, Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law (Oxford Private International Law Series, OUP 
2008) Chapter 13, 528-532. 
1018 Ibid, 529; cf This exclusion is partially mitigated by the fact that Article 3(b) of the Convention presumes 
agreements to be exclusive unless the parties have expressly provided otherwise and that Contracting States 
may make a declaration under Article 22 that they will recognise and enforce judgments given by courts of 
other Contracting States designated in non-exclusive choice of court agreements.  
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parties.1019 He concludes that the Hague Convention lends support to the view that choice of 
court agreements are ‘contractual in nature, and should be enforced because contracts 
should be enforced.’1020 However, this section will emphasize that the Hague Convention 
does not deal with questions of the contractual enforcement of choice of court agreements 
via anti-suit injunctions or the damages remedy. Instead the primary solution it proffers is 
rather different in nature. It would be unfair to wholeheartedly affirm that such agreements 
are intrinsically contractual in nature, classification and effects from the arguably extrinsic 
residual allocative scope that a Convention premised on a system of partial or qualified 
mutual trust may offer for the contractual enforcement of choice of court agreements. 
Before delving into the issue of whether a jurisdiction agreement can be reinforced by 
national remedies and whether it can be binding on the parties as a contractual agreement 
even if it is ineffective under the Convention, it is necessary to highlight the defining 
characteristics of the Hague Convention. 
The Hague Convention applies to exclusive choice of court agreements in international cases 
in civil and commercial matters.1021 Consumer and employment contracts are excluded from 
the scope of the Hague Convention.1022 Together with further exclusions under Article 2(2), 
this leads to the result that the Hague Convention primarily applies in ‘business to business’ 
commercial cases. The Hague Convention only applies in international cases. The definition 
of what is an international case differs between jurisdictional issues (Chapter II) and 
recognition and enforcement issues (Chapter III). For the Hague Convention’s jurisdictional 
rules to apply, a case is international unless the parties are resident in the same Contracting 
State and the relationship of the parties and all other elements relevant to the dispute, 
regardless of the location of the chosen court, are connected only with that State.1023 For the 
purposes of obtaining the recognition and enforcement of a judgment in a Contracting State, 
it is sufficient that the judgment presented is foreign.1024 
                                                          
1019 Briggs, Agreements (n 1017) 531; See Donohue v Armco Inc [2001] UKHL 64; cf Thiele (n 1011) 81, rejects 
any scope for court discretion in the Convention text. He even extends such inflexible reasoning to a court 
enforcing a judgment regardless of whether the ground of non-recognition are available. It is submitted that 
there is no support for such an assertion in the text of Article 9 of the Convention, the Official Explanatory 
Report or the Travaux Préparatoires leading up to the conclusion of the Convention. 
1020 Briggs, Agreements (n 1017) 531-532. 
1021 Article 1(1) of the Hague Convention; See Schulz (n 1011) 248-250; Brand and Herrup (n 1010) Chapter 4; 
Thiele (n 1011) 67-73. 
1022 Article 2(1) of the Hague Convention. 
1023 Article 1(2) of the Hague Convention. 
1024 Article 1(3) of the Hague Convention. 
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The basic principles of the Hague Convention can be summarized as follows:1025 The chosen 
court in an exclusive choice of court agreement shall have jurisdiction to decide a dispute 
which falls within its purview, unless the agreement is null and void under the law of that 
state.1026 Any court other than the chosen court shall suspend or dismiss proceedings to 
which an exclusive choice of court agreement applies.1027 A judgment given by a chosen 
court shall be recognised and enforced in other Contracting States and recognition and 
enforcement may be refused only on the grounds specified in the Hague Convention.1028 
Article 22 provides an optional fourth basic rule allowing each Contracting State the 
opportunity to declare that, on the basis of reciprocity, its courts will recognise and enforce 
judgments given by courts of other Contracting States designated in a non-exclusive choice 
of court agreement. 
The Hague Convention also gives effect to the principle of severability:1029 
An exclusive choice of court agreement that forms part of a contract shall be treated 
as an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract. The validity of the 
exclusive choice of court agreement cannot be contested solely on the ground that 
the contract is not valid. 
The substantive validity of the exclusive choice of court agreement in the Hague Convention 
is subject to the law of the state of the chosen court including its private international law 
rules.1030 A court designated by a choice of court agreement has no power under the Hague 
Convention to stay its proceedings on forum non conveniens grounds or to stay its 
proceedings on the basis of the lis alibi pendens doctrine.1031 This might be interpreted as 
the conferral of a right on the parties to invoke the jurisdiction of the court. However, Article 
19 of the Hague Convention allows a Contracting State to declare that its courts will not 
exercise jurisdiction when, except for the location of the chosen court, there is no 
connection between that State and the parties or the dispute. Thus, if a declaration pursuant 
                                                          
1025 Hartley, Choice of Court Agreements (n 1010) Chapter 1, 21-22; Schulz (n 1011) 254-258; Brand and Herrup 
(n 1010) Chapter 2, 11-14; Hartley and Dogauchi, Explanatory Report (n 1010) [1]. 
1026 Article 5 of the Hague Convention. 
1027 Article 6 of the Hague Convention. 
1028 Article 8 of the Hague Convention. 
1029 Article 3(d) of the Hague Convention; Brand and Herrup (n 1010) Chapter 4, 46-47. 
1030 Article 5(1) of the Hague Convention; Hartley and Dogauchi, Explanatory Report (n 1010) para 126; Hartley, 
Choice of Court Agreements (n 1010) Chapter 7, 165-171; Brand and Herrup (n 1010) Chapter 5, 80-82. 
1031 Article 5(2) of the Hague Convention; See Brand and Herrup (n 1010) Chapter 5, 82-84; Brand and Jablonski, 
(n 1010) Chapter 9, 208. 
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to Article 19 has been made, the possibility of declining jurisdiction effectively trumps the 
rule in Article 5(2).1032  
The Hague Convention does not entirely resolve the Gasser1033 problem of who should 
interpret the choice of court agreement as it does not confer sole competence on the court 
putatively chosen to do so.1034 Where the parties have agreed to the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the English courts, and the courts of another Contracting State are seised, the other court 
must normally decline to exercise jurisdiction.1035 The court other than the chosen court 
must decline jurisdiction if it is established that there is a valid and exclusive choice of court 
agreement in favour of the English courts and the claim falls within the scope of the choice 
of court agreement and the Hague Convention. At the least, the other court would need to 
establish a prima facie case that such an agreement confers jurisdiction on the English 
courts. It need not decline jurisdiction, however, principally, (a) if the agreement is invalid 
under the law of the state of the chosen court; (b) a party lacked the capacity to conclude 
the agreement under the law of the state of the court seised; (c) if giving effect to the 
agreement would lead to a manifest injustice or would be manifestly contrary to the public 
policy of the state of the court seised;1036 (d) if for exceptional reasons beyond the control of 
the parties, the agreement cannot reasonably be performed.1037 Therefore the legal risk of 
pre-emptive proceedings in breach of an English exclusive choice of court agreement is 
reduced but not removed in cases subject to the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements.1038 The interpretation of the scope for pre-emptive litigation in relation to the 
threshold issue and the exceptions to the obligation to decline jurisdiction may come under 
judicial scrutiny and as a result acquire further clarity in the yet to develop jurisprudence of 
the Hague Convention.   
The Hague Convention’s regime does not counter the potential for pre-emptive proceedings 
in every situation. First, the Hague Convention can only apply if an English exclusive 
jurisdiction agreement is challenged in a Contracting State. Second, it does not apply to 
                                                          
1032 Brand and Herrup (n 1010) Chapter 5, 84; Schulz (n 1011) 259; Thiele (n 1011) 74; Beaumont (n 1011) 149. 
1033 Erich Gasser Gmbh v MISAT Srl Case C-116/02 [2004] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 222. 
1034 Articles 5 and 6 of the Hague Convention. 
1035 Article 6 of the Hague Convention. 
1036 Hartley and Dogauchi, Explanatory Report (n 1010) para 151-153; Hartley, Choice of Court Agreements (n 
1010) Chapter 8, 184. 
1037 The exceptions in (c) and (d) are intended to apply ‘only in the most exceptional circumstances’: See 
Hartley and Dogauchi, Explanatory Report (n 1010) para 148; Hartley, Choice of Court Agreements (n 1010) 
Chapter 8, 183. 
1038 R Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (2nd Edition, OUP 2015) 97. 
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asymmetric jurisdiction agreements, which are frequently encountered in international 
commercial transactions.1039 Although there is no requirement that the parties should have 
equal rights, it was agreed by the Diplomatic Session that, in order to be covered by the 
Hague Convention, the agreement must be exclusive irrespective of the party bringing the 
proceedings.1040 Moreover, the grounds for displacing an agreement provided in the Hague 
Convention also offer significant opportunities to undermine a jurisdiction agreement, and 
to create uncertainty as to their status. Despite the enhancement of the enforcement of 
choice of court agreements in some cases, the potential for tactical forum shopping remains 
along with the burden on a defendant in foreign proceedings to mount a defence and incur 
costs and expenses in those proceedings. 
The lack of a lis alibi pendens mechanism1041 or a court first seised rule to coordinate 
proceedings and the apparent tolerance of ‘parallel proceedings’1042 suggests that the Hague 
Convention does not adhere to the strict multilateral jurisdiction and judgments model of 
the Brussels I Regulation premised on the mutual trust principle. Therefore, the issue of 
whether national remedies such as anti-suit injunctions and damages for breach of choice of 
court agreements might be relied upon may receive a different answer under the Hague 
Convention. 
The specific provision for the principle of severability along with a choice of law rule for the 
substantive validity of a jurisdiction agreement in the Hague Convention does lends support 
to arguments in favour of an essentially contractual justification for choice of court 
agreements. The referral of issues relating to material validity, a substantive element of a 
jurisdiction agreement, to the law of the chosen forum including its private international law 
rules recognises the complex ‘hybrid’ nature of a choice of court agreement incorporating a 
mix of substantive and procedural components. Article 3(d) of the Hague Convention offers 
an additional layer of protection for choice of court agreements by emphasizing that an 
attack on the validity of the main contract does not by itself impeach the validity of the 
independent choice of court agreement. This ensures that the forum chosen by the parties 
                                                          
1039 Hartley and Dogauchi, Explanatory Report (n 1010) [106]; Hartley, Choice of Court Agreements (n 1010) 
Chapter 7, 143-144. 
1040 Minutes No 3 of the Second Commission Meeting of Wednesday 15 June 2005 (morning) in Proceedings of 
the Twentieth Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (Permanent Bureau of the 
Conference, Intersentia 2010) 577, 577-578. 
1041 Article 5(2) of the Hague Convention; cf Article 27 of the Brussels I Regulation. 
1042 Brand and Herrup (n 1010) Chapter 5, 88; Hartley, Choice of Court Agreements (n 1010) Chapter 11, 231; 
Hartley and Dogauchi, Explanatory Report (n 1010) [132]-[134]. 
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exercises adjudicatory authority even where the very existence of the contract is in dispute. 
The principles of party autonomy and legal certainty justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the 
chosen court where the validity of the substantive contract is impugned. 
Article 7 of the Hague Convention states that the Convention does not affect the granting of 
interim measures of protection:1043 
Interim measures of protection are not governed by this Convention. This Convention 
neither requires nor precludes the grant, refusal or termination of interim measures 
of protection by a court of a Contracting State and does not affect whether or not a 
party may request or a court should grant, refuse or terminate such measures. 
Although anti-suit injunctions might be classified as interim measures of protection, they are 
not specified as such in the Official Explanatory Report.1044 However, the Explanatory 
Reports of the Draft Conventions on Choice of Court Agreements have cited an anti-suit 
injunction precluding a party from bringing proceedings in a court other than that chosen as 
an example of an interim measure of protection.1045 
   
A discussion between official delegates recorded in Minutes No 9 of a Second Commission 
meeting also provides support to the argument that anti-suit injunctions may be awarded to 
enforce choice of court agreements by Contracting States.1046 Significantly, Mr. Paul R 
Beaumont of the United Kingdom delegation sought to clarify the position in relation to anti-
suit injunctions by differentiating the formal ‘process’ of the Hague Convention from the 
                                                          
1043 Article 7 of the Hague Convention; See Brand and Herrup (n 1010) Chapter 5, 95-96. 
1044 Hartley, Choice of Court Agreements (n 1010) Chapter 10, 215-216; Hartley and Dogauchi, Explanatory 
Report (n 1010) [160]-[163]; cf Burkhard Hess, ‘The Draft Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, 
External Competencies of the European Union and Recent Case Law of the European Court of Justice’ in Arnaud 
Nuyts and Nadine Watté (eds.), International Civil Litigation in Europe and Relations with Third States (Bruylant 
2005) 263, 281-282, argues that, in principle, anti-suit injunctions and should be allowed as the EU notion of 
mutual trust does not apply between Contracting States of the Hague Convention. He even suggests that an 
express exclusive jurisdiction of the designated court to order such measures together with a corresponding 
obligation on all court of the Contracting States to recognise and enforce such orders should be incorporated 
into the Hague Convention.  
1045 TC Hartley and M Dogauchi, ‘Explanatory Report on the Preliminary Draft Convention on Exclusive Choice of 
Court Agreements’ (Preliminary Document No 26 of December 2004) in Proceedings of the Twentieth Session of 
the Hague Conference on Private International Law (Permanent Bureau of the Conference, Intersentia 2010) 
167, 195-197, [131]; TC Hartley and M Dogauchi, ‘Explanatory Report on the Preliminary Draft Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements’  (Preliminary Document No 25 of March 2004) (hcch.net) 
<http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgm_pd25e.pdf> accessed 01 July 2015, 24, [101]. 
1046 Minutes No 9 of the Second Commission Meeting of Monday 20 June 2005 (morning) in Proceedings of the 
Twentieth Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (Permanent Bureau of the Conference, 
Intersentia 2010) 622, 623-624. 
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desired ‘outcome’.1047 Where anti-suit injunctions upheld choice of court agreements and 
thus helped achieve the intended outcome of the Convention, there was a consensus among 
the delegates in the meeting that the Convention did not limit or constrain national courts of 
Contracting States from granting the remedy.1048     
The primary meaning of the concept is measures intended to protect the position of the 
parties while the proceedings are pending.1049 However, after mentioning freezing orders, 
interim injunctions and orders for the production of evidence the Official Explanatory Report 
states:1050 
All these measures are intended to support the choice of court agreement by making 
it more effective. They thus help to achieve the objective of the Convention. 
Nevertheless, they remain outside its scope. 
Arguably, an anti-suit injunction granted for breach of an English exclusive jurisdiction clause 
is a measure intended to make the choice of court agreement more effective. This opens the 
possibility for a party faced with proceedings brought in clear breach of an English exclusive 
jurisdiction agreement to apply to the English courts for an anti-suit injunction in Hague 
Convention cases.1051 The lex fori will govern the issue of contractual remedies for breach of 
English exclusive choice of court agreements as the Hague Convention is silent on the 
matter.1052 On the other hand, the operation of national law in relation to interim measures 
of protection is not completely unfettered by the Hague Convention.1053 Considerations of 
general treaty law may place constraints on the operation of national law. Thus, there is a 
legitimate question as to whether a court not chosen could issue an anti-suit injunction 
                                                          
1047 Ibid 624. 
1048 Ibid; The delegates who expressed a view that anti-suit injunctions to enforce choice of court agreements 
were compatible with the Hague Convention included Mr Paul R Beaumont (United Kingdom), Mr Trevor C 
Hartley (co-Reporter), Mr David Bennett (Australia), Mr Gottfried Musger (Austria); The Chair [Mr Andreas 
Bucher (Switzerland)] noted that the co-Reporters would make what had been said on this clear, and that there 
would also be a process for commenting on the Explanatory Report. 
1049 Hartley, Choice of Court Agreements (n 1010) Chapter 10, 216. 
1050 Hartley and Dogauchi, Explanatory Report (n 1010) [160]. 
1051 David Joseph QC, Jurisdiction and Arbitration Agreements and their Enforcement (Sweet & Maxwell 2010) 
410-411. 
1052 Ibid. 
1053 Brand and Herrup (n 1010) Chapter 5, 96; Hartley and Dogauchi, Explanatory Report on the Preliminary 
Draft Convention on Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements (December 2004) (n 1045) 167, 193, [120]-[121]; 
Hartley and Dogauchi, Explanatory Report on the Preliminary Draft Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 
(March 2004) (n 1045) 22, [88]-[89]; See also Andrea Schulz, ‘Reflection Paper to Assist in the Preparation of a 
Convention on Jurisdiction and Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters’ (Preliminary Document No 19 of August 2002) in Proceedings of the Twentieth Session of the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law (Permanent Bureau of the Conference, Intersentia 2010) 11, 25, [77], 
who identified whether the Convention should contain a rule prohibiting the courts of a Contracting State from 
issuing anti-suit injunctions with regard to proceedings before the court in another Contracting State which was 
designated by an exclusive choice of court clause. 
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against proceedings in a court chosen in an exclusive choice of court agreement. It is 
submitted, that in these circumstances, the use of anti-suit injunctions will actually impede 
the sound operation of the Hague Convention and jeopardize the enforcement of 
jurisdictional party autonomy. Thus, there is a strong argument that the Hague Convention 
will not permit the use of anti-suit injunctions to render choice of court agreements 
ineffective.1054    
To reiterate, the establishment of a choice of law rule for material validity and the 
enshrinement of the principle of severability for choice of court agreements will reinforce 
the contractual foundation of such agreements. Furthermore, it has been observed that anti-
suit injunctions granted for breach of English exclusive jurisdiction clauses are measures 
intended to make such agreements more effective. However, the principal method of 
enforcing choice of court agreements in both the Hague Convention and the Brussels I 
Regulation (Recast) is jurisdictional or procedural and not contractual in nature. The 
nominated court in a choice of court agreement shall exercise jurisdiction whilst all other 
courts are required to stay and eventually decline jurisdiction.1055 In the case of the Brussels I 
Regulation (Recast) a reverse lis pendens rule according primacy to the choice of court 
agreement rather than the court first seised is the envisaged method of enforcing 
jurisdictional party autonomy in the EU.1056 The prospects of contractual remedies enforcing 
choice of court agreements making much headway in the European Union is necessarily 
curtailed by a multilateral jurisdictional system that prizes the overarching principle of 
mutual trust and systemic objectives more than the enforcement of private rights and 
obligations embodied in an exclusive jurisdiction agreement.1057 
                                                          
1054 Brand and Herrup (n 1010) Chapter 5, 96; See Minutes No 9 of the Second Commission Meeting of Monday 
20 June 2005 (morning) in Proceedings of the Twentieth Session of the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law (Permanent Bureau of the Conference, Intersentia 2010) 622, 623-624: The delegates who 
expressed a view that anti-suit injunctions preventing parties from bringing proceedings in the chosen court 
were incompatible with the Hague Convention included Mr Paul R Beaumont (United Kingdom), Mr Trevor C 
Hartley (co-Reporter), Mr David Bennett (Australia), Mr Gottfried Musger (Austria); The Chair [Mr Andreas 
Bucher (Switzerland)] noted that the co-Reporters would make what had been said on this clear, and that there 
would also be a process for commenting on the Explanatory Report. 
1055 Article 6 of the Hague Convention; Articles 31(2) and 31(3) of the Brussels I Regulation (Recast). 
1056 For criticism of the kompetenz-kompetenz of the ‘allegedly’ chosen forum in a choice of court agreement, 
See Case C-116/02 Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl [2003] ECR I-14693, Opinion of AG Léger, [74]; A Briggs, 
‘What should be done about Jurisdiction Agreements?’ (2010) 12 Yearbook of Private International Law 319-
322. 
1057 See Martin Illmer, ‘English Court of Appeal confirms Damages Award for Breach of a Jurisdiction 
Agreement’ (Conflictoflaws.net, 31 July 2014) <http://conflictoflaws.net/2014/english-court-of-appeal-
confirms-damages-award-for-breach-of-a-jurisdiction-agreement/> accessed 30 July 2014. 
278 
 
In contrast, the Hague Convention is premised on a system of qualified or partial mutual 
trust which suggests that the arguments for the contractual enforcement of choice of court 
agreements may be pursued here with greater likelihood of success.1058 However, it should 
be noted, that neither the anti-suit injunction nor the damages remedy for breach of 
exclusive jurisdiction agreements were discussed as viable options for the enforcement of 
exclusive jurisdiction agreements in the official explanatory report.1059 The judgment of a 
Contracting State which rules on the validity of a choice of court agreement selecting that 
state itself shall be recognised and enforced in other Contracting States.1060 However, the 
judgment of a Contracting State which rules on the validity of a choice of court agreement 
selecting another Contracting State will not be entitled to recognition and enforcement in 
other Contracting States.1061 The application of an anti-suit injunction and the damages 
remedy may be justified in the case of the assumption of jurisdiction by a Contracting State 
without regard to the presence of a valid choice of court agreement in favour of another 
Contracting State. Thus, the Hague Convention might allow an English court to second guess 
the findings of another Contracting State as to the validity and effectiveness of an English 
choice of court agreement and award damages for breach of the jurisdiction clause. 
However, it should be noted that, the Hague Convention is a codified regime regulating the 
validity and effectiveness of choice of court agreements globally.1062 The application of 
contractual remedies to enforce jurisdiction agreements by some Contracting States may 
create a rift in the yet to develop jurisprudence of the Hague Convention and without an 
international court interpreting the meaning of the global Convention it is likely that the 
uniform application of the Convention might be compromised. 
Following the conclusion of the Lugano Convention (2007),1063 which fell entirely within the 
sphere of exclusive competence of the EU,1064 the Hague Convention was also concluded by 
                                                          
1058 J Harris, ‘Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: Where Next?’ [2009] LMCLQ 537, 560; Hartley, 
Choice of Court Agreements (n 1010) Chapter 10, 220; T Raphael, The Anti-Suit Injunction (OUP 2008) Chapter 
1, 20 FN 97; Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (2015) (n 1038) 98; Briggs, Agreements (n 1017) 
531-532. 
1059 See Hartley and Dogauchi, Explanatory Report (n 1010). 
1060 Article 8(1) of the Hague Convention. 
1061 Brand and Herrup (n 1010) Chapter 6, 100; Hartley, Choice of Court Agreements (n 1010) Chapter 9, 195; 
Hartley and Dogauchi, Explanatory Report (n 1010) [164]-[181]. 
1062 See Article 23 of the Hague Convention which highlights its international character and the need to 
promote uniformity in its application; Hartley and Dogauchi, Explanatory Report (n 1010) [256]; The equivalent 
provision in the preliminary draft Convention 1999 is Article 38(1). The commentary on this issue is in the 
Nygh/Pocar Report at 118 and 119. 
1063 OJ 2009, L 147/5; See Explanatory Report by Professor Fausto Pocar: OJ 2009, C 319/1. 
1064 See Lugano Convention Opinion 1/03, [2006] ECR I-1145; Opinion 1/13 of the CJEU (Grand Chamber) 
confirms that the exclusive competence of the EU encompasses the acceptance of the accession of a third State 
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the EU on behalf of the Member States (except Denmark).1065 The fact that the EU is a party 
has important consequences within the Union. The Hague Convention has the status of EU 
law within the European Union (except Denmark)1066 and the CJEU will have the final word 
on its interpretation as far as the EU Member States are concerned.1067 The Hague 
Convention as EU law is directly applicable,1068 would almost certainly fulfill the 
requirements for direct effect1069 and would prevail over the law of the Member States in 
case of conflict.1070 The CJEU would interpret the Hague Convention through the preliminary 
reference procedure from the courts of the Member States of the EU.1071  
The possibility of anti-suit injunctions receiving another fatal blow in the context of the 
Hague Convention by a CJEU seeking to harmonize its approach to anti-suit relief in the 
Brussels-Lugano regime and under the Hague Convention cannot be foreclosed.1072 This is a 
sensitive issue lying at the interface between the Brussels I Regulation and the Hague 
Convention. Let’s suppose that two non EU domiciliaries who are resident in Hague 
Convention Contracting States enter into an exclusive choice of court agreement for the 
English courts or one non EU domiciliary who is resident in a Hague Convention Contracting 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
to the Hague Convention on the civil aspects of international child abduction concluded on 25 October 1980. 
See Marta Requejo, ‘Opinion 1/13 of the ECJ (Grand Chamber)’ (Conflictoflaws.net, 16 October 2014) 
http://conflictoflaws.net/2014/opinion-113-of-the-ecj-grand-chamber/ accessed 17 October 2014; See, 
generally, Hugh Hutchison, ‘The External Competence of the European Union in Private International Law’ 
(University of Aberdeen LLM Thesis, 2012). 
1065 On 4 December 2014, the Council adopted the decision to approve the Hague Convention on behalf of the 
European Union (2014/887/EU, OJ 2014 L 353/5); See Pietro Franzina, ‘The EU prepares to become a party to 
the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements’ (Conflictoflaws.net, 11 February 2014) 
<http://conflictoflaws.net/2014/the-eu-prepares-to-become-a-party-to-the-hague-convention-on-choice-of-
court-agreements/> accessed 31 July 2014. 
1066 Hartley, Choice of Court Agreements (n 1010) Chapter 1, 22-23. 
1067 Ibid 23. 
1068 The principle of direct applicability refers to the extent to which EU measures take effect in the legal system 
of each Member State without the need for further implementation by the Member States themselves. 
Authority for this interpretation is Article 288 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ("TFEU") 
which states specifically that a Regulation "shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member 
States". Therefore, Regulations shall take effect in the legal system of each Member State without the need for 
any further implementation. 
1069 The principle of direct effect can be interpreted as meaning the extent to which EU law can produce legal 
rights and obligations which can be used in an action before a national court. The ECJ decision in Van Gend en 
Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen (26/62) [1963] ECR 1, [1963] CMLR 105 states that "[Union] 
law has an authority which can be invoked by their nationals before those courts and tribunals". See Paul Craig 
and Grainne De Burca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (5th Edition, OUP 2011) Chapter 7. 
1070 In Costa v ENEL (6/64) [1964] ECR 585 the ECJ espoused the principle of supremacy of EU law and stated 
that EU law could not "be overridden by domestic legal provisions, however framed, without being deprived of 
its character as [Union] law and without the legal basis of the [Union] itself being called into question". See TC 
Hartley, The Foundations of European Union Law (Eighth Edition, OUP 2010) Chapter 7; Craig and De Burca, EU 
Law: Text, Cases and Materials (n 1069) Chapter 9. 
1071 Article 267 TFEU; See Hartley, Foundations (n 1070) Chapter 9; Craig and De Burca (n 1069) Chapter 13. 
1072 See Turner v. Grovit (Case C-159/02) [2005] ECR I-3565; [2004] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 169; Allianz SpA (formerly 




State enters into an English exclusive choice of court agreement with an EU domiciliary. The 
Hague Convention is applicable pursuant to Article 26 of the same Convention.1073 One of 
the parties commences pre-emptive torpedo proceedings in the Italian courts for a 
declaration of non-liability in breach of the English exclusive choice of court agreement. The 
question is whether the aggrieved party can legally and legitimately seek injunctive relief or 
monetary compensation for breach of contract before the English courts. As the dispute 
involves proceedings before the courts of two Member States, there are strong arguments 
of principle based on the principle of mutual trust and the effet utile of EU law which may 
override the underlying ethos of the Hague Convention and disallow a claim for an anti-suit 
injunction and damages for breach of choice of court agreements.1074 In Nipponkoa, the 
CJEU has recently held that the application of an international convention under Article 71 of 
the Brussels I Regulation:1075  
cannot compromise the principles which underlie judicial co-operation in civil and 
commercial matters in the European Union, such as the principles, recalled in recitals 
6, 11, 12 and 15 to 17 in the preamble to Regulation 44/2001, of free movement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters, predictability as to the courts having 
jurisdiction and therefore legal certainty for litigants, sound administration of justice, 
minimisation of the risk of concurrent proceedings, and mutual trust in the 
administration of justice in the European Union. 
Arguably, an anti-suit injunction in the context of an intra EU Hague Convention case will 
contradict these fundamental principles of EU law including the overarching mutual trust 
principle. However, following the controversial English Court of Appeal decision in Starlight 
Shipping v Allianz, a claim for damages for breach of a choice of court agreement could also 
be transposed into the intra EU Hague Convention context, at least until the matter is finally 
                                                          
1073 See Article 26(6)(a) of the Hague Convention; Hartley, Choice of Court Agreements (n 1010) Chapter 6, 122-
123; Hartley and Dogauchi, Explanatory Report (n 1010) [291]-[304]; See Marta Pertegás, ‘The Revision of the 
Brussels I Regulation: A View from the Hague Conference’ in Eva Lein (ed.), The Brussels I Review Proposal 
Uncovered (BIICL, London 2012) 193, 199-200; Francisco Garcimartin, ‘Chapter 9 – Article 25’ in Andrew 
Dickinson and Eva Lein (eds.), The Brussels I Regulation Recast (OUP 2015) 284. 
1074 The interface between the New York Convention and the Brussels I Regulation also proscribes anti-suit 
injunctions in support of arbitration agreements. Where proceedings before the courts of two Member States 
are involved, the principle of mutual trust and the effet utile of EU law will prevent the courts of one Member 
State from restraining pre-emptive proceedings brought before the courts of another Member State in breach 
of an arbitration agreement. See the recent decision of the CJEU’s Grand Chamber in Case C-536/13 Gazprom 
[32]-[34], which purports to circumscribe the mutual trust principle and effet utile of EU law to court to court 
proceedings in Member States as in the core case of C-185/07 West Tankers EU:C:2009:69 [29]-[31]; See also, 
Martin Illmer, ‘Chapter 2 – Article 1’ in Andrew Dickinson and Eva Lein (eds.), The Brussels I Regulation Recast 
(OUP 2015) 86. 
1075 Case C-452/12 Nipponkoa Insurance Co (Europe) Ltd v Interzuid Transport BV ECLI:EU:C:2013:858, [2014] 
I.L.Pr. 10, [36]; See also to similar effect, Case C-533/08 TNT Express Nederland BV v AXA Versicherung AG 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:243, [2010] I.L.Pr. 35, [49]; See Pippa Rogerson, ‘Chapter 17 – Article 71’ in Andrew Dickinson 
and Eva Lein (eds.), The Brussels I Regulation Recast (OUP 2015) 569-571. 
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laid to rest by the CJEU on a preliminary reference from either the English courts or a 
Member State court seeking a clarification of its duty to recognise and enforce an English 
judgment awarding such remedies and whether the judgment contravenes the nature and 
scope of the public policy defence.1076      
It should be noted that such an interpretation would militate against the underlying ethos of 
the Convention per se, whose system of partial or qualified mutual trust may allow recourse 
to anti-suit injunctions and the damages remedy to enforce exclusive choice of court 
agreements. Secondly, a difference of approach to the interpretation of the Hague 
Convention in relation to the availability of contractual remedies within the EU and globally 
would widen the divide between European and worldwide practice, jeopardize the 
enforcement of jurisdictional party autonomy and limit the scope for pragmatic solutions to 
the conflicts of jurisdiction in Hague Convention cases within the EU. On the other hand, in 
relation to Hague Convention cases where the English courts are chosen by an exclusive 
choice of court agreement and pre-emptive torpedo proceedings are launched in a non-
Member State, there is no similar or comparable legal impediment to the English courts 
enforcing the agreement by injunctive relief or by an action for damages for breach of 
contract. 
Notwithstanding the incompatibility of anti-suit injunctions and the damages remedy with 
the European Judicial Area, Article 31(2) of the Brussels I Regulation (Recast) may still be 
applied within the scope of application of the Hague Convention. The ethos of the Hague 
Convention may not preclude the introduction by Contracting States of an exception to a lis 
pendens rule. This issue may be determined by the adoption of the most appropriate 
conception of Article 6 of the Hague Convention. If Article 6 of the Hague Convention is 
understood as a mere permissive rule, which does not oblige the non-designated court to 
decide on the validity and effectiveness of the clause but merely allows it do so, Member 
States may apply the mandatory provisions of Article 31(2)-(3) consistently with the Hague 
Convention.1077 However, Article 6 might alternatively be understood as a provision that 
                                                          
1076 Damages for breach of an English exclusive jurisdiction agreement governed by English law have been held 
to be compatible with EU law (Brussels I Regulation) by the Court of Appeal in Starlight Shipping Co v Allianz 
Marine & Aviation Versicherungs AG (The Alexandros T) [2014] EWCA Civ 1010 (Longmore LJ). Nevertheless, 
serious doubts persist on whether a reference to the CJEU on the matter will allow an ingenious alternative to 
the anti-suit injunction free reign to enforce a jurisdiction agreement; See also, West Tankers Inc v Allianz SpA 
[2012] EWHC 854 (Comm) (Flaux J). 
1077 Hartley and Dogauchi, Explanatory Report (n 1010) [300]; Heidelberg Report (n 1013) [391]; Article 26(1) of 
the Hague Convention; Francisco Garcimartin, ‘Chapter 11 – Article 31(2)’ in A Dickinson and E Lein (eds.), The 
Brussels I Regulation Recast (OUP 2015) 343; cf Matthias Weller, ‘Choice of Forum Agreements under the 
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gives a right to the claimant to have the case heard when one of the exceptions to that 
provision applies irrespective of whether the designated court has been seised or not. If we 
adopted this conception, which departs from the opinion of Hartley and Dogauchi in the 
Official Explanatory Report,1078 there would be a conflict between the two instruments and 
the Hague Convention should in principle prevail,1079 assuming that the Hague Convention 
applies because one of the parties is resident in a Contracting State which is not a Member 
State.1080 However, as noted above, in the recent decision in Nipponkoa concerning the 
application of an international convention under Article 71 of the Brussels I Regulation the 
CJEU has held that the fundamental principles underlying judicial co-operation in civil and 
commercial matters in the EU cannot be compromised - the ‘minimisation of the risk of 
concurrent proceedings’ is one of these overriding principles.1081 It further ruled that Article 
71 of Brussels I Regulation must be interpreted as meaning that it precludes an 
interpretation of Article 31(2) of the CMR1082 according to which an action for a negative 
declaration or a negative declaratory judgment in one Member State does not have the 
same cause of action as an action for indemnity between the same parties in another 
Member State. The relevant provisions of the CMR could be applied in the European Union 
only if they enabled the objectives of the free movement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters and of mutual trust in the administration of justice in the European 
Union to be achieved under conditions at least as favourable as those resulting from the 
application of the Brussels I Regulation.1083 The CJEU’s interpretation of Article 27 of the 
Brussels I Regulation prevailed over a contradictory interpretation of the lis pendens 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Brussels I Recast and under the Hague Convention: Coherence or Clash?’ Presentation at the plenary session of 
the 10th Anniversary of the Journal of Private International Law Conference 2015 (4th September 2015), argues 
that a clash does exist between the two instruments in relation to the lis pendens rule and suggests that the 
effects of the incompatibility may be minimised by recognizing the preclusive res judicata effect of the 
judgment validating the choice of court agreement in the chosen court in the other Member State court seised 
with the proceedings. See Case C-456/11 Gothaer Allgemeine Versicherung AG v Samskip GmbH 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:719, [2013] QB 548. However, the author disagrees with this approach and has argued that the 
principle of mutual trust and other fundamental principles animating the corpus of rules in the Brussels I 
Regulation may not permit a contradictory interpretation of Article 6 of the Hague Convention taking root in 
the first place. See Case C-452/12 Nipponkoa Insurance Co (Europe) Ltd v Interzuid Transport BV 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:858, [2014] I.L.Pr. 10, [36].    
1078 Hartley and Dogauchi, Explanatory Report (n 1010) [300]. 
1079 Article 71 of the Brussels I Regulation (Recast). 
1080 Article 26(6) of the Hague Convention. 
1081 Case C-452/12 Nipponkoa Insurance Co (Europe) Ltd v Interzuid Transport BV ECLI:EU:C:2013:858, [2014] 
I.L.Pr. 10, [36]; See also to similar effect, Case C-533/08 TNT Express Nederland BV v AXA Versicherung AG 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:243, [2010] I.L.Pr. 35, [49]. 
1082 Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road, signed in Geneva on 19 May 
1956, as amended by the Protocol signed in Geneva on 5 July 1978 (‘the CMR’). 
1083 Case C-452/12 Nipponkoa Insurance Co (Europe) Ltd v Interzuid Transport BV ECLI:EU:C:2013:858, [2014] 
I.L.Pr. 10, [37]-[38]; Case C-533/08 TNT Express Nederland BV v AXA Versicherung AG ECLI:EU:C:2010:243, 
[2010] I.L.Pr. 35, [55]. 
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mechanism in the CMR. Therefore, in the context of the Hague Convention mutual trust and 
the other animating principles of the Brussels I Regulation may also override any 
interpretation of Article 6 of the Convention which does not conform to the operation of the 
reverse lis pendens mechanism in Article 31(2) of the Recast Regulation. As a result, the 
approach adopted by the Hartley and Dogauchi Report has much to commend it as it follows 
the path of least resistance by seeking to resolve any differences in relation to the Recast 
Regulation and simultaneously helps control the incidence of parallel proceedings and 
irreconcilable judgments, which are significant objectives under the Brussels I Regulation. 
A concrete example will help illustrate both the issue of the perceived incompatibility of 
injunctive relief and monetary compensation for breach of a choice of court agreement with 
Hague Convention cases inside the EU and the mandatory operation of Article 31(2)-(3) of 
the Recast Regulation in Hague Convention cases within the EU: 
Party A is domiciled in Spain and Party B is domiciled in Mexico. Both parties have agreed on 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the High Court in London. Party A sues first in Madrid and Party 
B sues afterwards in London. According to the analysis considered above, Party B may not be 
able to obtain anti-suit relief against the proceedings commenced and continued in Madrid 
or recover damages for breach of the English exclusive choice of court agreement, even 
though the case falls within the remit of the Hague Convention. However, the Spanish judge 
will be obliged to suspend the proceedings in accordance with Article 31(2) of the Recast 
Regulation, notwithstanding the applicability of the Hague Convention.      
It is significant to note that anti-suit injunctions were discussed in the negotiations leading 
up to the conclusion of the Hague Convention but there was never any consensus that they 
would be prohibited by the Convention.1084 Thus the Hague Convention is neutral in its 
stance towards anti-suit injunctions and neither prohibits nor requires them.1085 However, a 
framework of partial or qualified mutual trust may allow an English court to enforce 
exclusive choice of court agreements through anti-suit injunctions and the damages remedy 
                                                          
1084 Hartley, Choice of Court Agreements (n 1010) Chapter 10, 216. 
1085 It is clear from the Travaux préparatoires that the Hague Convention was not intended to affect the power 
to grant anti-suit injunctions: See Andrea Schulz, ‘Report on the Second Meeting of the Informal Working 
Group on the Judgments Project 6 to 9 January 2003’ in Proceedings of the Twentieth Session of the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law (Permanent Bureau of the Conference, Intersentia 2010) 55, 57, [15]-
[16]; cf Thiele (n 1011) 75 states that: ‘As with the general preclusion of forum non conveniens by the 
Convention, the preclusion of antisuit injunctions promotes legal certainty and predictability and is in line with 
the view of the European Court of Justice with respect to the Brussels Regulation.’ However, it is submitted, 
that the alleged preclusion of anti-suit injunctions from the scheme of the Hague Convention is neither 
supported by the ethos or spirit of the Convention nor any official documentary evidence. 
284 
 
in cases involving the courts of non-Member States. Thus, the exclusion from the scope of 
the Hague Convention does not prevent contractual remedies for breach of exclusive 
jurisdiction agreements from helping achieve the very objective of the Convention. 
The entering into force of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements should be a 
major step towards increased legal security for European enterprises conducting business in 
non-Member States.1086 However, the actual success of the Hague Convention will depend 
on further ratifications by the major economic partners of the European Union.1087 If this is 
not the case, the practical impact of the Hague Convention’s entering into force will be 
negligible.  
The penultimate chapter of this thesis will examine whether damages may be recovered for 
breach of a choice of law agreement. After examining the preliminary issue of the 
classification of a choice of law agreement as either being declaratory of the intentions of 
the parties or as a binding and enforceable promise, issues arising from the private law 










                                                          
1086 On 4 December 2014, the Council adopted the decision to approve the Hague Convention on behalf of the 
European Union (2014/887/EU, OJ 2014 L 353/5). Under Article 2(2) of this Decision, the deposit of the 
instrument of approval shall take place within one month of 5 June 2015. The Convention shall enter into force 
for the Union and its Member States on the first day of the month following the expiration of three months 
after the deposit of the instrument of approval. On 1 October 2015, the Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice 
of Court Agreements entered into force in 28 States (Mexico and all Member States of the European Union, 
except Denmark). 
1087 Gottfried Musger, ‘The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court and Brussels I Recast’ at the European 
Parliament Workshop on Cross-border activities in the EU – Making life easier for citizens (PE: 510.003) (26 
February 2015, Brussels) 317, 333-335; The major business partners of the EU include Canada, China, Korea, 
Russia, Turkey and the USA. 
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Chapter 11 - Damages for Breach of Choice of Law Agreements 
The Primacy of Jurisdictional Disputes in Private International Law1088 
Before examining the specific issue of damages for breach of a choice of law agreement, it is 
necessary to examine the larger question of the proper role and scope of choice of law 
considerations in international commercial litigation before the English courts.1089 In that 
regard, in recent times it has become apparent in the leading global centres of transnational 
litigation that the outcome of a case depends much more on jurisdictional concerns than 
choice of law. Therefore, the assessment of choice of law agreements and the award of 
damages for their breach will occupy a secondary position in this thesis in relation to the 
examination of choice of court agreements and contractual remedies for their breach.       
The significance and frequency of jurisdictional disputes is witnessed by the fact that in the 
English courts there are far more reported cases on international jurisdiction and procedure 
than on choice of law.1090 These jurisdictional disputes are very rarely pursued till trial and 
are more in the nature of interlocutory or interim border skirmishes between the litigating 
parties to establish superiority.1091 This ‘litigation about where to litigate’1092 often witnesses 
a relatively disadvantaged party capitulating and seeking to settle or compromise. However, 
there may be instances where a coordinated attempt at multistate litigation becomes 
necessary as in international fraud litigation where the widespread nature of the fraud and 
its perpetrators, and the dissipation of its monetary proceeds leave no other option.1093 
Therefore, jurisdictional disputes in the English courts may settle before the trial stage 
where the application of choice of law rules and foreign law become most relevant.  
                                                          
1088 AS Bell, Forum Shopping and Venue in Transnational Litigation (OUP 2003) 14-19, 23-48; R Fentiman, 
International Commercial Litigation (2nd Edition, OUP 2015) 9-12; A Briggs, Agreements on Jurisdiction and 
Choice of Law (OUP 2008) Preface, vii; RH Graveson, Comparative Conflict of Laws (North Holland, Amsterdam 
1977) 8; Aude Fiorini, ‘The Codification of Private International Law in Europe - Could the Community Learn 
from the Experience of Mixed Jurisdictions’ (2008) 23 Tulane European and Civil Law Forum 89, 100. 
1089 See Manuel Penadés Fons, ‘Commercial Choice of Law in Context: Looking Beyond Rome’ (2015) 78 Modern 
Law Review 241. 
1090 Trevor C Hartley, International Commercial Litigation (CUP 2009) 6. 
1091 Campbell McLachlan, Lis Pendens in International Litigation (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden & Boston 
2009) 36-40. 
1092 Research in Motion UK Ltd v Visto Corp [2008] EWCA Civ 153, [2008] Bus LR D141, [3] (in the context of the 
Brussels I Regulation): ‘Too often one finds parties litigating as much about where and when disputes should be 
heard and decided as about the real underlying dispute’; See TM Yeo, ‘The Future of Private International Law 
in Singapore’ Seventh Yong Pung How Professorship of Law Lecture, Singapore Management University (22 May 
2014), 17. 
1093 McLachlan (n 1091). 
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However, from the perspective of transaction planning and litigation strategy, choice of law 
considerations cannot be ignored as they may determine where a party may sue if the 
choice of law rules of that forum give a wide effect to the choice of law agreement in the 
absence of any countervailing factors such as mandatory rules and the public policy of the 
forum. On the other hand, a party seeking to avoid the choice of law agreement may seek a 
forum which limits the autonomy of the parties as to choice of law, restricts the scope of the 
applicable law or contains an anomalous public policy provision which overrides the 
applicable law. The applicable law may also determine the outcome of a dispute and thus 
influence the choice of forum. The applicable law is also a factor to consider in determining 
the most appropriate forum for the purposes of the doctrine of forum non conveniens.1094 
The choice of a particular forum in an exclusive jurisdiction agreement may indicate that the 
parties intend the contract to be governed by the law of the chosen forum.1095 At common 
law, an exclusive jurisdiction or forum clause is considered to be ‘a weighty indication’1096 of 
the parties’ common intention, albeit ‘one which may yield to others’.1097 On the other hand, 
Recital 12 of the Rome I Regulation is more restrictive and provides that an exclusive 
jurisdiction agreement should be one of the factors to be taken into account in determining 
whether a choice of law has been clearly demonstrated. Unlike the Rome I Regulation which 
refers to the effect of a forum clause in a recital, Article 4 of the Hague Principles on Choice 
of Law in International Commercial Contracts contains a direct reference as to the effect of a 
forum clause on tacit choice of law: ‘An agreement between the parties to confer 
jurisdiction on a court or an arbitral tribunal to determine disputes under the contract is not 
in itself equivalent to a choice of law.’1098 
                                                          
1094 Spiliada Maritime Corporation v Cansulex Ltd [1987] 1 AC 460, 478 (HL) (Lord Goff of Chieveley); Ronald A 
Brand and Scott R Jablonski, Forum Non Conveniens: History, Global Practice, and Future Under the Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (Oxford University Press 2007) 33; Richard Fentiman, ‘Foreign Law 
and the Forum Conveniens’ in James AR Nafziger and Symeon Symeonides (eds), Law and Justice in a 
Multistate World: Essays in Honor of Arthur T. von Mehren (Transnational Publishers, New York 2002) 275; 
Maria Hook, ‘The Choice of Law Agreement as a Reason for Exercising Jurisdiction’ (2014) 63 ICLQ 963, 965. 
1095 For a discussion of the English common law presumption Qui elegit judicem elegit jus see, BA Marshall, 
‘Reconsidering the Proper Law of the Contract’ (2012) 13 Melbourne Journal of International Law 1, 15-17. 
1096 Compagnie d’Armement Maritime SA v Compagnie Tunisienne de Navigation SA [1971] AC 572, 587–91, 
593, 596–600, 604–7 (HL); John Kaldor Fabricmaker Pty Ltd v Mitchell-Cotts Freight (Australia) Pty Ltd (1989) 18 
NSWLR 172, 187. 
1097 Compagnie d’Armement Maritime SA v Compagnie Tunisienne de Navigation SA [1971] AC 572, 596 (Lord 
Wilberforce). 
1098 See Article 4 of the Hague Choice of Law Principles and Commentary in Permanent Bureau of the 
Conference, The Hague Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts (Approved on 19 
March 2015) <http://www.hcch.net/upload/conventions/txt40en.pdf> accessed 15 April 2015. 
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There are various reasons why choice of law has such a limited influence on the outcome of 
international commercial litigation. For starters, the procedural law of the forum is immune 
from the effects of choice of law.1099 Moreover, the English common law’s right-remedy 
approach to the substance-procedure distinction adopts a wide view of the proper and 
legitimate scope of the law of procedure.1100 However, the EU instruments on choice of law 
in contractual and non-contractual matters have reduced the scope of the law of the forum, 
as compared to English common law private international law.1101 
The English common law’s treatment of foreign law may be pragmatic and cost efficient but 
it lacks a conception of foreign law that is principled, multilateral and does not discriminate 
on the basis of the origin of the law.1102 Foreign law is a question of fact for the English 
courts.1103 As a consequence, the foreign law has to be pleaded by the party seeking to rely 
on the law. Furthermore, the content of the foreign law has to be proved to the satisfaction 
of the court. If neither party pleads the applicability of foreign law, the court will apply 
English domestic law to the issues in dispute. The English court has neither power nor duty 
to apply foreign law ex officio. It may be observed that, contract and tort cases litigated in 
the English courts will frequently be decided by application of English domestic law, even 
though choice of law rules might have indicated that a foreign law should be applied.1104 The 
difficulties in determining, understanding and correctly applying foreign law cannot be 
understated.1105  
                                                          
1099 Lex fori regit processum: ‘the law of the forum governs procedure’. 
1100 Richard Garnett, Substance and Procedure in Private International Law (OUP 2012) 7-10; Harding v 
Wealands [2006] UKHL 32, [2007] 2 AC 1; See also Michael Bogdan, Private International Law as Component of 
the Law of the Forum (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden & Boston 2012) Chapter VIII, 193. 
1101 The Rome I and II Regulations adopt a direct approach, whereby certain issues are subjected to the 
applicable law of the obligation [for example the existence, nature and assessment of damage, (Article 15(c) 
Rome II; Article 12(1)(c) Rome I) and limitation of actions (Article 15(h) Rome II; Article 12(1)(d) Rome I] and 
others, for example formal validity, to the law of the obligation or the law of the country of performance of the 
act (lex loci actus).(Article 21 Rome II; Article 11(1) Rome I) See Garnett, Substance and Procedure in Private 
International Law (n 1100) 37-39. 
1102 In civil law legal systems foreign law is a question of law and the judge is under a duty to establish the 
foreign law; accordingly, it is not permissible to simply apply the local law (or presume that it is the same). The 
civil law judge is presumed to know the law, which is well expressed by the Latin adage jura novit curia (the 
judge knows the law). Moreover, he has the duty to apply the law on the facts, which is expressed by the other 
famous Latin adage da mihi factum, dabo tibi jus (give me the facts, I will give you the law) See Sofie Geeroms, 
Foreign Law in Civil Litigation (Oxford Private International Law Series, OUP 2004) 30-34; ‘Foreign law’ in 
Jowitt’s Dictionary of English Law (3rd Ed. Sweet & Maxwell 2009). 
1103 See, generally, Richard Fentiman, Foreign Law in English Courts (Oxford Private International Law Series, 
OUP 1998); For a discussion on the sua sponte application of choice of law rules and foreign law, see: Bogdan 
(n 1100) Chapter VI, ‘Should Conflict Rules and Foreign Law Be Applied Ex Officio?’. 
1104 Adrian Briggs, The Conflict of Laws (OUP 2013) 9. 




The centrality of the procedural law of the forum in jurisdictional disputes and the wider 
conception of civil procedure in the English common law has effectively displaced choice of 
law concerns from the centre stage of private international law. Moreover, the English 
common law’s pragmatic approach to proof of foreign law offers the litigants a flexible 
device to evade the choice of law issue altogether and instead rely on domestic English 
private law. As a consequence, these forum centric features of English private international 
law relegate choice of law considerations to a secondary position.    
Fundamental Juridical Nature and Classification of Choice of Law Agreements 
Under the proper law doctrine of the English common law, a court gives effect to an express 
choice of law, as long as it is bona fide, legal and not contrary to public policy.1106 Hence, the 
entitlement of the parties to select the governing law is not absolute and there are 
limitations on it.1107 The Rome Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations 
replaced the English common law’s proper law doctrine on 1 April 1991.1108 For contracts 
concluded after 17 December 2009,1109 the Rome I Regulation applies to cases involving a 
contractual obligation in civil and commercial matters litigated before an English court and 
involving a choice between the laws of different countries.1110 
Drawing an analogy with arbitration and jurisdiction agreements, Briggs argues that choice 
of law agreements have two functions. The first is to identify the proper law of the contract. 
The second emanates from the contractual effect of a choice of law agreement and is 
concerned with the consequences of breaching a choice of law agreement. Therefore, ‘a 
choice of law clause may be interpreted as telling a court what it needs to know to 
adjudicate the dispute under the contract, and as each party telling the other what promises 
are made as to the law which will be applied to the contract’.1111 Ascribing the negative 
aspect of an arbitration agreement and exclusive choice of court agreement1112 to choice of 
                                                          
1106 Vita Food Products Ltd v Unus Shipping Co Ltd [1939] UKPC 7, [1939] AC 277 (Lord Wright) There is no 
reported English decision in which an express choice was disapplied on the basis of the provisio. See CMV 
Clarkson and Jonathan Hill, The Conflict of Laws (OUP 2011) 203-204. 
1107 Ace Insurance Ltd v. Moose Enterprise Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 724, [52] (Brereton J). 
1108 The Rome Convention 1980 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (OJ C 27, 26.1.1998, p 36-53) 
was enacted into law by the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990 in the UK.  
1109 Articles 28 and 29 of Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 
2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) OJ L/2008/177/6.  
1110 Article 1(1) of the Rome I Regulation. 
1111 Briggs, Agreements (n 1088) 436 (emphasis in original). 
1112 For the negative aspect of an arbitration agreement and exclusive choice of court clause See, Ust-
Kamenogorsk Hydropower Plant JSC v AES Ust-Kamenogorsk Hydropower Plant LLP [2013] UKSC 35, [2013] 1 
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law agreements, Briggs suggests that a choice of law clause in favour of State X may be 
reinterpreted to connote both an agreement that, if a dispute arises, the claimant will 
contend that the parties’ relationship is governed by the law of State X; but also an 
agreement between the parties that no law other than the law of State X shall govern their 
relationship.1113 
An express choice of law agreement specifies the applicable law of a contract.1114 The rights 
and obligations of the parties to the contract will be determined by reference to the 
applicable law.1115 However, the court seised with jurisdiction may not apply the selected 
law for a number of reasons – whether because its choice of law rules directed the judge to 
apply a different law; or its own choice of law rules, while accepting the right of the parties 
to choose the applicable law, regarded the particular choice as impermissible; or that the 
court was directed by its own choice of law rules to apply mandatory domestic law or public 
policy; that the court errs in its application of the chosen law. A controversial issue is 
whether adherence to a governing law clause may be enforced by an action for breach of 
contract.1116    
In other words, the legal basis of an action for damages for breach of a choice of law 
agreement hinges on the appropriate characterization of a choice of law agreement. Is the 
appropriate characterization of such agreements promissory or declaratory in nature? A 
recent decision of the New South Wales Supreme Court (Australia) has brought this issue to 
the fore and has tested the viability of Briggs’s ideas regarding the breach of choice of law 
agreements in a practical context. Ace Insurance v. Moose Enterprise Pty Ltd1117, is probably 
the first common law decision to consider whether proceedings in a foreign court could 
constitute breach of a choice of law agreement.1118 In the words of Briggs this is ‘territory 
into which the English courts have not [yet] been invited to go’.1119 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
WLR 1889; [2013] 1 CLC 1069, [21]-[28] (Lord Mance with whom Lord Neuberger, Lord Clarke, Lord Sumption 
and Lord Toulson agreed) . 
1113 Briggs, Agreements (n 1088) 439. 
1114 Article 3(1) of the Rome I Regulation recognises the principle of party autonomy as one of the cornerstones 
of the European system of conflict of law rules in matters of contractual obligations (Recital 11 of the Rome I 
Regulation); See Article 14 and Recital 31 of the Rome II Regulation. 
1115 See Article 12 of the Rome I Regulation. 
1116 Briggs, Agreements (n 1088) 446-453. 
1117 Ace Insurance Ltd v. Moose Enterprise Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 724 (Brereton J); See Perry Herzfeld, ‘Choice of 
Law Clauses are not Promissory’ (Conflictoflaws.net, 4 August 2009) <http://conflictoflaws.net/2009/choice-of-
law-clauses-are-not-promissory/> accessed 15 February 2014. 
1118 TM Yeo, ‘Breach of Agreements on Choice of Law’ [2010] LMCLQ 194, 194. 
1119 Briggs, Agreements (n 1088) 424. 
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One of the arguments advanced by counsel for the claimant in that case was that by 
commencing Californian proceedings for the purposes of taking advantage of Californian 
law, the defendant had broken the implied promise arising from the Australian choice of law 
clause, and that an anti-suit injunction should be issued to restrain this breach. In support of 
this novel argument, the counsel for the claimant relied on the suggestions of Briggs in 
Agreements.1120 Brereton, J. observed that the submission was premised on the proposition 
that the choice of law agreement was promissory in effect and held: 
No doubt a contractual provision could be framed which unambiguously contained a 
promise to do nothing that might result in some other system of law becoming 
applicable. However, in my opinion that is not ordinarily the effect of a choice of law 
clause, which is usually declaratory of the intent of the parties, rather than 
promissory.1121  
In our system of private international law, therefore, choice of law is about 
ascertaining the intention of the parties as to the legal system that is to govern their 
contract, not about covenants or promises that a particular legal system will 
apply…..It may well be that the parties could frame a provision which was promissory 
in effect, but – given the conventional function of a choice of law clause – it would 
require very clear language to make it promissory rather than declaratory.1122  
Although Brereton, J. acknowledged the possibility of an appropriately framed choice of law 
clause using ‘very clear language’ leading to a promissory effect, he nevertheless refused to 
give effect to the clause in the instant case by relying on the conventional declaratory 
function of such clauses.1123 The path well-trodden was chosen and rightly so considering the 
dearth of judicial authority and a lack of academic consensus for the novel interpretation of 
choice of law agreements advanced by Briggs. 
The promissory effect of a choice of law agreement was recently examined by the English 
Commercial Court in The Lucky Lady.1124 In that case, Navig8 (a Singaporean company) 
sought permission to serve Al-Riyadh (a Jordanian company) out of the jurisdiction, on the 
basis that proceedings brought by Al-Riyadh in Jordan were contrary to a choice of English 
law. Al-Riyadh claimed damages from Navig8 as the alleged carrier of damaged cargo. The 
bill of lading provided for English law. Pursuant to Jordanian choice of law rules, however, 
the law governing the dispute was Jordanian law. In the English court, Navig8 sought an anti-
                                                          
1120 Ibid Chapter 11. 
1121 Ace Insurance Ltd v. Moose Enterprise Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 724, [47] (Brereton J) (emphasis added). 
1122 Ace Insurance Ltd v. Moose Enterprise Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 724, [51] (Brereton J) (emphasis added). 
1123 Ibid; Yeo, Breach of Agreements on Choice of Law (n 1118) 196. 
1124 Navig8 Pte Ltd v Al-Riyadh Co for Vegetable Oil Industry (‘The Lucky Lady’) [2013] EWHC 328 (Comm), 
[2013] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 104, [2013] 2 CLC 461 (Andrew Smith J). 
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suit injunction, damages and a negative declaration that it was not a party to the contracts 
of carriage. It argued that, because English law contained certain protections that were not 
available to it under Jordanian law, the Jordanian proceedings were ‘designed to 
defeat….their rights under English law’.1125 
The English court rejected the applications for an anti-suit injunction and damages, on the 
basis that, by commencing the Jordanian proceedings, Al-Riyadh did not contravene ‘any 
(contractual or other) duty owed to Navig8’.1126 The court found that in effect Navig8 was 
claiming:1127 
a right, deriving apparently from the choice of English law, not to be sued in any 
jurisdiction that does not give effect to a choice of English law that is recognised by 
English private international law, at least unless the foreign jurisdiction recognises 
rights similar to those recognised by English law. 
The court held that: ‘There is no proper basis for so wide a proposition’.1128 Nevertheless, 
the court was willing to grant permission for leave to serve out of the jurisdiction the claims 
for declaratory relief, concluding that England was the proper place for these claims because 
of the parties’ choice of English law.  
Therefore, the English court in The Lucky Lady was quick to reject a submission that the 
English choice of law agreement conferred a right on the applicant to be sued in a forum 
that would give effect to it.1129 This ruling has confirmed the previous finding of the New 
South Wales Supreme Court in Ace Insurance Ltd v Moose Enterprise Pty Ltd that an ordinary 
choice of law agreement did not ‘found implied negative stipulations’ as to jurisdiction.1130 
Similarly, Takahashi doubts whether a choice of law agreement could entail a contractual 
promissory effect.1131 He argues that in most cases, a choice of law clause does not contain 
an express undertaking not to bring an action in a court which would deny effect to it. 
Therefore, it is even more difficult to read such an implied undertaking into a choice of law 
                                                          
1125 Ibid [16]. 
1126 Ibid [22]. 
1127 Ibid [22]. 
1128 Ibid [22]. 
1129 As opposed to the breach of a legal right or breach of contract in suing before a court which will not give 
effect to an express choice of law by the parties, it is not wrongful to sue in a court which will apply principles 
of private international law which are merely different from those applicable in an English court. See Erste 
Group Bank AG v JSC ‘VMZ Red October’ [2013] EWHC 2926 (Comm) (Flaux J); A Briggs, Private International 
Law in English Courts (OUP 2014) 400. 
1130 Ace Insurance Ltd v. Moose Enterprise Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 724, [53] (Brereton J). 
1131 Koji Takahashi, ‘Damages for Breach of a Choice of Court Agreement: Remaining Issues’ (2009) 11 Yearbook 
of Private International Law 73, 101-102. 
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clause. He concludes that a contractual claim seeking damages for breach of a choice of law 
clause should not be allowed unless the agreement contains an express undertaking not to 
bring an action in a court which would deny effect to it. It is submitted, that the conventional 
wisdom in the dicta of Brereton, J. in the Ace Insurance decision is reflected in Takahashi’s 
views. 
Basedow starts his inquiry into the binding effect of choice of law agreements by highlighting 
that ‘an inappropriate commingling of different types of contracts’ has occurred.1132 He 
submits that a choice of law agreement is of a different nature from an unfulfilled contract in 
which there is a mutual exchange of promises as to future conduct. He maintains that choice 
of law agreements are self-fulfilling dispositional contracts.1133 The effect of the agreement 
was realised at the moment it was jointly adopted by the parties. The contract embodies a 
dispositional character in that it disposes off the assignment of the contract to one of the 
several hundred legal orders found across the world. This position is in contrast to the 
classification adopted by Briggs which conceives choice of law agreements as part of a 
comprehensive dispute resolution agreement regulating the future conduct of the 
parties.1134 
Fentiman comments on the possible promissory nature of choice of law agreements with: ‘It 
is unclear how it assists to view the matter in contractual terms.’1135 He argues that it cannot 
be a breach to invite a court to characterize a given issue as one not falling within the scope 
of the agreed law, such as the law of the forum (lex fori). Such an allegation does not in any 
way deny that the contractual law governs matters to which it properly applies. A simple 
choice of law clause is not an agreement that the law agreed upon governs each and every 
aspect of the dispute. Moreover, if such a clause were to provide that the chosen law 
governs every aspect of a dispute it would be presumably ineffective. Fentiman concludes by 
                                                          
1132 Jürgen Basedow, The Law of Open Societies: Private Ordering and Public Regulation in the Conflict of Laws 
(Brill Nijhoff, Leiden 2015) 145; Jürgen Basedow, ‘The Law of Open Societies – Private Ordering and Public 
Regulation of International Relations’ (2012) 360 Recueil des Cours, 199-200; cf Ralf Michaels, ‘Party Autonomy 
in Private International Law--A New Paradigm Without a Solid Foundation?’ (126th Conference of the Private 
International Law Association of Japan, 2 June 2013) 8 
<http://www.pilaj.jp/data/2013_0602_Party_Autonomy.pdf> accessed 1 April 2015, notes that a choice of law 
agreement as a ‘disposition’ is similar in effect to an ‘obligation’ arising from the clause as both operate within 
the substantive law paradigm.  
1133 Basedow, The Law of Open Societies (n 1132) 145. 
1134 Cf J Harris, ‘Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: Where Next?’ [2009] LMCLQ 537, 549, doubts 
the view that choice of law agreements are dispute resolution agreements by referring to their significant role 
in transaction planning prior to actual litigation. 
1135 Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (2015) (n 1088) 129; R Fentiman, International Commercial 
Litigation (OUP 2010) 106. 
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stating that, the parties cannot by choice oust the private international law rules of the 
forum.1136 
Borrowing from HLA Hart’s illuminating terminology, in the ‘core’1137 case of exclusive choice 
of court agreements there is an express duty to bring proceedings only in the contractual 
forum and the correlative1138 right of the counterparty not to be sued in the non-elected 
forum. There is no such express duty to bring proceedings in a forum that will give effect to 
the choice of law agreement or correlative right not to sued in a forum that will defeat the 
choice of law clause in the more doubtful ‘penumbra’1139 case of choice of law 
agreements.1140 Building on this interpretation, a choice of law agreement may not be 
enforced by either party and it is simply an unequivocal expression of the law which the 
parties intend shall govern their contractual relationship.1141 This may or may not be applied 
by a court faced with a dispute relating to the contract. It has also been argued that 
jurisdiction and choice of law agreements fundamentally differ from each other because if a 
court does not choose to apply the law specified in the choice of law agreement it is more 
difficult to conclude that either party is at fault:1142 ‘It is in fact impossible to say that either 
contracting party breached his promise contained in the choice-of-law clause.’ The situation 
with respect to jurisdiction agreements differs in that a jurisdiction agreement can only be 
breached where one party willfully institutes proceedings in a non-contractual forum.1143 
The jurisdiction clause can only be breached by the deliberate act of one party.1144 
Non-exclusive choice of court agreements generally carry no promise not to sue in other 
jurisdictions.1145 However, the English Court of Appeal has reminded us that it is ultimately a 
                                                          
1136 Ibid. 
1137 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd Ed, Clarendon Press, OUP 1994) 121-150; HLA Hart, ‘Positivism and the 
Separation of Law and Morals’ (1958) 71 Harvard Law Review 593. 
1138 For the jural correlative concepts of right and duty see, Wesley N Hohfeld, ‘Fundamental Legal Conceptions 
as Applied in Judicial Reasoning’ (1917) Yale Law School Faculty Scholarship Series (Paper 4378) 
<http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/4378/> accessed 20 January 2015; Ernest J Weinrib, The Idea 
of Private Law (OUP 2012) Chapter 5, ‘Correlativity’. 
1139 Hart, The Concept of Law (n 1137) 121-150; Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals (n 1137). 
1140 Ace Insurance Ltd v. Moose Enterprise Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 724, [47] (Brereton J); Yeo, Breach of 
Agreements on Choice of Law (n 1118) 195. 
1141 Andrew Dickinson, ‘Restitution and Incapacity: A Choice of Law Solution?’ [1997] Restitution Law Review 
66, 69 FN 26; Daniel Tan and Nik Yeo, ‘Breaking Promises to Litigate in a Particular Forum: Are Damages an 
Appropriate Remedy’ [2003] LMCLQ 435, 437 FN 8. 
1142 Daniel Tan, ‘Damages for Breach of Forum Selection Clauses, Principled Remedies, and Control of 
International Civil Litigation’ (2005) 40 Texas International Law Journal 623, 650. 
1143 Ibid. 
1144 Ibid 651. 
1145 Ace Insurance Ltd v. Moose Enterprise Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 724, [15] (Brereton J); J Fawcett, ‘Non 
exclusive jurisdiction agreements in private international law’ [2001] LMCLQ 234, 253. 
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question of construction of the contract what promises the parties may have made in 
respect of a non-exclusive choice of court agreement.1146 Non-exclusive jurisdiction 
agreements may be the foundation for an anti-suit injunction to protect a contractual right if 
the conduct of foreign proceedings amounts to breach of an implied agreement not to bring 
such proceedings once proceedings have commenced in the non-exclusive but primary 
jurisdiction,1147 or if it amounts to the breach of an implied agreement because it (being a 
foreign anti-suit injunction action) attempts to restrain the exercise of a contractual right to 
commence proceedings in the non-exclusively chosen forum at all.1148 The analogy from 
non-exclusive jurisdiction agreements emphasizes that ultimately it is a question of 
construction what promises may be inferred from the parties in the contract.1149 In similar 
vein, whether or not a choice of law agreement is promissory in nature is, in the final 
analysis, an issue of construction.1150 To be fair, Brereton J also recognised that the issue is 
one of contractual construction1151 and the intentions of the contracting parties are very 
significant in that regard.1152 
The inherent value and necessary implications of a promissory choice of law agreement also 
need to be carefully examined. A promissory choice of law agreement comes close to being 
treated as an exclusionary jurisdiction agreement or an implied agreement to exclude the 
jurisdiction of the choice defeating forum. It is a matter of concern that this development 
has proceeded without any consideration of the principles and rules that would usually 
govern an agreement of this kind.1153 Exclusionary jurisdiction agreements that are implied 
from choice of law agreements fall short of the standard ordinarily required of jurisdiction 
agreements. 
                                                          
1146 Highland Crusader Offshore Partners LP v Deutsche Bank AG [2009] EWCA Civ 725; Royal Bank of Canada v 
Cooperative Centrale Raiffeisen-Boerenleenbank [2004] EWCA Civ 7, [2004] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 471; Fawcett (n 1097) 
235-236. 
1147 See, for example, BP Plc v Aon Ltd [2005] EWHC 2554 (Comm), [2006] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 549, [31]; Royal Bank of 
Canada v Cooperative Centrale Raiffeisen-Boerenleenbank [2004] EWCA Civ 7, [2004] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 471, [24]-
[25]. 
1148 See, for example, Sabah Shipyard (Pakistan) Limited v Islamic Republic of Pakistan [2003] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 571; 
Highland Crusader Offshore Partners LP v Deutsche Bank AG [2009] EWCA Civ 725, [112]. 
1149 Yeo, Breach of Agreements on Choice of Law (n 1118) 196. 
1150 Ibid; Adrian Briggs and Peter Rees, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments (5th Edition, Informa Law from 
Routledge, 2009) 625; Briggs, Agreements (n 1088) 451. 
1151 Ace Insurance Ltd v. Moose Enterprise Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 724, [51] (Brereton J). 
1152 See Fiona Trust & Holding Corp v Privalov [2007] UKHL 40; [2007] 2 CLC 553; [2008] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 254, [27] 
(a decision on arbitration agreements) where Lord Hope of Craighead stated that the same interpretive 
approach should be adopted in relation to choice of law and jurisdiction agreements. 
1153 Hook (n 1094) 970. 
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It is submitted that, the principle of pacta sunt servanda should be inapplicable because the 
enforcement of an implied intention to derogate from the jurisdiction of the choice 
defeating courts is inconsistent with the principles and rules that govern jurisdictional party 
autonomy more generally. In New Hampshire Insurance Co v Strabag Bau AG, the Court of 
Appeal held that the requirements of Article 17 of the Brussels Convention could only be 
met by a choice of court agreement.1154 The English common law of conflict of laws also 
requires an express jurisdiction agreement.1155 By excluding a forum, the parties forsake 
their right of access to justice in that particular forum and the parties should be aware of the 
consequences of their decision. 
An exclusionary jurisdiction agreement imputed from a choice of law agreement is neither 
express nor in most cases real. It is an implied term of the choice of law agreement that is 
based on the hypothetical or presumed intention of the parties: an agreement that the 
parties would have reasonably concluded if they had considered the matter. It is submitted 
that, parties should not be deprived of the ability to litigate in available jurisdictions on the 
basis of an imputed intention. As a matter of principle, a more stringent and objectively 
verifiable standard along the lines of the requirements for prorogation of jurisdiction should 
be a necessary pre-requisite for parties to effectively derogate from the jurisdiction of the 
available choice of law defeating courts. 
Furthermore, conceiving choice of law agreements from a purely contractual perspective 
ignores the very significant role of the law of the forum including its mandatory choice of law 
regime.1156 If a choice of law agreement is accompanied by an agreement to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of a given court, this presumably constitutes an agreement that the conflicts 
rules of the forum shall apply, including those giving effect to any choice of law clause. If 
such a clause is tied to a non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement or contains no jurisdiction 
agreement at all, this suggests that the parties are content that the effect of the clause is 
subject to the conflicts rules of any court seised of proceedings. 
                                                          
1154 New Hampshire Insurance Co v Strabag Bau AG [1992] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 361, 371-372 (CA); For a discussion of 
the formal validity requirements of a choice of court agreement, see, PR Beaumont and PE McEleavy, Anton’s 
Private International Law (3rd Edition, SULI/W Green 2011) 242-249. 
1155 New Hampshire Insurance Co v Strabag Bau AG [1992] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 361, 371-372 (CA); Lawrence Collins 
and others (eds.), Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Laws (15th Edition, Sweet and Maxwell 2012) para 
14-079. 
1156 See Bogdan (n 1100) Chapter II. 
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Implied choice of law under Article 3(1) of the Rome I Regulation is a potential source of 
difficulty for those arguing that a choice of law agreement is promissory in nature.1157 Article 
3(1) provides that the choice shall be ‘clearly demonstrated by the terms of the contract or 
the circumstances of the case.’ Where the choice of law is implied rather than express, it is 
not conceivable that there would be an implied negative stipulation not to invoke the 
jurisdiction of a court which would apply a law other than the chosen one. It is submitted 
that, this line of reasoning supports the conclusion that where there is an express choice of 
law agreement, there is similarly no implied obligation not to invoke the jurisdiction of a 
court which will not apply the chosen law. Therefore, the express choice of law in a choice of 
law agreement declares the intention of the contracting parties and is not promissory. The 
provision on party autonomy in the Rome I Regulation includes both express and implied 
choice within the same rule. This further suggests that an internally consistent and internally 
coherent application of Article 3(1) of the Rome I Regulation requires that both express and 
implied choice of law be interpreted as specifying the applicable law and as not supporting 
the conception of choice of law agreements as private law contracts between the parties to 
abide by the stipulated law. In the Ace Insurance decision, Brereton J used a similar 
argument to demonstrate that it cannot be a breach of contract to sue in a forum which will 
not give effect to an ‘inferred’ choice of law.1158 The promissory nature of a choice of law 
agreement is most plausible where there is a governing law clause and less so where the law 
chosen by the parties is identified from other terms of the contract or from their 
conduct.1159 Furthermore, Article 3(2) of the Rome I Regulation provides that: ‘The parties 
may at any time agree to subject the contract to a law other than that which previously 
governed it’.1160 Therefore, the subsequent agreement of the parties as to choice of law may 
override the choice of law agreement in their contract and render it nugatory.  
In order to understand the relative autonomy of choice of law agreements and their 
functional dependence on the law of the forum it is necessary to delve deeper into the 
theoretical basis for party autonomy in choice of law. Nygh examines the source of party 
autonomy in Autonomy in International Contracts: what gives the parties permission to 
                                                          
1157 See Article 4 of The Hague Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts (n 1098). 
1158 Ace Insurance Ltd v. Moose Enterprise Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 724, [51] (Brereton J); Yeo, Breach of 
Agreements on Choice of Law (n 1118) 196. 
1159 Dickinson, Restitution and Incapacity: A Choice of Law Solution? (n 1141) 69. 
1160 See Article 2(3) of The Hague Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts (n 1098). 
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make a choice in the first place?1161 First, he considers the situation where the will of the 
parties is truly autonomous and supreme.1162 In this scenario, the parties may choose to 
have the contract not governed by any law at all, or by the international principles of private 
law (lex mercatoria). If they do choose a municipal system of law they cannot be bound by 
subsequent changes in the law unless they agreed to be so bound. They can also contract 
themselves out of the operation of its mandatory rules including international mandatory 
rules and the public policy of the forum. However, Nygh remarks that a ‘free floating’ choice 
of law where the parties’ will is truly autonomous and supreme ‘does not as yet have much 
support’.1163 On the other hand, the choice of the parties must be based on the private 
international law rules of a particular municipal legal system and the scope of that choice of 
law will be necessarily limited by the operation of the mandatory rules and public policy of 
the forum. 
Nygh then goes on to trace the source of party autonomy in national municipal legal 
systems.1164 Ehrenzweig expressed the prevailing majority view when he stated: ‘Party 
autonomy is, of course, not an independent source of conflicts rules, but is effective only in 
so far as it is recognized by such a rule’.1165 In fact, Ehrenzweig went to the extent that he 
described this proposition as a ‘truism’.1166 Therefore, party autonomy is only effective if it is 
inserted as a connecting factor in the relevant municipal choice of law rule. It is submitted, 
that party autonomy can only operate through the choice of law rules of a national legal 
system and that the law of the forum must provide the necessary entry point for this 
autonomy to be exercised. 
With regard to Article 3(1)1167 of the Rome Convention, Nygh cites Paul Lagarde (one of the 
rapporteurs of the official accompanying report: the Giuliano-Lagarde Report) as stating 
that: ‘Ce choix est un choix de droit international prive’1168 (‘This choice is a choice of private 
international law’1169). Therefore, when the parties enter into a contract in relation to the 
                                                          
1161 PE Nygh, Autonomy in International Contracts (Clarendon Press, Oxford Private International Law Series, 
OUP 1999) Chapter 2, 31-45. 
1162 Ibid 31-32. 
1163 Ibid 32. 
1164 ibid 32-35. 
1165 Albert A Ehrenzweig, Private International Law (Volume I, Sijthoff 1972) 44. 
1166 Ibid. 
1167 ‘A contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties. The choice must be expressed or 
demonstrated with reasonable certainty by the terms of the contract or the circumstances of the case. By their 
choice the parties can select the law applicable to the whole or a part only of the contract.’ 
1168 Nygh (n 1161) 33. 
1169 Translation by author. 
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applicable law they are also agreeing to be bound by the mandatory private international 
law rules of the Rome Convention and its successor the Rome I Regulation that actually give 
effect to the choice of the parties and regulate or delimit the operation of the chosen law.  
Nygh explains that the concept underlying the search for an authorizing national law, 
particularly the law of the forum, is the ancient idea of the territorial sovereignty of the 
nation state and its ability to command its courts.1170 On this view, any freedom that the 
parties may possess is one granted by the sovereign. This view of party autonomy as being 
predicated on the territorial sovereignty of the nation state has metamorphosed into the 
increasingly multi-dimensional and international private international law rules of the EU 
conflicts regime. 
Nygh also examines international law or custom as a source of party autonomy.1171 In this 
regard, Lowenfeld has stated that ‘it is fair to say….that party autonomy- both for choice of 
law and for choice of forum, including an arbitral forum- is now part of an international 
customary law of dispute settlement’.1172 An international basis for party autonomy is also 
supported by the Institute of International Law.1173 Ralf Michaels cites this 1991 resolution of 
the Institute of International Law as supporting the contention that party autonomy should 
be based on the notion of human rights.1174 Jayme explains that the foundation of party 
autonomy lies in the principle of liberty of the individual which is a part of Human Rights, as 
proclaimed most prominently in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 10 December 
1948, which applies not merely in the personal but also in the economic sphere.1175 On that 
view, the freedom to choose the applicable law is not merely a connecting factor; it is the 
parties who insert their agreement in to the legal system they have freely chosen. In other 
words, the ‘sovereignty of the individual’ is recognised in an increasingly pluralistic and 
cosmopolitan international legal order.1176 In brief, ‘Rules of private international law strike a 
                                                          
1170 Nygh (n 1161) 35. 
1171 Ibid 35-37. 
1172 Andreas F Lowenfeld, International Litigation and the Quest for Reasonableness: Essays in Private 
International Law (Clarendon Press, OUP 1996) 208-209. 
1173 International Law Institute, ‘Autonomy of the Parties in International Contracts Between Private Persons or 
Entities’ (1991); Annuaire de l’institut de droit international, Session de Bale (1992) Volume 64-II, 208 
1174 Ralf Michaels, ‘Public and Private International Law: German Views on Global Issues’ [2008] Journal of 
Private International Law 121, 132. 
1175 Erik Jayme, ‘Identite culturelle et integration: le droit international prive postmoderne’, 251 Recuil des 
Cours (1995-I) 9, 147-148 in Nygh (n 1113) 36. 
1176 Alex Mills, The Confluence of Public and Private International Law (CUP 2009) 291-295; Alex Mills, 
‘Normative Individualism and Jurisdiction in Public and Private International Law: Towards a Cosmopolitan 
Sovereignty’ (Inaugural Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law Conference: Agents of 
Change: The Individual as a Participant in the Legal Process, Cambridge, 19 May 2012) 19. 
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balance between facilitating internationally recognised individual autonomy and respect for 
state regulatory authority – between individual freedom and collective cultural identity.’1177 
Writing at the turn of the millennium, Nygh concludes that there is still general support for 
the proposition that the law of the forum (including its choice of law rules) must provide the 
authorization for the parties to ‘exit’ the otherwise applicable law or the jurisdiction of the 
competent court.1178 However, in the context of the increasingly important and ever 
burgeoning European private international law regime, the Brussels I, Rome I and II 
Regulations provide uniform international rules for civil jurisdiction and choice of law 
matters which form part of the law of the forum. Therefore, matters which are subject to 
and governed by the supra-national European conflicts regime may be more readily 
explained by a combination of the international justification for party autonomy and the 
justification predicated on the territorial sovereignty of the nation state. Nygh does 
recognise that the right of the parties to choose the applicable law represents a rule of 
international customary law.1179    
It is the mandatory choice of law rules of the forum that characterize a given issue as 
procedural or substantive. The Rome I and II Regulations adopt a direct approach by 
subjecting particular issues to the applicable law of the contractual or non-contractual 
obligation.1180 The instruments exclude matters relating to ‘evidence and procedure’1181 
from their scope and lack any autonomous definition for these terms. The result is that 
national law will have to be applied to determine both the meaning given to these terms and 
what law should be applied to an individual issue (assuming that the matter has not been 
directly subjected to the applicable law by the Regulations). Considerable scope of operation 
is therefore left to national choice of law rules under the Regulations. Some commentators, 
in particular Illmer, have criticized this position, stating that the application of national law 
to matters of evidence and procedure, where the law of the cause of action falls under the 
Regulations, will lead to disharmony of court decisions and is incompatible with a European 
system of private international law.1182 Illmer argues that an autonomous conception of 
                                                          
1177 Mills, The Confluence (n 1176) 294. 
1178 Nygh (n 1161) 44. 
1179 Ibid 45. 
1180 Article 12 of the Rome I Regulation; Article 15 of the Rome II Regulation. 
1181 Article 1(3) of the Rome I Regulation; Article 1(3) of the Rome II Regulation. 
1182 Martin Illmer, ‘Neutrality Matters – Some Thoughts About the Rome Regulations and the so called 
Dichotomy of Substance and Procedure in European Private International Law’ (2009) 28 Civil Justice Quarterly 
237; Dickinson sees the concepts of evidence and procedure as ‘matters that define the scope of the 
Regulation’ which must therefore be given a uniform, autonomous meaning, independent of the forum’s 
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‘evidence and procedure’ is required, based on the idea of ‘neutrality’,1183 which means that 
a national court must apply the law of the cause of action to any issue which is concerned 
with or directed at the decision on the merits and which requires the law of the forum to be 
applied to any matter which concerns the mode or conduct of court proceedings. Garnett 
argues that whether or not an autonomous definition of procedure is adopted in relation to 
matters not considered by the Regulations, procedure should be based on the narrow mode 
and conduct of court proceedings view espoused by the Australian courts1184 rather than the 
traditional right-remedy test.1185 Following the lex fori regit processum1186 rule, the law of 
the forum applies to matters of procedure and the applicable law applies to matters of 
substance.  
Therefore, it cannot conceivably be a breach to invite a court to characterize an issue as one 
falling within the domain of procedure and outside the proper and legitimate scope of the 
agreed applicable law. As discussed above, national courts have the responsibility of defining 
the categories of procedure and substance and allocating a particular issue to either 
category. A conventional choice of law agreement is not an agreement that the law agreed 
upon will govern each and every aspect of a dispute. Such an agreement would presumably 
be ineffective as the parties cannot by agreement oust the mandatory choice of law rules of 
the forum. 
The doctrine of renvoi may also supply courts the judicial discretion to avoid the foreign 
applicable law and apply the law of the forum instead.1187 However, in the most significant 
commercial areas of private international law that dominate the discipline the use of renvoi 
is expressly outlawed. For instance, the doctrine of renvoi is excluded in the field of contract 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
notions: See Andrew Dickinson, The Rome II Regulation (Oxford Private International Law Series, OUP 2008) 
para 14.57. 
1183 Illmer, Neutrality Matters (n 1182) 246-247. 
1184 McKain v RW Miller and Co (South Australia) Pty Ltd (1991) 174 CLR 1; John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson 
(2000) 203 CLR 503. 
1185 Garnett, Substance and Procedure in Private International Law (n 1100) 39; Dickinson also suggests the 
adoption of a test on similar lines: Dickinson, Rome II Regulation (n 1182) para 14.60; Briggs and Bogdan too 
express dissatisfaction with the traditional English approach that remedies are a matter of procedure to be 
governed by the lex fori: Briggs, The Conflict of Laws (n 1104) 193; Bogdan, Private International Law as 
Component of the Law of the Forum (n 1100) Chapter VIII, 194. 
1186 ‘the law of the forum governs procedure’: See Garnett, Substance and Procedure in Private International 
Law (n 1100) Introduction, 1-4. 
1187 Bogdan, Private International Law as Component of the Law of the Forum (n 1100) Chapter IX, 206; See 
Clarkson and Hill (n 1106) 34-43. 
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by the Rome I Regulation1188 and in cases of non-contractual obligations by the Rome II 
Regulation.1189 Therefore, the issue of the application of renvoi to the applicable law 
specified by a choice of law agreement does not arise in the first place. 
Further limitations on the content of the applicable law specified by a choice of law 
agreement take the form of mandatory rules and the public policy1190 (ordre public) of the 
forum.1191 The contours of the public policy exception to the applicable law specified by a 
choice of law agreement can be defined, or at least described, with reference to the role of 
public policy as a basis for the non-recognition of a judgment under the Brussels I Regulation 
as interpreted by the CJEU:1192 
In that regard, the Court explained that recourse to a public policy clause can be 
envisaged only where recognition or enforcement of the judgment delivered in 
another Contracting State would be at variance to an unacceptable degree with the 
legal order of the State in which enforcement is sought inasmuch as it infringes a 
fundamental principle. The infringement would have to constitute a manifest breach 
of a rule of law regarded as essential in the legal order of the State in which 
enforcement is sought or of a right recognised as being fundamental within that legal 
order (Krombach, paragraph 37).  
Article 9(1) of the Rome I Regulation defines overriding mandatory provisions as:1193 
……..provisions the respect for which is regarded as crucial by a country for 
safeguarding its public interests, such as its political, social or economic organization, 
                                                          
1188 Article 20 of the Rome I Regulation; See Markus Altenkirch, ‘Article 20’ in Franco Ferrari (ed.), Rome I 
Regulation (Sellier European Law Publishers, Munich 2015) 485-487; Bogdan, Private International Law as 
Component of the Law of the Forum (n 1100) Chapter IX, 210. 
1189 Article 24 of the Rome II Regulation; See Markus Altenkirch, ‘Article 24’ in Peter Huber (ed.), Rome II 
Regulation (Sellier European Law Publishers, Munich 2011) 417-419; Clarkson and Hill (n 1106) 35. 
1190 For a discussion of a European public policy exception to the rules regarding the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments: See, Mills, The Confluence (n 1176) Chapter 4, 194-198; Alex Mills, ‘The Dimensions 
of Public Policy in Private International Law’ (2008) 4 Journal of Private International Law 201, 214; It is not for 
the CJEU to define the content of the public policy of the Contracting State but the Court of Justice has adopted 
the view that the limits of public policy are a question of interpretation of the Brussels Convention and are 
therefore a matter which must be determined by it: Case C-7/98 Krombach v Bamberski [2000] ECR I-1935 [22]-
[23]; Case C-38/98 Renault v Maxicar [2000] ECR I-2973 [27]-[28]; Case C-394/07 Marco Gambazzi v Daimler 
Chrysler Canada Inc [2009] ECR I-2563 [26]-[28]. 
1191 Bogdan, Private International Law as Component of the Law of the Forum (n 1100) Chapter X, 214-257; SC 
Symeonides, ‘Party Autonomy in Rome I and II From a Comparative Perspective’ in K Boele-Woelki, T Einhorn, D 
Girsberger and S Symeonides (eds), Convergence and Divergence in Private International Law – Liber Amicorum 
Kurt Siehr (Eleven International Publishing, 2010) 513, 528-530; Patrick J Borchers, ‘Categorical Exceptions to 
Party Autonomy in Private International Law’ (2008) 82 Tulane Law Review 1645, 1651-1657; cf HLE Verhagen, 
‘The Tension between Party Autonomy and European Union Law: Some Observations on Ingmar GB Ltd v Eaton 
Leonard Technologies Inc’ (2002) 51 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 135. 
1192 Case C-394/07 Marco Gambazzi v Daimler Chrysler Canada Inc [2009] ECR I-2563 [27]; See Case C-7/98 
Krombach v Bamberski [2000] ECR I-1935 [37]; Case C-38/98 Renault v Maxicar [2000] ECR I-2973 [30]. 
1193 A rule with similar effect is found in Article 16 of the Rome II Regulation, although the term ‘overriding 
mandatory provisions’ is not defined therein.  
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to such an extent that they are applicable to any situation falling within their scope, 
irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the contract under this Regulation. 
Apart from the compulsory application of the overriding mandatory provisions of the law of 
the forum,1194 effect may be given to such provisions of the law of the country where the 
obligations arising out of the contract have to be performed.1195 
The mandatory rules and public policy of the forum cannot be derogated from or evaded by 
a choice of law agreement.1196 Therefore, the law of the forum retains ultimate control over 
the content of the applicable law and it is not completely indifferent to the outcome of the 
dispute.1197 The overriding mandatory rules of the place of performance of the contract may 
also limit the scope of the applicable law insofar as those provisions render the performance 
of the contract unlawful. 
Having considered the role of the law of the forum, it is time to examine the viability of a 
claim for damages for breach of a choice of law agreement within the EU choice of law 
regime and beyond. Suppose that an international commercial contract is governed by an 
English choice of law agreement. If a party to the agreement sues in Italy and the Italian 
courts do not apply the English applicable law by characterizing an issue as procedural or 
override the applicable law by reference to its mandatory rules and public policy. Can the 
counterparty sue in England for breach of choice of law agreement? It is submitted, that 
such a cause of action would doubt the effectiveness of the choice of law regime of the 
Rome I Regulation. It will also indirectly imply that the party’s right to sue in the Italian 
courts under the Brussels I Regulation is undermined. Moreover, it will also mean that there 
is reason to deny effect to the resulting judgment of the Italian courts. The implications of 
such a cause of action for the principle of mutual trust and the effectiveness of EU law (effet 
utile) militate against the possible development of this remedy in the English courts.  
                                                          
1194 Article 9(2) of the Rome I Regulation. 
1195 Article 9(3) of the Rome I Regulation; See also, Article 7(1) of the Rome Convention; See Michael Hellner, 
‘Third Country Overriding Mandatory Rules in the Rome I Regulation: Old Wine in New Bottles?’ (2009) 5 
Journal of Private International Law 447. 
1196 See Section 27(2) and 27(3) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (Geographical Extent: England and 
Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland) which apply regardless of the applicable law of the contract where the 
choice of law agreement appears to the court, or arbitrator to have been imposed wholly or mainly for the 
purpose of enabling the party imposing it to evade the operation of the Act or in the making of the contract 
one of the parties dealt as consumer, and he was then habitually resident in the United Kingdom, and the 
essential steps necessary for the making of the contract were taken there, whether by him or by others on his 
behalf. 
1197 Bogdan, Private International Law as Component of the Law of the Forum (n 1100) Chapter X, 215. 
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To reiterate, it is perhaps misconceived to view the matter from a contractual or promissory 
perspective. The core of good sense in the conventional declaratory function of choice of law 
agreements has much to recommend it. This is due to the very prominent role of the law of 
the forum which actually authorises and recognises party autonomy as a connecting factor. 
There is, however, one situation in which it has resonance to suggest that non-compliance 
with a choice of law agreement is a breach of contract.1198 Suppose that a party commences 
proceedings in breach of an exclusive choice of court agreement in a court which would not 
uphold the governing law clause as the agreed court would have done. It would presumably 
be a breach of contract to advance any argument which denies the effectiveness of the 
clause. It is submitted, that in practice a court may choose to rely on the more conventional 
breach of an exclusive jurisdiction agreement to award damages or an anti-suit injunction 
rather than grounding the action on the novel breach of a choice of law agreement. In the 
Ace Insurance decision, Brereton J after considering the issue of contravention of the implied 
negative stipulation arising from a choice of law clause, concluded by awarding an anti-suit 
injunction for breach of an exclusive jurisdiction agreement in favour of the Australian 
courts.1199  
Private Law Enforcement of Choice of Law Agreements 
Prior to enforcing a choice of law agreement, it is necessary to examine the particular 
conception of such agreements in the Rome I Regulation. As observed, the Brussels I 
Regulation has its own understanding of jurisdiction agreements and Briggs conceives that 
conception as enshrining a public law notion of jurisdiction which does not adequately 
emphasize the contractual rights encapsulated therein. In similar vein, the key issue is 
whether the European legislature conceives choice of law clauses in terms of dispute 
resolution and the conferral of private law rights by virtue of selection of the applicable 
law.1200 Arguably, the Rome I Regulation is a complete code for determining which law or 
laws govern a contract. It seems unlikely that the argument that the choice of law clause has 
a separate, private validity (irrespective of the validity under the Regulation) would appeal to 
                                                          
1198 Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (2015) (n 1088) 129. 
1199 Ace Insurance Ltd v. Moose Enterprise Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 724, [82]-[83] (Brereton J); See Yeo, Breach of 
Agreements on Choice of Law (n 1118) 195; For a discussion of the Ace Insurance decision in the context of the 
construction of a jurisdiction agreement as exclusive or non-exclusive see Richard Garnett, ‘Jurisdiction Clauses 
Since Akai’ [2013] University of Melbourne Law School Research Series 6. 
1200 Harris, Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: Where Next? (n 1134) 553. 
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the CJEU.1201 A subsisting, separate and promissory conception of such agreements would be 
very difficult to reconcile with a conception of such agreements which focusses on the 
application of the law of the forum and its choice of law rules which in turn authorise the 
court to apply the law selected in the choice of law clause, subject to the mandatory rules 
and public policy of the forum. Therefore, the promissory conception only succeeds in 
narrating or describing an aspect of the application of the choice of law rules of the forum 
and may not represent a universally shared understanding of choice of law agreements.  
The remedy sought in the Ace Insurance case was an anti-suit injunction to restrain the 
breach of contract. The cross border injunctive remedy is unavailable to the English courts in 
respect of proceedings before the courts of another Member State and within the remit of 
the Brussels I Regulation, as the anti-suit injunction has been deemed to undermine both the 
principle of effectiveness of the Brussels regime and the overarching mutual trust principle 
which necessarily animates the EU private international law order.1202 Similar considerations 
premised on mutual trust and the principle of the effectiveness of the EU private 
international law instruments may well preclude cross border injunctive relief to restrain a 
party from commencing or continuing with proceedings in another Member State for the 
purpose of avoiding, evading or overriding the applicable law specified in a choice of law 
agreement.1203 The primacy of the mutual trust principle may be gleaned from the EU Justice 
Agenda for 2020 which declares that mutual trust is the ‘bedrock upon which EU justice 
                                                          
1201 Ibid; If an action for breach of the choice of law clause were permitted, this would also raise questions as to 
which courts should determine the meaning of a choice of law agreement; and whether only the courts first 
seised in the EU should be empowered to do so. It is submitted, that if there is no jurisdiction agreement 
accompanying the choice of law clause, the court first seised should proceed to determine the meaning of the 
choice of law clause. 
1202 Case C 159/02 Turner v Grovit [2005] 1 AC 101; Case C 185/07 Allianz SpA v West Tankers Inc [2009] 1 AC 
1138. 
1203 An argument may be made, however, that the situation is different if the contractual remedy is a matter of 
application of a law sanctioned by another European Union private international law instrument i.e. the Rome I 
Regulation. Moreover, the Rome I Regulation does not apply to matters of procedure but if a cause of action 
for damages for breach of a choice of law agreement impeaches and calls into question the effectiveness of its 
mandatory private international rules, the Regulation may well preclude the enforcement of subsisting and 
independent private contractual agreements as to choice of law. It is nevertheless apparently unlikely that the 
foundational mutual trust principle will lose any of its relevance or significance in relation to the European 
Union choice of law regime for contractual obligations in civil and commercial matters. For a discussion of the 
principle of mutual trust as the basis for neutral, multilateral and universal Savignyian conflict of law rules, see, 
Matthias Weller, ‘Mutual trust: in search of the future of European Union private international law’ (2015) 11 
Journal of Private International Law 64, 71-73 . 
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policy should be built’1204 The controversial remedy remains available in the armoury of the 
English courts if proceedings are outside the European Union.1205 
As a matter of principle, the award of damages may also be available for breach of a choice 
of law agreement in accordance with the applicable law of the contract, but this is as yet 
untested in the case law.1206 A claim for damages for breach of a choice of law agreement 
constituted by actions in other Member States may, however, be precluded for being 
incompatible with the choice of law instruments.1207 Moreover, the allegation that another 
Member State court refused or denied effect to the choice of law agreement also imputes 
that it was somehow wrong for the counterparty to have sued there in the first place. 
Therefore, both the right to sue in a Member State under the Brussels I Regulation and the 
application of forum law and choice of law rules under the Rome I Regulation are impeached 
and called into question.1208 Furthermore, as the damages remedy has the effect of second 
guessing and reversing or nullifying the judgment of the courts of another Member State, 
both the Brussels I Regulation’s system of direct rules of jurisdiction and the resulting 
automatic recognition and enforcement of judgments are undermined. It is submitted that, 
nullifying or reversing the effect of the foreign judgment is undoubtedly contrary to the 
principle of mutual trust and the obligation not to question the jurisdiction of another 
Member State court1209 and the obligation not to question a Member State court’s 
application of its own choice of law rules (The harmonized rules on jurisdiction and choice of 
law facilitate the mutual recognition of judgments within the EU and are also animated by 
the principle of mutual trust). As a general observation, the likelihood for non-compliance 
with the applicable law in cases where the proceedings are commenced within the Brussels-
                                                          
1204 The EU Justice Agenda for 2020 - Strengthening Trust, Mobility and Growth within the Union COM (2014) 
144 final; See Weller, Mutual trust (n 1155) 79-80. 
1205 See Ust-Kamenogorsk Hydropower Plant JSC v AES Ust-Kamenogorsk Hydropower Plant LLP [2013] UKSC 35, 
[2013] 1 WLR 1889; [2013] 1 CLC 1069 (Lord Mance delivering the judgment of the UK Supreme Court). 
1206 Damages for breach of an English exclusive jurisdiction agreement governed by English law have been 
awarded by the English courts even against proceedings in the Greek courts and within the remit of the 
Brussels I Regulation, See, Starlight Shipping Co v Allianz Marine & Aviation Versicherungs AG (The Alexandros 
T) [2014] EWCA Civ 1010 (Longmore LJ with whom Rimer LJ and Lord Toulson agreed); Substantive damages for 
breach of a jurisdiction agreement have been assumed to be an available remedy under English private 
international law: Donohue v Armco Inc [2001] UKHL 64, [2002] Lloyd’s Rep 425, [2002] CLC 440, [48] (Lord 
Hobhouse of Woodborough); The Spanish Tribunal Supremo has affirmed the award of substantial damages for 
breach of a choice of court agreement: Sogo USA Inc v Angel Jesus, STS (Sala de lo Civil, Sección 1ª), 12 January 
2009, Repertorio de Jurisprudencia 2009/544. 
1207 Yeo, Breach of Agreements on Choice of Law (n 1118) 199. 
1208 Harris, Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: Where Next? (n 1134) 554. 
1209 Case C-351/89 Overseas Union Insurance Ltd v New Hampshire Insurance Company [1991] ECR I-3317, [23]-
[25]; Case C-116/02 Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl [2003] ECR I-14693, [48]. 
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Lugano regime is remote, because it is unlikely that the application of the same set of choice 
of law rules1210 within Member States will result in a breach of contract.1211 
The argument in favour of damages for breach of a choice of law agreement must also 
overcome the problem that a foreign court’s ruling may be res judicata as to the applicable 
law. Separating the legal functions of a choice of law clause, Briggs suggests that this is not 
incompatible with a finding by the English courts that the parties had a binding contractual 
agreement as to choice of law. However, if the judgment emanates from a Member State, 
such an approach comes very near reviewing the foreign judgment as to its substance, or to 
second guessing the findings of the foreign court. Even in relation to proceedings brought in 
non-Member States, the very notion of allowing an action for breach of contract in the 
English courts seems likely to bring the English courts into conflict with foreign courts that 
have applied their own choice of law rules.1212 
A claimant will be unable to recover damages in respect of the loss which he has suffered if 
he cannot establish a causal link between his loss and the defendant’s breach of contract or 
that the loss is too remote.1213 Suppose that the forum classifies a particular issue as 
procedural and the chosen law thus does not properly apply to it. If that rule of the 
procedural law of the forum is the actual cause of the claimant’s loss, the chain of causation 
between the breach of the choice of law agreement and the loss suffered by the claimant 
will be severed. Similarly, the private international law rules of the forum may have caused 
the loss sustained by the claimant by regulating the application of the chosen law. In the 
words of Alex Mills, private international law rules are concerned ‘with the scope of 
                                                          
1210 There is a greater degree of harmonization in the Rome I Regulation as compared to the Rome Convention; 
there are no provisions which Member States may reserve against application in the Rome I Regulation. For 
instance, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal and the United Kingdom entered a reservation under Article 
22 of the Rome Convention in relation to Article 7(1) of the Rome Convention. See Bogdan, Private 
International Law as Component of the Law of the Forum (n 1100) Chapter X, 247. 
1211 Yeo, Breach of Agreements on Choice of Law (n 1118) 200. 
1212 A possible solution would be to rely on Section 32 of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 which 
provides that a judgment may arguably not be recognised or enforced in England because it has been obtained 
in breach of a dispute resolution agreement. The English choice of law agreement would presumably have to 
be construed as a dispute resolution agreement by the English courts but the language of the provision may 
not support the claim as its application to choice of law agreements is doubtful; cf Briggs, Private International 
Law in English Courts (n 1129) 496; However, if the claimant in the English proceedings had submitted to the 
jurisdiction of the foreign court, Section 34 of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 will bar further 
proceedings in the English courts. 
1213 For a discussion of causation and remoteness in the English and Scots substantive law of contract 
respectively, see, Ewan McKendrick, Contract Law (Palgrave Macmillan 2011) 354-360; Gillian Black, Woolman 
on Contract (W Green 2010) 145-149; For an analysis of causation and remoteness issues in relation to an 
action for damages for breach of a choice of forum agreement, see, Steven Gee, ‘Lord Bingham, Anti-Suit 
Injunctions and Arbitration’ in Mads Andenas and Duncan Fairgrieve (eds.), Tom Bingham and the 
Transformation of the Law: A Liber Amicorum (OUP 2009) 635, 641. 
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authority of the law, not the outcome in the specific case.’1214 From this perspective, there is 
no question of breach of the choice of law agreement when the law of the forum applies its 
choice of law rules. However, if it is determined that there is a breach, it may not always be 
an easy task to appropriate the entire blame on non-compliance with or breach of the choice 
of law agreement. The causation issue locates and traces the foundations of the choice of 
law agreement in the law of the forum and demonstrates the futility of viewing choice of law 
agreements from a contractual or promissory perspective. 
The natural extrapolation of Briggs’s theoretical speculation is that damages would be 
available for breach of a choice of law agreement. The theory, no matter howsoever elegant, 
appealing and persuasive gives rise to significant practical difficulty. A major impediment to 
the rational development of the remedy is the issue of quantification of damages.1215 
Suppose that there is a choice of law agreement for the law of State A. The courts of another 
state apply the law of State B instead. Should the English courts calculate the loss to the 
defendant overseas by determining what laws the English courts would have applied, and 
what the outcome would have been? The English courts applying the Rome I Regulation, 
may themselves not give unfettered effect to the law of State A, and may have imposed 
upon it provisions that cannot be derogated from by agreement of English law, or of some 
other state. The alternative is to consider the result had the law of State A alone been 
applied, albeit that there may not obviously be any state with jurisdiction which would have 
applied that law in its entirety and without any reservation. The problem gets enhanced 
when the court that denied effect to the clause is outside the EU and has fundamentally 
different choice of law rules as compared to the Rome I Regulation. The root cause of the 
difficulty stems from a misconception that the law chosen in a choice of law agreement 
governs each and every aspect of a dispute. However, as observed above, the parties cannot 
by agreement oust the mandatory choice of law regime of the forum. Characterization of an 
issue as procedural and outside the proper and legitimate ambit of the lex causae, the 
application of overriding mandatory provisions of the forum and other states and the public 
policy of the forum are all outcome determinative and regulate the application of the chosen 
                                                          
1214 Mills, The Confluence (n 1176) 19; Lord Mance describes the higher level secondary norms of private 
international law as ‘the infrastructure signposting parties towards the destination to determine substantive 
issues.’: Mance, The Future of Private International Law (n 1105) 186; See also JG Collier, The Conflict of Laws 
(Cambridge University Press 2001) Chapter 1, 6. 
1215 For the substantial practical difficulties faced by English courts when quantifying damages for breach of a 
choice of forum agreement, see FN 702 in Chapter 7 above. 
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law. An unfettered, free standing and truly independent choice of law which applies 
irrespective of the law of the forum and its choice of law regime does not exist.  
Suppose that the original proceedings took place in England and that it was the English 
courts which were unable to apply the law of State A in its entirety and without any 
reservation.1216 Would the English courts applying the choice of law rules of the Rome I 
Regulation, also have to award monetary compensation for the ‘loss’ caused to the 
defendant? By bifurcating the legal functions of a choice of law agreement into the law 
which the parties intended to apply to the contract and the contractual obligation to adhere 
to the chosen law in a choice of law agreement, it may be possible to allow an action for 
damages for breach of contract in this scenario.1217 However, it is submitted that the 
defendant will suffer no loss because the English court has applied the chosen law, subject 
to countervailing factors provided for by the Rome I Regulation. It may not be practicable to 
separate the procedural and substantive functions of the choice of law agreement because 
in this case the application of Rome I Regulation’s choice of law regime trumps any 
subsisting and independent obligation to adhere to the chosen law. Furthermore, a cause of 
action for damages for breach of a choice of law agreement will negate the impact of the 
choice of law rules under the Rome I Regulation which make provision for and limit the 
scope of party autonomy in the first place. 
In addition, one of the reasons for restricting party autonomy in relation to certain types of 
contract or fact patterns is because the law seeks to avoid the evasion of the rules of a 
particular state. In consumer contracts, the consumer retains the protection of rules of his 
home state, which cannot be derogated from by agreement.1218 This is a policy which 
intentionally protects weaker parties and limits party autonomy. However, if the agreement 
to choose another law can be upheld as a private international law bargain, this protection 
might come at a price.1219 A business which is sued and subjected to rules of the consumer’s 
home legal system might obtain damages for that ‘breach’. 
Brigg’s contractual analysis of choice of law agreements is without doubt a seminal 
contribution to legal scholarship. However, it is unlikely that the parallel existence of choice 
of law agreements as privately enforceable agreements for whose breach damages should 
                                                          
1216 Harris, Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: Where Next? (n 1134) 554. 
1217 Yeo, Breach of Agreements on Choice of Law (n 1118) 199. 
1218 Article 6 of the Rome I Regulation; Article 5 of the Rome Convention. 
1219 Harris, Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: Where Next? (n 1134) 555. 
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be available will attract the attention of the CJEU or the European legislature. In assessing 
the relevance or significance of attributing an obligation to adhere to the chosen law in a 
choice of law agreement, it may assist us if we consider another perspective on the 
fundamental nature of private international law rules and their inherent function.  
If the choice of law regime of the forum is conceived as a set of secondary rules for the 
allocation of regulatory authority, the descriptive, normative and interpretive narrative of 
the contractual perspective loses its perceived dominance and coherence as it fails to yield a 
complete and satisfactory justification for what we really understand by those rules. In the 
mantle of secondary power conferring rules as opposed to primary conduct regulating rules, 
choice of law rules perform a very significant public function of allocating regulatory 
authority. From this perspective, it is misplaced and misconceived to interpret choice of law 
clauses as contractual or promissory in essence. The contractual justification does not 
adequately account for the authorization of party autonomy by the choice of law rules of the 
forum, the supervening application of the laws of other states and ultimate forum control. 
Moreover, the pragmatic attractiveness of recovering damages for breach of choice of law 
agreements may be unsound in principle from the standpoint of a truly multilateral 
conception of private international law based on mutual trust or a strong notion of comity. 
An international private international law will always seek to promote judicial cooperation 
between legal systems in civil and commercial matters. 












Chapter 12 - Conclusions and Contributions to Knowledge 
This doctoral thesis has advanced the idea that it is misconceived to think of jurisdiction and 
choice of law agreements as unilaterally enforced domestic private law obligations within an 
English ‘dispute resolution’ paradigm because multilateral private international law rules are 
essentially secondary rules for the allocation or public ordering of regulatory authority which 
may not permit a separation of functions or the relative effect of such agreements. The 
author has endeavoured to subject the private law classification and enforcement of 
jurisdiction and choice of law agreements in the English common law of conflict of laws, the 
EU private international law regime and the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements to a rigorous analysis and in the process made an original and significant 
contribution to knowledge in the field. As a matter of fact, this is the first full length analysis 
of the impact of a multilateral and regulatory conception of private international law on the 
private law enforcement of jurisdiction and choice of law agreements before the English 
courts. In this regard, the thesis seeks to both pre-empt and offer innovative solutions to 
issues that may arise under the jurisprudence of the emergent Brussels I Regulation (Recast) 
and the Hague Convention. Briggs’ common law idea of the separation of functions or the 
relative effect of jurisdiction and choice of law agreements in Agreements may be 
considered to be the pre-eminent scholarly invocation and possibly the academic high water 
mark advancing the unilateral private law enforcement of such agreements before the 
English courts. 
The increasingly less relevant English common law jurisdictional regime in relation to choice 
of court agreements is a result of an ever burgeoning EU private international law regime 
and global efforts at regulation by the Hague Conference on Private International Law. 
Therefore, the need to understand the fundamental juridical nature, classification and 
private law enforcement of jurisdiction and choice of law agreements before the English 
courts from the perspective of the EU private international law regime and the Hague 
Convention is greater than ever. This doctoral thesis aims to fill an existing gap in the 
literature in relation to an account of jurisdiction and choice of law agreements which 
explores and reconnects arguments drawn from international legal theory with legal 
practice. However, the scope of the work remains most relevant for cross border 
commercial litigators and transactional lawyers interested in crafting pragmatic solutions to 
the conflicts of jurisdictions and conflict of laws. It is hoped that an awareness of the 
concept of a more reconciled international legal order in the form of multilateral private 
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international law rules should not blind us to the complex reality of international litigation 
where the distribution of regulatory authority by national private international law rules is 
often overlapping and may encourage competing jurisdictional claims. 
The author has drawn upon the significant recent jurisprudential deliberations on the global 
governance function of private international law as a multilateral structural coordinating 
framework for the allocation of regulatory authority to enhance the contours of the contrast 
with the English ‘dispute resolution’ paradigm. In particular, the conception of private 
international law norms as higher level secondary rules for the allocation of regulatory 
authority focused primarily on conflicts justice or an allocative distributive justice may limit 
the significance of the separation of functions within jurisdiction agreements. This thesis has 
argued that the separation of functions within a jurisdiction agreement is in itself 
incompatible with an internationalist or multilateral conception of private international law. 
In other words, a system for the public ordering of private law assumes priority over or 
trumps the existence of the private law rights and obligations of the parties to the 
jurisdiction and choice of law agreements and their unilateral enforcement by the English 
courts. Otherwise, the private law enforcement of the mutual contractual obligation not to 
sue in a non-contractual forum attributed to an exclusive jurisdiction agreement may 
operate as a ‘unilateral private international law rule’ with a controversial and 
confrontational allocative function of its own. It may lead to the ‘privatization of court 
access’ by dubiously perpetuating and prioritizing the unilateral private ordering of private 
law over the multilateral public ordering of private law. Moreover, the enforcement of 
jurisdiction agreements by private law remedies within a multilateral system will necessarily 
distort the allocative or distributive function of private international law rules by giving 
precedence to the redistributive will of the parties premised on principles of corrective 
justice inter partes of questionable applicability. International structural order is 
compromised in the unilateral private law enforcement of jurisdiction and choice of law 
agreements as such enforcement gives rise to a clash of sovereign legal orders and also the 
possibility of ‘regime collision’ by interfering with the jurisdiction, judgments and choice of 
law apparatus of foreign courts which a multilateral conception of private international law 
is supposed to prevent in the first place. However, this thesis has argued that outside the 
confines of the European Union private international law regime, the variable geometry that 
is characteristic of the international civil and commercial litigation sphere may not impede 
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the separation of functions within such agreements. Whether an English court ought to 
grant a private law remedy enforcing such agreements is of course another matter. 
The author has also sought to reconcile the lessons learnt from the quest for a sounder 
justification for the principle of party autonomy and the emerging third paradigm of 
jurisdiction with the continued viability of the damages remedy. A novel analysis of the 
damages remedy for breach of a choice of court agreement and parallel proceedings is 
carried out from the perspectives of the substantive law paradigm and the internationalist 
paradigm. It has been observed that those measures that exclusively rely on one paradigm 
largely to the exclusion of the other are most at risk of being rendered superfluous by 
Occam’s razor in the complex process of integration. The author renders the insightful 
observation that the reform process of the Recast Regulation in relation to choice of court 
agreements provides an ideal example of the internationalist paradigm of party autonomy 
incorporating the concerns of the substantive law paradigm.1220 Articles 5 and 6 of the 
Hague Convention are also identified as paradigm instances of the two paradigms of party 
autonomy at work in tandem. It is significant to note that the unilateral damages remedy 
was not a serious contender as a technique for managing and controlling the multilateral 
conflicts of jurisdiction in either the Recast Regulation or the Hague Convention. 
Drawing upon the international and regulatory dimensions of the discipline, the author 
rejects the view advanced by some scholars that the principles of private international law 
should be reorganized in order to draw a more systematic distinction between agreements 
and non-agreements. The application of a different set of principles to cases of party 
autonomy in jurisdiction and choice of law is not substantiated as all private international 
law rules operate within a regulatory framework in which competing interests are 
reconciled. On the contrary, this thesis has suggested that in light of the emergence of a new 
paradigm for party autonomy, the linguistic distinction between the phrases private 
international law agreements/non agreements and private international law rules by 
agreement/non agreement may better orient and prepare us for the challenges that lies 
ahead in the paradigmatic shift. Private international law agreements may be said to operate 
within the substantive law paradigm whereas the private international law rules by 
agreement may be considered to operate within the internationalist paradigm.    
                                                          
1220 For a discussion of the substantive law and internationalist paradigms of party autonomy featuring as 
dialectically opposite categories converging into a new and more reconciled transnationalist paradigm of party 
autonomy, see, Chapter 2 above.  
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The author attempts to deconstruct the pervasive analogy between arbitration agreements 
and jurisdiction agreements on an issue by issue basis to reveal the fundamental areas of 
divergence and the stronger public allocative imperatives in the private law enforcement of 
the latter. However, this thesis has argued that outside the strictures of the EU private 
international law regime the English courts are not constrained from applying unified 
principles for the unilateral private law enforcement of jurisdiction and arbitration 
agreements.  
Pacta sunt servanda may be an appropriate term to describe the enforceability national 
private law rights arising from jurisdiction and choice of law agreements. However, it is 
submitted that these clauses are primarily concerned with the multilateral or international 
allocative relationship between the courts (prorogation and derogation function). As a 
result, both the principles of pacta sunt servanda and the freedom of contract may be 
justified by the substantive law paradigm of party autonomy but the employment of such 
terminology and their ramifications in terms of primary and secondary remedies for breach 
of jurisdiction and choice of law agreements may damage the reputation of the 
internationalist paradigm of party autonomy and private international law. 
It has been observed that an English exclusive choice of court agreement gives rise to the 
mutual obligation not to sue in a non-contractual forum in the common law of conflict of 
laws whereas the civilian ‘procedural contract’ conception solely fulfills the international 
allocative function without giving rise to enforceable private law rights between the parties. 
The author has identified the existence of a minority view in the English common law of 
conflict of laws which adopts a conception of a jurisdiction clause bearing close resemblance 
with the ‘procedural contract’ model. An English non-exclusive choice of court agreement 
may generally not be breached but the mutual obligations of the parties with respect to such 
an agreement are properly a matter of contractual construction. 
Despite the contrary rulings of the French Cour de Cassation,1221 asymmetric choice of court 
agreements should in principle be valid under Article 25 of the Recast Regulation as the 
substantive validity of a jurisdiction agreement for the English courts will be referred to 
English law where such agreements have been held to be valid. Even if the compatibility of 
asymmetric jurisdiction agreements with Article 25 of the Recast Regulation is deemed to be 
                                                          
1221 Ms X v Banque Privee Edmond de Rothschild Europe (Societe) Cass civ, 1ere, 26.9.2012, No 11-26.022, 
[2013] ILPr 12; ICH (Societe) v Credit Suisse (Societe) Cass civ, 1ere, 25.3.2015, No 13-27.264, [2015] ILPr 39; cf 
Apple Sales International v eBizcuss Cass. 1ere Civ, 7.10.2015, No. 14-16.898. 
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a question governed by an autonomous interpretation of the scope of an ‘agreement’, it has 
been argued that such agreements should fall within the definition of an ‘agreement’. 
However, it is likely that such agreements will not be covered by the protective umbrella of 
Article 31(2) of the Recast Regulation which would only extend to exclusive jurisdiction 
agreements. The author has argued that the damages remedy may compliment the 
protective function of Article 31(2) if it does not apply to such agreements or if recourse to 
the provision is available but the party does not commence proceedings in the contractual 
forum. 
Under the Brussels I Regulation, choice of court agreements serve a procedural or 
international allocative function and do not give rise to an enforceable obligation not to sue 
in a non-contractual forum.1222 However, this thesis has argued that what counts as a 
‘contract’ is a matter of perspective or legal culture and it would be unfair to classify the 
operation of a ‘procedural contract’ as a ‘formal waiver of jurisdictional privilege’ which does 
‘not depend upon the existence of a private contract’.1223 If consent or agreement rather 
than the mutual exchange of promises is considered to be the theoretical basis of a contract 
then there is no reason to deny a procedural contract the status of a contract. The use of the 
word ‘agreement’, the provision for the technique of severability and the utilization of the 
applicable law to assess the material validity indicate that Article 25 of the Recast Regulation 
is concerned with a contract but one that only gives rise to procedural consequences. This 
thesis has proposed that the employment of the neutral term ‘hybrid’ contract offers the 
advantage of a conception of a choice of court agreement which recognises and 
incorporates a mix of procedural and substantive elements without prioritizing either. 
This doctoral thesis has argued that the private law enforcement of foreign (non-English) 
choice of court agreements premised on pure contractual principles and lacking any 
jurisdictional connection with the English forum is tantamount to enforcing an international 
contract between the parties (in personam) without any regard for the specific international 
allocative relationship between the foreign courts. (in rem) The author identifies this 
phenomena as another manifestation of the substantive law paradigm which subordinates 
the interests of states to the dispute resolution needs of the litigating parties. Moreover, the 
                                                          
1222 Cf Starlight Shipping Co v Allianz Marine & Aviation Versicherungs AG (The Alexandros T) [2014] EWCA Civ 
1010.  
1223 See Adrian Briggs, Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law (OUP 2008) 524. 
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prospects of English courts policing foreign choice of court agreements by treating them as 
ordinary contracts is bound to provoke resentment from other states. 
A weaker conception of comity and the role of public international law imperatives is 
characteristic of the English substantive law paradigm which focusses on the vertical 
relationship between the court and the parties. As a result, the notion of comity is nearly 
irrelevant in the private law enforcement of choice of court agreements. The author has 
dismissed the use of a ‘system transcendent’ notion such as freedom of contract or pacta 
sunt servanda to justify the private law enforcement of choice of court agreements because 
such a concept still cannot justify the unilateral nature of the English court’s interpretation 
of the rights of the parties and their enforcement without regard to the rights of other 
states. 
This thesis has highlighted that indemnity clauses and liquidated damages clauses may act as 
an effective deterrent, obviate the need for a separate cause of action for breach of a choice 
of court agreement, reduce the burden of determining heads and quantum of damages and 
thus facilitate the secondary enforcement of choice of court and choice of law agreements. 
Apart from the contractual basis for the recovery of damages for breach of a choice of court 
agreement, the author has explored the appropriate legal basis for tortious damages for 
breach of a choice of court agreement which point towards the tort of malicious prosecution 
or abuse of process and the tort of inducing breach of contract. However, the author 
concludes that the jurisdictional and choice of law rules under the Brussels I Regulation and 
the Rome II Regulation will be a substantial impediment and they may preclude the claim 
because of the localization of the damage in the forum where the abusive proceedings or 
the inducement of the breach of contract took place. Significantly, the principles of mutual 
trust and the effectiveness of EU law (effet utile) may render the claim for tortious damages 
incompatible with the European private international law regime.   
The author has argued that restitutionary damages for breach of a choice of court 
agreement may not normally be recovered. It has been argued that the characterization of 
the event rather than the consequences of the restitutionary remedy should determine 
whether Article 4 or Article 10 of the Rome II Regulation is applicable. As a matter of 
principle, restitution for wrongs should fall under Article 4 of the Rome II Regulation. It is 
submitted that the jurisdictional and choice of law impediments under the Brussels I 
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Regulation and the Rome II Regulation that apply to a tortious claim will also preclude a 
restitutionary cause of action.  
Problems of a similar nature surface in relation to the award of equitable damages. Doubts 
have been expressed about both the existence of a substantive equitable right not to be 
sued abroad vexatiously and whether this right is capable of supporting a claim of equitable 
damages. Even though the contemporary trend is to apply choice of law principles to 
equitable obligations, it has been argued that if non contractual anti-suit injunctions are 
classified as procedural matters then the choice of law problem does not arise in the first 
place. The author extrapolates the choice of law consequences of a procedural classification 
of an anti-suit injunction to a claim for equitable damages. The procedural classification has 
the knock on effect of truncating the substantive right and not extending it to a claim for 
damages in equity. Thus, it is at best doubtful, whether the non-contractual avenues 
explored in this thesis will yield the required result and be more than a dead end. 
It has been observed, that the contractual damages remedy for breach of a jurisdiction 
agreement might be available under the English common law jurisdictional regime. 
However, outside the narrower confines of cases analogous to Union Discount v Zoller,1224 
the damages remedy raises complex and sensitive issues which require careful analysis and 
examination. The author notes that the remedy still needs clarification and elucidation in the 
more doubtful penumbral cases, before the course of the remedy can be fully mapped. A 
decision of the foreign court on costs or on the merits may preclude the damages action by 
reliance on the res judicata effect of the foreign judgment. Quantification of damages is a 
significant practical impediment and may require a trial within a trial.  
In the course of Chapter 8, the author renders an innovative suggestion that the concept of 
the extended doctrine of res judicata based on abuse of process or the importation of the 
notion of constructive res judicata may be applied in the international litigation sphere to 
limit the claim for damages to the foreign court as it could and should have been raised 
there in the first place. Therefore, a more discriminating approach employing the notion of 
methodological pluralism will limit the private law remedy to the foreign court and may act 
as an effective control mechanism. The author notes that in terms of practical effectiveness, 
damages are a second best solution to problems of lis pendens and the enforcement of 
jurisdictional party autonomy. 
                                                          
1224 Union Discount Co v Zoller [2001] EWCA Civ 1755, [2002] 1 WLR 1517 (Schiemann LJ). 
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This doctoral thesis concludes that the damages remedy should have a very limited role to 
play in international commercial litigation. The remedy can damage the reputation and 
coherence of private international law as an international system functioning as a structural 
coordinating framework for the allocation or mapping of regulatory authority. 
The author reasons and arrives at the conclusion that in every conceivable situation 
damages cannot be claimed in the European Judicial Area. Starlight Shipping Co v Allianz 
Marine & Aviation Versicherungs AG1225 is a decision to the contrary but it is submitted that 
it is a controversial authority which has not reconciled the countervailing demands of the 
principle of mutual trust and the effet utile of EU law adequately. This was arguably a case 
where a reference to the CJEU on the matter should have been sent. It is highly unlikely that 
the CJEU will adjudicate that the private law remedy is compatible with the principles of 
mutual trust and the effectiveness of EU law (effet utile). Indeed, it may be viewed as yet 
another attempt to reassert the role of the common law of conflict of laws and to bypass the 
operation of the uniform codified rules of the Brussels I Regulation. 
It may be that the damages remedy post Starlight Shipping Co v Allianz Marine & Aviation 
Versicherungs AG has been bequeathed a new lease of life under the Recast Regulation,1226 
at least until the issue is finally determined and laid to rest by the CJEU on a preliminary 
reference from the English courts or from the courts of another Member State in cases 
where the judgment creditor is seeking to rely on an English judgment awarding the 
controversial remedy. In this interim phase, it is arguable that the damages remedy may be 
applied to plug the lacunas in the legal regulation of choice of court agreements by the 
English courts. Until the Lugano Convention (2007) is reformed along the lines of the Recast 
Regulation, the threat of torpedo proceedings in the Lugano Convention area cannot be 
foreclosed. A remedy in the form of a claim of monetary compensation may ameliorate the 
legal risks that surface from for instance, torpedo proceedings before the Swiss courts in 
breach of an English jurisdiction agreement. 
Damages may also compensate for the legal risks in relation to threshold issues. If a Member 
State court is seised in breach of an English jurisdiction agreement, and in its proceedings 
                                                          
1225 Starlight Shipping Co v Allianz Marine & Aviation Versicherungs AG [2014] EWCA Civ 1010, [15]-[22] 
(Longmore LJ); Longmore LJ’s decision was cited with approval and endorsed by Christopher Clarke LJ in 
Marzillier, Dr Meier & Dr Guntner Rechtsanwaltsgesellschaft MbH v AMT Futures Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 143, 
[62]. Permission to appeal was granted to the appellant in the latter decision and the case is now pending 
before the UK Supreme Court. 
1226 [2014] EWCA Civ 1010. 
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the court goes beyond a prima facie examination of the agreement, undermines the 
kompetenz-kompetenz of the English court and also Article 31(2), damages may arguably be 
recovered for the wasted costs and expenses of litigating in the Member State court. A party 
may also not choose to initiate protective proceedings under Article 31(2) but wait for the 
Member State court to decline jurisdiction and then recover damages for breach. Damages 
may also be recovered for breach of asymmetric or unilateral jurisdiction agreements 
because Article 31(2) may not extend its cover to such agreements.  
The author has conducted original primary research into the role played by private law 
remedies enforcing exclusive choice of court agreements in the context of the Hague 
Convention and made a significant contribution to knowledge. It has been argued that the 
Hague Convention’s system of qualified or partial mutual trust does not expressly or 
implicitly sanction but may permit contractual remedies for breach of a choice of court 
agreement in non EU cases, if such measures further the objective of the Convention. The 
author identifies two relevant issues that lie at the interface between the Hague Convention 
and the Brussels I Regulation which may constrain private law remedies enforcing exclusive 
choice of court agreements. First, as a matter of principle, anti-suit injunctions and the 
damages remedy may arguably not be awarded in Hague Convention cases within the EU 
(between the courts of two Member States) as the mutual trust principle and the effet utile 
of EU law will be compromised.1227 Court of Justice jurisprudence on the interface between 
the New York Convention and the Brussels I Regulation and the interface between the CMR 
Convention and the Brussels I Regulation confirm the accuracy of this hypothesis.1228 
Secondly, Article 31(2) of the Recast Regulation may nevertheless apply in intra EU Hague 
Convention cases as it is arguably compatible with the prevailing interpretation of Articles 5 
and 6 of the Hague Convention. 
Choice of law considerations are relegated to a secondary position in the English common 
law as compared to jurisdictional issues. It has been argued that it is fundamentally 
misconceived to view choice of law agreements from the purely contractual perspective as 
the very significant role of the law of the forum and its choice of law regime are not factored 
into the equation. If choice of law rules are primarily and essentially secondary power 
                                                          
1227 Case C-159/02 Turner v Grovit [2004] ECR I-3565. 
1228 Case C-185/07 West Tankers Inc v Allianz SpA ECLI:EU:C:2009:69, [2009] 1 AC 1138 (Arbitration interface); 
See also, Case C-536/13 Gazprom OAO ECLI:EU:C:2015:316 (Arbitration interface); Case C-452/12 Nipponkoa 
Insurance Co (Europe) Ltd v Interzuid Transport BV ECLI:EU:C:2013:858, [2014] ILPr 10 (CMR Convention 
interface); Case C-533/08 TNT Express Nederland BV v AXA Versicherung AG ECLI:EU:C:2010:243, [2010] ILPr 35 
(CMR Convention interface). 
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conferring rules for the allocation or mapping of regulatory authority rather than primary 
conduct regulating rules, the descriptive, normative and interpretive narrative of the 
contractual perspective loses its perceived dominance, consistency and coherence as it fails 
to yield a complete and satisfactory justification for what we understand by choice of law 
agreements. The author concludes that a ‘promissory’ conception of a choice of law 
agreement can only be subsumed under the substantive law paradigm because it fails to 
incorporate the demands of the internationalist paradigm of party autonomy.   
Moreover, the decisions in Ace Insurance v Moose Enterprise Pty Ltd1229 and Navig8 Pte Ltd v 
Al-Riyadh Co for Vegetable Oil Industry (The Lucky Lady)1230 support the conventional 
declaratory function of choice of law agreements. It is submitted that the enforcement of 
choice of law agreements by the damages remedy within the EU will compromise the mutual 
trust principle and the effet utile of EU law in relation to the European choice of law 
regulations (Rome I and II Regulations) and also question the assumption of jurisdiction by 
the court seised and the eventual judgment rendered by that court under the Brussels I 
Regulation. Outside the EU, the choice of law issue may have been rendered res judicata by 
the judgment of the foreign court and in that case the judgment creditor will be estopped 
from raising the issue in the English enforcement proceedings. The language of Section 32 of 
Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 may also not permit the extension of its scope to 
the refusal of recognition of judgments rendered in breach of a choice of law agreements as 
such agreements may not be deemed to be dispute resolution agreements. In any case 
submission by the party to the foreign court under Section 34 of the Civil Jurisdiction and 









                                                          
1229 Ace Insurance v Moose Enterprise Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 724 (Brereton J). 
1230 Navig8 Pte Ltd v Al-Riyadh Co for Vegetable Oil Industry (The Lucky Lady) [2013] EWHC 328 (Comm), [2013] 
2 Lloyd’s Rep 104, [2013] 2 CLC 461 (Andrew Smith J). 
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